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ABSTRACT: 
LIMINAL BLANKNESS: MIXING RACE & SPACE IN 
MONOCHROME'S PSYCHIC SURFACE. 
ANGELINE DAWN MORRISON. 
Blank space in western Art History and visual culture is something that has tended to be either 
explained away, or ignored. Pictures that do not depict challenge the visual basis of the ego and 
its others, confronting what I call the `Phallic reader' (who sees according to the logic and rules of 
the Phallogocentric system he inhabits) and potentially disturbing his sense of the visible. The 
Phallic reader, the visible and the seeing ego's sense of how to see, meet in what I call the `psychic 
surface'. Deploying this notion of a `psychic surface' allows for readings which move on from the 
potentially confining logic of the Phallus. Paradoxically, the psychic structure of monochrome's 
liminal blankness is homologous to the indeterminate Mixed Race subject, whose body 
transgresses not only the foundational historical binarism of `Black/White', but also Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. This thesis aims to concentrate on exploring blank spaces, with particular 
reference to the monochrome within western Art History. Building on the considerable work 
since at least the 1960s that critiques the binary logocentrism of Eurocentric, Hegelian-originated 
Art History, this thesis aims to explore the specific ways monochrome evades, undermines and 
tricks commonly accepted `groundrules' of Art History. The Phallic reader is severely restricted in 
understanding that which falls outside of the signifying logic of a particular system of Art History 
that follows a binary, teleological and Phallogocentric course. Both monochrome and the Mixed 
Race subject fall outside of this logic, as both contain the structure of the trick. In each case, the 
trick is activated in the tension between the prychic and the optical surfaces. I suggest that 
monochrome's psychic space is pre-Phallic, a space of eternal deferral of meaning, a space that 
playfully makes a nonsense of binary structures. Psychoanalysis is largely used here as an analytic 
tool, but also appears as an object of critique. Art History provides an anchor for the optical 
surfaces under discussion. Theories of `radical superficiality' both contradict and complement 
these ways of theorising the psychic surface. The trick/ster is a significant/signifiant means of 
deploying interdisciplinary methodologies to negotiate this difficult terrain between Black, White 
and monochrome. An interdisciplinary approach also enacts the psychic structure of 
indeterminacy of my objects of study. I hope that by proposing a potential transgressive power 
for those indeterminate things that continue to confound the binary systems that aim to 
contextualise and confine them, I will contribute to the areas of Visual Culture and `Race' Theory. 
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INTRODUCTION 
`Lacan points out that there are two things that can never really be known but 
are always recognized: death and the father's role in procreation. It is the place 
of the father, not the actual father, that is thus here significant, and it is to this 
acknowledgement or recognition that Lacan attaches such importance. The 
little boy cannot be the father, but he can be summoned for his future role in- 
the-name-of-the-father. The symbolic father, for whose prehistoric death the 
boy pays the debt due, is the law that institutes and constitutes human society, 
culture in the fullest sense of the term, the law of order which is to be 
confounded with language and which structures all human societies, which 
makes them, in fact, human. ' (Mitchell 1974: 391). 
`In a historic passage Mallarme describes the terror, the sense of Sterility, that 
the poet experiences when he sits down to his desk, confronts the sheet of 
paper on which his poem is supposed to be composed, and no words come to 
him [... ] indeed, in support of this, could one imagine anything that was more 
expressive of, or would be held to exhibit more precisely the poet's feelings of 
inner devastation than the virginal paper? ' (Wollheim in Battcock [ed] 
1968: 388) 
The world we inhabit is stuffed full of blank spaces. Moments of blankness are everywhere, 
though frequently invisible -a pause in conversation for example, or the background in a picture. 
Whilst these ubiquitous blanknesses tend to be read as meaningless in themselves, they also tend 
to have meaning structured around them. Blank spaces thus remain invisible, contextualised as 
meaningless in the discourses that hide them. In the context of images that tell stories, mimic 
objects from real life or at least have some kind of logic of differentiation in their surface 
markings, blank or monochrome space stands out as resolutely, unashamedly illegible. The 
definition of monochrome that I use here is that it may be any colour or no colour (depending on 
one's position about the status of black and white as colours, see Chapter One, note 48). If 
considered as a form of abstraction, monochrome is the least legible and most non- 
representational of all - it makes no attempt to tell a story, contains nothing that is visually 
recognisable from everyday life, confounds any pre-existing western notions of perspective, or 
figure/ground relations -- in short, the least differentiated and most uniformly blank surface is the 
`most' monochrome. 
12 
Within the context of western Art History, monochrome has become the accepted vehicle for the 
presentation of visual blankness. Monochrome is the picture that does not depict. As artist and 
theorist David Batchelor describes, the blank space of monochrome is as ubiquitous as the 
invisible blank spaces of everyday life, and sometimes shares with them more than we might 
realise; 
`Anyone can make a monochrome. Most of us probably have made one at 
some time or another, although we wouldn't necessarily have recognised it. 
And we wouldn't necessarily need to have made one, as most of the time we 
are already surrounded by ready-made monochromes of various shapes and 
sizes. The world is full of unintended, sometimes accidental, often temporary, 
and mostly unnoticed monochromes. ' (Batchelor 2000: 151) 
Like any blank space, monochrome confounds interpretation. Once blank space is foregrounded or 
actively presented as a separate entity in its own right, historically received notions of meaning are 
radically destabilised. When a spectator stands before a surface that appears to be presenting 
nothing, a sort of psychic panic often ensues - what if there really is nothing there? This 
fundamental and deep fear of nothingness - also a fear of meaninglessness - tends to result in 
frantic attempts to not see the blankness of monochrome. Many kinds of critical writing on 
monochrome attempt to `explain away' the blank surface, or enact attempts to find the tiniest area 
of surface differentiation and cling to it resolutely. These attempts to fix meaning and re-order 
the chaos, to either `fill' the blank space or to concentrate on anything but the surface blankness, 
are what I call `Phallic readings'. The Phallic spectator (or critic) is someone who is in thrall to 
the monarchy of fixed meaning, who inhabits the realm of that ultimate decider and fixer of 
meaning: the Lacanian phallus. Just as nature abhors a vacuum, so the Phallic reader abhors non- 
meaning, rejecting it outright and sometimes using elaborate strategies to refute its possibility. 
Phallic readings are characterised by an insistent avoidance of the fact that the optical surface of 
monochrome presents the spectator with something illegible. Monochrome confounds attempts 
to fix meaning in two main ways; first of all within its optical space (that is, the surface that we 
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both see and refuse to see), then more subtly in its psychic space (the invisible, notional space of 
psychic activity, which we don't see). This results in the Phallic spectator's increased 
determination to pin down something that is fundamentally slippery, or tricky. Monochrome's 
resistance to Phallic interpretation ensures that, `[t]he monochrome is the most enigmatic icon of 
modern are (McEvilley 1988 [trans. Anson, 2001]: 1)'; but it also, I think, begs the question of 
whether monochrome is involved in some kind of psychic trickery - or at least whether, in a 
Gothic spirit not usually associated with monochrome, it might conceal an unfathomable secret? 
Mocking, confounding, recurring - the secret is something whose presence is perpetually as 
alluring as it is elusive. The reader of Wilkie Collins' story of the mysterious Woman in White has 
an experience of the `Secret' that is comparable to the experience of the spectator in front of the 
blank monochrome. Collins"Secret' is, like the monochrome, highly visible from the outset, 
structuring the labyrinthine plot developments around itself - yet throughout it also remains 
maddeningly just out of reach. 
Was it possible that appearances in this case had pointed one way while the 
truth lay all the while unsuspected in another direction? [... ] I-Iere -- if I could 
find it - here was the approach to The Secret, hidden deep under the surface of 
the apparently unpromising story which I had just heard. ' (Collins 1994 
[1868]: 426). 
The fugitive quality of The Secret' in Collins' novel - the destabilising effects of the mad desire- 
to-know that it creates, its simultaneous qualities of high visibility and total illegibility, its eternal 
trickery of the reader by eluding interpretation - make it an apposite analogy for the blank space 
of the monochrome surface within the story of western Art History. The subject of Mixed Race, 
understood for the purposes of this argument as both Black and White', who lives in a society 
structured by the foundational binary `Black/\Vhite', can also be said to contain a `Secret' in much 
the same way as she can be said to have been `blanked' - (a)voided, rendered invisible and 
inaudible. In this case extreme measures to conceal this `racial' secret are sometimes taken, 
especially in cases where the Mixed Race subject wishes to `pass', usually for White'. Sara Jane 
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Johnson, the cold and strange protagonist of Douglas Sirk's melodramatic film Imitation of Life, 
(1959: Dir. Sirk) is an example of this. Rejecting her mother and erasing her background, she will 
go to any lengths to be considered WYlhite. The radical and ongoing erasure which she performs on 
herself is intended to cancel out the residual `Black blood' which does not really show in her 
features; eventually allowing her to present herself as a tabula rasa, a blank, White woman. 
Instead, all she achieves is emotional weariness (the attempted erasure is endless, since the 
coveted `real Whiteness' can never be anything more than a phantasy), loneliness and pain. In 
Sara Jane Johnson, the secret, the trickster and the trick find a meeting-ground. Whilst she 
delights in successfully `tricking' those she meets about her `racial' identity, the trick itself, 
(homologous to the secret) asserts itself and has the last laugh. 
James Weldon Johnson's 1912 classic, Autobiograply of an Ex-Coloured Man, shows a similar 
meeting-place of the secret, the trickster and the trick. The hero is a light-complexioned man 
who did not discover that he was `a Nigger' until he was a schoolchild. In disclosing his `secret' 
he writes, 
`I know that I am playing with fire, and I feel the thrill which accompanies that 
most fascinating pastime; and, back of it all, I think I find a sort of savage and 
diabolical desire to gather up all the little tragedies of my life, and turn them 
into a practical joke on society. ' (Johnson 1912: 1) 
The laughter here has no joy; it is the laughter of mockery, or the ironic laughter of resigned 
acceptance. In both the above examples, the Mixed Race subject presents problems for the 
Phallic system of interpretation which would assign them a Black identity on the basis of a single 
drop of `tainted' ancestral blood. Both characters play a trick on the system that wishes to classify 
them, the trick depending entirely on that system's commitment to reading the distinction 
Black/White as a binary opposition. The characters always elude classification - when identities 
are assigned them, they always exceed them at the same time as being unable to fill them. 
Successful `passing' depends on tricking the classificatory system, which always operates from 
is 
outside of the subject. The success of this trick, in turn, depends upon how `convincing' the 
physical appearance, phenotype or optical surface, looks to the outside system. In terms of a 
psychic structure, Mixed Race people are multiple with shifting identities, and such a structure 
cannot be accommodated by a system whose judgements are binary. In cases where a subject's 
optical surface visibly confounds the structure's foundational binary, the system is doubly 
confounded, its ego disturbed by the evidence of split subjectivity that is staring it in the face. 
There are many different kinds of blank space within Art History, and many different ways of 
framing, conceptualising and `making' blankness; just as there are many more ways of being 
Mixed Race than the `Black/ White' model. The varieties of mixture are as endless as the varieties 
of life-experience that the Mixed subject may relate. This fact, combined with the lack of fixed 
geographical or cultural communities of Mixed Race people (with the exception of such 
communities as the `Cape Coloureds' of South Africa, or the established Mixed Race community 
of Liverpool 1), makes it almost impossible for anyone to speak on behalf of all Mixed Race 
subjects. It is for this reason that the story of each Mixed Race individiia/becomes vitally 
important, as Mixed Race identities continually defy categorisation as a simple, single thing. 
American artist Isa Dean, who is of Mixed Race, writes in her artists' statement, 
`Who is the "tragic mulatto"? She is both "not Black enough" and "not White 
enough". Her position lies in the middle, both undefined and ambiguous. As 
the product of Black/White miscegenation (rarely discussed and once 
outlawed), her story continues publicly unnoticed and seldom told. This is my 
story. ' (Dean 2001: www. digitalid. 8m. net/isa. html) 
Such stories are seldom told because they cause discomfort to a system that demands that 
someone be either Black, or White. I want to consider that the psychic indeterminacy of the 
monochrome surface causes a parallel discomfort to its own system, continually presenting that 
system with the possibility that the mastery and classificatory powers that the system wishes to 
believe it has, are nothing but an illusion. Just as the Mixed Race subject is not reducible to Black 
or White, so monochrome is not reducible to either side of the representational binary of 
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`full/empty', `meaning/non-meaning' or `information/no information'. Just as the monochrome 
is simultaneously fetishised and illegible, so the subject of Mixed Race is also endlessly fetishised 
(as a sexual prize or object of obsessive classificatory legislation, for example) and illegible (she 
will always be something other than what a category can provide for her). In each case, the 
endless play of possibilities within mean that fixed meaning is always slipped out of. 
Unique within Art History in its resistance to interpretation, monochrome cannot easily be seen 
as a `genre' of painting in the usual sense. Although critics such as French Art Historian Denys 
Riout (1996) have made good cases for likening monochrome to a genre, I take the position that 
monochrome is nothing like a genre4. Showing none of the conceptual or chronological cohesion 
necessary to a genre, each time monochrome appears, it seems that it is called upon to represent a 
different cause. As Briony Fer points out, the Black Square of Malevich (often, as we shall see in 
Chapter One, cited as the proto-monochrome of western Art History), has been called upon as an 
eloquent recruit for various causes, such as, `the original "conceptual" idea, as an anti-art gesture 
akin to Duchamp's, or as the exemplification of the purely aesthetic principle of form as such; 
[... J it could be pure Idea or material object, exalted or grounded in matter. ' (Fer 1997: 10). We 
might add to these the other tried and tested readings of monochrome that present themselves 
with wearying regularity. These count among their number the `Spiritual' discourses, traceable at 
least as far back as the Nineteenth Century movement of Theosophy, via Kandinsky's musings on 
colour and composition. Blankness here has meaning, but the meaning is something utterly and 
inevitably cabalistic. This of course can be a good thing for Phallic writers with a penchant for 
conjecture; one can never really be proved wrong by that which is eternally esoteric. Writing 
about Malevich's White on White, Carter Ratcliff provides an example of such conjecture 
masquerading as certainty; 
`[... ] the Malevich who struggles here against selfhood has become an 
exemplar of Modernist individuality. His monochrome is the emblem of failed 
saintliness. ' (Ratcliff 1981: 112) 
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Other common critical interpretations of monochrome include the categorisation of anything 
blank as being `about' Minimalism (eg Fried 1998a: 149). Equally popular but far more related to 
specific art historical doctrines are the various `endist' discourses that monochrome invites (eg 
Rodchenko, 1921). The problem with the `endist' discourses is, quite simply, that they don't 
work. `Endist' writings have kept on coming back with a frequency and regularity as marked as 
those with which the monochrome itself continues its seductive dance of disappearance and re- 
appearance. Painting, like a rebellious revenant, carries on regardless of declarations of its death - 
which goes to prove that whatever it was that `ended', it certainly wasn't painting. 
Other tried, tested and (apparently) re-usable ways of approaching the monochrome surface 
include discourses about nothingness and emptiness, and that the monochrome represents a 
rejection of academic traditions such as perspective and narrative in painting. Less common is 
the discourse discussed closely in Chapter One, that of mocking laughter. These written 
discourses of monochrome share a Phallic avoidance of monochrome's complex surface 
illegibility, of the fact that what takes place in the surface resists reading. Perhaps this means that it 
is precisely this resistance to reading that we should try to read. This thesis aims to read these 
resistances in light of the possibility that Phallic readings of monochrome are structured by fear. 
Firstly there is the fear of meaninglessness -a fear that the Phallic ego could not stand to stare in 
the face, since it would present that ego with the reality of its powerlessness to decipher. Also, 
however, there is the fear that the Phallic system's phantasy of its own unified nature will be 
shown up by blank or illegible aesthetic space as a phantasy - which would in turn cause the 
system to fear the collapse of its dominance. I will argue in Chapter Three for a `racing' of the 
Lacanian Phallus that should parallel way the way in which the Phallus has been gendered. I 
suggest that the characteristics, functions and attributes of the Phallus align it with Whiteness as 
well as patriarchy, so that the Phallic system of western Art History is exposed as a normatively 
White system. The capacity of the Phallus of western Art History to decide meaning is 
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destabilised, continually, by that which refuses to be decided. The Mixed Race subject in 
racialised society, who also cannot be `decided' despite frantic attempts by the system, also poses 
a threat to the system's phantasies of mastery and intactness. 
I have chosen to confine this study to monochromes that appear and re-appear in western visual 
culture, in the knowledge that non-western monochromes or blank spaces carry quite different 
meanings from their western counterparts. `Art History' as a discipline has a specifically 
European provenance, traceable first to Italy with Giorgio Vasari (1511-1574) and his lives of the 
Artists often understood as the first art historical text proper5. This text set the tone for the kind 
of linear, teleological historiography of style following on from style that characterises the kind of 
traditional western academic Art History that I refer to in this thesis as `received'. The basis of 
Art Historical education is in western philosophical thought, specifically in the writings of 
Eighteenth century German historian Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717-1768), whose beliefs 
underscore much of what today is considered conventional Art History. Winckelmann's main 
area of study was the classical art of ancient Greece. Like his contemporaries, he believed in the 
godlike genius of the Greek mind. Winckelmann however made no mention of the African 
sources of ancient Greek and Roman art - that is, the art of the ancient Egyptian civilisation - 
and so his writings went a long way towards what has been, until very recently, Art History's 
passionate policing of its western, White parametersb. Traditional western Art History has been 
identified as a Phallogocentric discourse for some decades now - Linda Nochlin's essay Why Have 
There Been No Great Women Artists? (1971) is frequently used as a discussion aid for students on the 
patriarchal nature of the recording of art and its histories. Whilst the gender balance within 
western Art History is at least under discussion, the position of the Black artist within western Art 
History has remained - until comparatively recently with artists such as Chris Ofili, Isaac Julien or 
Kara Walker - one of almost total invisibility. I understand western Art History here as a 
kinship system, where rules of lineage and heritage apply. In this White family with its ancient 
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pedigree, monochrome is the `black sheep' or more specifically, the embarrassing Mixed Race 
relative. Monochrome is a wild card whose unpredictability disturbs the system it occupies. Both 
the monochrome work and the Mixed Race subject exist in homologous conditions of liminality 
or in-between-ness (although the latter often wears this in-between-ness literally on her body, 
whilst the former disguises it with an optical surface that is apparently unified). In both cases, it is 
the relation of subject (or object) to the system that attempts to force it to conform that is 
important; and it is in this relationship, which happens in the psychic as well as the social space, 
that transgressive potential can be found. The Mixed Race subject confounds the fixed notion of 
`either Black or White' by existing in liminality; the monochrome confounds fixed meaning by 
presenting unity optically, but existing in liminality psychically. In both cases, their respective 
binary systems cannot hold them and they continually cause friction at the edges of those systems. 
In order to explore this, I will consider monochromes whose blankness is that of erasure or 
subtraction (such as Rauschenberg's Erased de Kooning Drawing), those that are about accumulation 
(such as the monochromes of Alan Charlton), and I will also consider monochromy as a principle 
at work in organised surface composition (Chapter Two). Each use of blankness activates 
different experiences of the blank, and I wish to show that what appears to be a lack of 
signification is in fact a complex and problematic significatory mode. 
Within a tradition like `Phallic' Art History that relies on the fixing of meaning, spaces which 
repeatedly resist interpretation act like mirrors to the system, reflecting the system back at itself 
and forcing it to question its authority. The binarist tradition that Art History resides in (a 
tradition identified by Derrida as the Logoeentrirm that dominates western metaphysics) is 
interrupted by the Derridean undecidable, which I suggest works in a similar way to both the 
monochrome and the Mixed Race subject. That which the ruling White Phallus does not 
recognise or cannot categorise, it will judge illegible, nonsensical, and sometimes of little or no 
value. Neither one thing nor another, neither everything nor nothing, the undecidable acts as a 
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perpetual thorn in the side of the Logocentric system, which will sometimes go to great lengths to 
disavow the presence of the undecidable. 
One way of disavowing a problem is to absorb and claim it. Despite its initial shock-value, 
monochrome has for some time now been accepted as a signifier of `high art'. This is partly to do 
with its profound illegibility, and the popular social equation of `high art' with `inscrutability' 
which has been attributed to White masculine bourgeois attempts to gain control over meaning. 
Yasmina Reza's 1994 play, Art, relies on this assumption as the carrier of the play's action (see 
Chapter One), and monochrome's popularity within the corporate sector also attests to this 
`instant art' status'. This is all down to the radical illegibility of the surface, a quality that also 
means many people will simply write off monochrome as an example of the Emperor's New 
Clothes. Novellist Dave McKean writes, 
`I think there's one of these blank canvases in every museum in the world. 
They must come with the building. "Here's the lease, here's the key, and here's 
the large matt-black painting with the free, incomprehensible title. " ' (McKean 
1998: 370) 
Monochrome introduces chaos into the system it inhabits primarily by foregrounding the 
blankness that is usually understood to signify background, thus disturbing the received optical 
logic - the `solid ground' - of painting. Monochrome also introduces chaos into the stories the 
west tells itself about the origins of pictographic art. These largely seem to have representation, 
mirroring, resemblance, mimesis at their heart (though E. H Gombrich reminds us that these 
resemblances are always mediated, `Nature reflected in art always reflects the artist's own mind' 
(Gombrich 1984[1950]: 338), and monochrome puts mimesis in crisis'. As an organising 
principle, the value of mimesis is seemingly irrefutable; western epistemological systems have 
traditionally relied on notions of resemblance, mimesis and similarity as ways of weighing and 
measuring the world. Images have a powerful part to play in this organising of the world; 
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The image is not simply a particular kind of sign but a fundamental principle of 
what Michel Foucault would call "the Order of Things". The image is the 
general notion, ramified in various specific similitudes (convenientia, aemulatio, 
analogy, sympathy) that holds the world together with "figures of knowledge" '. 
(Mitchell 1987: 11) 
The four main modes of analysing the world as pointed out by Michel Foucault in the story of 
western knowledge - convenience, emulation, analogy and sympathy - are all fundamentally 
mimetic9. One of the major ways in which the monochrome acts as a perpetually re-appearing 
embodiment of chaos is in the fact that it seems to resemble, mimic or represent nothing. Ntimesis 
holds the meaningful world together, and monochrome is the nemesis of mimesis. 
Monochrome has `turned up' in western art history on numerous occasions, with an inevitability 
that is sometimes measured, sometimes surprising. From the imaginary monochromes of 
Nineteenth Century France1°, through Malevich's Black Square of 1915, Yves Klein's iconic blue 
monochromes, Ad Reinhardt's white monochromes and the minimalist traditions, and finally to 
the contemporary British monochromists like Zebedee Jones or David Batchelor - monochrome 
has persisted as a method of framing or presenting blankness. Maurice Besset, in 91 
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foreword 
to the Lyon monochrome retrospective, CouleurSeule: L'acph ence du Monochrome begins to suggest 
the transgressive nature of monochrome. Composition here is, `the supreme gift of the western 
traditions of visual art', and the monochrome artist is involved in a conscious decision to `reject' 
this gift (Besset 1988 [Trans. Anson 2001: 2])". An uncommon, and possibly highly productive 
way of considering these endless returns might be to suggest that perhaps monochrome also plays 
a trick, laughs at the expense of the Phallic system it occupies. In terms of the Freudian psychic 
economy, that which is condemned to endless return is un-symbolisable, un-assimilable to the 
ego. Monochrome as an art form has been `assimilated' into the art world, but what 
monochrome actually is remains elusive. The `Secret', of course, is not necessarily the thing which 
cannot be symbolised or assimilated, but may indeed be the fact that there is a persistent, niggling 
and ever-present concept that is continually trying to break the existing boundaries. The `Secret' 
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may even be the source of the mocking laughter, especially if the `Secret' is the knowledge that 
what the System imagines as its own unity and mastery is nothing but an imagining". 
In aiming to exploit the blankness or illegibility of the monochrome surface, my approach is 
radically superficial. I want an epistemology of suspicion; I do not trust what is immediately 
visible on monochrome's optical surface, and suspect that monochrome is deeply involved in 
some kind of psychic trickery. Whether the trickery is harmless, impish fun or a more sinister 
kind of mockery remains to be seen. As with the Jamaican trickster figure of Anansi the Spider, 
or the Morris Fool of English folk traditions, it seems possible that all systems allow for a Wild 
Card'. I think, however, that differences exist between these Wild Cards. A figure such as the 
Morris Fool has his activities prescribed and confined to particular dates in the year, to specific 
social occasions and customs. Even his movements are mapped and socially agreed before he 
begins; the Fool's actual agency is severely limited. If he dresses up as a King to mock the power 
of Royalty, this mockery already has an imposed time limit, and everyone involved in the ritual 
knows that sooner or later the system they have just transgressed will get the better of them once 
again. Anansi the Spider is slightly different in that the common thread running through all his 
tales is his proficiency at being a final, or confidence trickster". Anansi always manages to get the 
better of a range of other characters, from his superiors to his peers, even his own wife and 
children. In each case the spider satisfies his selfish aims, but in the majority of cases a horrible 
punishment befalls him. A punishment frequently associated with Trickster' figures from many 
different cultures is that of castration. This sets the trickster up in a perpetually adversarial 
relationship with the system (which, crucially, he is able to trick by virtue of his own doubleness; 
Jung for example describes the trickster archetype as having a divine/animal nature), but it also 
sets the trickster up in a perpetual relation to castration and disempowerment. Both the figure of 
Anansi and that of the Fool are examples of the way that tricksters can perform their functions in 
systems because the system, crucially, allows it. Since the trickster relies on the system's 
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permission, it is the system that ultimately has the power and the trickster, (like the `Mulatto') is 
always already castrated. What the system can less easily control, however, is the trick, which 
exists independently of the body of the trickster. The figure of the trickster might be a useful way 
of examining what it is that the notion of the psychic surface allows us to read. A more 
productive view, however, might be to consider the monochrome and the Mixed Race subject as 
psychically homologous to the structure of the trick. 
The undecidable condition of simultaneous illegibility and high visibility is a condition 
monochrome shares with the subject of Mixed Race in White western society; neither fully White 
nor fully Black but both at once and something else besides, a weird kind of monochrome, at 
once more than one colour and the absence of colour: indeterminate. Since indeterminate things 
refuse to be held down by single, fixed or Phallic interpretations, my methodology will be 
necessarily interdisciplinary. Neither Art History nor Cultural Studies, neither Visual Culture nor 
Psychoanalytic Studies nor Poststructuralism nor Semiotics, but a combination of all of these and 
some other things, this thesis aims to body forth the undecidable nature of monochrome in order 
to try and say something about its illegibility. I hope that a full reflexivity, or mirroring will take 
place - that this thesis will mirror the paycbic surface effects of monochrome within western Art 
History, and the surface effects of the `indeterminate' body of the Mixed Race subject in White 
western society14. If there is a methodological bias, it will be towards Psychoanalysis. This is 
because Psychoanalysis, in particular Freudian and Lacanian analysis, has traditionally concerned 
itself with the study of places where meaning reri 1s. Psychoanalysis also recognises the 
importance of that which is either invisible, not immediately visible, or signalled and ignored. If 
monochrome uses psychic sleight-of-hand to perform its trickery, it is most likely that 
Psychoanalysis can help to expose its workings. For this reason, I will `not simply apply 
psychoanalysis to a reading of cultural forms. The question is, how do you analyse the dynamics 
of culture differently once you recognise the centrality of the unconscious? (Donald 1991: 3). A 
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little like a symptom, the monochrome within western art history displays itself clearly and in 
direct contrast (if not opposition) to its context. Its apparent contempt for interpretation is the 
clearest sign of its difference and uncategorisability. I will look at the ways in which monochrome 
is a perpetual corrupter and confuser of received, normative notions that have previously 
provided structure, coherence, cohesion. I will argue that the surface illegibility of monochrome 
may have to do with its location in the prelinguistic space of the Lacanian Real, anterior to lack's. 
If monochrome exists in the Real, the Phallus cannot enter or stop the continual shifting play of 
signifiers, and cannot decide on any definite meaning. The apparent smooth, undifferentiated 
calm of monochrome's optical surface tricks the Phallic viewer into avoiding engagement with the 
uninterrupted shifting of signifying chains in its invisible psychic space. Similarly, the 
appearances of Mixed Race bodies, despite Phallic attempts to pin them down to a single fixed 
`Black' identity, can conceal any variety of identities, endlessly slipping through identity-definitions 
and rendering them meaningless. 
So as you can see, I have a story to tell. It is partly a story about a trickster, but more so the story 
of a successful trick. The trick's subtlety, ingenuity and success depended on the desire of its 
audience. Once the audience longed to be amazed and impressed - essentially, giving permission 
to be fooled - then the conjuror was free to pursue pretty much whatever she wanted. In this 
case, a demonic idea came to the conjuror. Supposing she conjured a space that appeared entirely 
blank and illegible, inserting this space into a discourse that demands a critical and theoretical 
response, thus causing thousands upon thousands of words to have been written in an attempt to 
understand it? Imagine, all those words, utterly wasted! But the conjuror realised that this was 
pure pantomime, the mere sequinned-and-feathered costume of the trick. This was not the trick 
itself, but concealed the sleight-of-hand in a remarkably successful way. The conjuror had enticed 
the desire of the audience into the heart of her trickery -a desire she needed for the successful 
operation of the trick - then proceeded to mock and to deride the very desire itself. The trick 
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was a skilful double-bluff. Of course there couldn't be nothing there, there had to be something 
- or at least, a special kind of nothing that is rich with meaning. Gradually, then with gathering 
momentum, more and more words began to be written about the conjuror's nothingness-trick, 
each more futile and wasteful than the last, because each missed the point of the secret of the 
trick. The . secret was that the trick was 
in fact a message for the code, a mirror in which the code 
should examine itself. The code would not accept the challenge, and thus the tricky mirror 
returned... 
1 La peinture monochrome est l'icöne la plus enigmatique de fart moderne' (McEvilley 1988: 1). Please note that the 
original essay, published in the exhibition catalogue for the 1988 Lyon show, Couleur Seu/e: LExperience du Monochrome, 
was not available in an English translation. The catalogue itself has proved impossible to locate, with even the British 
Library unable to help. I am grateful to my Ph. D colleague Mary Anson for translating the original French catalogue 
essays, and to Veronique Fouilloux at the Marie St. Pierre dArtModerne in Lyon, for kindly sending me photocopies of 
these essays. 
2 The term `Mixed Race' is used here to describe a person who has one Black parent and one White parent; or who 
has one Mixed Race parent and one Black parent, or any other possible variation that can be conceived. I wish to 
stress that I lean towards the `Black/White' model for the purposes of my argument in this thesis, and not because I 
believe that a person needs to have some White, or some Black in them in before they may be considered 'Mixed 
Race'. I very much wish to stress that I am mindful of the Mixed Race or Multiethnic people who express concern 
about what they see as the `dominant' social stereotype of 'Mixed Race' as being'Black/White' (see for example 
Mahtani, M& Moreno, A (2001) `Same Difference: Towards A More Unified Discourse in `]Mixed Race Theory' in 
Parker & Song [eds] (2001) London, Pluto Press). As regards the term 'Mixed Race', it is surrounded by much 
debate. The term is not readily accepted by some, and reviled by others. As far as I know, there does not yet exist 
any adequate terminology to describe, happily, the person whose skin colour, hair type and facial features show 
clearly that they are of a 'racially' mixed genetic inheritance. Many new terms are put forward, (eg Multiracial, 
Multiethnic, Mixed Heritage) all of which are intended to help fix the problem of definition that seems inescapable 
for the Mixed Race subject, but I wonder if it is really possible to find a term that is acceptable to everyone. For 
example, in the case of Black/White people, 'dual heritage' is intended to fix the problems that so many people have 
with the existing, often racist terminologies (eg, `half caste'), but this term is still relatively new. Jayne Ifekwunigwe 
(1999) suggests the term netis(e) to describe a Mixed Race subject, since this term does not have automatic 
associations of Black/White' and its meaning is mutable. This term is traditionally used in Canada to describe 
people who are part First Nation and part White. The Hawaiian pidgin term'Ilapa' is also currently considered 
useful, especially since it has no negative connotations. Hawaii has a long cultural tradition of public acceptance and 
recognition of various Mixed Race groups and individuals. At the moment, 'Iiapa' tends to be used to describe 
someone with Asian and White heritage. 
3 Although 'passing' for Black does occur (see Piper, Adrian (1992) `Passing for White, Passing for Black' in Transition 
58: 4-32), the term `passing' is usually only used to describe the actions of people of Mixed Race who wish to be 
considered White. 'Passing' is full of negative connotations of inauthenticity, of letting the side down, or of 'selling 
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out' for personal gain. It is interesting that there is a tendency for Mixed Race subjects who wish to identify as Black 
- Hollywood actress I lalle Berry, for example, or British musician Ms. Dynamite - to experience an unproblematic 
acceptance of their wishes (though this does, of course, depend on how well the optical surface of this subject is 
deemed to fit). Such people are in the fortunate position of rarely, if ever, being accused of 'passing'. I suspect 
however that if such people were to express a wish that they be considered White, (which, theoretically, having one 
White parent they should be allowed to do), they would become objects of ridicule. I think that White Studies needs 
to consider the problem posed to it by the subject of Mixed Race who is White in as complex, problematic and 
potentially destabilising a way as she is Black. These issues will be discussed in more detail later on. 
Other examples of this school of thought include French artist Bernard Aubertin, allied to the `Group Zero' art 
collective, who published an article in Dynamo in 1960 that also made a case for the monochrome as an actual school 
or genre within art history, similar to Cubism, and as important. 
5 During a dinner party in Rome in 1546, Cardinal Famese asked Vasari to assemble `a catalogue of artists and their 
works, listed in chronological order. ' The result was The L res of the Most Excellent Painters, Se motors andAirhitects, first 
published in Florence in 1550. 
6 My position about the automatic categorisation of non-western visual culture as `art', is that it involves the 
application of a western historical paradigm that is not necessarily appropriate. As with the walk-on part played by 
African masks in the story of the development of the Modernist aesthetic, to refer unproblematically to non-western 
visual culture as are is simply another instance of cultural colonialism. Applying the name of `art' to non-western 
visual culture constitutes an insidious appropriation of culture by the western world, and an application of its own 
standards of excellence. One should always be vigilant about asking who is doing the categorising, and in this case, it 
is western Art Historians. African American artist David Iiammons says, `It all depends on who is seeing and we've 
been depending on someone else's sight [... ] We need to look and decide. ' 
7 Monochrome's apparent illegibility is a key factor in its corporate popularity - that which appears to be about 
nothing cannot be controversial. 
s Plato's analogy of the cave, where the passage of dim shadows enchants the prisoner in the cave, is a good example 
of a story of the mimetic origins of drawing. Another'origins of drawing' myth that is clearly concerned with the 
mimetic is the story of the Greek maiden Butades, who lovingly traced the outline of her banished lover's shadow on 
a wall. His likeness acted as a comfort to Butades, helping her to keep the image of his face alive in her heart. In 
some way, this kind of graven likeness may also work to the denial of absence, as the Egyptian mummy helped to 
keep the idea of the finality of death at bay (see Chapter Two). 
9 The impression is that here, Foucault's presentation of the story of western philosophy is a relentlessly teleological 
one, one that believes in the fundamental value of progress as a thing in itself, one that embraces the latest version' 
whatever the consequences. 
tollere I am grateful to Professor David Cottington for translating the documents containing information about these 
'pleasantries'. For more information, see Riout, Denys (1996) 'The History of the Monochrome: From I tumour to 
High Art and Back Again'. 
11 Ce travail de qualification est evidemment oriente par l'intention meme qui a dicte au peintre sa decision 
? rimordiale de rejecter la donne maitresse de la tradition occidentale des arts visuels: la composition. ' (Besset 1988: ii) 
Z Deborah J. Haynes' 1995 book, Bakhtin and the VisualArts (Cambridge University Press), includes a discussion on 
Malevich's Black Square (pp144-155). However, her analysis does not include notions of 'carnival' or ritual as I wish 
to use them here. 
13 Anansi's origins are in the folklore of the Ashanti of Ghana. However, since my own knowledge of Anansi comes 
primarily from hearing my family tell the Jamaican versions of the Anansi stories, I tend to refer to this trickster 
character as `Jamaican'. For Anansi stories, and studies on the Trickster figure in general, see for example: Hynes, 
William J. & Doty, William G. [eds] (1993) Mythical Trickster Fi. guns: Contours, Contexts and Criticrsms Tuscaloosa, 
University of Alabama Press. Of particular interest in this book are: Hynes & Doty's `Historical Overview of 
Theoretical Issues: The Problem of the Trickster' (1993: 13-32), and Robert Relton's essay, `West African Tricksters: 
Web of Purpose, Dance of Delight' (Relton in Hynes & Doty [eds] 1993: 122-140). Books of Anansi stories are easy 
to find and include the following; Temple, Frances (1998) Tiger Soup: AaAnaus Story fmm Jamaica (New York, 
Orchard Books), or McDermott, Gerald (1987) Anansi the Spider A Tab from the Ashanti (Henry Holt & Co. ) 
14Any attempt I might make to mimic the optical, rather than the psychical, effects of monochrome would result in a 
blank thesis. 
is Please note the system I will use in this thesis to distinguish between words which could mean more than one 
thing. References to the Lacanian Phallus, Real, Imaginary and Symbolic will be capitalised, to distinguish them from 
the human phallus, reality, imagination and symbols. When White and Black are used to refer to human skin or 
'race', they will be capitalised. Where white and black are seen with no capitals, they are to be taken to refer to paint, 
or to colour in general. 
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1: 0 Introduction 
This chapter aims to look at some of the (dis)guises of the monochrome as eternally returning 
wild card or trickster, bringer of chaos, trangressor of `meaning'. I wish to explore the potential 
that monochrome has for being a painterly category of indeterminacy, a straddler of the Cartesian 
dyadic divide of is cogitans vs res extetisae, and an outcast within a White Phallogocentric system. 
This suggestion of `wild card' status would negate any attempt at a linear, teleological `historical 
overview'. Instead I aim to isolate and discuss some prior moments within western Art History 
when blankness has appeared and, crucially, when it has appeared in the guise of `art'. I also want 
to begin asking questions about the nature and circumstances of these different blanknesses, the 
kinds of illegibility they present and the potential they have for transgression within their system, 
and to set up this line of questioning for the following chapters. I also wish to show how 
monochrome and the Mixed Race subject both describe the movement of a perpetual oscillation, 
thus disturbing a system that expects a linear progression. I will allow for the possibility that the 
slippery, indeterminate blankness of monochrome is structured as a trick, and consider the ways 
in which the activities of both monochrome and the Mixed Race subject in their respective 
classificatory systems are, in some way, `tricky'. In terms of the notion of `family resemblances' 
mentioned in the Introduction, the monochromes in this section can be said to have White 
`ancestral' status, appearing as `art' at moments historically prior to those discussed later in the 
thesis. I am aware that this sounds suspiciously like a search for `origins', and wish to make it 
clear that this study does not equate prior chronological appearance with greater worth, value or 
interest. If the monochromes are in some way White, their Whiteness is of the same troubled, 
unacknowledged and disruptive kind as the Whiteness that is worn, to varying degrees, on the 
body of the `Black/White' Mixed Race subject of this thesis. Monochrome is understood here as 
a re-occurring concept within an established system which has its own applicable rules of kinship, 
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lineage and heredity. Within this system monochrome, in its continued and near-random 
appearances, can be read as counter-teleological. 
Indeterminate things slip between the oppositional categories a Logocentric system sets up for 
the purposes of definition and pinning down; they make themselves impossible to catch. This is 
especially the case with monochrome because it is now unproblematically accepted as `art'. 
Innumerable exhibitions have been dedicated to the history of monochrome and to its various 
'guises', perhaps the most important of which is Monochrome Malerei (Monochrome Painting), 
Leverkusen, 1960. Denys Riout describes this as, 
`[... ] a landmark event[... ] that marks a qualitative transition, the point at 
which the monochrome is seen as a unifying theme, a genre. A new situation 
arises in which no painter doing a monochrome can fail to be aware that he is 
working in a constituted tradition. ' (Riout in Millet 1996: 20)' 
By 1960 then, according to Riout, it was impossible for a painter to make a blank space without 
an awareness that this could now be named: monochrome. Monochrome Malerei was the initial 
performative act of naming monochrome: afterwards it became easier for curators to frame 
monochrome as a genre with a history. Denys Riout published an article in 1989 called, La 
Peinture Monochrome: Une Tradition Niee' (Monochrome Painting. A Denied Tradition), where he proposed 
that there was an identifiable tradition, if not exactly a history or `genre', of monochrome 
painting. Maurice Besset also cites monochrome's near-impossibility to categorise (though here 
he seems to see it as painting only); 
`Indeed, since the monochrome is neither a subject, nor a "genre", but a mode 
- the limit of the existence of painting and a tool, the use of which is inscribed 
in the logic of disparate approaches, of which it is never the point of departure 
and not necessarily the conclusion - its history develops in a discontinuous 
manner. Neither the traditional game of chrono-geological affiliations, nor that 
of a regrouping by way of thematic affinities, permit the bringing together of 
the diversity of its sporadic appearances to a coherent collection. ' (i3esset 1988 
[Trans. Anson 2001: 3])2. 
It is interesting that Besset explicitly conceptualises monochrome as a 'tool'. I would prefer to 
suggest that monochrome is more of a lens through which to see. This approach, an alternative 
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to the more usual classification as an `object' or part of a `genre', suggests two important things. 
Firstly, it suggests an agency of some kind for monochrome. There is more to each of these 
diverse blank spaces than simple absence of figuration; these blanknesses can be deployed, 
activated in a variety of potential ways to provide unexpected readings. In allowing for the 
possibility of monochrome as something that can be an active lens, Besset's interpretation 
facilitates a radical departure from Phallic readings of monochrome. Secondly however, and 
unwittingly, Besset provides monochrome with a homologous structure to that of the Mixed Race 
subject within Whiteness. That which is `never the point of departure and not necessarily the 
conclusion' can also be seen as the uncomfortable middle-ground which cannot be forced to 
stand unproblematically for one thing; which will never achieve the noble status original or final; 
which is understood to be endlessly and sporadically appearing. The `discontinuous' history, the 
pointlessness of attempting to play `chrono-geological affiliations', and the impossibility of putting 
together a `coherent collection' are as true of the Mixed Race subject in the White west as they are 
of the blank space of monochrome. Both share the status of outsider, and both share the burden 
that, to the system they occupy, they make no `coherent' sense. Both share the disruptive status 
of trickster or `wild card'. 
Besset also identified three `key moments' in its history: early 1950s New York (all about a refusal 
of the iconography of archetypes, and of gestural abstraction), 1960s Europe (with Group Zero 
and their Malevich-inspired preoccupation with imageless painting), and finally back to New York 
in the 1980s, when `radical painting' forged an interest in holistic approaches to the canvas. The 
important aspect of all this is repetition. I want to examine the phenomenon of monochrome's 
eternal returns, but to do this there first needs to be an engagement with some of the accepted 
definitions and discourses that surrounded monochrome at the times of its appearances. Some of 
these `guises' will be examined here; others in later chapters where they can be more suitably 
aligned to other concerns inherent in monochrome. This will enable a concentration on the 
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phenomenon of repetition that so suffuses any attempted examination of the monochrome 
surface, its affects and effects. 
A little like a thorn in an item of clothing, the wild card or trickster will make its presence felt 
continually (and not necessarily comfortably), and it won't stop until it is found and examined. 
Monochrome has never really been examined, palpated like a patient; it seems that instead it has 
been theorised around. This is particularly true of the psychic space I am proposing for 
monochrome, the notional space of its agency and interaction with its spectator, as opposed to its 
visible, optical surface. Maurice Besset is convinced that monochromes `refuse all sideways 
approaches, such as the customary attitudes of comparison and juxtaposition, and they demand to 
be read face to face' (Besset 1988 [Trans. Anson 2001: 1])3. I perceive that these `sideways 
approaches' are the apparently conventional ones, `received' or accepted ways that the observer is 
taught to `read' the confoundingly blank surface of monochrome; ways that tend to evade 
monochrome's illegibility. In the context of a history of surfaces that depict, monochrome 
stands out as something which does not depict, and which therefore cannot be read. The 
blitheness with which many discourses on monochrome seem willing to pass this by suggests 
foreclosure. Refusal to engage in the confounding, unyielding mystery of the monochrome 
surface reads like the activity of a tricked ego, uncomfortable with something it does not 
understand, wounded because it has been tricked, and absolutely unwilling to endure any 
discomfort. 
It is whilst rigged out in one of its official, approved guises `as' something - whilst `passing' as a 
genre - that the wild card of monochrome accomplishes its trickery so slickly. In a kind of 
psychic drag act, monochrome poses successfully as an approved `moment' in the teleological 
western history of art; art which began in one style and, in a smooth succession of other, more 
appropriate styles, evolved in a complex but understandable way. Monochrome, however, did not 
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appear in any one set of historical, cultural, geographical or political circumstances. It did not 
stand for one particular thing. It did not unite one particular group of practitioners. It is not a 
genre, but then it is not quite a counter-genre. It reappears with great regularity although it would 
appear to have been done and dusted and explained away many times. This suggests that the 
main fallback theories that attempt to explain monochrome's various guises - eg, `End-of- 
Painting', `Minimalism', `Objecthood', `Sublime', `Colour', `Elimination of Composition', `Pure 
Painting', and so on - all of these guises are exactly that, (dis)guises, imperfectly concealing 
something that is compelled to return, for the simple reason that it cannot fit into any of the 
conceptual garments provided. Monochrome is a neither-nor, an indeterminate, a Derridean 
undecideable, a Lacanian pre-genital, pre-linguistic `Real"Thing'. Like the subject of Mixed Race 
who lives in a predominantly White (or sometimes Black) society founded on binarist 
oppositions, there is a strong possibility of never fitting in°. Until they can `read' you - and they 
will never be able to do this until they change the way they read - you will always be in a slippery 
state of flux, always subject to definitions that never quite fit. Psychically the monochrome, like 
the Mixed Race subject, is not part of the system operated by a transcendental signified, and thus 
can never be a single specific `thing'. So whilst monochrome has now been approved as `art', it 
has never been fully `symbolised' (and I use this in the psychoanalytic sense) into Art History. We 
only have to look at all those returns of monochrome for evidence of this. The question to ask is: 
what does the lack of a fit enable monochrome to perform? Can a misfit achieve what an insider 
cannot? 
1: 1 French Connections: Blank Satire vs. Blank Virtuosity 
`Evoking a system of thought that he judges too simplistic, Hegel rests on the 
metaphor of a "painting absolutely monochrome", in order to stigmatise its 
failure'. (Riout 1989: [Trans. Cottington 2000: 4])'. 
`To most people the monochrome is perceived as an absurd form of art'. (Tan 1998: 1) 
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Despite the common understanding that monochrome had its genesis in the heady atmosphere of 
the Russian Avant-Garde movements of the early Twentieth Century, an earlier, ludic tradition of 
fictive monochromes can be found in the intellectual culture of Nineteenth Century France, first 
appearing in the Satirical Salons of the 1840s6. Both literally and pictorially, the Nineteenth 
Century played host to the spectre of a tendency towards monochrom?. Conceptual 
monochromy in literature probably finds its most famous example in Mallarme's poetic ideal of 
the blank white page, expressive of the paradoxical vide or emptiness which is as full of potential 
as it is a terrifying prospect of falling into nothing8. The Mallarmean word ptyx, proposed to exist 
in a condition of meaninglessness, Flaubert's project of a book about nothing and James Abbott 
McNeill Whistler's musically-titled series of representational paintings about a single colour all 
testify to this interconnected Nineteenth Century artistic-literary tendency towards the 
monochrome. If all this spectral blankness is the result of a fear of emptiness, this provides an 
interesting counterpoint to the manic clutter of Victorian interior decoration; the kind of horror 
vacui seen in such work as William Holman Hunt's The Awakening Conscience (1851-3), where 
riotous patterns fight for attention. Riout, who has suggested a parallel between monochrome 
and the poetry of Maliarme, interprets the Nineteenth Century as pervaded by a threat of 
imminent collapse, which perhaps goes some way to explain the prevalence of `voided' images. 
He says; 
`The 19`h Century is haunted by the idea of the sudden collapse, the 
"decrepitude" of art. Values were in turmoil. Democracy had shaken the old 
criteria and the crisis was leading art to disaster. One way to pin-point this 
debacle was to show painting void of content, painting more empty of images 
than full of colour. Later, in the 1860s, just before Impressionism, there was 
growing mockery of monomaniac painters of yellow, blue or purple. This 
obviously reinforced the feeling that painting was going to the dogs. ' (Riout in 
Millet 1996: 24)9 
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Figure 1: James Abbott McNeill Whistler, Symphony in White No. 1: The While Girl 1862. Oil on canvas. 214.6 x 
108cm. National Gallery of Art, Washington. 
It should not be forgotten that the `democracy' to which Riout refers was founded on 
Colonialism, and that for much of Europe, the Nineteenth Century was a period of swaggering 
Imperialism. Perhaps the threat that so troubled the Empires was that of the imminent collapse 
of their own systems of Phallic power, the awakening of knowledge that they wished would 
remain unconscious - that Colonial rule was a trick, doomed to be seen through. 't'here is a sense 
in which Whistler's Symphony in White No. I [Figure 1] can be read as nostalgic. The decorative 
quality of the surface attests to the influence that Japanese art had on Whistler's painterly practice; 
at the same time, however, it passively inscribes the dominance of western painterly traditions 
over non-western - the nostalgia is thus for the structure of Empire that allows for unproblematic 
appropriation of `exotic' cultures (cf. Said 1979). Whistler's paintings could not, of course, be 
described as `void of content' in terms of recognisable surface organisation. In terms of subject 
matter however, the accusation of `void' would not be inappropriate. Whistler's 1862 The White 
Girl "', was rejected in 1862 from the Royal Academy exhibition; the following year saw its 
rejection from the Paris Salon as well. It was finally exhibited in the Salon des Refuses, where it 
caused a major stir. The relentless whiteness of the painting, the blank, expressionless face of the 
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model and the fact that it didn't seem to be about anything caused a great deal of confusion for 
contemporary spectators - was the painting about virginity? A newly deflowered bride? A purely 
formal or decorative study? In terms of narrative or meaning (outside of simple portraiture, of 
course), there really seemed to be nothing there". 
In Whistler's defence, Castagnari proposed a psychological interpretation in his `Salon des 
Refuses', 
`I have proposed an interpretation of The White Lady which nobody else has 
accepted, so much repugnance is there to accord ideas to painters. "What have 
you wanted to show", I asked the strange artist [... ] "a tour-de-force of your 
trade as a painter, consisting in putting whites on whites? Allow me not to 
believe it. Allow me to see in your work something more elevated. The 
morrow of the bride, this troubling minute, when the young woman asks 
herself, and is astonished to no longer recognise in herself the virginity of the 
day before". (Castagnari in Riout 1989 [trans. Cottington 2000]: 31) 
Sean Cubitt interprets the blankness in Whistler as reflective of the emptiness within the society 
that gazes upon the paintings; 
`The popular Orient might stand in for the Other of love rather than the Other 
of consumption. In the emptiness of its signification, there hung robed in 
indefinite sensuality, a returned image of the vacuum at the heart of the society 
of the spectacle. ' (Cubitt 1998: 68) 
Cubitt's interpretation supports the notion of Nineteenth Century Europe's prescient mourning 
for the loss of its colonial power. His understanding of Whistler's W'firte Girl suggests that the 
girl's `exotic' setting reveals Whistler's (and, therefore, his society's? ) reliance on the contrasting 
notion of a sensual, decorative Other to highlight the purity of the virgin White girl. However, I 
suspect that the Other - in this case, western society's construction of the `Orient' - asserts its 
agency by playing a specular trick. It tricks the White west into believing the myth of its own 
superiority, whilst at the same time acting as a mirror that shows the White west, the Phallic 
system, the emptiness at its heart. 
I want to suggest another, related interpretation. For a long time now, I have considered 
Whistler's White Girl paintings as imperfectly-veiled studies in the development of a White 
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supremacist aesthetic. The overriding, relentless whitenesses of the pieces - the chaste folds of 
dripping cloth of the girls' gowns, the drapes and spots of light, but most of all the Whiteness of 
their skins - all conspire to suggest an interpretation of whiteness (and therefore of Whiteness) 
where the varieties of white signify varieties of goodness. The kinds of white here, and the 
devotion to their exploration, all appear to equate the colour white, and White women, with 
associations of goodness, of aspiration". Richard Dyer writes of Whiteness that, 
`Though the power value of whiteness resides above all in its instabilities and 
apparent neutrality, the colour does carry the more explicit symbolic sense of 
moral and also aesthetic superiority. It is evidently the case that white people 
are not invariably represented as good and beautiful - therein lies our diversity, 
our all-encompassing particularity; yet the moral and aesthetic resonance of 
whiteness can and often has been mobilised in relation to white-skinned people 
[... ] the particular way in which this superiority is conceived and expressed, 
with its emphasis on purity, cleanliness, virginity, in short, absence, inflects 
whiteness once again towards non-particularity, only this time in the sense of 
non-existence. ' (Dyer 1997: 70) 
If applied to Whistler's girl and Castagnari's assumption of her virginity, Dyer's reading of 
Whiteness creates a double-blank. The girl is a sexual `tabula rasa'; she has yet to be claimed by a 
man, and therefore has yet to come into being - her beauty and superiority depend on this. So if 
Whistler's painting is conceptually `blank', the girl's unattainable White beauty is analogously 
blank, since `the conceptualisation of white beauty and white virtue emphasises absence. ' (Dyer 
1997: 45) The Nineteenth Century sense of impending loss of colonial power can be read 
analogously to the sense of impending loss of virginity that is implied in Whistler's surface. 
Perhaps this explains in some way why the painting provoked such heated reactions. 
The notion of the White woman as a pure, virginal Madonna has been historically set up in the 
White racialised imagination in direct opposition to the notion of the Black man as a 
personification of brute id energy; a creature driven mad by his unnatural desire to sexually 
possess the White woman. This binary opposition is destabilised by the sexual desire of the 
White woman, something which was also deemed taboo. Whilst White men busied themselves 
protecting the White women whom they saw as their property against the rapacious advances of 
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the `buck Nigger', their zeal suggests that whilst their professed fear was that the White woman 
should be sullied, their actual fear was that the White woman might actually desire such an 
encounter (cf Young 1995)14. Whilst the Phallic system of White racism desired that its 
foundational binaries (White/Black, Self/Other, Mind/Body, etc) be kept intact, the actual 
meanings of these binaries were far from clear. The construct of the sexually bestial Black male, 
for example, suggests a man with potency and agency. In reality, as Kobena Mercer discusses, the 
Black man's position was a highly complex one; a castrated masculinity where the Phallus would 
always be out of reach: 
`Whereas prevailing definitions of masculinity imply power, control and 
authority, these aspects have been historically denied to black men since 
slavery. The centrally dominant role of the white male slave master in 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century plantation societies debarred black males 
from patriarchal privileges ascribed to the masculine role. For example, a slave 
could not fully assume the role of "father", as his children were the legal 
property of the slave owner. In racial terms, black men and women alike were 
subordinated to the power of the white master in the hierarchical social 
relations of slavery, and for black men, as objects of oppression, this also 
cancelled out their access to positions of power and prestige which in gender 
terms are regarded as the essence of masculinity in patriarchy. Shaped by this 
history, black masculinity is a highly contradictory formation of identity, as it is 
a subordinated masculinity. ' (Mercer 1994b: 142-143)15 
Directly at the centre of the `White female virgin/Black male rapist' dichotomy sits the `Mulatto', 
or Mixed Race subject, the product of this unholy sexual union. The provenance of the 
derogatory term `Mulatto', once used as a legitimate classification, is from the Spanish word for 
`mule'. Just as the mule is the barren product of an unnatural union between species, so the 
`Mulatto' was historically believed to be sterile and desireless16. In this sense, the Mixed Race 
subject is, like the Woman in Lacanian psychoanalysis, always already castrated. Perhaps, though, 
the Mixed Race subject here has more in common with the always-already-castrated figure of the 
trickster, whose purpose is to continually get inside the system in order to wreak confusion. The 
`castrated' subject of Mixed Race, whose body is a living testimony to the fact that an `unnatural' 
or unlawful sexual union has taken place, shows the system that the apparently clear and distinct 
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boundaries it sets up between Black and White are, in fact, a nonsense. In her liminal blankness, 
the Mixed Race subject confuses the system's exchange value. 
Whistler's white paintings, as with his Nocturnes, solve the conceptual problem of painting a scene 
of distinct objects of essentially the same colour and hue with painterly virtuosity. A 
contemporary critic, Paul Mantz, wrote of Whistler's exhibition in the Salon of 1843 that anyone 
who viewed Whistler as an eccentric was in fact ignoring the history of painting. Mantz pointed 
out the precedence of a tradition that he stressed must not be misunderstood, especially not in 
France. This was the tradition of which the famed Canard Blanc, or White Duck of jean-Baptiste 
Oudry is emblematic. Mantz wrote that he did not know whether Whistler had seen the FVhite 
Duck, but suggested positioning Whistler's work within the context of Oudry, affirming that, 
`these associations of analogous nuances were understood by everybody 100 years ago, and this 
difficulty which today would embarrass more than a master, passed then for a schoolboy's game' 
(Riout 1989 [I"rans. Cottington 2000: 2 n. 10])". 
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Figure 2: Jean-Baptiste Oudry, Canard Blanc 1753. Oil on canvas. Private collection. 
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Jean-Baptiste Oudry's Canard Blanc [Figure 2], exhibited in the Salon of 1753, is a pictorial tour- 
de-force of white on white. It was hailed by the critics at the time as a masterpiece of mimesis, 
testament to the painter's art of virtuoso sleight-of-hand and showing a white ground on which 
were depicted a series of all-white objects. In his drama of white-on-white, Oudry is also 
performing a critical investigation of mimesis - though in a vastly different way from Malevich, 
who made mimesis redundant and invisible. Denys Riout writes that, 
`Oudry, when he painted whiteness, found himself up against an immovable 
epistemological obstacle: mimesis, still triumphant. Constrained to pledge 
allegiance to it, he puts it in crisis; disposing in front of him an arrangement of 
objects whose relationship is paradoxical because, far from individualising the 
ones in relation to the others, it tends to confuse them. The consummate art 
of the painter consists in registering and containing this dissolution. ' (Riout 
1989: [Trans. Cottington 2000: 2])18. 
Since a complete repudiation of mimesis would have been unthinkable in 1753, Oudry does the 
next best thing and limits the conditions in which it can flourish. At the same time he is showing 
his painterly virtuosity; look what I can make out of nothing. 
This kind of showy game, a game that demonstrates the artistic skills of the winner, belongs to a 
prior tradition. In Pliny's tale of Apelles and Protogenes, Apelles places a sort of `calling card' on 
his absent friend by drawing a line on a wooden panel in Protogenes' studio, a line `of extreme 
fineness'. When Protogenes comes back he recognises the mark as his rival's, and puts his own 
line beside it, finer still. Apelles makes another visit later on, and, embarrassed that his friend has 
outshone him, draws another line, that leaves no room for anything finer. In his brilliant book 
Stealing the Mona Lisa: WhatArt Stops us from Seeing, Lacanian psychoanalyst Darian Leader observes 
that this fable has inherently to do with Art History as a story of competition between men. 
Using Pliny he foregrounds the surface `emptiness' as exhibiting a fundamental pull on its 
audience; 
`Pliny adds that (the panel) was burned in the first fire to strike Caesar's palace 
on the Palatine: "It had been previously much admired by us, on its vast 
surface containing nothing else than the almost invisible lines, so that among 
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the outstanding works of many artists it looked like a blank space, and by that 
very fact attracted attention and was more esteemed than any masterpiece. " 
Thus Pliny gives an account not only of the birth of abstract art but also shows 
how the work takes on its peculiar power through the production of a central 
zone of emptiness. ' (Leader 2002: 71) 
This contest, it appears, was not solely one of evidence of practical skills, but also one of 
conceptual problem-solving. The finest line can be understood and appreciated for its minimalist 
beauty and the cunning it took to describe it. It can also, however, be said to represent an 
attempt to show the least essence of any thing possible, whilst still showing something; the 
essence, it might be said, of many latter-day monochrome paintings. 
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Figure 3: Alphonse Allais, Combat des Negrrr Dans Une Cave, Pendant La Nuit (reproduction du ceebrs tableau) 1884. 
Ex. Cat. Exposition des Arts Incoherent:, 1884 (Riout 1989: 90) 
Social satirist Alphonse Allais' Combat des Negras Dans Une Cave, Pendant la Nuit [Figure 3] had, in 
fact, been common currency long before Whistler's Symphonies and Nocturner". From the 
beginnings of the 1840s, the caricaturist `Salons' began to develop so considerably that their 
specific style of absurdist humour eventually became mainstream. Situations imagined by the 
caricaturists would lead to the most limited representation possible, often with a litany of 
adjectives so excessive it would almost make one strain one's eyes to `see' the imaginary scene. 
The satirical or `false' monochromes generally took the form of drawings in humorous journals or 
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books, accompanied by captions. The unifying factor of these monochromes was that they would 
exist only notionally, in the mind of the reader of their copious descriptive texts. The deployment 
of the `comic' in these ludic monochromes took place at the nexus of the verbal and the visual; 
however, that binary was always further problematised by the fact that the `visual' appeared to 
contain no information. What is most intriguing about these imaginary monochromes is that 
whilst they did not `exist' in any tangible way - as drawings of imagined paintings, they were 
representations of representations of representations - they satirised a form of painting that also 
did not yet exist; one that could not even be imagined, except as some horrible joke10. Several dozen 
examples of these imaginary satirical monochromes have been found that bear dates subsequent 
to 1854, and whose excessively verbose joke-titles attest to the impossibility of imagining 
monochrome-as-art21. This type of joke has persisted in different ways up until the present day; 
the popular post card, entirely black but inscribed with text that reads, `Falmouth (or wherever) 
By Night' is an example of the persistence of this comic tendency. 
The fictive monochromes appear at first glance to completely prefigure (at least formally) the 
uninflected monochrome-as-`art' of the Twentieth Century. The key difference is that the 
Nineteeth Century `pleasantries' have at their core the notion of satire or laughter. Whether or 
not it is actually funny is another question altogether, since the later, theoretically and historically 
quite serious monochromes have also been responded to with cynical laughter. This laughter 
does not occur because the joke is pleasing, rather the `joke' status happens after understanding 
has been foreclosed. This laughter sets up a defence for the ego which wishes to avoid the shame 
of neither understanding nor being able to decipher what is placed before its=. With their 
presentation as intentional jokes, the `pleasantries' set up a legitimate historical context for not 
having to take monochrome seriously23. The Surrealists sparked a revival of interest in Allais, 
whose earlier monochromatic jokes could be described as proto-Surrealist in their use of the 
absurd. Andre Breton elevated the earlier artist to a position of honour in the Surrealist 
movement in his Anthologie de 1'HxmourNoir (`Anthology of Black Humour'). It is partly the 
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timing of Breton's Anthologie that prompted the republication of Allais' works in paperback after 
the Second World War. On a conceptual level it is not difficult to see the precedent that Allais' 
original publication set for the work of Marcel Duchamp. The fictive monochromes of Allais, 
like the existing readymades of Duchamp (cg Forsntain, 1917), both accomplished the similar 
confusions of Art History's system of exchange. Both, for instance, presented a radical challenge 
to traditional definitions of value in art; both rejected the fetishisation of the unique touch of the 
artist in favour of the mass-produced; both were intentionally enigmatic and had an air of 
indifference to `readings'; both were disdainful of traditional notions of beauty. 
In the above example of Allais' Combat desNegres, however, the situation is more complex as the 
joke can also be read as fundamentally Phallic. The tacit associations of Black people with 
darkness, violence, `nature' (as opposed to `culture'), are all just as essential to the comedy as is the 
deployment of a blank surface accompanied by a specific verbal description. In order to `get' it 
the audience must be inside of, or at least allied with, the Phallic system that relies on the 
prevalence of such essentialist caricatures as `Blacks equal Caves' or `Blacks equal Violence'. 
Allais"joke' can be read in a direct oppositional relation to Whistler's White Girl, " the latter 
functioning on the premise that White girls equal purity, the former on the premise that the Black 
body is `stained'. Black humanity has already been voided in White Phallic consciousness; a prior 
voiding that allows Allais' pictorial mimicry of the voided subject to work on a superficial level as 
a pleasing joke. Freud singles mimicry out as one of the functions of the comic, equating it 
specifically with caricature; `As a rule, no doubt, mimicry is permeated with caricature - the 
exaggeration of traits that are not otherwise striking - and it also involves the characteristic of 
degradation. ' (Freud SE viii: 208). However, Freud in this case attributes to caricature the 
function of mocking someone who is `superior'; `Caricature, parody and travesty (as well as their 
practical counterpart, unmasking) are directed against people and objects which lay claim to 
authority and respect' (SE viii: 200). The Phallic system that the blank jokes inhabit uses caricature 
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in quite the opposite way. First it dehumanises a set of subjects, then it sets about continually 
reinforcing that dehumanisation. 
Perhaps, as an `insider' in his own Phallic system, Freud was unable or unwilling to see that 
caricature can function against those designated inferior as well as the superior. Freud makes 
some problematic remarks about `race' and the comic in his jokes and Their Relation to the 
Unconscious, which position him as an `insider'. Freud writes that, 
`[... ] a person appears comic to us if, in comparison with ourselves, he makes 
too great an expenditure on his bodily functions and too little on his mental 
ones; and it cannot be denied that in both these cases our laughter expresses a 
pleasurable sense of the superiority which we feel in relation to him. ' (SE 
viii: 195) 
This brings to mind images such as the famous illustrations for the 1920s Paris Revue Negre, 
starring a young Josephine Baker, which depicts a caricature of a rubber-limbed Black woman 
prancing, grinning and over-expending bodily energy to `comic' effect. However, Freud goes on 
to be more specific about the kind of person that the group he refers to as `us' finds laughable, in 
a passage that relies on the racist positioning of Whites with intellect and `the Negro' with the 
body; 
`Direct observation shows that human beings are in the habit of expressing the 
attributes of largeness and smallness in the contents of their ideas by means of 
a varying expenditure in a kind of ideational mimetics. If a child or a man from the 
common people, or a member of certain races, narrates or describes something, it is 
easy to see that he is not content to make his ideas plain to the hearer by the 
choice of clear words, but that he also represents its subject-matter in his 
expressive movements: he combines the mimetic and the verbal forms of representation. 
(SE viii: 192-193, my italics)24. 
Whilst it is not explicitly stated that the `certain races' are those with dark skins, I think it seems 
likely. Moreover, the equation of children, working class people and these `certain races' is quite 
explicit, and would have been unquestioningly accepted by other `insiders' in the Phallic order. 
What is also interesting is Freud's theory that the source of the comedy is in the fact that this 
figure straddles a binary, or `combines the mimetic and the verbal forms of representation'. 
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Over-signification takes place, and again an excess of energy is expended. A similar combination 
of `the mimetic and the verbal forms of representation' takes place in the fictive monochromes, 
except that the joke is a double one because the verbal is made to perform the function of the 
mimetic. In what I am assuming Freud understands as the `comedy Nigger', another over- 
signification takes place. In what Freud would probably understand as the problematic `Mulatto', 
again the joke is (at least) doubled. The `Mulatto's inferiority relies on the prior voiding of the 
Black subject in the White imagination; but the `joke' the `Mulatto' is able to play on White society 
is that she contains that which White society would attempt to deny her - Whiteness. Her optical 
surface or phenotype is `blanked' as unproblematically Black, but in her psychic surface, the 
binary of Black and (problematic) White meet. The `Mulatto', like blank space, symbolises the 
slippery nature of the structural binary categories that Phallic society wishes to believe are 
immovable, and in this way poses a threat to that society's illusion of its own dominance. Any 
laughter on behalf of the system would be the uncertain laughter of the very nervous. 
One of the more interesting features of the Nineteenth Century comic incarnations of 
monochrome is the ability to induce relays of different kinds of laughter, analogous to the relays 
of looks that `serious' monochromes induce. From the guffaws of the person who wishes to 
disguise their bafflement at the apparently blank surface, to the smoothly superior sneer of the art 
aficionado; it seems that the monochrome painting produces in the spectator the kinds of 
laughter that protect. The laughter is necessary as a psychic shield from the terror of being 
presented with something that baffles the ego; that interrupts the conceptual foundations of a 
system, or that might be a representation of a great chasm of nothingness. The ludic 
monochromes of the Nineteenth Century are inaugural in a twisted sense. Whilst they deride the 
notion of monochrome-as-art, they nevertheless disguise Ihemrelves, or `pass', as monochrome-as-art 
in order to play their trick. They contain the seed of their own destruction. When monochrome 
does disguise itself as art, however, gaining access to a particular set of discourses and demanding 
that it be read in certain new ways, it becomes more than just a joke. Maurice Besset suggests 
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that the `joke' behind this playful tradition of satirical monochromes is a radical re-assessment of 
the circular exchange-values of the art world; 
`[... ] it is [... ] in a few drawings by satirical draughtsman of the second half of 
the Nineteenth Century and the beginning of the Twentieth Century, that the 
monochrome made its first concrete appearances: both to illustrate the 
shocking confrontation between the excesses of the Artist (who believed 
everything to be permitted) and the philistinism of the Bourgeois confronted 
by an object invisible to him and for which he was asked a price which he 
thought exorbitant considering the tiny amounts of material and work which 
had been invested in it'. (Besset 1988 [Trans. Anson 2001: 5]). 
The magic transition from everyday object to `Art' object imbues the humble blank space with 
status and a new name: monochmme. This magic transformation is the subject of Yasmina Reza's 
1994 play, Art, whose very title acts as a concentrate of all the emotional and visceral responses 
elicited by something that does not `look like' art. The play examines three male friends, Marc, 
Serge and Yvan, whose relationship is fractured almost irreparably when Serge, eager to appear 
cultured, spends two hundred thousand francs on a white painting (with a few barely-perceptible 
diagonal lines) by the fictitious artist, `Antrios'. The impossibility of imagining that something 
blank could be `Art' is at the heart of the play's comedy - the friends simply cannot comprehend 
the fact that any value, especially financial value, could be placed on a picture whose surface has 
nothing in it. 
Marc: Serge, you haven't bought this painting for two hundred thousand 
francs? 
Serge: You don't understand, that's what it costs. It's an Antrios. 
Marc: You haven't bought this painting for two hundred thousand francs? 
Serge: I might have known you'd miss the point. 
Marc: You paid two hundred thousand francs for this shit? (Reza 1996: 2-3) 
Each friend starts to question the other's personal integrity and intellectual ability, and the 
friendship becomes dramatically strained. Art's silent protagonist, the monochrome, introduces 
chaos and competition into this small circle of male friends within the first ten minutes of the play 
- the `passing' is successfully accomplished, and the trickster is W. Monochrome's trickery here 
is again located at the nexus of at least one foundational binary. In this case, what is at stake is 
the commodification system that the Phallic ego has set up - by `passing' successfully enough `as 
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art' for someone to pay huge sums of money for it, the white monochrome in Reza's play makes a 
comic nonsense of the invisible division between what `is' and `is not' art; associating itself with 
the Freudian currency of abjected matter, or `shit' as gold. In this case the optical surface is as 
divisive as the psychic surface is (playfully) divided, and the fundamental irony of the meaning of 
the word `monochrome' is evident. 
In the following exchange, nobody seems quite sure w1y they are laughing, and if anyone could be 
said to have the `last laugh', it would have to be the silent monochrome surface: 
Yvan: He laughed because he sensed I was about to laugh. If you like, he 
laughed to put me at my ease. 
Marc: It doesn't count if he laughed first. If he laughed first, it was to defuse 
your laughter. It means it wasn't a genuine laugh. 
Yvan: It was a genuine laugh. 
Marc: It may have been a genuine laugh, but it wasn't for the right reason. 
Yvan: What is the right reason? I'm confused. 
Marc: He wasn't laughing because his painting is ridiculous, you and he 
weren't laughing for the same reasons, you were laughing at the painting and he 
was laughing to ingratiate himself, to put himself on your wavelength, to show 
you that on top of being an aesthete who can spend more on a painting than 
you can earn in a year, he's still your same old subversive mate who likes a 
good laugh. (1996: 16-17) 
The assured Serge acts out the part of a Phallic reader so certain of the superiority of his own 
intellect that he will not allow for the possibility of trickery. Marc, who doubts with equal 
certainty, is a near mirror-image of Phallic readership and can be read in symbolic `opposition' to 
Serge. The problematic `middle ground' between their opposing positions of certainty is 
illustrated near the end of the play (60-61), where Marc does the unthinkable. Disgusted with 
what he understands to be a worthless sham, he takes a marker pen and draws a diagonal line 
bisecting the surface of the `Antrios', complete with a tiny ski-ing figure. He acts out the position 
that blank space requires figurative drawing to make sense of it. The humble Yvan, however, will 
not commit himself to any single position, refusing to acknowledge a finite end point to surface 
signification. So, although it comes from feelings of social inadequacy rather than a radical 
intellectual position, Yvan's ambivalent spectating attitude mirrors the psychic indeterminacy of 
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the monochrome surface - that which always slips around and comes between the fixed 
oppositions of the usual interpretative stances about monochrome. Perhaps he is the closest of 
all the three to `getting' the message of monochrome's trick; of seeing that `passing' has taken 
place. Perhaps the whole of the play's action, and the characters' tissue of `Phallic' readings, 
could also be read as manifestations of Phallocentrism's horror of monochrome's apparent 
blankness; a horror that requires figuration to `make sense' of, or to cancel out that blankness. 
Some of Freud's observations on jokes could be used equally well for `passing'. Explaining first 
how parody and travesty work by `destroying the unity that exists between people's characters as 
we know them and their speeches and actions', (SE viii: 201), Freud goes on to write that, 
`The same mechanism is also used for unmasking, which only applies where 
someone has seized dignity and authority by a deception and these have to be 
taken from him in reality. ' (SE viii: 201) 
Freud could almost be describing the `tragic Mulatto' figure such as James Weldon Johnson's Ex 
Colored Man, who, in popular narratives, is always already punished, or at least operates from the 
anxious condition of a subject perpetually awaiting punishment. Johnson's character, in the final 
sentence of his story, manages to secure a White wife, who tragically dies after having borne him 
two beautiful White children. All of his former dreams of identifying as White come true, but the 
price he pays is a heaviness in his soul, and the feeling that he has traded his birthright `for a mess 
of pottage. ' Like the trickster figure in folk mythology, the `tragic Mulatto', intent on `passing' at 
all costs, has to bear the consequences of the successful trickery s/he has performed. Like the 
trickster, the subaltern power of this Mixed Race subject is bought at a high price; that of 
castration within the system that subject wishes to take a place in. However, once `passing' has 
been successfully achieved, the trickster can really be said to have moved inside the system, and it 
is from this position that the paradoxical power can begin to be put to use, and the very 
foundations of the system's exchange-value disturbed. Perhaps the overbearing psychic burden 
of inevitable punishment or `unmasking' explains, in part, some of the more morbid associations 
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of monochrome (Chapter Four). Perhaps it is the notion inherent in `passing' of having to `kill' 
part of oneself that has a cataclysmic feeling-tone, the ever-present lain of the trickster's trick. 
Either way, it seems that it is the imaginary `comic' monochromes of the Nineteenth Century that 
inaugurate the trickster's first successful move right inside Art History. 
1: 2 The Square, the Rectangles and the Nemesis of Mimesis 
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Figure 4: Saviour Not Made By Human Handr. Early 16th Century. School of Novgorod. Tretyakov Gallery. 
`A Twentieth Century Russian painter paints a painting. He paints it all black. 
A great Abuse and mutation, and a rendering sensible of itself as itself. ' 
(http: www. crosswinds. net/ -ideoplastic / diss / blacksquare. htrnl) 
The Spas Nerukotvornyi, or The Saviour Not Made By Human Hands is a Novgorodian Icon of the 
Twelfth Century, originally kept in the Cathedral of the Assumption but now residing in the 
Tretyakov Gallery [Figure 41. Tradition holds that it is one of the earliest surviving examples of 
the particular type of icon that initiated the use of representation in Christian visual culture. In 
other words, The Saviour Not Made By Human I lands, though intended to please God, can also be 
read as representative of the moment in a culture when the Almighty's command that His 
children must not make any copies or likenesses was ruptured. A moment of flagrant 
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disobedience of the Father, but veiled to resemble obedience. A moment of conflation of two 
apparently opposing positions. If this icon is read as embodied doubleness or indeterminacy (is 
it an act of obedience, disobedience, neither or both? ), then Malevich's relationship with it can 
also be read as productive of a further, related and repetitive indeterminacy. 
The legend that accompanies the Icon concerns the King of Odessa, Adgar IV the Black, who 
was suffering from leprosy. Having heard of the miracles of Jesus, the King sent his scribe 
Hannan with a letter asking Jesus to come to Odessa, heal the King and preach the Word. Jesus 
praised Adgar the Black for his faith, promising to send an apostle on His behalf. Whilst in the 
presence of Jesus, Hannan attempted to paint a portrait of Jesus. He found, however, that the 
ever-changing and radiant Divine face eluded capture. Seeing Hannan's frustration, Jesus bathed 
His face with water and pressed it to some linen, where a likeness was imprinted. When Hannan 
returned with the letter and the cloth bearing Jesus' image, the King was immediately healed". 
That Kazimir Malevich had an interest in this Icon is documented in a typewritten manuscript 
dated 1924 that was an appendix to the unpublished essay, The World As Non-Objeclirrity. As far as 
Malevich was concerned, representation and its confines only served to further the divisibility of 
the world, and artistic `truth' could only be communicated in the form of paradox, or even of the 
lie. `To speak of truth without lies we must know some other language. Our language is not 
suitable' (wtvv. crosswinds. net/-ideoplastic/diss/blacksgare. html). 
The concept of the Black Square or Black Quadrilateral [Figure 5] had at its heart the notion of the 
possibility of lie, paradox or trick as container of meaning, as well as potential shifter of existing, 
stifling artistic paradigms. It also contains the counter-logical notion that the only way to tell the 
truth is through the form of the he. From the outset, then, Malevich's relationship with meaning 
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is not straightforward. The choice of blackness for his square is significant, and this also 
problematises meaning. As the absence of all light, it represented the absence of all sight. As 
Figure 5: Malevich, Black Square, c. 1915. Oil on canvas, 79.5x79.5cm. Treryakov Gallery, Moscow. 
light is the condition through which the human eye is able to apprehend visually, when light is 
taken away it leaves no `element', so to speak, and no possibility of seeing anything at all. The 
Black Square can then be read as the ultimate painterly paradox; a visual image that tells of the 
impossibility of seeing, embodied in an object whose very reason for existing is to be seen. 
Malevich declared that his Black Square was not only the end of painting, but that it was painting's 
absolute essence, its zero degree. It was essentially a meta-painting, a painting about painting, a 
painting whose subject matter was the investigation and laying bare of painting, and something 
that was to usher in a new order of painting. lie presents nothing other than that which his 
painting presents and, perhaps most importantly, his painting has no apparent opposite in, say, 
representational painting - no `painting' exists as the antitype to the Black Square's `anti-painting'. 
Malevich's painting was more than the final zero point (or the zero of limitless possibility) of 
painting; it was more than a confounding new void in the context of a vast system of recognisable 
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images. The Black Square was also the Jinal icon. In the context of the Russian Orthodox Church's 
strong tradition of icon-painting, the Black Square is generally seen as an iconoclastic gesture. In 
the traditional Russian peasant home, pride of place would be given to the religious icon by 
placing it high on the wall, almost at ceiling level, in a corner. This positioning was considered an 
act of reverence, and the position itself became synonymous with Russian Christianity and the 
worship of `graven images' forbidden by Yahweh. At the first showing of the Black Square, 
Malevich issued strict instructions that his icon-sized painting be hung high in this position 
[Figure 6]. 
Figure 6: Installation photograph of'( ). I0: Last Futurist Exhibition, Petrograd, Dec. 1915 -Jan. 1916, showing 
position of Malevich's Black Square 
This gesture was intended to shock; a direct usurpation of the spiritual with the secular seemed to 
be taking place, except that this usurpation acted out an insult. It equated the message of 
Christianity with a zero of meaning, and with the pointlessness of any kind of exegesis. The 
rational, legible image of Christ was replaced with the irrational, illegible image of Finality (or 
Nothingness). This finality is, however, in itself a paradox - the Black Square was intended as a 
political symbol of collectivity, to be endlessly repeated on walls, hands, posters, and every other 
conceivable surface26. From its very inception, this `first' monochrome was to exist through 
perpetual repetition and return. If the acceptance of Malevich's Black Square `as' art, and its 
positioning in a gallery at all (as well, of course, as the subversive nature of that positioning) is an 
early example of the trickster's move inside art history, then the kind of finality that the Black 
Square allegedly has is a further trick (or paradox). It is also a classic embodiment of doubleness 
or indeterminacy. The old tradition of religious icon-painting meets the new, radical sensibilities 
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of revolution in the Black Square's surface - it is literally made out of a confluence of incompatible 
notions. 
Malevich's Black Square then is almost full to overflowing with apparent contradictions. The 
painting was intended to inaugurate a new socio-cultural order, the order of Revolution, as 
opposed to the `order' of Christianity, stating that, 
`The image is the final path [... ] everything which has paths converges toward 
the image, all paths lead to the image particularly if it is holy, hence I see the 
justification and true significance of the Orthodox corner in which the image 
stands, the holy image as opposed to all other images [... ] The corner 
symbolises that there is no other path to perfection except for the path into the 
corner. ' 
(www. crosswinds. net/-ideoplastic/diss/blacksgare. html) Z' 
None of these contradictions are optical - the black square on white ground is simple enough for 
the eye to comprehend - but happen in the unseen psychic space of the picture. First of all, there is 
the doubleness of disobedience and devotion within the Spas Nerukotvornyi, the actual icon that 
directly inspired Malevich. Secondly (and more importantly) there is the fact of Malevich's 
creation of something that sits directly in between the ancient Russian Orthodox tradition of 
Iconography; and the profoundly new, revolutionary, secular and political concerns of 
Suprematism. There are more issues at play here, however, than the embodiment of a 
doubleness. Malevich had also made a definitive gesture against representation, which he wrote 
of with great disdain as belonging in, ` the rubbish-filled pool of academic art' (Malevich in 
Harrison & Wood [eds] 1992: 166). With Suprematism, Malevich had `dragged himself out' (166) 
of this foul swamp, working towards a paring down of visual images which would make visible 
the truth and purity he sought in an art that had severed all connections with representation; 
`Only with the disappearance of a habit of mind which sees in pictures little 
corners of nature, madonnas and shameless Venuses, shall we witness a work 
of pure, living art [... ] To reproduce beloved objects and little corners of 
nature is just like a thief being enraptured by his legs in irons. ' (Malevich in 
Harrison & Wood [eds] 1992: 166) 
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So whilst the Black Square is often casually cited as the first monochrome in western Art History 
(cf Ratcliff 1989), it can also be read as an early example of psychic indeterminacy played out on 
an optical surface, of the conjunction of at least two seemingly incompatible or diverse things. 
We might also read the Black Square as having a further psychic status, of which its optical image 
is symbolic. If the Black Square is in some way psychically symbolic of the overthrowing of an old 
order, an order which has had repressive functions, then it can be seen in a warped relation to 
such work as Whistler's White Girl, if we read the latter as psychically symbolic of the impending 
collapse of Colonialism in which the Phallic is so strongly implicated. 
For the Suprematists, the square was the ideal shape. Its flawless system of equal fours was a 
reflection of the cosmic `fourth dimension' that Suprematist philosophy embraced. The fourth 
dimension was the zone of transcendence of mere matter; a dimension of spiritual and perceptual 
possibilities existing beyond the quotidian limitations of the three dimensions ordering the 
physical world. The fourth dimension essentially tied in with Suprematist ideals and the `beyond 
the mind language' that was Zaum (Douglas 1980: 28), but had its roots in a direct challenge to 
Euclidean geometry. The whole notion of a `fourth dimension' was exciting cultural currency in 
early Twentieth Century Russia, capturing the public's attention in a similar way to the concept of 
the Black Hole or Chaos Theory more recently28. James Billington suggests the term 
`Prometheanism' to describe the cultural feeling-tone of early Twentieth Century Russian artistic 
circles, with their fashionable belief that, `man - when fully aware of his true powers - is capable 
of totally transforming the world in which he lives. ' (Billington 1968: 478). 
The proposed Suprematist being, a hyper-developed human who epitomised this psychic 
revolution, was thought to be already present in the world by some writers - most notably P. D 
Uspensky. His two seminal works, 1909's The Fourth Dimension and the later Tedium Organum of 
1911 espoused the sum of Suprematist thinking. Coming from a Theosophical background 
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(Madame Blavatsky herself had also written about the fourth dimension), Uspensky was most 
crucial as a philosopher in his fundamental belief that these new people with their new powers 
were most likely to be artists, and that the new consciousness would first be noticed in art. I le 
wrote, `In art we already have the first experience of the langua<ge of the future. Art is the avant-garde 
of psychological evolution' (Uspensky in Douglas 1980: 30)30. Perhaps the most notable aspect of 
Uspenskian thinking in terms of his influence on Malevich is Uspensky's prophecy that a race of 
`supermen', the equivalent of eastern yogis, would emerge from the loins of the western world. 
The mark of this White western 'superman'- and it is here that we begin to detect echoes of the 
Suprematist doctrines of Malevich - would be his ability to perceive beyond established Euclidean 
limits. The `superman' would be fully able to perceive the world as a four-dimensional totality, 
and the events of the three-dimensional world will seem to him transparent, simplistic - like a 
child's view of the world. In fact, children's and so-called `primitive' art began to be avidly 
studied by painters, in order to try and gain access to a space that was considered `pure', 
untouched by rational logic. 
Figure 7: Kazimir Malevich, Sußeematist Composition: White on White c. 1918 Oil on canvas. 79.4x79.4cm. Museum of 
Modem Art, New York. 
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The sense of a progressive erasure of objecthood found almost completely monochrome form in 
Malevich's Suprematist Composition: White on White c. 1918 [Figure 7]. Apparently, Malevich was so 
certain about the birth of a new era of four-dimensional consciousness in art that he spoke of this 
painting as the limit of painting, existing among the last possible works of art in two dimensions 
(cf Henderson 1983). For Malevich the colour white stood for infinity, a perfect world where 
objects were no longer capable of strangling the will of the artist. For others, the colour white 
and notions of the strangling of individual wills have more sinister connotations. Contemporary 
painter Gordon Bennett, a Mixed Race Aboriginal/White Australian, takes on the kind of 
symbolic privileging of the colour white that Malevich exemplifies, and puts it in a position where 
it cannot win. Bennett's often harrowing images explore the complex historical position of the 
Aboriginal in the White Australian culture and imagination, and an identifiable trope in his work 
is his tendency to `quote' passages from the `canon' of western Art History. Sometimes Bennett 
will position these alongside illustrated events from Aboriginal history; at other times he will 
combine on a single canvas passages painted in a western academic style, with sections painted in 
an Aboriginal style. Bennett's acts of reverse cultural appropriation are accomplished neatly and 
with wit. 
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Figure 8: Gordon Bennett, Supnmatirt Painting No. 1(Nigger i. over)1993 Acrylic on canvas. 5Ox5Ocm. Acrylic on 
canvas. Bellas Gallery, Brisbane; Sutton Gallery, Melbourne. 
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er) Gordon Bennett's 1993 `cover version' of a Malevich, Supremacist Painting No. 1(NiggerLov 
[Figure 8] is a rare example of near-monochromy in a body of work that is largely figurative. A 
barely-visible `Suprematist' cross orders the composition of Bennett's white almost-monochrome, 
which `passes' for art in a manner similar to the way the artist himself, who is light-skinned, 
`passed' for White for many years before he began to think about his Aboriginal identity. As Bob 
Lingard and Fazal Rizvi write, 
'Bennett's work is located at once within both European institutions and 
traditions of Aboriginality. It is both inside and outside the institutions of 
Western traditions of art. Thus ambivalence lies at the heart of Bennett's 
oppositional critical consciousness. He exploits this ambivalence, positioning 
himself in such a way as to disconcert and discomfort his audience. But his is 
not a realist representation of the history of European brutality toward 
Aboriginal people, but a political project that uses historical images to make the 
viewer uncomfortable, unsure of how to react. ' (Lingard & Rizvi 1994: 84) 
With a strategy of what I call `critical indeterminacy', Gordon Bennett reproduces an image which 
he knows has a specific cultural currency `as' art, and which he can be sure will be familiar to 
gallery-goers. However he undermines that `art' status with a palimpsest of tricks, all of which 
disturb the White western notion of the sanctity and purity of its art traditions. Bennett makes 
stylistic reference to Aboriginal painting, and places an enormous burden of signification on a 
single consonant in his title. When white Suprematism becomes White supremacism, the 
association of Malevich's ideal, enlightened White western subject with acts of horrific racist 
abuse is chilling. Bennett visits the domain of western traditions of academic painting in his way, 
unmasking the brutality and exclusionary nature of a system which considers itself enlightened, 
`supreme'. If Bennett's word-play, mimicry and `shifting of emphasis' (SE viii: 51) are all 
techniques which Freud describes as comic, then this painting can be read as a joke of some kind 
at the expense of the White Phallus and his followers. The addition of text to Bennett's surface 
is, I think, the final and most successful `trick'. The phrase `Nigger Lover' is inscribed on to the 
near-monochrome surface, formally `sullying' what could be described as surface `purity' in the 
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same way as racist thinking would describe Bennett as having been `sullied' and rendered valueless 
by his Black blood'. However, the phrase was written with red paint straight from the tube and 
overlaid with white, which Bennett then cut with a knife so that the raised skin of the painted 
letters gives the effect of bleeding, cut flesh. This references both the ritual scarification 
performed by some Aboriginal peoples, but also the violent act of stabbing or cutting that often 
takes place in racist assault. Bennett's Suprematist Painting No. 1(Nigger Lover) performs a kind of 
tricky mirroring; it reflects to the system its own image, but that image also contains the 
unexpected and disturbing reflection of two subjects whose existence that system would rather 
not acknowledge - the `Nigger', and the treacherous White `Nigger Lover'. Here, the colour 
white that for Malevich signified the ultimate creative freedom of the infinite void is redeployed; 
this time by one of the subjects at whose expense this freedom was bought. For Bennett and 
others like him, the associations of the colour white (and of white crosses) can never be quite so 
simple, or so idealistic31. 
If Malevich's white was purity, `truth', and freedom from colour, his black is far more 
problematic. The intervention of X-Ray technology has enabled the discovery that the very 
blackness of Black Square is, if not strictly a lie or trick, at least a disguise. Irina Vikar of the 
Tretyakov Gallery says, 
`[... ] the picture must have been a result of some complicated work. When we 
look at the Black Square, we see under its cracks the lower layers of paints - 
pink and green; evidently that was some colour composition, which was found 
unsatisfactory and painted over. ' 
(h ttp: / /xv,, vw. vor, ru/culture/cultarch9 cng. htrnl) 
The presence of other colours under the now famously cracked surface of the Black Square seems 
at first almost like a cancellation of the painting's resolute blackness. What else might that 
painting be concealing? Might there be some form of mimetic representation underneath? Did 
Malevich perhaps even paint a traditional Russian religious icon beneath, effectively pulling a dark 
symbolic cloak of invisibility over the centuries-old tradition of representative Christian painting? 
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No-one can look upon the face of the living God and survive, not even an epoch-making visual 
artist of the Twentieth Century. 
The blackness of Malevich's Black Square is essentially a paradox. Malevich could be read as 
blacking out authority in a completely literal way, by the act of painting over. The scene of the 
crime, as it were, is now veiled. However, in the confusion that surrounded the dating of 
Malevich's work, nobody discovered until after his death that the work's original title was simply, 
Square. The `original', which everyone knew but no-one had seen, had a powerful notional 
existence (especially since Malevich painted a second version in 1920). If we were to read this as 
an act of trickery, the Black Square is brought into tension with the fictive monochromes of 
Nineteenth Century France. Both the `original' of Malevich's Black Square and the Nineteenth 
Century joke monochromes share the status of existing `notionally'. As good mimesis requires 
submission to the Logos, Malevich's painting, with its insistent non-mimetic quality, slips out 
from under Logocentric authority, beginning a deferral of meaning that could continue 
indefinitely. It is pregnant with possibilities, and therein lies its power. Like the Imaginary, it is 
on the threshold of meaning rather than the anti-meaning of the Nineteenth Century joke 
monochromes, which remain within the Symbolic because they are defined in opposition to 
meaning (in this case, figuration). Reading Malevich's blackness, which is underscored by colour 
(and maybe even representation, who knows), as a trick becomes easier when we remember that 
Malevich himself wondered whether the `trick' could be the only way in which to present the 
`truth'. 
In 1913 Malevich joined the Budelyabin, or Man of the Future group. Along similar lines as 
Suprematism, Budelyabin espoused doctrines pertaining to the transcendent power of humankind, 
and the creation of new social and cultural values. The . 
Budelyabin project was to create a new 
language; something which would be universal and, more importantly, would transcend reason. 
Uspensky (in Kantian mode), had proposed in the Tertium Organum that behind each phenomenon 
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lay the noumenon, the spiritual or multi-dimensional world or idea. This could not be expressed in 
words and was therefore outside of logic. The Black Square, though never quite achieving the 
ubiquity Malevich desired, retains its illegibility because it too is `written' outside of logic. In fact, 
the metaphor of `writing' is really wrong here, as Uspensky's formula does not allow for anything 
outside of logic to be inside any systems of reading or writing: that which is outside of logic is 
always illegible. The notion of the unreadable kickstarted Malevich's experiments in Zaum, a 
language that can be understood as proto-Semiotic. Charlotte Douglas writes that Malevich's 
painting style became `alogical' at the height of his Zaum experiments (Douglas 1980: 33); varying 
object size at will, for example, or obliterating notions of narrative cohesion. Douglas does, 
however, refer here to Malevich's figurative painting style. The Black Square or the White Square on 
White Ground can be seen as persistently `alogical' amongst Malevich's works, balancing on the 
threshold of meaning, always threatening to obliterate the possibility of a full and final reading. 
As proto-blank spaces - spaces with potentially mobile and paradoxical meanings, spaces which 
are usually interpreted as `unintelligible' - both these paintings exist in the tantalising, Imaginary 
state of almost (but never quite) touching anti-meaning, presenting meaning as an oscillation. 
Malevich, influenced by the ideas of Bogdanov and Lunarcharsk? 2, conceived the Black Square as 
an Icon (albeit, ironically, an anti-iconic icon) of common relation and common destiny. His anti- 
iconic Icon was to be a new way of visualising the creativity and intense energy of the state of 
continuous Revolution". The Black Square is an attempt to revolutionise not only sensory 
experience, but also the way we communicate and `read'. It is complicit in the `trick' of the blank 
surface within a replete visual culture, it seeks the space between spectator, work and meaning -a 
space that the spectator's ego wishes to close - and then jams it perpetually open. 
60 
Figure 9: Aleksandr Rodchenko, Pure Red Colour, Pure Yellow Colour, Pure Blue Colour 1921. Oil on canvas. Each panel: 
62.5 x 52.7cm. Rodchenko-Stepanova Archive, Moscow. 
Aleksandr Rodchenko's three rectangles, Pure Red Colour, Pure Yellow Colour and Pure Blue Colour, 
1921 [Figure 91 also shared in the Malevichian explosion of representation. More specifically 
however, Rodchenko was convinced that the advent of these three pictures indisputably spelled 
the death of painting. In 1921, Rodchcnko was part of a group of five Constructivist artists 
(including Stepanova, Ekster, Popova and Vesnin14) who each contributed five pieces of work for 
the first part of a two part show in Moscow entitled, 5X5=25. Years later and with a showy 
finality, Rodchenko claimed, 
`I reduced painting to its logical conclusion and exhibited three canvases: red, 
blue and yellow. I affirmed; it's all over. Basic colours. Every plane is a plane 
and there is to be no representation. ' 
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Like Malevich just before him, Rodchenko enacted what he perceived as the death of old, 
outmoded forms. Like Malevich, he showed that he had seen through the suspensions of 
disbelief. He had reduced all the trickery of realist painting to its logical end, thus revealing it for 
what it really was: a show. Rodchenko's triptych has iconic status in terms of the story of 
Modernist art. For Rodchenko and the other Constructivists and leaders of the avant garde, the 
gesture of distilling the whole history of painting into the three primary colours from which all 
painting is generated was full of political as well as artistic significance. By `proving' the death of 
the old forms, Rodchenko had forced the imperative of seeking out new ones. 
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In an example of the kind of art criticism that I describe as `Phallic', Thomas McEvilley sets up 
the binary of `spiritual/political' and situates Rodchenko and Malevich squarely on either side. He 
writes that, 
`It is with Malevich and Rodchenko that the two great axes of Twentieth 
Century monochrome traditions are defined - metaphysical and materialist'. 
(McEvilley 1988 [trans. Anson 2001: 4)'5 
McEvilley's radical polarisation of Malevich (spiritual, cerebral, sublime) and Rodchenko 
(political, sculptural, direct) attempts to `solve' the problem of surface illegibility by ascribing 
symbolic significance to that illegibility. What this kind of reading does not do, however, is to 
allow for a close inspection of that illegibility. If we attempt to find common ground between the 
two painters, instead of seeing them as occupying opposing positions within a binary, we will see 
that both painters understood the blank vehicle of monochrome as a symbol of collectivity. What 
Rodchenko's monochromes also share with the Black Square, however, is an essential 
understanding that in order to be truly revolutionary in image-making, the hegemony of 
representation must be shaken. Composition must be eliminated, for only then can anyone begin 
to ask questions about what the elimination of composition might reveal for painting. The 
blankness that is created by the erasure of something perceived as hegemonic (in this case 
figuration) is a generative blankness, full of potential (see Chapter Four). It is interesting to think 
about the recent fervent activity around the abolition of references to `race' in a similar light. It is 
now commonly accepted that `race' has no scientific credibility; that beneath the optical surface 
where variations in skin colour, eye shape, hair type and so on occur, there is in fact no provable 
difference. Nevertheless, in the words of pioneering `Mixed Race' theorists Naomi Zack and 
Jayne 0. Ifek-unigwe, `race' remains a `popular folk concept' (Ifekwunigwe in Parker & Song [eds] 
2001: 42), and will not be erased so easily. If the terminology of `race' it erased, though, what it 
would leave would be an area of blankness of enormous potential; a blankness that would be 
claimed and contested by many. It would leave a new notional space, but this space would be 
paradoxical for it would contain the traces of issues set adrift by the removal of foundations upon 
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which, previously, their discussion had rested. The removal of composition, similarly, creates a 
fertile instability. The nemesis of mimesis as shown in Rodchenko and Malevich allows for a 
questioning of that which was previously taken for granted; representation. I also read the erasure 
of the individual authorial mark as equally important for both artists - this may be inspired by 
Impressionism, the first movement where systematically the authorial mark begins to be erased. 
Blank space as represented by the monochrome has factored into it a fundamental duality; it is the 
place where the condition of fullness and the condition of emptiness are often mistaken for one 
another. 
`In order to perceive fullness, one must retain an acute sense of the emptiness 
which defines it. Conversely, in order to perceive emptiness one must 
apprehend other zones of the world as full [... ] if only because the art work 
exists in a world furnished with many other things. The artist who creates 
silence or emptiness must produce something dialectical; a full void, an 
enriching emptiness, a resonating or eloquent silence. ' (Sontag in Minimal Means 
Ex. Cat. 1989: 10) 
In a blank surface, conditions are interchangeable and can take advantage of this by swapping 
clothes, deliberately confusing the viewer. It is in this switching, this perpetual disguise, that 
attempts can be made to re-order the world. The cancelling activity of the blank space of 
monochrome can be read as a stamping-out or a covering over (as in Malevich's Black Square), in a 
possible attempt to destroy or conceal something. However, this reading would need to take into 
account the possibility that, in order to perform the concealment, the surface would have to 
contain within itself the thing it wanted to destroy. In other words, it had to eat it up, to 
assimilate in order to manage the threat. The `crime' would then be covered over with a veil of 
black paint, attention would be shifted neatly to the veil, (for it is all about the veil, after all) and 
the culprit would thus become invisible. In Malevich's case, for example, what gets assimilated 
into the reading of his monochrome as the end of compositional relations is in fact a series of 
actual compositional relations; present but rendered invisible by the black monochrome. 
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1: 3 Monochrome: Art or Object? 
Monochrome is often positioned alongside such things as Duchamp's readymades; both are 
frequently seen as objects whose objectness puts the category of `art' in crisis. Here, 
monochrome's psychic indeterminacy is concealed by a quite clear optical indeterminacy; the 
trickery acquires an extra layer and begins to perform the movement of an oscillation. Barbara 
Rose, in her 1965 essay ABCArt, cites Malevich in a relation to Duchamp as dual initiator of 
what is usually described as Minimalism; 
`In 1913, Kasimir Malevich, placing a black square on a white ground that he 
identified as the 'void', created the first suprematist composition. A year later, 
Marcel Duchamp exhibited as an original work of art a standard metal bottle- 
rack, which he called a `ready-made'. For half a century, these two works 
marked the limits of visual art. Now, however, it appears that a new generation of 
artists, who seem not so much inspired as impressed by Malevich and 
Duchamp [... ] are examining in a new context the implications of their radical 
decisions. Often, the results are a curious synthesis of the two men's work. ' 
(Rose in Battcock [ed] 1968: 275, my italics) 
Rose raises two important points; first of all the concept of `limits' for visual art; limits which 
monochrome, when decked out in the guise of art, always seems to float dangerously close to. 
Secondly, she positions the origins of the Minimalist aesthetic within which monochrome is so 
often located, as the result of a confluence of the work of two artists. Whilst the artists in 
question are not diametric opposites, this could still be read as a juncture of a Two which 
produces a tricky One (that is not really One, but Many). The practitioners of Minimalist art (also 
called `ABC Art', (Rose) `Literalist Art' (by Michael Fried, unconvinced of its value36), `Primary 
Structures' and `Specific Objects') generally had a developed awareness of the movements of 
western art, and of their place within these movements. Malevich, the second great influence that 
Rose mentions, was key to the Minimalists as a forerunner of an art that was free from service to 
the state and free from representation and all its concomitant ideological constraints'. Some 
Minimalist artists paid tribute to the Russian Constructivist sculptors who had helped pave this 
particular way, for example Dan Flavin's Monument for V. Tatlin, 1964. Flavin's Monument, an 
assembly of neon tubes, had not been carved, painted or even arranged by the artist - Flavin 
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issued instructions to electricians in the gallery space for its arrangement. Echoes of Duchamp 
resound in this kind of sculpture, echoes which are as evident in relation to chance as to the 
exploration of the `non-art' aesthetic. The favouring of simple order over complex compositional 
relations resulted in what appeared to be an aesthetic of exclusion, a gradual paring down. 
Importantly, as surfaces (or appearances) closed down, the possibilities of what could count as art 
opened out quite radically. Even Clement Greenberg wrote that, 
`The paradoxical outcome of this reduction has been [... ] to expand the 
possibilities of the pictorial; much more than before lends itself now to being 
experienced pictorially or in meaningful relation to the pictorial; all sorts of 
large and small items that used to belong entirely to the realm of the arbitrary 
and the visually meaningless. ' (Greenberg in O'Brian [ed] 1993: 132)'s 
A work of art's factuality or `objectness' was understood, within the written discourses of 
Minimalism, to directly problematise meaning. Interestingly, Lawrence Alloway writes of this 
process as anti-significatory: 
When we view art as an object we view it in opposition to the process of 
signification. Meaning follows from the presence of the work of art, not from 
its capacity to signify absent events or values (a landscape, the Passion, or 
whatever). This does not mean we are faced with an art of nothingness or 
boredom as has been said with boring frequency. On the contrary, it suggests 
that the experience of meaning has to be sought in other ways. ' (Alloway in 
Battcock [cd) 1968: 55) 
Alloway's vision of Minimalism is not a simple challenging of existing codes, it's a full-scale 
takeover. Alloway reads Minimal works as though they were a new language, each piece 
understandable in the context of another, similar piece, and changing the process of reading. The 
work does this in two ways, first of all by its objectness, and secondly by its chaotic relation to the 
concept `work'. Monochrome has quite happily acted as a sign for both, as we will see. 
To consider monochrome's `objectness' first of all, some accounts write with a great deal of 
certainty, as though the objectness of monochrome were already a given. Yve-Alain Bois 
provides a classic example of this kind of `Phallic' certainty when he writes, `Priscilla Colt's 
sensitive article in Art International in 1964, warned against looking at Reinhardt's canvases as if 
65 
they were pure monochromes (hence objects). ' (Bois 1991: 12). Lucy Lippard's interpretation 
provides another example, `if a surface is not painted, it becomes `sculptural', no matter how the 
edges are treated. ' (Lippard 1966: 59). The Phallus has spoken and there is no room for argument: 
monochrome is an object. Only it isn't, not completely. With its uncluttered clarity of surface, 
monochrome is often cited as the ideal figure for Modernism as well as Minimalism. Most 
importantly, it has been seen as the nearest thing to perfection in painting, with its exploration of 
the flatness intrinsic to the medium as posited by Greenberg; 
The basic text in Greenberg-influenced criticism is an article, written after the 
publication of Art and Culture, but on which the essays in his book rest, called 
Modernist Painting. Here he argues for self-criticism within each art, "through 
the procedures themselves of that which is being criticized". Thus "flatness, 
two-dimensionality, was the only condition shared with no other art, and so 
modernist painting oriented itself to flatness" '. (Alloway in Battcock [ed] 
1968: 51) 
In spite of his commitment to each medium exploring its own truth, defining characteristics and 
limit conditions, Greenberg also seemed to allow for the possibility that monochrome painting 
was not entirely what it seemed. He famously stated that, `a stretched or tacked-up canvas already 
exists as a picture (though not necessarily a successful one)', (Greenberg in O'Brian [ed] 
1993: 131), contrasting with Motherwell who thought the empty canvas beautiful to begin with. In 
Recentness of Sculpture, Greenberg describes the `derision mixed with exasperation' he felt on first 
seeing Rollin Crampton's near-monochromatic pictures in 1951. Some time later, having seen 
other monochromes (by Yves Klein, Sally Hazlett, Ad Reinhardt), he was ready to admit that 
some `domestication' had taken place, though what was domesticated was, 
`[... ] emptiness, the look of the "void". A monochromatic flatness that could 
be seen as limited in extension and different from a wall henceforth 
automatically declared itself to be a picture, to be art [... ] Minimal works are 
readable as art, as almost anything is today - including a door, a table, or a 
blank sheet of paper. ' (Greenberg in Battcock [ed] 1968: 181,183) 
So monochrome, at first appearing to be non-art, eventually became `readable' as art. Greenberg 
(wittingly or otherwise) is describing an oscillation, although it is an observable and optical one (as 
well as having to do with the oscillating tastes of the spectator), rather than a hidden and psychical 
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one. As aforesaid, monochrome also problematises the notion of 'work- particularly in an 
industrial society that allows for the possibility of a `readymade'. Art was under threat, and as 
Bois writes, Even at the outset, industrialisation meant much more for painting than the 
invention of photography and the incorporation of the mechanical into the artist's process 
through the readymade tube of paint. It also meant a threat of the collapse of art's special status 
into a fetish or a commodity. ' (Bois 1990: 233) Could the artefact still stay special? The pared- 
down aesthetic of Minimalism privileged the mind of the artist, set creative genius above the 
formerly fetishised hand, or brushstroke. Ideas replaced `work' (or at least became equally 
fetishised), and for Greenberg, this was the main problem with Minimalism. As early as 1924, El 
Lissitsky (who did not actually make a monochrome) satirised the notion that the privileging of 
the idea resulted in optically impoverished work, 
`Now the production of art has been simplified to such an extent that one can 
do no better than order one's paintings by telephone from a house painter 
while one is lying in bed. ' (Lissitsky in Buchloh 1986: 45) 
In one sense this attitude is a direct descendant of the jocular digs at `modern are as practised by 
the imaginary monochromists of Nineteenth Century France. In both cases the comment (or the 
work) is predicated on a sense of the ridiculous - how can such a thing possibly expect to be read 
as art, especially when there is no evidence that the artist has actually done anything? David 
Batchelor suggests that this is, in fact, one of monochrome's more mischievous roles. 
`For adults, getting up is usually the prelude to going to work. Lissitsky's 
staying put marked a refusal to go to work, or, more to the point, a recognition 
that painting might have become largely a question of going to work [... ] Now 
that anyone could make a monochrome, why not stay in bed and order it up? 
This is perhaps the greatest threat that the monochrome could whisper in the 
ear of painting: "Pssst, you're not so special; there's no difference anymore 
between painting and a paint-job. "' (Batchelor in Osborne [ed] 2000: 167) 
Monochromes in the guise of the `readymade' or that which puts `work' into crisis, also perform a 
task akin to Barthes' notion of the Death of the Author. Whilst such a notion does not seem to 
have a parallel founding moment in the visual arts, when such monochromes appear they 
challenge the idea of the artist as a uniquely gifted creator. Anyone could make one. 
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Monochrome's role here is as a democratising device; its mischievous mashing of equal parts 
wheat and chaff encourage all and sundry to practice `art' because now it looks easy. 
Monochrome knocks the crown from the head of the Artist King. 
The aesthetic of austerity, of course, had many critics. Peter Fuller writes, 
`[... ] in 1969 an exhibition entitled, The Art of the Real was sent out of MOMA 
to the Tate Gallery in London. Characteristically, it was attempting to 
legitimise internationally vacuous, American Late Modernism. It contained 
coloured planks, bland monochromes, and cubes by a range of artists including 
Andre, Feeley, Judd, Kelly, McCracken, Noland, Stella etc. On the cover was 
the statement, "Today's real (sic) makes no direct appeal to the emotions, nor 
is it involved in uplift, but instead offers itself in the form of the simple, 
irreducible, irrefutable object"[... ] Reinhardt's parody has come to life: the 
development of post-war American art is fixed in our minds as a great 
evolutionary tree which somehow manages to feed and fertilise itself, and from 
which all parasites fall. It was, however, an evolution towards - rather than 
away from -a grey expanse of primordial sludge'. (Fuller 1980: 87) 
Fuller's disenchantment with the Modernist project is a disenchantment with what he sees as the 
constraints of `objecthood'; he is unwilling to accept a message which has not enough `medium' 
there for hire to get hold of. Fuller's `primordial sludge', of course, is another critic's `pure 
painting', and monochrome is also often situated within traditions of pictorial purity. The 
monochrome becomes a figure for the exploration of the painter's work, and therefore resembles 
an experiment of some kind. With nothing superfluous allowed, monochrome is the perfect 
lightweight, unencumbered vehicle through which both the act and the status of painting can be 
explored. 
The kind of monochrome that is made by a process of reduction, or that symbolises an aesthetic 
of exclusion, also troubles received notions of how to `read' a painterly surface, and I wonder 
whether the `exclusion' is symptomatic of some kind of Phallic activity. The White Phallus asserts 
its power to define, in order to exclude. The act of fetishisation (of the ethnic `Other', for 
example) is a Phallic act, and one which simultaneously reinforces both the power of the Phallus, 
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and the perpetual `outsider' status of the fetishised object. 't'hrough the optical surface of a 
monochrome whose blankness derives from exclusion, might it be possible to read in the psychic 
surface a version of Phallic activity, one that bears structural resemblance to the activities of the 
Phallus, but that is, in some way, re-appropriated? The fact that exclusion is a Phallic activity 
does not, of course, make all practices of exclusion Phallic. 1-Iowever, if we remember that the 
purpose of fetishism is to disavow the imagined sight of castration, this might help. If the subject 
of Mixed Race as `tragic Mulatto' reads as castrated, then once the Phallic ego looked on such a 
creature, it would surely recognise in her optical/phenotypic surface the troubling reflection of his 
own castration. This could explain some of the sexual fetishising of Mixed Race subjects that can 
happen. I Iowever, what I really want to suggest here is that the kind of problematic and 
troubling Phallic activity in a structure that is outside of Phallic Law - in this case, monochromes 
whose aesthetic is one of exclusion - is in some way structurally homologous to the problematic 
and troubling Whiteness in the optical and psychic surfaces of the subject of Mixed Race. 
Figure 10:: ßd Reinhardt, /lbslra / Rain/in{g No. 5 1962. Oll on canvas. 152.4 x 152.4cm. 'l'ate Gallery, London. 
The surfaces of Ad Reinhardt (1913-1966) [Figure 10] explore the negative, through repetition. 
Reinhardt's copious, fierce and profoundly confusing writings - what Yve-Alain Bois calls an 
`oxymoronic and asymptotic logic, always almost an illogic' (1991: 11) - make a strong case for the 
69 
exploration of doubt or negativity. Reinhardt stressed the intellectual power of asserting `not'. 
For him denial was almost like an affirmation and he worked to a pictorial philosophy that what is 
not there is more important than what is there. Barbara Rose in ABCArt called him the `father' 
of minimalism. As little as two years after his death, he was also hailed as the father of 
conceptual art. It seems as though everyone wanted a piece of Reinhardt's artistic pie. His earlier 
paintings from the 1940s have busy, almost figurative surfaces39. It is, however, for his black 
paintings that Reinhardt is best known. These works, which began to appear in 1955 and carried 
on until the end of his life, were as far as Reinhardt was concerned, both `the first paintings that 
cannot be misunderstood', and `the last paintings that anyone could make'40. These assertions 
show that there was nothing there, to either understand or misunderstand. Reinhardt's obsessive 
repetition of the black monochrome (from 1959 onwards he would only paint square 5'x5' black 
canvases), earned him the status of `black monk' of the New York School, a maverick status he 
enjoyed. His black paintings differed only infinitesimally from one another in what Sam Hunter 
refers to as his, `rather esoteric and severely reductionist art. ' (Hunter 1991: 27). Reinhardt was 
interested in Jungian analytical psychology and Eastern philosophies - he said he was attracted to 
Zen because it, `goes over and over something until it disappears' - but he did not understand his 
laying-on of paint as a devotional act in the same way as, say, Yves Klein. What he does share 
with Klein is a strong objection to the idea of art as a kind of expressionistic autobiography. In 
many of his cartoons and satirical drawings he liked to ridicule critic Harold Rosenberg and his 
famous statement about Abstract Expressionism, that the canvas had become an `arena' in which 
the artist must `act', flashing a glimpse of bare human psyche. However, the interest in 
psychology and spirituality was definitely confined to his `Life' as opposed to his `Art'; Reinhardt 
repudiated any kind of supernatural content in pictures to be useless metaphysical baggage that 
detracted the viewer from the experience of the painting, from Reinhardt's own quest for an art 
of absolute purity. 
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Yve-Alain Bois (1991: 11) directs attention to the fact that Reinhardt jotted down the phrase, `a 
sign which refuses to signify', another oxymoron in the Reinhardtian tradition. Signification is 
not only what signs do, it is also what they are. It is in the `refusal' that the importance resides; 
echoing Reinhardt's own refusal to be categorised by critics of the time. lie liked to collect lists 
of all the different schools his work had been fitted into, usually to disprove them. Some of these 
labels would include, `negativist', `classicist', `purist', `avant-gardist', `religious painter' and so on 
(Bois 1991: 11). Reinhardt's puritanical stance towards the absolute separateness of art and life 
earned him another label; that of an artist with great integrity and ethical imperatives. All of this 
just goes to show, however, how elusive and resistant to categorisation were Reinhardt's singular 
approaches to painting, and to life. Like Barthes' notion of myth itself in his essay Myth Today, 
Reinhardt's monochromes are a second-order semiological system, or meta-painting. A second- 
order semiological system is constructed from a semiotic chain that preceded its own existence 
(Barthes 1957: 114), and obviously such a signifying system will not easily lend itself to 
categorisation. Reinhardt's failure to gain the admiration of his own generation was to haunt him 
throughout his life, despite the fact that the new generation of young neo-conceptualists 
(particularly Stella who collected Reinhardt's black paintings), was profoundly influenced by his 
stark form of non-objectivity. As signs that refuse to signify, Reinhardt's almost identical black 
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Figure 11: Donald Judd, Untitled 1963. Cadmium red light oil on wood. 49.5 x 114.3 x 77.5cm. Collection of G. 
Locksley & G. Shea. 
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canvases continually repeat and rehearse a paradox - the creation of something that is not there. 
Donald Judd, who began as an art critic, wrote with the kind of spare clarity that characterised the 
look of his `specific objects'. Neither painting nor sculpture but a three-dimensional object in 
between, the `specific object' is by its very nature indeterminate. For Judd, the well of possibilities 
inherent in both painting and sculpture had run dry. Interestingly for an indeterminate thing, 
Judd drew attention to what he saw as the `singleness' (Fer 1997: 133) of the 'specific object'. 
Taking as an example Judd's Untitled [Figure 11], it is possible to begin to see the conflation of a 
`single' object with voided object41. Untitled was exhibited in 1963 at the Green Gallery, New 
York, as part of a series of sculptures, all painted the same colour to emphasise the unity of the 
whole. In the essay Speeefic Ojbects, Judd wrote that, `The thing as a whole, its quality as a whole, is 
what is interesting' (Judd in Harrison & Wood [eds] 1992: 183). Untitled interests me because it 
shows its status as an empty object, an object filled with a void. Bryony Fex takes this 
fundamental duality and runs with it brilliantly, making observations about what is `repressed' 
within Judd's structures and his writing''. Whilst Judd's lack of interest in the spectator was clear, 
and his work is often made to stand for logic and rationality, Fer makes an ingenious claim for a 
`repressed' in his work, which shifts the status of Judd's monochrome object from an optical (or 
physical) unity to a psychic duality; 
`I want to argue that Judd's art expresses, even in the prohibitions it imposes, 
its own type of anxiety. This does not involve a simple negation of pleasure, 
but the work mobilises a rather different set of pleasures from those associated 
with opticality. More than anything else, it is an often uneasy relationship 
between anxiety and pleasure that characterises the effects of the work. 
Although Judd and others stressed the singleness of the object, this split 
between anxiety and pleasure occurs at the cost of the unity of the viewing 
subject. ' (Fer 1997: 137) 
Fer differs from previously-quoted Phallic readers in at least three ways. First of all she refuses to 
allow for a single, `simple' reading of Judd's blankness; instead she engages immediately with the 
possibility of duality and/or multiplicity. Secondly, Fer's reading of the effects of the work as 
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mobilising in the spectator an `uneasy relationship between anxiety and pleasure' performs a 
radical opening out of meaningful possibilities by deploying the p'ychic activities of both object 
and spectator. Thirdly, her acknowledgement that there is a `cost' for the viewing subject's unity 
places her interpretation very much outside of the tradition of Phallic certainty whose aim is to 
preserve the unity of the (Phallic) spectating subject at all costs. In troubling that unity, or 
entertaining the possibility that that unity is unstable, Fer's criticism is refreshingly a-Phallic. 
For Fer, the split is mirrored - the psychic duality of the object invokes an analogous reaction in 
the spectator (or, perhaps, a recognition of that spectator's own psychic duality? ). The smooth, 
even nature of Judd's monochrome objects refuses the spectator the possibility of engaging in a 
reading of compositional elements or parts, confusing any tacit knowledge of how to approach 
such a surface. However, the deeper and more radical unsettling that Fer suggests Judd's objects 
perform is in, `what I call the dual structure of anxiety and pleasure which underlies Judd's work 
[... ] I do not want to reinforce conventional equations of colour with pleasure and industrial 
materials with rationality, which are precisely the kinds of opposition that Judd's "specific 
objects" put in question. ' (1997: 148). Again, Per recognises Judd's problematic framing of a void 
as something that is troubling to established categories, that performs precisely the function of a 
question to those categories. In actively refusing to engage with such Phallic binaries as `colour 
equals pleasure' versus `industrial materials equal clarity', Fer frees her reader from the constraints 
of Phallic spectatorship, and is therefore able to actually read, rather than avoid the blankness. If 
a writer like McEvilley exemplifies, in some of his work, a tendency towards the kind of Phallic 
reading that disavows blankness, or forces it to `mean' a single thing, then someone like Fer 
would provide the perfect example of a non-Phallic, or a-Phallic reading; a reading where 
blankness is perceived as something mobile, unfixed and ultimately worth examining. 
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The sheer scale of some Minimalist works, along with the radical positioning of others (for 
example, on floors or ceilings) meant that Minimalism was often seen as a direct and new 
challenge to the physical body of the spectator. We remember Michael Fried's dictum that 
`presentness is grace' (Fried 1998: 168). Whilst Judd's materials, and the large scale of some of his 
works are often read as belonging to the hard, `masculine' surfaces of Minimalism, their flawlessly 
smooth surfaces could in fact be ruined by the tiniest oily fingerprint. Fer suggests that the 
anxiety inherent in Judd's object is, then, an anxiety about touch. Formally, Untitled of 1963 
fudges the limits of the binary inside/outside. The object's edges are clearly seen, but so is its 
empty interior. The visibility of the void inside the structure emphasises the void space 
surrounding the structure, the space the spectator moves and sees in. Here, Fer draws the 
reader's attention to Lacan's version of the uncanny, which has explicitly to do with the concept 
of a psychic skin (1997: 148). L'extimite reveals neither inside nor outside, but acts as a rupture in 
the continuous skin which reveals the `empty' centre, the Real. Exposure of the Real generates 
anxiety and feelings of vulnerability, the ego's reaction to this is one of manic covering-over. 
Certain kinds of monochrome reveal the Real in a comparable way to Judd's structures. In Judd, 
the three-dimensionality of the work creates perceptible levels of Real (as well as real) depth, 
which I suggest are horrifying to a spectator who is determined not to see the Real. Drawing on 
Lacan's notion of 1'extimite, a three-dimensional object such as Judd's box would at first appear to 
present the possibility of containing the Real. However the spectator's ensuing unconscious 
realisation that the Real cannot be contained - the box is not a closed object, and furthermore the 
void within it echoes the void the entire box occupies - is terrifying, and engenders a sustained 
effort in the spectator to cover over or disguise what they think they have just seen. This can take 
many forms, the most obvious of which is the kind of critical writing that denies uncertainty, 
indeterminacy, or the void (which is itself indeterminate). 
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Anna C. Chave's reading of blankness in Minimalism can be understood as a determined attempt 
to pretend she hasn't seen the full horror of the Real - so determined, in fact, that she aligns it 
with the least indeterminate and most decisive thing of all; `The blank face of Minimalism may 
come into focus as the face of capital, the face of authority, the face of the father. ' (Chave 
1990: 44-63). Chave's interpretation of abstract art in this essay is quite contentious. Her reading 
tends towards a sort of arcane alphabet of forms, which David Batchelor describes as `distinctly 
dodgy claims'; '. I agree with Batchelor that the activity of forcing meaning on to abstract or 
blank forms via resemblance is `dodgy', but I would rather describe that activity as `Phallic', since 
it tacitly colludes with the idea that mimesis is meaning. However, I also think that Chave is 
perceptive in her reading of the blankness of Minimalism as in some way Phallic; though I would 
say that it is Phallic in a confounding way. The face of the father (and of capital) appears blank, in 
order to disguise its approach. Judd's objects appear powerful optically, because of their scale and 
their smoothness. Psychically, Judd's objects oscillate subtly between containing and presenting 
the empty horror of the Real, and evoke the duality of horror/pleasure in the Phallic spectator's 
ego. This, again, makes Judd's objects appear powerful - the evocation of anxiety is also a 
function of the deciding Phallus. IfJudd's objects are Phallic, they are Phallic in the same way 
that the Mixed Race subject is White - in a troubling way that has to do with mockery and 
appropriation. 
1: 4 The Monochrome World of Yves Klein 
`There is another aspect of that dual character that is dramatised in the 
conjunction of Judd and Klein and that is the question of the relation between 
painting and sculpture, picture and object. The Minimalist critique of a 
modernist surface was not directed against painting on principle, yet sculpture 
became a way of thinking one's way out of the modernist paradigm of painting. 
If the boundaries between painting and sculpture had tended to blur in the idea 
of the `specific object', then Klein's monochromes could be seen as objects, 
their literal presence enhanced by the rounded corners; as pictures, they 
approached a condition of objecthood almost akin to sculpture, or certainly the 
pictorial quality of the three-dimensional object Judd had in mind. ' (Fer 
1997: 154) 
75 
Figure 12: Yves Klein, Untitled Blue Monochrome (IKB 83) 1960. Dry pigment and synthetic resin 
on canvas and wood. 92.7 x 73.7cm. Sidney Janis Gallery, New York. 
Judd famously admired the blue monochromes of Yves Klein (Figure 121. Judd saw the abolition 
of figure-ground relationships as the only way to rid painting of spatial illusionism, and cited the 
paintings of Yves Klein as exemplary in this (Fer 1997: 144-146). 1 lowever, if Judd's work 
deliberately defied both depiction and representation, Klein's blue monochromes both depict and 
represent the expansive blue void of the sky. What I find most interesting about the 
monochromes of Klein is that they all have their genesis in a fundamental duality, or split-ness, in 
the artist. As we will sec, Klein's dazzling personal showmanship was a deliberate feature (and 
sometimes the content) of his art - yet he also professed to 
despise Abstract Expressionism, 
which he interpreted as vulgar emotional incontinence. Ile was passionately involved in esoteric 
mysticism - yet certain features of his work, such as the misogyny of his Anthropometrier, seem 
inconsistent with the behaviour of a spiritual being. Perhaps Klein's personal devotion to fighting 
- he was a champion judo fighter, a symbolic Knight of the Order of St. Sebastien and 
had a 
reputation at school as a barrageur - could be seen as a symptom of his inability to reconcile his 
warring inner self. Either way, I would like to read the uninterrupted calm of Klein's blue 
monochromes both in terms of their genesis in a psychic split, and in terms of Lacan's notion of 
1'extimile, and to see if this might reveal an activation of blankness that has its own defining 
characteristics. 
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First seeing Klein's work in New York in 1962 at the Alexandre Iolas Gallery, Judd weirdly 
described Klein's paintings as `unspatial' (Judd in Fer 1997: 144). Klein was highly vocal about his 
obsession with space, and so Judd's reading of Klein runs counter to Klein's reading of Klein. I 
do not want to engage with `misreading' here, as this is only relevant if you first take the position 
that there is a single, correct interpretation, and that the author's word is final. What is interesting 
about this counter-reading is Klein's own counter-reading of Malevich, with whom his work and 
ideas share common ground. Both artists revere space, infinity and the hidden spiritual powers of 
humanity. Ad Reinhardt's mystical interests can be allied to Klein's own - the latter saw in 
monochrome the sign of a spiritual path. Reinhardt was influenced by Buddhist texts, in 
particular the manuals of classical Chinese and Japanese painters, based on Zen or Ch'an 
Buddhism. The Buddhist idea of shunyata, or emptiness, is itself a principle creator from which 
comes the space necessary for things to arrive into. At the same time, though, it is also the 
principle of extinction, a sort of black hole through which every entity that hopes to eventually 
be, must pass. In classical Buddhist painting this concept is often symbolised by pure sky, or 
areas of space. In Yves Klein, shunyata manifests itself in the form of his `immaterial zones'. 
With its generative yet annihilatory power, shunyata shares aspects of the Kristevan and Platonic 
chora (see Chapter Four), at once generative and death-bearing. Both concepts are fundamentally 
indeterminate. 
Klein criticised Malevich harshly for what he saw as his slavish devotion to representation, 
reading Black Square as a picture of a monochrome, rather than a monochrome itself. Malevich 
puts monochrome on stage, creating a background of infinite white space in which it could act or 
be seen4. Klein's monochromes on the other hand exist unfettered, staged only once in the 
gallery - but magnificently, with Klein's trademark showmanship. M ein's criticism of Malevich, 
however, is put into crisis when we consider the little-known drawings which show his own 
`staging' of monochrome [Figure 131. 
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Figure 13: Yves Klein, Red Monochrome on Stage 1954. Watercolour, pastel, ink and pencil on page from a 
spiral-bound notebook. 13.5 x 21cm. Private collection. 
Klein's monochrome-on-stage is complete with proscenium arch and curtains, we almost expect it 
to burst into song and a soft-shoe shuffle. I think that Klein's point here is to literally make 
monochrome take centre-stage, to foreground it as an active agent. Perhaps he felt that 
Malevich's treatment was not literal enough; Klein gives a starring role to his monochrome, 
Malevich merely gives a ground. Whilst Klein's extravagant gestures and his status as a 
`personality' within the art world might ally him more with the Duchampian, they have also 
resulted in Klein being dismissed as a chancer, 
`Because Klein not only used blue but favoured monochromes devoid of 
expressionistic, representational, compositional or personalising elements, his 
art is often misunderstood as an extreme form of pure abstraction based on 
reductivist and formalist tenets. And because Klein presented his art in 
theatrical, unconventional displays, his work is often characterised as a 
burlesque, anti-art, anarchistic commentary'. (Stich 1994: 9) 
The awareness that he was not the first person to make a monochrome did not stop Klein from 
claiming he had invented monochrome. Denys Riout understands Klein's obsession with 
monochrome as something profoundly new in art, and says, `strange as it may sound, I believe 
that we need to take him at his word and admit that he really did invent the monochrome. 
Painting a monochrome and inventing the notion of monochromy are two different realities. ' 
(Riout in Millet 1996: 19) Klein's devotion to monochrome was certainly unique, affecting even 
his identity - he officially changed his name to Yves Le Monochrome. Yves Klein was one of the 
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main post-war `abstract' painters who attempted to give a reason and theory to the monochrome, 
although he himself insisted that he was not an `abstract' painter, but a painter of the void as 
Fascinated by themes of the One and the Many in western and non-western esoteric philosophies, 
Klein used his beloved Rosicrucianism to frame notions of separateness and unity. The 
Rosicrucian theology of emanation has much in common with Plato's doctrine of the same. In 
Rosicrucian theology, the divided universe emanates from an original unity. The emanation has 
seven stages, the last and lowest of which is the level of the body where human life is lived out. 
In this plane of existence, the multiple boundaries of each individual thing are made rigid by their 
acquisition of material form. Out of this, logically, comes the notion that form in painting 
imprisons space. The understanding of `form' and `line' in painting as confining and reductive 
was something Klein was to concentrate his considerable combative energies towards eliminating 
throughout his artistic life'. Out of the desire to free colour from the tyranny of line, Klein 
developed the notion of blue as the ultimate signifier of free, infinite space inspired by Gaston 
Bachelard's Poetics of Space, a book that was Klein's constant companion. Here he differs from 
Malevich, for whom infinity was white. Infinity was to play a key role in the `new age', when: 
`We will all become men `of air', we will recognise the force of attraction 
towards that which is on high, towards space, towards emptiness (... ] we will 
literally levitate towards physical and totally spiritual liberty. ' (Klein in 
McEvilley 1982: 234) 
His blue monochromes were known as Portraits of the Sky, in fact he was later to declare the sky 
itself as his `first and biggest monochrome', which immediately brings to mind the contemporary 
artist James Turrell, many of whose installations do in fact act as framing devices for the sky. 
Where Klein differs from Turrell is in the apologetics for his work, Klein insisting that he had 
signed the sky-portraits during an act of levitation from the other side of the sky (Stich 1995: 18- 
20), where space is indivisible47. 
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Yves Klein showed his first monochrome paintings informally in London in 1950 (later claiming 
that the paintings dated from three years earlier, an act that seems to align him more with ego- 
centred self promotion than with Zen doctrines of ego control). Following this, his vigorous 
attempts to establish himself as a part of the Paris art world met with some quite extraordinary 
rejections. In 1955 he received a rejection from the Paris Salon des Realites Nouvelles, to which 
he had submitted an entirely orange monochrome. Their ridiculous letter of response exemplifies 
the total lack of comprehension of Klein's project. The Administrative Committee had advertised 
that the salon was open to all kinds of non-figurative art, yet one of their representatives had told 
Yves' mother in a telephone conversation that, `You understand, it is really not enough - but if 
Yves would agree at least to add a small line, or a point, or even simply a touch of another colour, 
we would be able to hang it. But only one uniform colour, no, no. Truly, this is not enough, it is 
impossible' (Stich 1995: 58). The following morning, Klein received a letter from the salon 
representatives exemplifying (in Klein's words) their `totalitarian spirit'. He was told, `We will be 
happy if [... ] you decide to exhibit with us another year - to the extent that having seen our 
Salon, you will envision a way to bring your effort in agreement with ours' (Stich 1995: 59). 
The rigidity of the Salon's representative is characteristic of certain Phallic behaviour. When 
confronted with something that does not fit the established criteria, the system resorts to one of 
two tactics: either the work in question must submit to having its own nature altered to fit the 
nature of the system, otherwise it must be obliterated. It is interesting that something as tiny as `a 
touch of another colour' is all that the Salon required to make Klein's work signify, for them, as 
`art'. This totalitarian approach is reminiscent of the famous `One Drop Rule', the historical and 
legal custom operational in certain States in America of classifying anyone with one Black 
ancestor, regardless of how far back the ancestor or how White the person's appearance, as Black. 
A single `drop' of `Black blood' was, according to this Phallic thinking, potent enough to destroy 
(socially, at least) even the Whitest of complexions. A single `drop' was necessary for the system 
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to practice its (exclusionary) definition, in a comparable way to the way the single touch of 
another colour would have allowed Klein's painting to be classified as `art' by the salon. I think 
that the key point here concerns the Phallic tendency to seize the smallest area of differentiation, 
then use that to make classifications whose function is to maintain the Phallus' illusion of power. 
The subject with various degrees of `racial' Mixing - in particular the subject with very White 
looks - or the painting that appears to be empty, both present the uncanny in their psychic and 
optical surfaces. Lacan's conceptualisation of the uncanny as a problematic skin (1'extimite) can be 
used as a metaphor for both. In the example of Klein's orange monochrome, its optical surface 
presents psychic panic to the phallic spectators, since the blankness of the optical surface both 
reveals and conceals the terrifying emptiness of the Real. In the case of the White-looking subject 
of Mixed Race, the uncanny feeling she inspires in the Phallic spectator is more complex; her 
optical surface suggest to that spectator a single thing, but her psychic surface reveals the 
(Ph)allacy of thinking about `race' or skin or identity as a single fixed thing. 
By the time of his solo 1957 show LEpoca blu, or Blue Epoclh/Era/Period, in which he exhibited 
eleven identical blue monochromes, Klein really felt he had now established a new era for art. 
Thanks to some careful publicity, Klein's exhibition attracted phenomenal crowds, including the 
Parisian Fire Brigade (who were unable to get past the hordes of people packing the streets 
surrounding the Iris Clert Gallery). The total lack of anything recognisable in Klein's blue 
surfaces caused outrage, but this was consistent with his hatred of any sort of identifiable 
authorial imprint in the surface. Klein wrote in The Monochrome Adventure, `I loathe artists who 
empty themselves into their painting, as is quite often the case today. Morbidism [sic], rather than 
thinking of the beautiful, the good, the true in their paintings: they express, they ejaculate, they 
spit out every horrible, rotten, and infectious complexity in their painting as if relieving 
themselves and putting the burden on others, "the readers of their works", all of their sorry 
failures' (Klein in Stich 1995: 26-27). The fact that Klein-as-showman was so inseparable from 
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Klein's work does suggest that the strength of his denial and rejection may be a double bluff. 
Perhaps he attempts to render something in himself that makes him uncomfortable - his own 
revealing of himself in his work - invisible, by a process of covering-over and deflecting attention. 
The `thing', of course, is still there, but imperfectly covered so that it will make unwelcome 
returns at unexpected times. Just when Klein's own ego censorship thinks it has established him 
as a still, calm Zen master, the repressed showmanship will erupt in often spectacular ways. 
1I 
Figure 14: Yves Klein, Le I "ide (detail from the interior of Galerie Iris Clert, Paris, April or May 1958). In FA. Cat. 
Rice University, Houston, Texas 1982: 305. 
An example of this occurred in 1958, when Klein organised his famous exhibition of the 
`immaterial zone' of an empty gallery, known as Le Vide or `The Void' [Figure 14]. To prepare 
the gallery, Klein covered the walls with several coats of a special pure white pigment blended 
with his own varnish alcohol, acetone and vinyl resin. I le then emptied the furniture out of the 
gallery (leaving some intact but whitened, so as not to shock). A white curtain covered the front 
door, long white drapes camouflaged the main entrance to the gallery - this was truly a 
monochrome environment. Klein's idea was to emphasise the progression from blue -a visible 
and tangible colour - to white, which Klein saw as immaterialised blue. However, all the 
spectacular elements - the presence of the French Republican Guard as security, the special blue 
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cocktail from La Coupole which gave all the guests blue urine for two days - all ensured that rather 
than an exhibition of `nothing', this was a grand, theatrical event (Stich 1995). Klein's 
paradoxical centrality in both his events and the understanding of his work problematises his own 
expressed hatred of ego-centred work. In this light, his monochromes can be read as having their 
genesis in a fundamental condition of confusion - or in the denial of a Phallic psyche which can 
produce this kind of contradiction. 
Klein's 1957 Epoca Blu show in Milan convinced the young painter Piero Manzoni to begin to 
experiment with what he called his `achromes' [Figure 15], or paintings devoid of colour. 
Chromatics, the study of the colour spectrum, has traditionally received a great deal of attention 
from researchers in the arts and the sciences alike, but the same cannot be said for the related 
discipline of `achromatics'; the study of black, white and grey as isolated or independent colours. 
Black and white are classified as distinct from colours in the chromatic spectrum; white being the 
effulgent repository of light-rays of all possible colours, black being the absence of the same4". 
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Figure 15: Piero Manzoni, Achmme 1962-3. Polystyrene pellets on canvas. 31.5 x 25cm. Manzoni Archive, Milan. 
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Manzoni's work shifted into the realm of neutral, unpainted canvases whose surfaces would, 
unlike Klein's, often be textured. His canvas (or other material) would be soaked in kaolin-and- 
paste or wet plaster, and left to dry without any intervention on behalf of the artist. Each 
`achrome' was a discrete entity, unlike the group identity of Klein's monochromes. Manzoni 
would go on to produce achromes in different materials such as stitched cloth, adding definition 
and differentiation to the surfaces which would have appalled Klein. In the years following 1957, 
Manzoni frequently travelled to Paris to visit Klein and the Iris Clert gallery. Together with Klein 
he signed the `Manifesto Against Style', a text that broke absolutely with the traditions of beauty 
and technique demanded by the `School of Paris'. After this however, `[h]is oeuvre became a 
strange parody, or deliberate inversion, of Yves" (McEvilley 1982: 44). Perhaps the most 
significant `deliberate inversion' was Manzoni's re-interpretation of Klein's war between line and 
colour. Manzoni was to continue the battle, reversing the significance of Klein's symbolism. In 
Manzoni's universe, space and the universe of forms were symbolised by a rolling infinity of lines. 
In Klein, line was anathema, anti-space. Other ways in which Manzoni could be said to be 
continuing the Kleinian project by inverting (or even perverting) its central tenets include his use 
of breadcrumbs as sculptural or plastic elements in the achromes, or his exhibition of old shoes - 
such activities focussed attention on the material details of human existence in the physical world 
which Klein sought to disguise by focusing on the infinite. 
The exhibition of Manzoni's own faeces can be read as a mischievous comment on the 
`everything produced by the artist is art' thesis, or otherwise it can be seen as a direct and 
oppositional response to Klein's exhibition of gold. In the framework of the Freudian 
unconscious however, where gold and faeces as symbolic substances are interchangeable, 
Manzoni's gesture ceases to be `oppositional' and can be read as a direct reinforcement of the 
understanding that whatever the artist produces is `gold'. What Manzoni's work provides in 
formal or optical terms is a transition point between the metaphysical monochrome tradition and 
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the more strictly formalist, material traditions discussed below. In psychic terms it appears to 
support a reading of oppositionality just as well as it supports a reading of non-oppositionality, or 
insiderism. His version of blankness is perhaps more troubling than others, since it is able to 
`pass' so easily as something that reflects and reinforces the system's exchange-value. 
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Figure 16: Yves Klein, Immaterial Room at the Museum Haus Lange, Krefeld, Germany 1961. Photograph from the 
collection of Ed Kienholz. 
1: 5 The Monochrome Sublime: Barnett Newman 
Western spiritual and philosophical traditions have historically had problems with the notion of 
unity or oneness; a problematic often played out in discourses of the 'Sublime'. The universe is 
typically perceived as a fragmentary collection of pieces beyond which exists a superior, unified 
reality, impervious to the possibility of rupture. In Eastern philosophies such as Buddhism or 
Hinduism, notions of oneness are more common. Western philosophies tend to treat the notion 
of oneness as an esoteric matter, situating it in the marginal occultist schools such as 
Rosicrucianism or Theosophy. The philosophical roots of the `unity vs. dividedness' problem are 
in the neo-Platonic writings of the Second Century scholar Plotinus. Plotinus' central question 
was the problem of oneness and multiplicity, the contradiction between the universe's evident 
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fragmentation and its equally evident coherence. For Plotinus and the neo-Platonists, access to 
higher realities than those of the everyday, realities closer to that of the infinite One, could be 
gained through art. The reality of the infinite or Sublime One erases all finite, fragmented 
realities, stripping them of all content. It makes no difference to the Sublime, or the infinite One, 
whether the finite reality in question is an individual figure or interactions between figures in a 
social setting. The Sublime makes the individual redundant and destroys the finite universe of 
form. This conception of the Sublime has clear echoes of the Buddhist doctrine of Nirvana 
(annihilation of Self and absorption into the Supreme Spirit), achievement of which requires 
absolute submission of the ego (cf Cragg [ed] 1968, Rogers, Vienne & Zarka [eds] 1997). 
The notion that art reveals the sublime was to be revivified in the neo-Platonic circles of 
Eighteenth-Century Cambridge (Havell 1963)9. Towards the middle of the century, Edmund 
Burke more famously wrestled with his own interpretations of Longinus' texts50. The Burkean 
sublime was a terrible thing, vast, gloomy, threatening, and predicated on the complete 
annihilation of the Self. Still later, Immanuel Kant wrote that by virtue of its immensity and 
irreducible alterity, the sublime also shrinks the individual. The Romantic conception of the 
heroic Self as something that surpasses mere individuality takes place in the confrontation with 
the Sublime. Coupled with the idea that the sole purpose of art is to reveal this ineffable, higher, 
unified reality, it is easy to see how the artist, creator of this revelatory thing, becomes the most 
exalted `Self of all. Peter Fuller writes, 
... ) in the dosing decades of the Eighteenth Century and the opening decades 
of the Nineteenth, the word "art" changed its meaning. When written with a 
capital "A" it came to stand not for just any human skill (as previously), but 
only for certain "imaginative" and "creative" skills; moreover, "Art" (with a 
capital "A") came also to signify a special kind of truth, "imaginative truth", 
and artist, a special kind of person, that is, a genius or purveyor of this truth'. 
(Fuller 1980: 44) 
There is, however, a danger in the Sublime, an uncanniness. It poses a direct threat to the fleshy 
body in its physical universe of forms; it can annihilate and kill. Fatal desire for the Sublime is 
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embodied in what is probably the most perfect example of Romantic literature, Goethe's Sorrows 
of Young Werther (1774), where the protagonist is eventually `voided' by the Sublime51. Longinus, 
who affirms that, `a lofty passage does not convince the reason of the reader, but takes him out of 
himself, (Longinus Trans. H. L Havell 1963: 136) illustrates the same point using a poem by 
Sappho, in which the poet describes a fit of erotic passion which seizes her like a little death. 
Sappho writes, `[... ] Whene'er I look on thee, my voice /Falters, and faints, and fails; /Paler than 
ashes grows my cheek; /And Death seems near at hand'. 52 It would seem, despite the 
androcentricity of the notions of the Romantic genius, the `Self' (like Friedrich's IVanderer, or 
Coleridge's wild-haired poet in Kubla Khan), that the essential experience of rapture within the 
sublime is not gender specific. Both Sappho and Longinus are able to lose sight of their Selves, 
the Sublime does not discriminates' 
Fascinations with the Sublime gradually caused the figure to disappear in favour of a ground that 
took on greater and greater value54. The culmination of this process in the Twentieth Century 
could be said to be the monochrome surface. In terms of latter-day Western conceptions of the 
Sublime, Thomas McEvilley suggests that the problem of unity vs dividedness takes place in the 
space of Modernist Sublime, where the problem translates into the plastic reality of figure and 
ground: 
`The ground represents the unique ground of being, its potentiality; it serves as 
a support to the multiplicity of figures who, in a certain way, are detached from 
it in order to, in a certain way, ground themselves on it once more. 
Monochrome painting, without figure, which only `figures' the ground, affirms 
the primacy of the One. This affirmation is characteristic of the Sublime'. 
(McEvilley 1988 [trans. Anson 2001: 1]). 
Monochrome affirms the primacy of the one - or so it would appear... 
Although he only produced one actual monochrome (his 1966 all-white painting Fourteenib Station, 
[Figure 17]), American painter Barnett Newman (1905-1970), highly articulate scholar of all 
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things metaphysical, continually returned to notions of the Sublime in his extensive writings, most 
of which appear in the journal The Tiger's Eye. The concept of infinity, of vast cosmic unity, 
Figure 17: Barnett Newman, Fourteenth Station, 1966. Acrychc polymer on canvas. 195 x 150cm. Collection Annalee 
Newman, New York. 
fascinated Newman, who studied Buddhist philosophy for many years and who believed (like the 
neo-Platonist philosophers before him), in art's potency to reveal the universal cosmic truth 
behind the deceptive veil of objects. The physical world was illusory for Newman, a mere 
obstacle course he must navigate in order to reach the great truths beyond. In 1940s and 1950s 
America, Newman's paintings with their characteristic `zips', or painted-out single bands, sparked 
off debates about the nature of nothingness in artistic circles. 
In the chronology of Newman's surfaces, the zips provide areas of silent repose. Conversely, 
however, the zips can also be seen as dynamic or vital - as optical as opposed to psychic 
phenomena, they enliven and create mobility in the surface. The sublime in Newman continually 
oscillates between the generative and the deathlike, so that whilst the optical surface gives the 
appearance of unity, the psychic surface, like the human psychic economy, plays host to a 
continuous oscillation between Eros and Thanatos. 
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Figure 18: Barnett Newman Onement 1,1948. Oil on canvas. 67.5 x 40cm. Collection of Annalee Newman, New 
York. 
Newman's Onement I of 1948 Figure 181, is a painting whose very title attests to a preoccupation 
with the theme of unity, integrity, the condition of being first, a primordial space of generative 
blankness. Yet it has a carefully controlled inner duality. Both the title, (twice, and tautologically) 
and the underlying concept of the painting ensure that all separateness, all isolated thing-ness, 
fades into insignificance when presented with the all-absorbing universal unity. The painting 
seems to me to combine the notion of the surface as mirror, or potential site of narcissistic 
activity, with the notion of the surface as a mirror that reveals a lack. This makes of the surface a 
psychic space for the reception, generation and movement of desire. 
`The essentialising moves made by Newman to reduce the formal complexity 
of the elements in painting to large areas of a single color have an extraordinary 
importance. The paintings are a saddle-point between art predicated on 
expression and art as an object. ' (Alloway in Battcock led] 1968: 55) 
The surface also contains, structured into the composition, a potential representation of lack 
itself. It is not that the zips interrupt the composition - in this case they are the composition; in 
Onemeni I the zip is described with heavy layers of thick impasto. Just as Lacan would posit lack 
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as a necessary condition of humanity, so Newman shows us the gap as a part of the reality of the 
`whole' surface. The gap of Barnett Newman is psychically if not optically empty and invites 
filling - which is interesting, because what began as a compositional strategy to refute the 
autocracy of figuration became established in the repertoire of modem art as the epitome of so- 
called `pure' painting. 
Like the Lacanian Real, Newman's gap contains a vast configuration of possibilities - only in 
Newman's case these are predicated on a series of dualities. The horizontal space that divides 
Onement I is at once both mute and articulate, both static and dynamic. As a result of this 
proliferation of opposites (or at least separates) the gap or zip in Newman can be understood to 
be both overstuffed and empty; just like the Lacanian notion of desire-fuelled lack which, on 
filling, immediately stretches so as to lay bare yet more space. It is a space, receptacle, or hole 
within a mirror (the blank `ground' of the painting), which itself represents lack. Newman's 
`ground' (in fact the field of this painting was `initially conceived as a "prepared ground" ' (Bois 
1990: 191-2), acts as a projective mirror, whilst the zip both actively represents and mirrors the 
lack. What spectators experience, therefore, is a layering, or doubling-up of the representation of 
lack, paradoxically so full that it is empty, so noisy with the clamour of desire's siren-call that it is 
silent. This notion of dynamism is extremely important in terms of the psychic space of the 
monochrome; the apparent unity of the surface is a trick, imperfectly concealing the playful erotic 
dance of signifiers, free to play because they are not under the shadow of the Phallus, which 
always interrupts to ensure specific signification. Psychically, Newman's surface is both 
indeterminate and mobile, it can slip through fixed Phallic categories; 
`His strategy was to emphasise the intentional nature of the perceptual field by 
urging us to shift from our preconscious perceptual activity (or the "normal" 
preconscious level of perception) to a conscious one, and at the same time to 
prevent this consciousness from crystallising in any definite way [... ] We 
cannot both fix the zip and look at the painting at the same time[... ]' (Bois 
1990: 203) 
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Newman owed a great debt to Longinus' Treatise on the Sublime. In the same year as he painted 
Onement I, he wrote a piece on the conflict in art between the search for `beauty', (an aspect of 
form), and the search for the `sublime', (existing beyond form and having the power to extinguish 
it). Newman felt strongly that the only answer to this problem was to radically repudiate both 
form and beauty, leaving an art whose form `is perhaps without form'; in other words, the relation 
between ground and figure (or form) is rejected in favour of the undifferentiated ground, which 
in turn affirms that the aim of art is identical with that of mysticism - arrival at the space of the 
One, rather than the Many. Newman's interest in `oneness' and'firs tness' found its natural well 
of inspiration in cosmological traditions of the creation of the world; the moment where the first 
suggestions of form were produced out of absolute emptiness". His abiding interest in the 
Kabbala, the esoteric tradition of Judaism, brought to his attention the concept of Tsim-Tsoum, 
which stayed with him throughout his painting career. In Tsim-Tsoum, God actually contracts 
Himself in order to leave a space in the universe - which is of course both distinct from Him and 
contained in Him - which He can fill. This `first moment' for Newman is always a transposition 
of his interest in the present; the first moment in the perpetual mystery of being was, as he saw it, 
essentially a paradox - that which comes first is at the same time always being repeated. 
1: 6 Conclusion 
`Gottlieb, Newman and Rothko jointly declared: "there is no such thing as a 
good painting about nothing. We assert simply the subject is crucial" '. (Fuller 
1980: 75) 
Fuller's observation was not an `official' line on the monochromatic surface, it jostled with some 
of the others seen above. The various painterly manifestations of `nothing' discussed here show a 
variety of possible ways in which blankness causes problems for a Phallic audience. We have 
seen monchrome `dismissed as a joke', but also operating as the vehicle and subject of a series of 
elaborate, repeated jokes against the art establishment, which were tolerated by that establishment 
(which is a cunning way of castrating the joke). Whilst unintelligibility disturbs the ego, it is also 
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possible that some of the disturbance comes from monochrome's dual and oppositional 
conditions of finality and endlessness. Both optically and psychically, monochrome is the 
embodiment of indeterminacy. Its lack of stability makes it a force that introduces chaos into 
systems, and its apparently paradoxical status as receptacle for opposing paired values makes it the 
ultimate puzzle, the ultimate indeterminate. 
In 1962 Umberto Eco wrote his highly influential text, The Open Work, in which he examined 
what he understood as the perpetual relationship throughout history between the arts and the 
sciences, frequently understood as incompatible or opposed categories. He suggested, for 
example, that `formlessness' in the cultural sphere (which, as I read it, might take the form of a 
monochrome painting), had direct correspondence with the scientific application of the 
`uncertainty principle'. For Eco, traditional forms of expression can only convey traditional 
meanings or conventional views, whereas the modem `open work' implicitly denies them. 
Uncertainty itself, for example, is now no longer a lacuna in knowledge, but a legitimate category 
of knowledge in its own right. For Eco, new styles of expression are absolutely essential. 
However, there is more to this than meets the eyes, as Eco appears to allow for a fundamental 
challenge to the very nature of the sign itself: 
`[... ] whereas classical art introduced original elements within a linguistic 
system whose basic laws it substantially respected, contemporary art often 
manifests its originality by imposing a new linguistic system with its own inner 
laws [... ] contemporary art constantly oscillates between the rejection of the 
traditional linguistic system and its preservation - for if contemporary art 
imposed a totally new linguistic system, then its discourse would cease to be 
communicable. The dialectic between form and the possibility of multiple 
meanings, which constitutes the very essence of the "open work", takes place 
in this oscillation'. (Eco 1962: 60) 
He could almost be describing the monochrome surface, whose illegibility speaks eloquently of its 
condition as `new linguistic system' with its own inner laws. Since uncertainty is no longer simply 
a notion but a category of knowledge, there exists in the plastic arts no reason why the signifier 
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cannot now operate without any pre-existing notion, or tacit knowledge, of the signified. The 
sign can now quite legitimately refuse to signify - or refuse to own knowledge of that which it is 
meant to signify. 
`Through Impressionism, the "sign" had become increasingly imprecise, 
dissolving finally into a mist in Monet's late works. Progressively, the 
relationship of form to substance had been overturned [... ] the substance had 
become the true "subject" of the picture, and the beholder was obliged to 
choose his interpretation from within a complex configuration where a 
plurality of "signifieds" coexisted within the one signifier. ' (Daval 1989: 97) 
What is more interesting, however, is the importance Eco gives to `oscillation'. The unmarked 
space between two opposing certainties becomes a space of agency, a space where the `dialectic 
between form and the possibility of meanings' is eternally worked out. The meaningful 
possibilities become endless, as the movement of oscillation is continuous. The oscillation that 
starts from the optical surface of one particular monochrome is, however, just the first in a series 
of oscillations. If we enlarge the analogy to include the various appearances of monochrome 
within the context of Art History, we can read each appearance as taking part in a larger 
oscillation between the `meaningful' surface, made sense of by figuration, and the `meaningless', 
understood as `empty'. This `emptiness' is partly concealed and partly displayed by the uncanny 
psychic surface that is 1'extimite, a surface which allows for a glimpse of the Real where the 
invisible signifiers in monochrome's psychic surface exist in blissful, silent and invisiblejouissance. 
These oscillations between spectator and surface allow the eternally deferred signifiers to 
gradually pass, with each oscillation, from the Real through the Imaginary and finally to the 
Symbolic or optical surface. Psychically indeterminate blank optical space actively resists reading 
and goes on playing. If its purpose is to dance across certainty and avoid finality of meaning, 
monochrome as bringer of chaos is unable to settle down. Perhaps this is its psychic or art 
historical `symptom'; to defy definition. 
I think a potentially more fertile consideration, though, would be that the mischievous blank 
space is able to give the appearance of accepting Phallic authority whilst covertly continuing to 
93 
flout it - it does this with its psychically indefinite surface which appears, superficially or optically, 
to be definite. This is one amongst several types of blank indeterminacy that we have seen so far, 
some of which coexist in Newman's surface. First we have seen blank indeterminacy performing 
the role of trickster or playing a joke against the system of Phallic authority. This kind of 
blankness operates at the confluence of two distinct paths - in the case of the fictive 
monochromes, literature and visual art - and introduces chaos into both, blurring the margins 
that once distinguished them. This `joke' relies on `passing' successfully as something the Phallus 
will recognise as one of its own. Then there is the blankness whose indeterminacy has to do with 
covering over, and the indeterminacy whose blankness comes from a process of reduction. There 
is also the indeterminacy that presents the Phallus with a reflection of itself, but a tricky reflection 
that contains that which the Phallus is determined not to see. In each case the qualities of 
blankness and indeterminacy activate each other in a continuous psychic oscillation. In each case, 
also, the result for the Phallic spectator is a feeling of intense discomfort, momentary 
destabilising, and manic foreclosure of the possibility that his power is based on an illusion. 
Homi Bhabha describes cultural hybridity as, `liminal space, in between the designations of 
identity [... ] the connective tissue that constructs the difference between upper and lower, black 
and white. The hither and thither, this interstitial passage [... ] that entertains difference without 
an assumed or imposed hierarchy. ' (Bhabha 1994: 4). In response, Paul Spickard signals concern 
at what he sees as an unproblematic privileging or esteeming of something, simply because it is 
indeterminate. He writes that, `Like many of his colleagues, Bhabha is not very clear about what 
he means by hybridity and assumes that this amorphous mixedness is antihierarchical, 
revolutionary, and therefore good. ' (Spickard in Parker & Song [eds] 2001: 93). Robert Young's 
argument in `Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race' is more cautious; he 
describes the ways in which Colonialism has appropriated the body of the Mixed Race subject in 
order to perpetuate the illusion of Colonial rule. In having to submit to preposterous legal 
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classifications ('Mulatto', `Octoroon', `Quadroon', etc), the Mixed Race subject's body can be (and 
has been) implicated in the continuation of Colonial hierarchies. I think that both approaches are, 
in some way, right, though I want to make a slightly different suggestion by nuancing both. In 
relation to Bhabha's comments, I would prefer to say that the culturally liminal thing has 
transgressive potential, rather than the `power' that Bhabha suggests. Potential only becomes 
power when put to use, and it is difficult to think of Young's obsessively categorised and defined 
Mixed Race subject as having any of her own `power'. If we deploy my notion of a psychic space 
in relation to the positions for the indeterminate subject that Bhabha and Young put forward, we 
can further nuance the argument. Psychic space allows for the consideration that it is precisely 
the inherently transgressive nature of someone whose existence points to an illicit union, that 
prompts the deciding Phallus to go on the categorising rampage described by Young. It is not a 
case of `either inherently transgressive or historically implicated'. Rather it is that the dominant 
system perceived its own reflection in the psychic surface of the indeterminate creature and, 
fearing the sight of itself `contaminated', began to categorise more and more manically. The 
indeterminate body gives the lie to the `either/or' binary of the `race' thinking of the Coloniser, 
and in this way it is a threat. The reaction of Young's Colonisers is comparable to the reactions 
of the Phallic critics to the blank space of monochrome, which threatens to disrupt the 
genealogical lines which have been largely based on family resemblance. The disturbing blankness 
of the surface cannot be entertained, so meaning must be forced to `fix', and possibilities shut 
down. 
1 Other important exhibitions of monochrome painting include the 1988 Lyon show, Couleur Seu/e: L24eriurce du 
Monochrome (Colour Alone/Only: the Monochrome Experience/Experiment), the 1998 Monomania show at the Rocket 
Gallery, Cork St, the earlier 1978 show in New York, curated by Michael Walls, In the Reabn of the Monochromatic, or the 
1989 show MinimalMeans at the Showroom Gallery, curated by Jonathan Watkins and dedicated to only white or 
black paintings. 
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2 En effet, comme le monochrome nest ni un `sujet', ni un 'genre' mais un mode - limite d'existence de la peinture 
et un instrument de 1'emploi/le rejet s'inscrit dans la logique de demarches disparates dont il n'est jamais le point de 
depart et pas necessairement la conclusion, son histoire se developpe dc facon discontinue. Ni le jeu traditionnel des 
filiations chrono-genealogiques, ni celui des regroupements par `affinites thematiques' ne permettent dc ramener la 
diversit6 de ses manifestations sporadiques ä des ensembles coherents: (Besset 1988: ii) 
3 'Elles refusent toute approche oblique, par le biais coutumier des rapprochements et des comparaisons, et exigent 
d'etre regardees en face. ' (Besset 1988: ii) 
4 Some Black societies, for example the Jamaican society, accept varying degrees of `racial' mixing as largely 
unproblematic. However, whilst being informed by White society that they are Black, many Mixed Race people find 
themselves rejected by certain Black societies. For example, whilst living in Dublin in 1999 I visited one of the 
growing number of Black hairdressing salons in the city, one which was run by Nigerians. I was having my hair 
(which is unprocessed) corn-rowed, when my hairdresser called her friends over to come and look at my hair type, 
which they all seemed to find hysterically funny. I pretended to laugh along with them, though I did not enjoy being 
the butt of their jokes. Later, when the hairdresser and I were discussing our experiences of racism in Ireland, I was 
quite taken aback when she informed me categorically, `but you are not Black'. This has happened many times before 
and since. For what is arguably the definitive essay on the issues surrounding Black hair, see Kobena Mercer's `Black 
Hair/Style Politics' (Mercer 1994: 97-130) 
s Evoquant un systeme de pensee qu'il juge trop simpliste, Hegel recourt ä la metaphore d'une 'peinture absolument 
monochrome' pour en stigmatiser la faillite. ' (Riout 1989: 88) 
6 Even Kierkegaard famously 'painted' a literary example of a notional monochrome entirely red, stating that, '[t]he 
rest of my life is null; it is a vague feeling; a greyness. It resembles a painting by that artist who, to represent the 
Hebrews crossing the Red Sea, covered the whole wall in red on the pretext that the Hebrews had already crossed 
and the Egyptians had been drowned. ' (Kierkegaard in Millet 1996: 24). 
7 Ellsworth Kelly attracted the attention of a number of critics and historians of art when he revealed that one of his 
green monochromes had been directly inspired by his recent visit to Giverny. Immediately there followed a feeding- 
frenzy of interest in what was perceived as the proto-monochromatic character of much of Monet's later work, 
particularly his Nymphias. Interestingly, Kelly's work has been written of in terms that explore its inherent 
indeterminacy, or the confluence of ideas in his work which had previously been considered as dualisms (eg, line and 
colour). In his introduction to MinimalArt, Gregory Battcock writes that, `[P]aintings by Ellsworth Kelly also seem 
to allude to current critical ideas. For example, we know that the new Minimal style should not be considered a 
repudiation of the earlier Abstract-Expressionist aesthetic. Rather, modern artists, such as Ellsworth Kelly, 
emphasise the lingering vitality of certain Abstract-Expressionist discoveries, and at the same time acknowledge the 
legitimacy of that movement. In Kelly's new paintings (Sidney Janis Gallery, NY, 1967, my note) there is no formal 
distinction between line and edge - they are both the same. Nor is there the possibility of color as form because 
when a color ends, so does the edge of that particular pane [... ]In addition, Kelly throws new light on various ideas in 
modern aesthetics, such as those proposed by Michael Fried, Barbara Rose, and Lawrence Alloway - including shape 
as form, color as shape, primacy of literal over depicted shape, illusion in art, image and theatricality, and system in 
art. ' (Battcock 1968: 31) 
8 Mallarme's (and some of his contemporary painters') fascination with whiteness is interesting when considered 
alongside the Impressionists, who did not see white in nature. Van Gogh also allegedly asked himself if it were 
possible to paint a white wall using white paint, arriving at the conclusion that it was not. 
s On the poetry of Mallarme, see Penny Florence's Un Coap de Di: Jamais N'abofrra Is Hasard (A Single Throw of the 
Dice Will Never Abolish Chance), Oxford, 2000. This is an interactive, multimedia version of Mallarme's last poem 
(1898), the typography of which was revolutionary at the time, the words resembling in places the patterns of 
scattered dice. The multimedia presentation allows for a radical experience of reading, with lithographs by Odilon 
Redon, and music (Claude Debussy's La Mer III: Dialogue du Vent et de la Met). See also Dee Reynolds' (1995) SymboG; d 
Aesthetics and Early Ahstrac7Arh. Sites of Imaginary Space Cambridge University Press. 
10 This painting was re-titled by the artist six years later as Symphony No. 1: The White Girl, to fall into series with his 
other musically-titled white compositions. As well as showing an interest in music as an art form, Whistler's 
preoccupation with musical titles of his work recalls Walter Pacer's dictum that the condition of music is what all an 
aspires to. For a further discussion of this, please see Florence (1986) A1a11arme, Manet & Redon: Visual and. 4urral Sims 
and the Generation of Meaning Cambridge University Press. 
tt Whistler was no stranger to artistic controversy throughout his career. In a response to his showing of Noctum in 
Black and Gold: The Falling Rocket at the Grosvenor Gallery in 1877, John Ruskin famously wrote of Whislter's 
insolence, charging, 'two hundred guineas for flinging a pot of paint in the public's face. ' Whistler responded by 
charging Ruskin with libel, and the ensuing court case involved some of the major figures of the Victorian art world. 
Testifying for Ruskin were the successful figures of Edward Burne Jones and William Powell Frith. On Whistler's 
side were Albert Moore and William Michael Rossetti. The outcome was that Whistler won the case, and was 
awarded a farthing for damages. 
12 J'ai propose une interpretation de la `Dame Blanche', qui n'a eu de succes qu'aupres dc moi, taut on repugne ä 
accorder des id6cs aux peintres. Qu'avez-vous voulu faire? Demandai-je ä l'etrange artiste dont je n'avais admire 
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encore que les fantasques eaux-fortes. Un tour de force de votre metier de peintre, consistant ä enlever des blancs 
sur des blancs? Permettez-moi de ne pas le croire. Laissez-moi voir dans votre oeuvre quelque chose dc plus eleve, le 
lendemain dc l'epousee, cette minute troublante oü la jeune femme s'interroge et s'etonne de ne plus reconnaltre en 
eile la virginite de la vieille. ' (Riout 1989: 84) 
13 Much current literature on 'Whiteness' owes a great deal to such scholars as Vron Ware, who has written on White 
women in particular. See Ware (1992) Beyond the Pale: White [Women, Racism, and Hzrtory (London, NY, Verso). 
14 For a discussion on sexual stereotypes in the colonial imagination, also see Bhabha (1983), Hall (1997), or Suzanne 
Shaw of Duke University's paper, The Hottentot/Hot-to-Trot Penis: the_Pornotmping of the African Male, presented in 2000 
at `The Black Gaze - International Perspectives on African-World Literature and Visual Culture', University of 
London, Dept. of English Studies. 
15 Kobena Mercer introduces another subject who poses problems for the fetishistic binary of 'Black man/White 
woman', that of the gay Black man. He writes that, 'As black men we are implicated in the same landscape of 
stereotypes which is dominated and organised around the needs, demands and desires of white males', and goes on to 
identify, 'a rigid set of racial roles and identities which rehearse scenarios of desire in a way which traces the cultural 
legacies of slavery, empire and imperialism. ' (Mercer 1994b: 131-2). Like the subject of Mixed Race, the gay Black 
man also confuses the exchange-value of the White Phallic system of racist stereotypes, rendering that system's 
desires visible and exposing its hypocrisy. This exposure is crucial, as it allows for an inspection of structures whose 
rower has previously been predicated on their invisibility. 
6 The ability or otherwise of the so-called 'Mulatto' to bear children has been the subject of much pseudo-scientific 
and popular enquiry and mythmaking. See, for example, Ifekwunigwe 1999: 1-10. 
17 Ces associations des nuances analogues etaient comprises par tout le monde il ya cent ans, et cette difficulte, qui 
embarrasserait aujourd'hui plus dun maitre, passait alors pour un jeu d'ecolier' (Riout 1989: 96, footnote 10). 
18 'Oudry, lorsqu'il peint la blancheur, se trouve place devant un obstacle epistemologique incontournable: la mimesis, 
encore triomphante. Contraint d'y faire allegeance, 11 la met en crise, disposant devant Jul un arrangement d'objets 
dont le rapprochement est paradoxal puisque, loin de s'individuer les uns par rapport aux autres, ils tendent I. se 
confondre. L'art consomme du peintre consiste i enregister et contenir cette frenesie de dissolution. ' (Riout 1989: 83) 
19 Bizarrely enough, in the catalogue accompanying the 1884 exhibition ofArtr Incohennts, in which Alphonse Allais 
invents a painterly history for himself, he describes himself in an unintentionally premonitory way as a 'pupil of the 
masters of the Twentieth Century', reinforcing the impossibility of monochrome-as-art in the Nineteenth Century 
imagination. Retracing the genesis of his pictorial history, Allais gives homage to fictitious paintings (Riout 1989 
[Trans. Cottington 2000: 4]). The last exhibition but one of Ler Incaherents, in 1889, presented a Sky Without Clouds, a 
Cloud Without Sky and a Total Eclipse of the San in CentralAfrica. It's not difficult to imagine the colours covering these 
canvases. 
20 Denys Riout (1996) believes that there is nothing innately funny about the blank image of the false monochrome's 
surface; he situates the humour specifically in the accompanying text. Other writers such as Eugene Tan or David 
Batchelor comment on the absurdity of monochrome, connecting its absurdity with humour, My observations of 
spectators' reactions to monochromes would encourage me to position myself alongside Tan and Batchelor; the 
illegibility of monochrome often produces the reaction of laughter. Whilst watching Yasmina Reza's play, Art, in 
May 2002, I was interested to note that the moment the white monochrome around which the action is structured 
was revealed, the audience responded with almost unanimous laughter. It was as though they had been primed to 
find a white monochrome painting funny, and also as though this were the most acceptable and understandable 
reaction in the world. 
21 Examples of these include, 'Vue d'Amsterdam au clair de Lune. Le bateau ä vapeur nest pas encore arrive assez 
pres d'Amsterdam pour pouvoir distinguer cette ville i l'oeil nu. ' (View ofAmaterdam in Moonkght. ' The steamboat has 
not yet arrived close enough to Amsterdam to be able to distinguish this town with the naked eye). 
'Un tableau mal eclaire' (A Painting Badb Lit). 
'Etude de nuit, paysage ä la maniere noire, ' (Study of Night: Landscape in a Black Manner). 
'Jeunes albinos prenant leurs ebats sur des terrains albinos. Voues au blanc depuis leur enfance, les enfants et les 
terrains ont un air de candeur et d'innocence qui repose 1'esprit. ' (Young Albinos Fro/cking In Albino Landscapes. 
Devoted to white since their childhood, the children and the fields have an air of freshness and innocence that rests 
the spirit). (Riout 1989 [Trans. Cottington 2000: 3-4) I wonder if Whistler was ever shown the latter derisory joke. 
One can imagine a prankster showing Whistler the page where the 'Albinos' are described, disguising the fact that 
they in fact predate his own Little White Girl. Such a prankster could easily make Whistler believe that the comments 
were about his own work; after all, they are not so far removed in tone from Ruskin's memorable accusation that 
Whistler was, 'flinging a pot of paint in the public's face'. 
22 Joke monochromes that were actually exhibited, or existed as paintings, were a slightly different matter. Alphonse 
Allais has remained celebrated for his First Commmnion of Young Chlomtic Girls in Snowy Weather, which was exhibited in 
the context of the 1883 Exhibition of Incoherent Arts. By 1883, of course, the tradition of comic fictive 
monochromes was already a long one. The original, which was a piece of completely unmarked white paper, has 
since been lost, but the legend lives on, and reproductions can be found in his famous Apr//Fools' Day book 
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(reprinted in 1962 and again in 1987). The humourist repeated the offence the following year, with his 1884, A 
Harvest of Tomatoes on the Shores of the Red Sea by Apopleptic Cardinals: Effect of the Aurora Borealis. 
23 By 1889, the year of the penultimate show of Arts Incoherentr, comic fictive monochromy had lost much of its initial 
comic lustre, many in France found that the joke was no longer funny, simply a worn, repetitive cliche. In the 1880s 
in Belgium, however, the fast-fading patina of the comic monochrome received a final polish; it was put to use as a 
polemical device. In 1885 the members of the traditionalist group LE. csor, who were fundamentally opposed to the 
avant-gardism of Lea XX, organised an exhibition whose profits were to go to'the unemployed workers'. The 
journal L'Art Moderne, who supported Les XX, felt that this Great Zwans Exhibition was little more than a 'clownish' 
frontal attack, and flatly refused to publish any material about it (other than its statement of refusal to publish). In an 
admittedly far from subtle statement against what they perceived as the frivolous folly of avant-gardism, LEssor 
included three monochromes in the show whose titles, again, both proved the existence of the monochrome as a 
'proper' painting with 'real' subject matter - genre painting, history painting, and so on - and also explained that the 
monochromes were to be understood as a joke. Of the three monochromes exhibited by Lynen, the Liberalwas blue, 
the Clerical red and the Independent green. The avant-garde's organised combat against the outmoded styles of 
academicism was not really countered by academicism's weak attempt to lampoon the avant-garde. What 
academicism's supporters failed to realise was that by moulding an established tradition of derision to their own ends, 
they risked a derisory response to their work. 
24 Freud does distinguish between 'jokes' and 'the comic', in SE viii Chapter VII, Jokes and the Species of the Conric (181- 
236). 
25 This seems to suggest, at least in the context of the Russian Orthodox Christian society on whose psyche this 
legend had such an effect, another dimension for understanding the monochrome. The inability to represent 
something like the Face of God, which no person may see and live, poses problems for any painter, not just the 
scribe Hannan. The light-filled radiance of Jesus' face, however, suggests that an attempt to re-capture that mutable 
light might be the most appropriate way to represent the Divine Face. One can only speculate about the contents of 
anybody's unconscious mind, but it is possible that in making what he conceived as the ultimate gesture against God, 
Malevich was unconsciously making a copy of the instrutable Divine Face, a faithful non-representative image of the 
illegible Face of God. 
26 Many other examples exist of blankness used for political ends. In 1951, a political satire on the lack of freedom of 
the Argentine press was timed to coincide with the opening of a meeting of Latin American foreign ministers in 
Washington. The comment took the form of a cartoon edition of the Argentine Newspaper, La Prensa, which was 
entirely blank except for the words, La Prensa at the top of the title page, and the date (Mar 51) at the bottom. All 
this blank white paper was mockingly titled, White Paper on the Peron Dictatorship, which calls to mind the spirit of satire 
that accompanied the French imaginary monochromes of the Nineteenth Century. In both cases, the satire is 
intended to provoke awareness and discussion, even change. (Cf. The Herblock Book, 1952, Boston: Beacon Press). 
27 The 'path into the corner' which he speaks of is the path to the Cross; the path to the perfectability that Jesus 
Christ offered to mankind by His death. The 'Image' that all paths lead to is the Buck Square, which he speaks of as 
though it were a religion or some kind of pathway. Malevich did, in fact, revere art, viewing it as almost like a deity. 
He believed that the stars in the sky had also been created by an artist. 
28 According to Linda Dalrymple Henderson, the first recorded use of the term 'fourth dimension' appears to be in 
Seventeenth Century England, in Henry More's circle of Cambridge Platonists. This was, however, less a geometric 
space, and more specifically the dwelling place of the Platonic Ideal. In this sense it can be said to have commonality 
with the Platonic, and subsequently Kristevan, chow, which is not a physical space either, but a notional space of 
transition. Eventually, the association of the fourth dimension with the Platonic Ideal was to become commonplace 
in hyperspace philosophy, a dimension of space, unlike the nebulous notion of Henry More's Cambridge Platonists, 
where the Kantian 'thing-in-itself would be revealed (Henderson 1983: 30). The fashion for fourth dimension 
mathematics took late Nineteenth Century England by storm; there are even short stories by Oxford mathematician 
Rev. Charles Dodgson (better known as Alice author Lewis Carroll), such as his 1865 tale Dynamics o fa Part-icle, which 
poke fun at the 'fourth dimension students' (Henderson 1983: 21-22). The Nineteenth and early Twentieth century 
public held the popular notion of the fourth dimension as a spatial concept. By 1919, Einstein's interpretation of 
time alone as the fourth dimension in the space-time continuum had largely replaced this in popular consciousness 
(cf. Linda Dalrymple Henderson's article, `The Merging of Time and Space', in Soviet Union 1978 5.2, pp171-203). 
29 Uspensky's writings were a syncretic mixture of mathematics, modem physics (see for example his notion of the 
space-time continuum in four dimensions), Kantian thought, I linduism, Plotinus, Boehme, Spinoza and the writings 
of his contemporary RAI Bucke, a Canadian physician who was also a friend of Walt Whitman. The full title of 
Uspensky's 1911 volume is, Tertium O anum: The Third Canon of Tbougbt, a Key to the Enismas of the Wor/a 
30The full reference for this quote is: Peter Uspensky, 'Tertium Organum', as quoted by Matiushin in '0 Krüge 
Metsanzhe-Gleza'Du Cubisme', Soh(ZA1oloderhi 3 (March 1913): 25,28. 
31 For further discussions of the work of Gordon Bennett, see Rex Butler's brilliant essay, Echo and Narcissus: Gordon 
Bennett and his Critics. This can be found at: littp: //www. uws. edii.,, iu., irts/nroject uni /publishing/postwestlpdf- 
files/Butler. Also see Terry Smith's essay, 'Australia's Anxiety' in History and Memory in the Art of Gordon Bennett 
(2000) Ikon Gallery, Birmingham [exhibition catalogue], Jeannette Iloorn's essay, 'Positioning the Post-Colonial 
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Subject: History and Memory in the Art of Gordon Bennett' in Art and Australia vol. 31, no. 2, summer 1993, and Ian 
McLean (1998) White Aborigines: Identity Politics in Australian Art London, Cambridge University Press. 
32 AN Lunarcharsky, A. A Bogdanov and Maksim Gorky were principle members of a group who formed in 
opposition to the authority of Lenin, which by 1908 was already being challenged. Their philosophical positions 
came to be know as bogostroitel'stov, or God-building. 
33 Many theorists have considered Malevich's rejection of traditional notions of artistic beauty and so on as futile, as a 
direct result of the horrors of Word War One. Thomas McEvilley writes for example that in Malevich's paintings, 
The contours of the objective world become more and more blurred, step by step, until, finally, the world is out of 
sight. This way of diverting the world of forms can be partly interpreted as a terrified and disgusted reaction to the 
First World War, and the desert which extends above forms was an involuntary description of Europe in ruins. The 
enthusiasm for the sublime seems bound to the aftermath of a devastating war. It played an important role just after 
the Napoleonic wars and after the First and Second World Wars. When Malevich denounces artistic knowledge, 
conventional beauty and all art bound to form, as futile and vulgar, perhaps we must see here the sign of a 
disillusionment as much as of the benefits of civilisation. ' (McEvilley 1998 [trans. Anson 2001: 8]). Teresa Brennan 
(1993) looks at the possibility of the 'ego's era', through which it would be interesting to look at the desire for 
cultural, psychical and personal revolution as a symptom of. Brennan examines Lacan's theory of the pathology of 
history, which states that a psychotic era began in the Seventeenth Century and is in a stage of near-culmination 
'now'. She argues that psychical fantasies are mircocosmic versions of macrocosmic processes that take place in the 
ego's era. See Brennan (1993) Hi toryAfterLaean London, Routledge. 
34 The first three of this list were women. It is interesting to note the apparently equal importance of women artists 
in the Russian Constructivist movement compared to, say, Cubism or Impressionism. 
35 'C'est toutefois avec Malevich et Rodchenko que sont defines les deux grands axes du monochrome du Xxieme 
siecle - metaphysique et materialiste. ' (McEvilley 1988: 4) 
36 See Michael Fried's recently republished Art and Objecthoor Essays and Review: 1998, University of Chicago Press. 
37 Many sources give as reasons for the development of a Minimalist aesthetic the notion of a profound reaction 
against the frenzied gestures of Abstract Expressionism, and its apparent privileging of the ego of the Divine Creator 
Artist. Marcia Hafif writes concisely that, 'In Europe the reaction had been against the composition and signature 
touch of Tachisme and Informel, as in New York it had been against the sensitive brushstroke of Abstract 
Expressionsim. ' (Haff 1989: 138) Also see Strickland [cd] (1993) for a discussion of some of these issues of reaction. 
There is a large body of literature, much of it quite confusing or at least conflicting, on the relation between Abstract 
Expressionism and contemporary political and social realities. Whilst it cannot be said that Abstract Expressionism 
was 'in service to the state', it is nevertheless inescapably bound up with the facts of Stalinism's growth in the Soviet 
Union and Communist parties around the world, the tragic fate of the socialist revolution in the 1930s and '40s, and 
the nature of American society as it emerged from World War II. Abstract Expressionism is often written of as 
though it were a master-stroke for American identity; the post-war American media gleefully situating their country as 
a major player in contemporary art and culture and destabilising Paris (or Europe), who had formerly held this 
position. However, the matter is more complex than this - Trotsky had massive currency in New York's intellectual 
circles (Lee Krasner, for instance, sympathised with Trotskyan ideas, as did Gottlieb, Rothko, Greenberg and 
Rosenberg). Serge Guilbault, in How New York Stole the Idea ofdlodern Am Abstract Expressionism, Freedom and the Cold 
War (1983, University of Chicago Press), documents these complex events and attitudes, making it clear that the 
artists themselves quickly became disillusioned with some of the emerging aspects of McCarthyite, Cold War 
America. He writes, 'They were sick of politics and therefore thought they were sick of history as well. By using 
primitive imagery and myths to cut themselves off from the historical reality of their own time, they hoped to protect 
themselves from the manipulation and disillusionment they had suffered previously' (1983: 77). Also sec Peter 
Fuller's essay 'Jackson Pollock' in Beyond the Crisis in Ad (1980). The general American panic about the encroaching 
threat of Communism also invoked some serious, converse panic about whether abstract painting of this nature (or 
abstract painting at all) counted as 'un-American activity'. In this atmosphere, Ellsworth Kelly lost his teaching job at 
the American School in Paris for the abominable crime of abstract painting. His paintings were confiscated and a 
humiliating FBI investigation followed. Also see George Dondero, United States Senator for Michigan, who in the 
1940s became the mouthpiece of conservative America's attack on 'communistic' art. Isis speech, 'Communists 
Maneuver to Control Art in the United States' is published in Harrison & Wood [eds] (1992: 654-658). Alfred II. Barr 
of MOMA wrote an article in defence of the American avant-garde entitled, 'Is Modern Art Communistic? ' 
Originally published in the New York Times in 1952, this can also be found in Harrison & Wood [eds] (1992: 660- 
663). 
38 Michael Fried would go on to use this quotation of his guru Greenberg's to illustrate his point, in relation to Stella, 
that the expansion of the 'realm of the pictorial' to include things that were not immediately recognisable as 'art' was 
as potentially problematic as it was freeing. He writes in Three American Painters: Kenneth Noland, Jules 0ütski and Frank 
Stella that, 'the expansion of the realm of the pictorial is at best a mixed blessing for the modernist painter: because at 
the same time that the spectator may have gained the ability to see a length of fabric as a potential painting, he may 
also have acquired the tendency to regard a modernist painting of the highest quality as nothing more than a length of 
coloured fabric. That is, because all sorts of large and small items that used to belong in the realm of the arbitrary and visually 
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meaningless may now be experienced pictorially or in meaningful relation to the pictorial, the risk is greatly increased 
that first-rate modernist paintings will appear arbitrary and visually meaningless. It is in this sense that modernist 
; 
painting presents unique difficulties to the beholder. ' (Fried 1965 in Fried [ed] 1998: 259-260, my italics). 
9 Reinhardt did in fact embrace Abstract Expressionism for a brief period in the 1940s, though he is well known as 
one of its detractors. 
40 Reinhardt said this in 1966 in an interview with Bruce Glaser in Art Intentional (L`'inter 1966-67: 18). He was of 
course not the only artist to have made such an assertion about his work, but it is observable that critics have tended 
to pack his work together with others of the same period (particularly Rauschenberg, bianzoni, Fontana) because 
they have read them as being concerned with 'the end of painting'. I do not believe that any kind of 'ending' of 
painting was Reinhardt's major concern. I find it strange that, given Reinhardt's obsessive written, verbal and painted 
explorations of the possibilities of art, that anyone could think he might be concerned with its 'end'. Ad Reinhardt 
wanted to get inside painting, to get under the skin of Art (with a capital 'A', understood by him as entirely separate 
from 'Life') and expose Art. Perhaps 'expose' is not the right word; rather I should say that Reinhardt's desire for 
immersion into and understanding of painting was total. He wanted it undressed, not in front of him for the 
gratification of his consuming stare, but with him, for the closest communion possible. 
41 In terms of a 'zeitgeist' or a 'historical ego', it should be noted that Judd's presentation of a void coincided with the 
rise of Feminism and Black Power in the United States. Feminists and Civil Rights activists alike were concerned 
with ensuring that those subjects who had historically been 'voided' and rendered invisible could be allowed to speak 
and act freely, could be acknowledged and seen. 
42 Fer explains that, 'It has been claimed that phenomenology is the philosophy of Minimalism, because of the 
emphasis it places on the bodily encounter of the spectator and the work. ' (Fer 1997: 135), informing us that in Three 
American Painters, Fried 'invokes Nierleau-Ponty', and that Merleau-Ponty is implicitly present in his later, Art and 
Objecthood. In 1966 Rosalind Krauss also offered a phenomenological reading of Judd. (Fer 1997: 135) 
43 'Chave has reduced abstract art to the condition of resemblance-based representation by treating it as cryptically 
iconic. This iconifying of the abstract is based in not much more than a combination of literalness and selectiveness 
in the matter of the artists' expressed interest and intentions, deconstructive redundancy, and a certain amount of 
screw-up-your-eyes-until-you-can-see-it methodology. Thus she is able to read a selection of work by Flavin, Andre, 
Noland and others as highly schematised depictions - of phalluses, military emblems, and so on. ' (Batchelor 1991: 49) 
44 The picture's entrance on to the 'stage' of the gallery constitutes, I think, yet another level of 'staging'. 
45 Klein's lack of interest in 'abstraction' comes from his understanding of abstraction's prior debt to realism, and 
thus to the trickery of the eye that he so despised. In any consideration of Klein it is important to remember that his 
development out of the 'School of Paris, the centre for modernism in visual art prior to New York' (Rosenthal 
1982: 91) was almost entirely self-directed. We cannot know for sure whether he had any formal contact with his 
contemporary American painters, though it is reasonable to assume he was aware of their work It is this relentless 
self-propulsion of Klein, and his ferocious over-compensation for his failure to meet the demands of the French 
school system that led to his lifelong autodidactic project. Klein's pampered childhood as the only son of painter 
parents in idyllic Nice was ruptured by World War H. This had an adverse effect on his schooling, lie acquired a 
reputation as a troublemaker or barrageurin class, and was asked to leave several schools. Ultimate failure to obtain 
his Baccalaurat infused the stubborn dreamer, whose head was filled with his favourite Tintin and 'Mandrake the 
Magician' stories, to ensure that his life was one long learning experience. Along with his two best friends Armand 
Fernandez (later 'Arman') and Claude Pascale (later 'Pascale Claude'), he embarked on a course in judo lessons at the 
local Police school. Klein was hooked. Discovery of the ancient philosophies underlying the Japanese martial art - 
that ability to overcome the strength of one's opponent could be achieved by the harmonious interaction of body, 
mind, spirit and force - fitted beautifully in with Klein and his friends' recent discovery of the esoteric mysteries of 
the Rosy Cross. Throughout his life Klein continued with his 'homework', a correspondence course in Rosicrucian 
philosophy based on Max Heindel's famous text, 'La Cosmogonie do Rose-Croix' ('Rosicrucian Cosmogeny'), which he 
sent away to California for. 
46 When Klein was later asked, to his delight, to join the chivalric order of the Knights of St. Sebastien, the young 
artist dedicated his life's work to the 'battle' against form and line, and the attempt to free space, and the void, from 
the confines of its prison. His noble 'cause' would be colour, 'the real and abstract medium of space, the sensibility 
that inhabits extradimensional space and impregnates both people and environments'. (Stich (1995: 66) Also 
anathema to Klein was the juxtaposition of colours, interrupting the spatial purity of a single-colour expanse and 
therefore impeding the spirit in its journey towards the transcendent beyond. Ile famously stated that, 'Once there 
are two colours in a painting, a conflict begins', and followed Steiner's doctrine that, 'Colour is that thing which 
descends as far as the body's surface; it is also that which raises man from the material and leads him into the 
spiritual. ' (Steiner 1991: 146) 
47 Sidra Stich (1995: 19) retells the story of the three friends; Yves, Arman and Pascal who were hanging out practising 
meditation on a beach one day. They made the decision to divide the world into three realms, taking one each to 
preside over. Klein chose the mineral world, but specifically appropriated the sky as his own by an act of signing. lie 
marked space with his signature to claim it, thereafter seeing the sky not as a background, but an 'immaterial painting' 
(Stich 1995: 19) through which access to the mysterious void beyond could be gained. Klein in fact later expressed a 
100 
hatred for all birds, since, `they attempted to make holes in my greatest and most beautiful work. The birds must 
disappear! ' (Klein in Stich 1995: 253n. 21). Bachelard also interpreted birds as untidy and destructive, though it is 
unclear whether Klein borrowed directly from Bachelard here. Certain Buddhist texts actually make the direct 
comparison of the healthy, light spirit to the vast, unlimited space of the open sky. This spirit that knows no division 
is that of Dharma, meaning transcendental truth. Klein's absolute is above and beyond forms, it does not underlie or 
inhere in them. 
48 Scientific theories of Chromatics that have greatly influenced Western perception of colour can be said to have 
begun in 1704 with the publication of Newton's Optickr, the first sustained research into the subject of colour. In 
1666 Newton used a prism to observe refractions of light. This observation led him to conclude that white light was 
a complex mixture of rays which the prism then separated into seven hues, identical with the colours of the rainbow; 
red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, violet. He aligned these to seven planets, and the seven diatonic scales. In 
1810 the German Romantic painter Philip Otto Runge advanced his contribution to colour theory in Die Farbenkrngel. 
His highly ordered system consisted of a colour sphere, a three-dimensional globe with black and white at its polar 
extremes, the lines of the spectrum at the equator, and a grand total of 3,405 hues. Goethe's slightly earlier Farbenlehre 
of 1808 took a more organic approach to colour, combining physical, psychological, historical and aesthetic aspects. 
Goethe is perhaps best known for disputing Newton's `erroneous' theories. Ultimately, Newton's theories on colour 
have been proven by science to be correct and Goethe's incorrect, but Goethe's dispute with Newtonian Optickr 
constitutes a good example of the debate between scientific and organic/psychological theories on colour. For a 
helpful overview of the history of Chromatics, see Jennifer 111 Jeffers' 'The Image of Thought : Achromatics in 
O'Keeffe and Beckett' in Mosaic vol. 29, no. 4 (1996) 
49 Early in the Eighteenth Century as part of the `Cambridge Platonists', Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Count of 
Shaftesbury, wrote about and discussed the sublime at length. Direct links were made with the long-standing 
philosophical tradition of the sublime. 
50 The famous treatise On The Sublime (c. AD 213-73) was attributed for a long time to Longinus of Emesa, friend and 
minister to Zenobia, Queen of Palmyra. Generally the author of On the Sublime is referred to as Pseudo-Longinus, as 
the attribution was later proved false. 
51 The super-sensitive protagonist Werther catches sight of his `ideal' woman cutting slices of bread-and-butter for 
some children, and immediately falls utterly in love with his image of the person he wishes her to be. His love is, 
literally, for the Sublime itself. To love the Sublime is to be cursed with certain death, for it is a force bigger than the 
imagined universe and will ultimately incorporate anything in its path, like a twister. The doomed young Werther 
commits suicide whilst in prey to the ecstasy of the Sublime; he is the archetype of Romantic artists who, from 
Shelley to Pollock, had for their muse the Sublime itself. 
52 To `die', in fact, was a common euphemism in Elizabethan and Jacobean England for orgasm, a pleasure whose 
intensity can momentarily make one forget one's Self. 
53 There is much debate on this topic - see for example Christine Battersby (1998) The Phenomenal Woman: Feminist 
Metaphysics and the Patterns of Identity New York, Routledge. 
54 Towards the end of the Eighteenth Century and into the Nineteenth, landscape became a common figure for the 
Sublime. One of the most famous paintings in this 'Sublime landscape' tradition would be Caspar David Friedrich's 
iVandererAbove the Sea of Fog (1818). The human figure with his stark, black back to us in this painting is alone above 
turgid waves, thrashing wind and the immeasurable greatness of nature all around hire. His purpose is merely to 
show the insignificance of the human being in the face of the natural world. In 1810 Goethe predicted the logical 
progression of the Sublime in art from the figure of the landscape to a `pure' surface of a single colour -a 
monochrome. His text On the Theory of Colours was an attempt to complement the existing diverse theories of optics, 
in which he brought the idea of unity into the experience of colours in a neo-platonically inspired cosmos. Goethe 
announced that the contemplation of a single colour expanse awakened to the individual conscience the concept of 
cosmic unity. This kind of contemplation would thus be healing to the spirit, situating the spectator in harmony with 
the fundamental connected Oneness of things. The single colour is like the religious icon, a pathway to the mystery 
of unity. We know that Turner had read Goethe's On the Theory of Colours, and made at least two painted attempts to 
work out some of its problems. 
ss His titles, for him metaphors for the emotional content of his paintings, attest to this. Many of them come directly 
from the Old Testament, in 1946 he painted The Beginning and The Command, Abraham, The Covenant and By Twos in 
1949, Eye in 1950, Adam in 1951, and so on. 
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2: 0 Introduction: The White Eye of Photography 
The aesthetic technology of photography, as it has been invented, refined and 
elaborated, and the dominant uses of that technology, as they have become 
fixed and naturalised, assume and privilege the white subject. They also 
construct that subject, that is, draw on and contribute to a perception of what 
it means to be white. They do this as part of a much more general culture of 
light [... ] The culture of light is part of the still wider characterization of 
modem Western culture as one which privileges seeing above all other senses. ' 
(Dyer 1997: 103) 
'To look is an act of perception, but it is an interrogation and an assumption of 
a place which yields itself as a metaphor for knowledge to which Michel 
Foucault has given the term, "The Eye of Power" '. (Pollock in Melville & 
Readings 1995: 41) 
As a `metaphor for knowledge', the human look is heavy with possibilities. Acknowledging this, 
Griselda Pollock calls for an Art History which, rather than charting a chronology of seen objects, 
analyses the political history of the look (Pollock in Melville & Readings [eds] 1995: 38-65). The 
activity of the look involves so much more than mere seeing, even more than the presumed 
positioning of the seeing subject. The same can be said for the objecthood of the photograph or 
film; the technology of which is far from `neutral', but is in fact engaged in the privileging of a 
particular visual economy. Richard Dyer reasons that, 
`Just as perspective as an artistic technique has been argued to be implicated in 
an individualistic world view that privileges both men and the bourgeoisie, so I 
want to argue that photography and cinema, as media of light, at the very least 
lend themselves to privileging white people. ' (Dyer 1997: 83) 
Dyer (1997) charts the relation between this White, bourgeois privileging of seeing and an 
inherent privileging of Whiteness. fie writes that the media of photography and cinema are 
highly complicit in this; firstly techniques such as Hollywood `movie lighting' (1997: 84), 
technology and equipment, were developed around the capture and representation of the White 
face as `normal'. As a result, in shots where all kinds of faces and `races' are present, those that 
`deviate' from Whiteness can look like indistinct blobs, making the scene look `a bit down' 
(1997: 82). Importantly, Dyer points out that there is no reason why the aesthetic technology of 
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film and photography has to continue privileging the White body, as it would now be entirely 
possible to create new ways of photographing a scene. Dyer gives interesting examples where 
Black and White subjects appear together in shot, as posing special problems for the White 
technology of the lens. It seems that there is less of a problem photographing a solo Black 
subject, or group of Black subjects - the problem arises when Black and White are `mixed' in the 
shot; the White lens will apparently not tolerate this violation of binary racist codes. The fact 
that the photographic or cinematic image is composed entirely of light, and that lens-based 
technology is designed for light, is Dyer's second point about the photographic privileging of 
Whiteness. Thus the association of lightness, glow, beauty, vision and so on are not only present 
in the appearance of the image on screen, but are the stuff of its very existence`. In these ways, 
film and photography can be read as `ideal' media for the naturalision of White `normality'. 
I want to use this understanding of photographic technology as the basis for this chapter, asking 
questions about what the `staging' or `mediation' of blankness - that is, the positioning of blank 
space as a compositional figure within the legible context of surface organisation - means for the 
psychic surfaces of monochrome and of the Mixed Race subject. Beginning with the 
understanding that the insertion of the look of the lens into the existing, highly complex relays of 
looks that happen between artist, spectator and surface, I want to test the ways monochrome 
films and photographs, which are made of light but which cannot be `seen', introduce chaos or 
uncertainty into the White economy of lens-based media. I also want to ask what issues are posed 
to a `racially' indeterminate subject by a medium whose technology continually re-inscribes the 
dominance of a particular `race'. 
Whether painted or photographed, monochrome always seems to contain something like 
Foucault's `Eye of Power', that is, it is the final place where the look must stop, confounded. The 
Eye of Power is indispensable to Phallic control, wielding the authority to stop the endless play of 
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signification. If we also consider Dyer's reading of photography and film, the Eye of Power is 
unmasked as a White eye. What problems occur when the White eye of photography or film 
gazes upon the psychically indeterminate and optically illegible monochrome? When psychical 
indeterminacy is paralleled with formal indeterminacy - in the case of the monochrome as a 
compositional `figure', for example, where the binary of `figure/ground' is problematised - what 
does this allow us to see? When `racial' indeterminacy (and thus illegibility) is paralleled with 
optical indeterminacy (and thus, again, illegibility), what does this allow us to see, and what of the 
complex layers of seen and unseen, imagined and assumed audiences? Things that cannot be 
deciphered or immediately understood do sometimes inspire reverence as well as negation. 
However, there is always the possibility that the `mastery' of the revered object is an illusion, or a 
trick. Shoshana Felman writes of the notoriously indecipherable nature of the Lacanian text, that, 
`To fall for the illusion of Lacan's mastery is to be trapped in the imaginary of the text'. (Felman 
in Gallup 1985: 72). Entrapment in the Imaginary register with neither language nor subjectivity is 
a terrifying possibility, and a difficult one to conceptualise. Without even subjectivity as a 
starting point, how does anyone begin the process of conceptualising at all? How would the 
subject without subjectivity (for example, the subject subjugated by `race' thinking), even know 
they were trapped in the Imaginary resigster? Felman seems to suggest that the mechanics of 
Lacanian textual mastery operate in a similar way to the monochrome surface that subjugates the 
spectator's gaze. There comes a moment of passive acceptance, where the illegibility of the 
looked-at object prevents further deciphering. The subject reaches a dead end. Motionless and 
confounded by the illegible object, the subject without subjectivity fades back into the Imaginary 
register to be eluded by even language. The masterful roles of both the Lacanian text and the 
monochrome surface depend on the willing gaze of the spectating subject. Without this subject's 
initial desire to understand, to know and to be in on something, the mastery of the text or image 
ceases to be absolute. The spectating subject may seek a hidden trickery in the image or text, but 
it seems that the trickery is in the illegibility itself. 
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In a culture where the visual is dominant, that which cannot be seen is a problem. Where visual 
representations of invisible things occur, the problem is compounded'. In the case of the blank 
film or photograph containing a blank passage, monochrome is effectively staged - in the 
photographs of Hiroshi Sugimoto and John Hilliard, monochrome is part of the compositional 
organisation of the surface and can thus also be read as a figure, a protagonist around whom all 
action is organised. A sort of sitting in state takes place, as though the central monochrome were 
a living monarch or the corpse of someone so revered that their death cannot be conceptualised 
as a possibility. In Sugimoto's case the looks are complicated further by the fact that what he 
photographs is another photographic art form. Photography and film, mechanical extensions of 
the (White) human eye, imbue the monochrome surface with the significance of something 
already observed, which shifts the problem of looking on to another level. In the case of Derek 
Jarman's monochrome film, Blue (1992-3), where the entire visual cinematic experience is of a 
cyan monochrome, this monochrome performs three main functions. First of all it presents a 
monochrome that appears to be stationary but that is, through the trick of cinema, in fact in 
motion. Second and more importantly, it foregrounds the experience of the auditory, which I 
propose is interstitial, another layer of indeterminacy. It also enacts and rehearses Jarman's 
blindness, a portent of impending death/castration. British photographer Clement Cooper 
embeds blankness within narrative in a very different way. Of Mixed Race himself, Cooper spent 
time in 1995 and 1996 in some of the British cities where Mixed Race populations have been 
present, though generally ignored (blanked), for over two hundred years. Cooper made portraits 
of Mixed Race people of all different mixtures and all ages. What is also vital is that an audio CD 
accompanied the final show, which consisted of the subjects telling their own stories, crucially, in 
their own words Cooper embeds psychic blankness into both visual and auditory narratives, and in 
his work we can see the White technological hegemony of the lens interrupted in a unique way - 
an undecidable Other appropriates White technology to capture the image of another undecidable 
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Other. Questions should be asked about vision itself, because, like the lens, it is often tacitly 
assumed that vision is a value-free neutral. Really this is also a trick, as Griselda Pollock reminds 
us, 
`Vision presents itself to us as a simple, primary, self-evident category, yet, 
through psychoanalytical studies of that complex formation we call human 
subjectivity, the visual is always already invested with meanings, potencies and 
effects in the organisation of the drives, the formation of psychic 
representatives, symbolisation, fantasy and hence sexuality and the 
unconscious' (Pollock in Melville & Readings [ed] 1995: 42) 
2: 1 The Deathlike in Photography 
Martin Jay places photography alongside the microscope, telescope and camera obscura in the 
category of `technological extensions' of the human eye Qay 1995: 435). The camera obscura in 
particular has been theorised in terms of human society and subjectivity. Perhaps the most 
famous example is Marx's theory that in all ideology, men and their relations appear as the image 
in a camera obscura - upside-down. The dominant beliefs, value systems and everyday 
assumptions that society takes for granted represent for Marx an inversion of the reality of social 
relations. Those with the most access to power are those most able to determine discourse and to 
shape systems of representation. Barthes followed this by positing the very process of 
mythology as one of inversion. The unveiling of this truth, Barthes claimed, constituted a 
subversive political act. In a similar way, I want to suggest that a refusal to signify in the terms 
dictated by the dominant scopic regimes can also be, if not an automatic act of transgression of 
the Law, at least an introduction of chaos into that Law. Things that are illegible in the terms of 
a particular significatory Law `unveil' the fact of that Law's (ph)allibility. Jonathan Crary suggests 
that the camera obscura has a specific function of individuation to perform, since its 
configuration necessarily 
`[d]efines an observer as isolated, enclosed and autonomous within its dark 
confines [... ] the camera obscura is inseparable from a certain metaphysic of 
interiority: it is a figure for both the observer who is nominally a free sovereign 
individual and a privatised subject confined in a quasi-domestic space, cut off 
from a public exterior world [... ] Another related and equally decisive function 
of the camera was to sunder the act of seeing from the physical body of the 
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observer, to decorporealise vision. The monadic viewpoint of the individual is 
authenticated and legitimised by the camera obscura' (Crary in Mirzoeff [ed] 
1998: 245) 
So not only do these new `mechanical eyes' revolutionise vision, they also cement the monocular 
gaze of the biocular subject, seal the subject's sense of separation from the visible world, and, 
perhaps most importantly, lend an air of subjecthood or apartness to vision itself. The magical 
qualities of the sense of sight were foregrounded in these `mechanical eyes', whose appeal was to 
the inherent nobility of vision. Of course, anything so noble as sight could not remain 
conceptually situated in the corporeal body for long, and this is what Crary refers to as the 
`decorporealisation' of vision. 
Jay also suggests that the popularity of such innovations had an active role to play in the 
dissemination of the Cartesian scopic regime, with its Albertian notions of perspective'. As a 
physical object, the photograph helped to democratise the image, destabilise notions of privilege 
with regard to portraiture, and pave the way for an image-fed society. Most importantly however, 
along with film, the photograph abetted the normalisation of apprehending the world in terms of 
a monocular (usually White, usually male) gaze. Luce Irigaray has argued in relation to the 
discourse of mastery, that a different relation to the look has specified feminine sexuality in 
modernism, `Investment in the look is not as great in women as in men. More than any other 
sense it objectifies and masters. The moment the look dominates the body loses its materiality. ' 
(Irigaray quoted in Pollock in Melville & Readings 1995: 56). 
The advent of photography and film also introduces into society the concept of an eye that can be 
confused or misled - what you see is not your own vision but someone, or something, else's; 
`[... ] the observer within does not see his or her own vision but a disembodied 
picture of the world, emphasising the Enlightenment belief in a sharp 
distinction between the mind, which judges sensory perceptions, and the body, 
which merely registers them, just as the camera obscura admits light through its 
lens. ' (Mirzoeff 1998: 185) 
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1839 is usually cited as the key year for the introduction of photography into the public domain, 
and it induced an almost immediate public hysteria based on what was assumed to be its ability to 
reproduce images perfectly and impartially. At that time photography was also widely believed to 
be the death-knell for paintings. Much later, we find even Twentieth Century film critic Andre 
Bazin writing of photography in language redolent of the Kantian sublime, 
`[... ] for the first time an image of the world is formed automatically, without 
the creative intervention of man [... ] photography affects us like a 
phenomenon in nature'. (Bazin 1967: 13)6 
The gaze of the camera at first appeared to be the perfect example of disinterested objectivity. 
Because of its supposed lack of ideological investment in any scene, its cool look approached 
flawless mimesis of the perceptual world. However, hostilities against the camera began to arise 
precisely as a result of this; because it mimicked monocular specularity, it appeared that the 
photograph validated what Noel Burch refers to in his discussion of cinema and its origins as, 
`the bourgeois ideology of representation [... ] another step taken toward the "re-creation' of 
reality"'. (Burch 1979: 21) This particular ideology of representation is consistent with the 
monocular, patriarchal White gaze that the photograph played a part in normalising in the 
Nineteenth Century. 
However, the photograph was not quite so objective as it first appeared, and this ideological 
problem was one strand of a complex anti-photographic trend. Baudelaire was famously against 
the new invention and was quick to lament its popular triumph. Daumier was to use the very 
objectivity of the camera's gaze to denounce its value, `photography imitates everything and 
expresses nothing. It is blind to the world of the spirit'. (Schwarz 1986: 140) Faith in the 
reproductive verisimilitude offered by the camera began to shake with the discoveries of 
retouching, composite photography, double-exposure and so on. It could even be said that the 
new varieties of scopic instruments available could, `undermine confidence in the authority of the 
eyes' Qay in Melville & Readings [eds] 1995: 350), as the mechanical `eye' of the camera not only 
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mimicked the structure of the human eye, but also saw and recorded images in its place; usurping 
human memory with its mechanical capture of the same image through time'. 
By 1900 the camera had achieved such familiarity in western culture that Freud was able to use its 
apparatus as a metaphor for the structure of the unconscious in his Interpretation of Dreams. Rather 
than conceptualising the psyche as an undifferentiated, monolithic machine, 
`[... ] we should picture the instrument which carries out our mental functions 
as resembling a compound microscope, or a photographic apparatus, or 
something of the kind. On that basis, psychical locality will correspond to a 
place inside the apparatus at which one of the preliminary stages of an image 
comes into being'. (Freud 1900 [1973]: 536)8. 
This conception of the unconscious mind is curious but powerful, particularly the notion of an 
image `coming into being'. In much the same way as one would struggle, squinting up one's eyes 
and peering in an attempt to see an image not yet fully formed, so the spectator in front of the 
monochrome painting mimics the struggle to see something whose `thereness' is tacitly 
understood, but not actually decipherable. This sense of incompleteness or becoming also 
resonates with the idea of psychic `stages' that must be passed through in progressive order of 
accruing subjectivity; perhaps he is referring (unconsciously) to his own series of topographies of 
mind. We can also find an echo with Lacan's subsequent formulation of subjective registers, the 
Real, the Imaginary and the Symbolic, which the analysand passes through in that order. The 
Symbolic is the ego-ised realm of social activity, and we can assume that a fully-realised image 
would be concurrent with this order. Freud's `preliminary stages of an image', fuzzy and 
indecipherable, could be read as analogous to Lacan's Imaginary'. The image could not be 
properly understood until actual lived experience in the Symbolic had given the subject 
opportunities to recognise the image. Through Freud's analogy of an impaired optical device, we 
can approach the indecipherability of the monochrome surface in terms of the pre-linguistic, pre- 
subjective Lacanian Imaginary. 
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The notion of an unconscious that is blind, operating in hiding beneath a sighted consciousness is 
complicit with my conception of the monochrome as a bright, placid surface layer tricking the eye 
away from its invisible hubbub of psychic activity. The absence of differentiation in the 
monochrome surface makes the experience of looking one of enforced ocular mobility. After an 
initial, frantic race around the monochrome surface in search of something recognisable - even 
the evidence of a brushstroke, or the touch of colour that Yves Klein's gallerist needed - the 
spectating eye finds that it cannot come to a final standstill. For this confused eye, kinetic 
tensions are never reduced to zero. The Freudian Death Drive (or Thanatos) continually aims to 
reduce all tensions in the psychic economy to zero, returning the subject to the originary 
inorganic state. As such it is in constant conflict with Eros or the Life Drive, the subject existing 
in a state of conflict between two opposites. The notion of deathliness in the visual arts is not 
new, Andre Bazin's Ontology of the Photographic Image begins with the suggestion that the plastic arts 
be put `under psychoanalysis' suggesting that underlying the origins of both painting and 
sculpture there is what he calls a `mummy complex' (Bazin 1967: 9), which he explains has nothing 
to do with Oedipal activity. Ancient Egyptian religion sought to outwit death by ensuring the 
continuing survival of the corporeal body. Their sophisticated techniques of embalming were 
developed to these ends, and as Bazin writes, `to preserve, artificially, his bodily appearance is to 
snatch it from the flow of time' (Bazin 1967: 9). The analogy of ancient Egyptian mummification 
is perhaps one of the clearest ways of demonstrating that a visual representation of life can 
guarantee a preservation of life. What Bazin identifies as, `man's primitive need to have the last 
word in the argument with death' (Bazin 1967: 10) fir ly fixes photography, as ideal mimetic art, 
in a relationship with death itself. If placed over Freud's concept of Repetition Compulsion, the 
relation Bazin describes seems almost too perfect a fit. 
Freud's concept of the Compulsion to Repeat originates from a 1914 paper entitled, Remembering 
Repealing and UYýorking-TÜrough1Q. Arguably the best known passage on this, however, is the famous 
Tort-Da' episode where Freud describes watching his eighteen-month-old grandson playing with 
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a cotton reel. The boy's symbolic re-enacting his mother's departure and return supposedly 
allowed him to feel some kind of control over his mother's movements; the repetition offered a 
way to domesticate and contain the anxiety he felt at his utter lack of control. Freud situated 
Repetition Compulsion in the domain of the Death Drive, and since this compulsion originates in 
the unconscious, it is `ungovernable' (Laplanche & Pontalis 1973: 78)". The boy's Thanatic re- 
enactment or mimicking of his mother's actions can also be seen in tension with Bazin's `mummy 
complex'. Ernst freezes his mother's movements into a single, perpetually repeated moment. He 
reduces a flesh and blood woman to a repetitive motion, symbolically (psychically) performing a 
`murder' and an `embalming' or preservation, so that he can retain her inside himself, retain the 
illusion of mastery. 
Lacan's mirror stage, which leads the infant from the chaos of the Imaginary Order into the 
subjectivity of the Symbolic Order, takes place between the ages of six and eighteen months, so 
Freud's grandson was the right age for this. The repeated games with the cotton reel act as 
rehearsals of the condition of mastery that comes with the Symbolic. The particular exchange of 
gazes between subject and mirror, however, is where the acquisition of this mastery happens. It 
should be remembered that the Mirror Stage and the subsequent entry of the subject into the 
Symbolic are predicated on a double misrecognition. The infant looks in the mirror at a time when its 
motor functions lack co-ordination. What it recognises, however, is a false image of itself as a 
coherent and fully integrated being. The child is, also, often held up to the mirror by its mother, 
who will often articulate something like, `that's mel' on the child's behalf. The result is the child's 
identification with what s/he thinks is the mother's ideal image of her/him -a further, more 
involved misrecognition. All these misrecognitions show that the Mirror Stage is, in fact, a trick; 
and that the self is `an illusion done with mirrors'. Foucault realises the specular confusion of the 
subject regarding him/herself in the mirror in Of Oilier Spaces, 
`In the mirror, I see myself there where I am not, in an unreal, virtual space 
that opens up behind the surface; I am over there, there where I am not, a sort 
of shadow that gives my own visibility to myself, that enables me to see myself 
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there where I am absent: such is the utopia of the mirror. But it is also a 
heterotopia in so far as the mirror does exist in reality, where it exerts a sort of 
counteraction on the position that I occupy. From the standpoint of the 
mirror, I discover my absence from the place where I am, since I see myself 
over there. ' (Foucault in Mirzoeff 1998: 239-240) 
In Barthes, the connection between photography and death is symbolised by the snapshot. The 
snapshot has the power to rob life of its fluid temporality, introducing what Martin Jay calls a 
`kind of visual rigor mortis' Gay in Melville & Readings 1995: 349)'2. Unlike straightforward 
analogical representations of nature, photographic denotation, according to Barthes in Rhetoric of 
the Image, locates an absent reality. A photograph is a fragment of a whole that is, and will always 
be, invisible. It can only ever exist as a fragment, and for Barthes this is inherently traumatic. 
`It establishes not a consciousness of the being there of the thing (which any 
copy could provoke) but an awareness of its bating been there. What we have is a 
new space-time category, spatial immediacy and temporal anteriority, the 
photograph being an illogical conjunction between the here-now and the here- 
then. ' (Barthes 1997: 443). 
Secondly and as a direct result of the `inevitable aura of a lost past' (Jay 1995: 444) associated with 
all photography, Barthes posits that each photographic object presents an essential and unique 
opportunity for mourning". Barthes final text, the famous Camera Lrcida, could quite literally be 
said to be his final word on the essential union of death with photography, since it was published 
posthumously in 1981 (a year after Barthes' death). 
The photographs discussed in the following section can be read as foregrounding not only aspects 
of surface illegibility, but also of concealment. The fact of the fifteen-year gap between the start 
of Sugimoto's cinematic odyssey and the pictures under discussion here has an air of Thanatic 
activity about it - here the monochrome appears as compositional motif and returns, as does the 
repressed. Only this time the monochrome `repressed' is disguised as part of a tightly organised 
surface structure. Paradoxically, at the same time it is also staged as the `centre', in a way that 
troubles the established `centre' of the White photographic lens. One centre is challenged by the 
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confronting gaze of an illegible, subjugated space that posits itself paradoxically as an alternative 
centre in a silent battle for the domain of the Symbolic. 
2: 2 Hiroshi Sugimoto & the Returns of Blankness 
'Why do you he to me saying you're going to Cracow so I should believe you're 
going to Lemberg, when in reality you are going to Cracow? ' (Joke quoted by 
Lacan after Freud) 
Figure 19: 1 lirahi ýuiinwu>, I'aiwwnmi I brai r. OaAlrnrd Black and white photograph. Private collection. 
I Iiroshi Sugimoto's series Theaters, which began in 1978 with the unsettling Sam Eric, Pennsylvania 
(not illustrated), are prime examples of a serial `staging' of monochrome. In each picture from 
this series, Sugimoto presents the cinema screen as monochrome; its glowing blank white surface 
the result of keeping the shutter open for the entire duration of the film. Sugimoto substitutes an 
eye for an eye. Not only does the eye of his camera present the spectator with an actual 
invisibility (the central `monochrome'), but it also mediates the finished image so that, in order to 
come into being, it must pass through a series of eyes (of lens, photographer and spectator). 
Paramount Theater, Oakland [Figure 191, whose screen nestles at the heart of a series of carved, pre- 
Art Deco proscenium arches and ornate baroque decorations, is one of the original cinema 
buildings from boom time 1920s and pre-Depression 1930s America. The gaudy overhead light- 
fitting directs attention to the bright, white cinema screen, a perfect glowing rectangle set within a 
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deep black border. A surplus of light from the screen in the form of an elongated crescent moon 
lies like a shadow in reverse on the floor of the orchestra pit. We are also shown the first three 
rows of seating, but the seats are unoccupied, suggesting an empty cinema. A general atmosphere 
of reverence or even worship is apparent, with any approaching eye's attention focused on the 
mysterious white glowing rectangle that occupies centre stage in surroundings as embellished as 
any Catholic or High Anglican Cathedral. If seen as an `eye that presents', the monochrome 
cinema screen in Paramount Theater, Oakland plays a joke against the eye that one would expect to 
be doing the presenting; the White eye of photography. As an illegible undecidable in the centre 
of a narrative of definite and layered legibility (cinema's legible narrative, then the legibility of the 
setting as a cinema, then the legible narrative of the White lens of photography); Sugimoto's 
monochrome screen momentarily usurps the privileged position of mimetic representation. 
Rather than an `eye that presents', perhaps it might be better understood as, or read concurrently 
as, an example of the `subject presumed-to-know'". It is presumed to know in ways that are 
problematic to the Phallic order, however, since what it knows is the same as what it presents - 
the `secret' of its threatening indeterminacy. 
Sugimoto has said, `recently I've been experimenting with intentionally out-of-focus shots. I set 
up the position of the film and lens of my camera so that the focal point is twice the point of 
infinity. i15 Sugimoto's surfaces attest to a preoccupation with infinity, optically similar to the 
infinity of Klein or Malevich. The blurring and deliberate playing with notions of `correct', 
recognisable focus procedures crops up again and again, a gesture that is at once both repetitive 
(and therefore deathlike) and defiant. Infinity in Sugimoto appears to signify a place of free play, 
an opening up of possibilities. If we consider this in Lacanian terms we are faced with an intra- 
surface paradox. The indecipherable areas of monochrome provide endless potential for derance 
in Sugimoto's surface. The paradox is that the Phallus which casts its shadow over the signifiers 
to stop play and decide meaning, is also represented by the same monochrome passage in 
Sugimoto's surface. The monochrome in centre stage is godlike, regal - it invokes a sense of 
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subjection (if not abjection) in the spectator, it rules the composition. As the focal point of the 
surface, it could be said to be a stopping-place. If this monochrome has Phallic attributes, they 
are those of a damaged or incomplete or indeterminate Phallus, since the same monochrome also 
eternally defers. The Phallic attributes of this monochrome are rather like the White attributes of 
the Mixed Race subject, who exhibits and contains a `deviant' kind of Whiteness that threatens 
the imagined purity of the White Phallus, and that has the potential to sentence the Mixed Race 
subject to a life of perpetual oscillation between the perceived Phallic binary of `Black/White'. 
The playmates in Sugimoto's monochrome also oscillate, continually interrupting their own play 
as the very thing that creates endless potential for meaning is also involved in a perpetual act of 
legalistic paternal forbidding. It would seem that the gesture of putting monochrome on stage - 
a gesture foreshadowed by Klein's sketch in Chapter One - only increases its indeterminacy. 
The glowing white screen positioned as subject or `figure' in the composition guards the secret of 
what is contained in the film. This is especially the case when we consider that Sugimoto's 
technique here is to leave the shutter open throughout the entire length of the film. What we are 
actually seeing, although it is not possible to read, is the complete film, from opening scene to 
credits. This is an extraordinary film `still' that shows us an eye that presents something invisible. 
Whilst the presenting eye keeps a tight guard on the secret, the Death Drive can be perceived at 
work within the surface. The concealment is murderous, for in order for the monochrome to 
hide the film and present the illusion of its own mastery, the film must be destroyed. All tensions 
are genuinely reduced to zero, the spectator sees the zero of white light, the usually invisible 
middle frequency at which light is emitted. The film dies as it is being run, each scene, or each 
cineme endlessly overwriting the preceding one. The internal monochrome, where the signifiers 
play, also commits a perpetual and repetitive suicide, under the murderous eyes of the camera 
lens, the screen and the devouring audience. Except that since we know it will be `reborn' at the 
next screening, there exists a perpetual, conceptual oscillation. At the same time as it creates the 
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possibilities for free play, it also prevents any play at all through its intransigent untranslatability. 
The surface that cannot be read will always have the final word. The picture sees, knows and 
presents, but the mode of presentation is plain and simple trickery and the thing presented is 
`hidden' or illegible. David Batchelor makes mention of a process of concealment when he 
describes cinema as `one of the truly great monochromes of the twentieth century' (2000: 174). 
He writes that the cinema screen is, 
`So great and magnificent that it has to be kept in darkness and behind a 
ludicrously fenestered and often polychrome curtain. But so great that, like 
other monochromes of the city, it is almost always overlooked. The cinema 
screen: another palimpsest. Another covering over or erasure of a world, a 
world behind the screen, which in turn becomes the ground for another world 
to be poured onto the newly whitened expanse. ' (Batchelor 200: 174) 
Sean Cubitt also reads a deathly and `negative' quality into Sugimoto's blank spaces, but this time 
he aligns it with pain and longing, lived aspects of deathlikeness. Although the longing, like that 
of Narcissus, is for the thing that will devour one, still the longing persists, and the lack (from 
which stems the longing) hurts; 
`But what for Sugimoto is the zen interpretation of internal and external voids 
becomes [... ] the projection on screen of a vast, insatiable yearning for 
something beyond, something negative. ' (Cubitt 1998: 71) 
Figure 20: I Itroshi Sugimo, tu Shadium I )me In, Urenge (. oinih4 1993. IiLick : Inrl white I) hotot; r; iI) h. Private a)IIcrti-' - 
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Perhaps it is because of its situation out of doors, but the monochrome dominating the 
composition of Stadium Drive-In, Orange County [Figure 20] seems to command a different respect 
from the indoor, heavily contextualised monochrome of Paramount Theater. With Stadium Drive-In, 
an entirely different emphasis takes place in the relations between viewers. Stadium Drive-In, 
Orange County does, I think, provide a more subtle example of an act of concealment than 
Paramount Theater- it is not immediately obvious that what you are seeing is a film (albeit one 
captured in slow suicide). Stadium Drive-In, Orange County performs a cunning sleight-of-hand; in 
yet another paradox of blank double-dealing, it manages to thoroughly hide something by 
appearing to present it. As in Edgar Allan Poe's mystery tale of The Purloined Letter, sometimes the 
best way to disguise something you wish to conceal is to place it in full view of everyone16. In 
Sugimoto's photograph, what is hidden is concealment itself, effecting a kind of double-disguise. 
Presenting the concealment, Sugimoto draws suspicion away from the mute monochrome 
surface, away from the fact that it hides something and away from that which it hides. 
The Purloined Letter tells a tale of paradoxical concealment which Lacan examined in his famous 
seminar on the story. Lacan used the metaphor of the letter to show how subjectivity is 
constituted in the Symbolic Order - the letter profoundly alters each Subject with which it has a 
relation, whether that relation is one of loss, searching or concealment. Poe's letter is a metaphor 
for the signifying chain, and, 
`[... ) in analysis, the chain of unconscious purposive ideas (or, in linguistic 
terms, the signifying chain) insists in being expressed and heard, beyond any 
attachment to a pleasure/unpleasure principle, or the ego's attempts to stifle 
meaning. ' (ßenvenuto & Kennedy 1986: 93) 
Thus the letter persistently shows up (no matter how carefully someone thinks they have hidden 
it), and the subject persistently speaks or asserts individuality (no matter how carefully the ego of 
the hegemonic system thinks it has voided that subject's subjectivity, or right to speak). The point 
is that the Thanatic activity of Repetition Compulsion occurs, literally, beyond the pleasure 
principle - it is outside of the Freudian binary of `pleasure/unpleasure'. Perhaps Freud situates it 
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in the realm of the Death Drive because things that exist outside of structuring binaries are as 
unsymbolisable as death itself. 
The incriminating `letter' in Poe - stolen from the Queen's boudoir by a Minister, and in full view 
of the King - inspires a very particular kind of concealment that relies on the duping of the look 
itself. Lacan's Seminar on Poe's story makes much of the complex interchange of looks, and the 
relationship these looks have to concealment. Derrida's reading of Lacan's reading of Poe, The 
Purveyor of Truth, sets up yet more complex interchanges of glances and interpretations. Poe, 
Lacan and Derrida step around each other in a dance that mirrors the fantoula of glances taking 
place between King, Queen and Courtier. In Poe, the hiding of the letter actually takes place twice 
- once in the Queen's boudoir, once in the Minister's apartment. Lacan designates the whole 
structure of the two scenes as mimicking the subject's unconscious. The first scene of theft, 
taking place in the Queen's boudoir, is equivalent to the primal scene, `Since the second may be 
considered its repetition in the very sense we are considering today' (Lacan 1972: 48) ". It should 
be noted that it is not the repetition of events that constitutes the analogy of the Repetition 
Compulsion, but the overall structure of the tale which Lacan sees as parallel with the structure of 
a life's story. Lacan notes the striking similarities between the two thefts, as if the second one 
were necessary to bring the first to light. What is common to both theft/concealment situations 
is that each incident is predicated on a complex interchange of looks and misinterpretations, or 
misrecognitions. Whilst the two scenes do not have identical situations, mirroring does occur 
with respect to the `three glances, borne by three subjects, incarnated each time by different 
characters. ' (1972: 49) 
Shoshana Felman identifies three repeated `functional positions in a structure' (1987: 41) standing 
for three different points of view, and three different ways in which to see the purloined letter: 
`The first is a glance that sees nothing: the King and the Police. The second, a 
glance which sees that the first sees nothing and deludes itself as to the secrecy 
of what it hides: the Queen, then the Minister. The third sees that the first two 
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glances leave what should be hidden exposed to whomever would seize it: the 
Minister, and finally Dupin'. (Felman 1972: 44) 
Lacan insists on the importance of the position of the `pure signifier' - that is, the purloined letter 
itself - in the trio, for it is the position of the pure signifier that decides on the relative positions 
of the subjects in the intersubjective relation structured around the letter's concealment. It is also 
this same pure signifier that becomes, according to Felman, a symbol of the unconscious. The 
necessity of the pure signifier to repress its own message means that like the unconscious desire 
which, upon repression, continually engages in repeated attempts to push itself up through the 
psychic economy; the pure signifier also survives in displaced symbolic media that end up taking 
over the subject's life. Lacan writes that the displacement of the signifier `determines the subject'. 
The purloined letter itself appears first in the tale as a signifier of the repressed, returning later as 
a signifier of the unconscious. 
We may see the Mixed Race body in much the same way as Lacan sees Poe's letter. This subject 
may find herself in a continual oscillation between the Symbolic, (for which she aims because she 
seeks to be recognised as a legimitate subject), and the Imaginary (which the White Phallic 
censorship attempts to push her back into, so that it can deny her subjectivity). This oscillation 
arises from the Mixed Race subject's refusal to accept the prohibitory and censoring action of the 
Phallus. She continues to assert her presence and identity (or push up through the censorship), 
but may have to find cunning or tricky ways to do this. We can also apply Lacan's reading of Poe 
to the interval between the two photographs by Sugimoto, and his repetition of them in the form 
of a series. In the first instance, Paramount Theater, Oakland shows the basic impossibility of ever 
reaching or comprehending what the unconscious holds within. The blank of glowing light that 
the screen emits does give some kind of tantalising, almost too obvious link to `seeing the light', 
the type of word-play relished by the Freudian unconscious. The irony of seeing the light, but not 
`seeing' the message is not lost on the conscious mind, either. When repetition comes in the 
shape of Stadium Drive-In, Orange Co/Inty, the point of staging such a repetition could easily be read 
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in terms of the following; a return of the letter in the story, of the repressed in the unconscious, 
or indeed of the monochrome in the narrative of western Art History. In each case the motif 
which defies reading turns up again to prompt an analysis of its original appearance. As Lacan 
points out in his reading of Poe, this in itself can be read as an allegory of psychoanalysis. 
What repeatedly calls out for analysis is the repeated appearance of the unreadable within the text. 
Sugimoto's repetition of blank spaces in legible compositions mimics the repeated returns of the 
illegible blank space of monochrome within a system of legible pictures. For Lacan, that which is 
repeated is always other. This means that the triangulated relationship of subject/look/letter 
relies on different characters taking up each position every time it is repeated, as illustrated in Poe. 
It is only in these differences that the significance of the structure of the game can be perceived. 
The insights into the unconscious that these repetitions provide for Lacan, then, prove the 
indelible fact of difference. The staged monochromes of Sugimoto's surfaces also show two 
other Lacanian notions; first that the subject is constructed in the Symbolic, second that what is 
repeated is always other. To take the latter point first, Sugimoto's repetition through at least one 
decade of similar monochrome areas within areas of mimetic representation is one way of 
asserting monochrome's Otherness. However, I think there is a more complex relation at work 
here. Sugimoto's monochromes, created from and suffused with light, glow purely and regally 
white. In this sense they are made of the same inherently Phallic White `stuff as other film, and 
at first glance they look like they are reinforcing this. What I see happening here, though, is a 
cunning inversion of the authority of the Phallic White lens; Sugimoto's monochromes appear to 
assert White phallic authority, but are actually presenting that authority with an image of its 
workings. Sugimoto's cinemas are `voided' of real audience members, and therefore we must 
assume that the `audience' is the lens. In presenting a clear picture of the mechanics of that lens' 
power, Sugimoto does the forbidden and strips the `veil' from the Phallus. This enforced 
unveiling, this revelation of the techniques of Phallic power, leaves the lens - and we, the 
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spectators - with an image of precisely nothing. In terms of subjectivity and the Symbolic, the 
central positioning of the monochromes is of great importance. This positioning enacts the 
central positioning of the empowered subject of traditional portraiture in representational painting 
and photography, except that now an indeterminate, Other subject has usurped that position of 
power (if only for a moment). 
Another important insight from Lacan's reading of The Purloined Letter, which I want to relate to 
the blank spaces in Sugimoto, is his notion of reading the signifier rather than the signified. 
Lacan does not believe that the analyst's task is to find out the hidden content of the letter". The 
fact that we, the readers, are left in ignorance of this makes no difference to his analysis of the 
unconscious as something that is exposed, rather than concealed, in language through 
displacement. 
We shall find illumination in what at first seems to obscure matters: the fact 
that the tale leaves us in virtually total ignorance of the sender, no less than of 
the contents, of the letter'. (1972: 56) 
This model of paying attention to the disturbances in conscious meaning is also found throughout 
the work of Freud, in the Interpretation of Dreams for example, or in his work on parapraxis. This 
type of reading opens up another, newer approach to understanding a text than the traditional 
one that reading is an uncovering of meaning. What is read can now be precisely the thing that is 
not meaningful or logical, that significance can be found not only in what is conscious, but also in 
what disrupts that consciousness. The two photographs of Sugimoto's can both be read as 
conscious, logical and ordered compositions - in both cases recognisable scenes from everyday 
life - but compositions where, in each case, the conscious, structured logic is interrupted by 
something it is not possible to understand, order or file away. Consciousness is clearly disrupted 
in both photographs by an image that appears to be incomprehensible. This symbol of the 
unconscious reasserts itself in Sugimoto's series, demanding that questions be asked about the 
unconscious of photography, or that of painting. By clearly situating an area of non- 
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comprehension within a comprehensible structure, as Poe and Lacan have done, Sugimoto creates 
a disharmony within the surface, yet another within the spectating subject's unconscious mind. 
By repeating this structure, however, Sugimoto (along with Poe and Lacan) calls for a reading of 
the unconscious as something which can be seen pushing itself up through the areas where it has 
worn thin the logic of consciousness. Much like the poetry of Edgar Allan Poe, the monochrome 
has been at once one of the most resisted and the most irresistible surfaces in the context of 
western art history. As Shoshana Felman writes on Poe, he is a, 
`[... ] symptom of poetry to the extent that poetry is both what most resists a 
psychoanalytical interpretation and what most depends on psychoanalytic 
effects. ' (1987: 51) 
I want to argue that the monochrome, in this case the concealed, concealing monochrome within 
the ordered surface of Sugimoto's photographs, is a symptom of the unconscious of the visual 
image. Rather like the (un)intentional slip-up of a parapraxis, or the (un)intentional re-appearance 
of the purloined letter, the unconscious, though hidden, needs us to know that it is there. 
2: 3 John Hilliard & The Specular Monochrome 
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Figure 21: John Hilliard, Debate (18% Reflectance) 1996. Cibachrome on aluminium. 120 x 157cm. Private collection. 
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Whilst light in Sugimoto's surfaces represents agency, John Hilliard's surfaces display a 
`preoccupation with light that both illuminates and extinguishes' (Wallace 1997: 41). Hilliard's 
light has a weirdly indeterminate agency, it plays a part in the dramatics of cancelling that his work 
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explores. Marina Wallace has called this the `visual communication of denial and obliteration' 
(1997: 41). Hilliard is involved in exhibitionistic activities of disguising and concealing, his 
surfaces foregrounding the `text' of monochrome as a writing that is not to be read". In the 
works by Hilliard discussed here, it is possible to see the development of an eye that first records 
and then presents, but whose presenting power is, again, mediated by the artist's own eye. 
Hilliard's recent photographs, bright cibachromes on aluminium, show scenes from what look 
like gallery openings, and in contrast to Sugimoto, Hilliard not only shows the audience, but 
implicates them in the drama of the surface. In Debate (18% Reflectance) of 1996 [Figure 21], a 
group of young White people stand around in a gallery. What is not apparent on initial looking, is 
that not one of the faces in the gallery is looking at the huge grey monochrome rectangle in the 
centre of the composition20. The people are peripheral to the upright `painting' on the floor, the 
compositional subject that dominates the scene. If the spectators in the photograph are meant to 
stand for `us', the spectators of the photograph, it is interesting to note that they all appear to be 
White. These White people are engaged in deflecting attention away from the huge, blank central 
motif. The gallery visitors seem more interested in a series of smaller, figurative canvases (the 
ones we can see portray heads). The canvas propped against the chair shows the face of a child 
with a little dog's nose and whiskers painted on, the visible wall-mounted canvases depict 
glamorous, 1950s-looking women, one of whom is identifiable as Marilyn Monroe. The `Monroe' 
canvas has writing on it, part of which is cut off by the parameters of the painting, and thus made 
illegible and mysterious - it is a mystery we want to solve, to complete21. 
As we look into the surface, two important clues begin to appear. First, the mad-trousered 
woman is carrying her small canvas so that we can only see its back. Secondly, the heads and 
upper bodies of two men, who at first appeared to be part of the general audience, are now quite 
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clearly holding the painting upright and moving it somewhere. Behind the painting (or rather in 
front of it if you are viewing it as a spectator in a gallery), are a selection of tools on the floor, 
such as tape measures and a hammer. It suddenly comes in a flash that maybe we are looking at 
the back of something; we are presented with the scene that the gallery walls, if they had sight, 
would see. The privileged position of the White spectator is shown as so much nonsense, and all 
at once we realise that this massive, central monochrome is either an oversized photographic test 
card (the clue is in the title, 18% reflectance is the optimum amount of light a photographer 
requires), or the back side of a painting. The ambiguity could be deliberate. If indeed this is a 
painting, its `front' side could still be blank, but that side remains a mystery. On that side is 
inscribed the writing that is not to be read. 
The position of seeing the back of the painting is not unlike positioning oneself before the 
illegibility of the monochrome. In both cases, something appears to be hiding. Both surfaces are 
filled with visual bait, both are approached as the powerful, all-knowing subject, and both surfaces 
remain invisible to the spectating eye. Hilliard has factored optical (as well as psychic) 
indeterminacies into his surface. As David Green points out, 
'The large canvas has been so arranged that its evenly lit and uniform surface is 
exactly parallel to the picture plane of the photograph with the result that our 
reading of the grey rectangle continually oscillates between seeing it as set 
within the illusory space of the image and seeing it as coextensive with the 
surface of the photograph itself. ' (Green 1999: 18) 
Another `conceptual photograph' by Hilliard from the same series [Figure 22J depicts a similar 
scene, except that the bright young things striking contemplative poses with their glasses of wine 
are now almost certainly watching the back of a slide screen. The title, Of Screen, again provides a 
clue - in this case the monochrome that dominates the picture is a white, light-filled screen, 
except this time `we' the spectators see its front. The audience in the picture are grouped behind 
this monochrome. The group, which now includes a girl who looks Asian (left hand side), are 
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Figure 22: John Hilliard, Of Screen 1999. Cibachrome on aluminium. 124 x 156cm. Private collection. 
watching something we will never see, whilst we are looking at nothing, and in this sense are 
visually `castrated'. Debate (18% Reflectance) positions all spectators as excluded, subjugated. 
Importantly, Hilliard's surface organisation allows a conceptual oscillation to take place. At the 
centre of his composition he places the paradox of the screen as it appears during a screening; 
highly visible and intently observed, but not actually seen, and therefore in a crucial way invisible. 
Like the blankness of monochrome, like the Whiteness of the Mixed Race subject, and the 
Whiteness of the Lacanian Phallus, all of which are observed - sometimes pathologically closely - 
but not seen, the invisibility is paradoxical and problematic. 
Earlier works by Hilliard also seem to take on the idea of an eye that is capable of showing. I lis 
1971 photograph, A Camera Recording Its Own Condition (7 Apertures, 10 Speeds, 2 Mirrors) arranges 70 
photographs in the form of a grid. The camera looks back at itself in a mirror, except that of 
course it is not the camera's image as it sees itself, but its image as the photographer, and 
afterwards the spectator, sees it. Hilliard alters the shutter-speed and aperture on each occasion, 
so that the resulting images swing between over- and under-exposure. The gridlike surface almost 
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resembles a chart or spectrum, in the centre the most `correctly' exposed, or legible images are 
placed. At the top are pure white monochromes, at the bottom pure black ones, both of which 
are immediately ill/legible. Whilst the image contains monochromes, it is not a monochrome 
itself. It is, however, a good example of an eye (the camera), that presents. Hilliard's treatment of 
the camera as the subject of a photograph is unsettling. Surely the camera is what creates the 
photograph, rather than sitting for its own portrait? The quasi-subjectivity that I lilliard imbues 
the camera with is a subtle inversion of an audience's usual understanding of the role of the lens, 
and asks unsettling questions about spectatorial roles. However, if we use theories which expose 
the particular and non-objective nature of the lens (eg Mulvey, Dyer), it becomes possible to read 
I Iilliard's piece as the Phallus Recording Its Own Condition. This condition is paradoxical and 
mutable; the phallus is well able to morph itself to whatever shape it needs to maintain the 
illusion of its dominance - even to appear `invisible'. 
Figure 23: A'cIäsquez, Ltis, llenintm 1656. Oil on canvas. 3.21 x 2.81m. Prado, Madrid. 
Michel Foucault discusses the problematic specular interrelationships that an inversion of visual 
norms can bring about in his well-known essay about Veläsquez's famous portrait from the 
classical `canon' of Art History, Las Meninas (Foucault 1966: 3) Figure 231. In using this painting 
as a stepping-stone to his work on human knowledge, Foucault immediately sets up the primacy 
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of vision as a way of apprehending the world. Beginning with a description of the Veläsquez 
painting, Foucault has established a problematic of inter-visual relations within the first 
paragraph. 
`The skilled hand is suspended in mid-air, arrested in rapt attention on the 
painter's gaze; and the gaze, in return, waits upon the arrested gesture. ' 
(Foucault 1970: 1) 
Hilliard seems to have been inspired by Lis Meninas, repeating many of Velisquez's compositional 
gestures such as showing the back of a painting. What is interesting is that both pictures are 
records of occasions that never actually took place. The reluctant stance of the Infanta Dona 
Margarita in the Veläsquez, the imploring attitudes of her handmaidens (known by the Portuguese 
title Meninas), the introduction of her court dwarves Maribarbola and Nicolasito - all are designed 
to humour her into posing for her portrait. Kenneth Clark (1972) informs us that the five-year- 
old Infanta would have posed regularly for portraits since birth, and, as one can imagine, would 
be thoroughly bored with the process by now. According to Clark, this sitting differed from the 
rest. It was to be an enormous official portrait, so big that it had to stand on the floor, of the Infanta 
with her parents King Philip IV and his wife, Queen Mariana. As far as we know, this big official 
portrait which Veläsquez only shows the back of, was never finished. The enormous `canvas' in 
Hilliard's Debate (18% Re. flectance), is also so big it must rest on the floor, and also dominates the 
scene by showing us what looks like its back. Of course, in the latter we see only a section of the 
canvas, whilst Hilliard shows us the reverse of a `full frontal' - but the effect is the same. 
Similarly, Hilliard's casual dispersal of carpentry tools on the floor in front of the canvas echoes 
Veläsquez's unobtrusive inclusion of the artist's brush. That tool of the artist's trade, sparking so 
much debate and reverence, hangs flaccid in the painter's hand as the hammers and screwdrivers 
are discarded on Hilliard's gallery floor. When not in use, the `tools' lose some of their mystique. 
When positioned as one of many objects in a picture, the tools become strangely redundant, 
occupying the same conceptual space as a shadow on a fold of drapery, or a dog's tail. Hilliard's 
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tool, his camera, somehow escapes this loss of status. Rather than existing as an element within a 
compositional schema, the camera in A Camera Recording Its Own Condition is, through its relentless 
repetition, sole subject and occupant, many times over, of the picture space. As it returns and 
returns, the mythic status of the camera is raised yet higher until we are faced with the realisation 
that the camera is not in fact a tool, but an eye. The monochrome mediated by photography is 
under perpetual scrutiny from this eye. 
In Foucault's analysis of Lzc Meninas, the painter himself is described as having been caught in, `a 
moment of stillness, at the neutral centre of this oscillation' (1970: 1). Despite the fact that each 
passage of the composition seems to act as a springboard for specular relations, the wild 
reflections back and forth of the various glances in the picture are tamed by the presence of the 
painter, who acts as the eye of the storm. In Hilliard's picture, the eye of the looking-storm is not 
the painter but the painting, or worse, the dominant back of the painting. It seems as though 
Hilliard is making a point about the theoretical shift in importance from the Romantic notion of 
the artist as a genius endowed with God-given sight, to the more recent usurpation of the 
position of the artist by the work. Hilliard, however, is subtle. He presents us with something 
that cannot be seen, therefore alluding to two things at once. First he makes reference to the 
previous Romantic `mystery' of what the artist puts into the canvas; secondly the fact that the 
current cultural significance that the surface enjoys can always succumb to the danger of the 
`Emperor's New Clothes'. An audience can always get excited by a trick, and being shown 
nothing at all - provided the visual palate is adequately peppered with flavoursome theories - can 
induce great reverence and (misplaced) respect in the viewer. Following on from this, the court 
`buffoons' in Veläsquez, people with physical deformities or learning disabilities, become in 
Hilliard the gallery visitors. Whilst we have no idea about the content of the surface that dwarfs 
everyone but at which nobody bothers to look, we are clearly presented with something that 
appears to be a grey monochrome. One cannot help but wonder whether the blank, affecdess 
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surface of the monochrome is somehow having a laugh at our expense. In a turn that belongs to 
the tradition of the monochrome sublime, we have all become buffoons and dwarves under the 
magnificently inscrutable presence of Hilliard's massive grey monochrome subject. 
Like the cinema screen, the painting in both Veläsquez and Hilliard is visible to the point of 
obtrusiveness, yet remains invisible to the characters. Foucault writes that a `double invisibility' 
takes place in Las Meninas. He begins by pointing out that the painter's face is turned towards an 
invisible point -- however, as spectators we can easily assign a place to this point. 
The place is 
ourselves, our bodies, our eyes. Foucault writes, 
`The spectacle he is observing is thus doubly invisible: first, because it is not 
represented within the space of the painting, and, second, because it is situated 
precisely in that blind point, in that essential hiding-place into which our gaze 
disappears from ourselves at the moment of our actual looking. And, yet, how 
could we fail to see that invisibility, there in front of our eyes, since it has its 
own perceptible equivalent, its sealed-in figure, in the painting itself? (1970: 4) 
So, first we have what Lacan refers to in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Pychoanalyrir as 
something that is always present in every picture because of the eye's very structure, and has to do 
with the inherent (Phallic) power of the (White) eye to separate (in so far as Lacan assumes a 
White, French, masculine subject, we can assume his `eye' to be White, Phallic); 
`Indeed, there is something whose absence can always be observed in a picture 
- which is not the case in perception. This is the central field, where the 
separating power of the eye is exercised to the maximum in vision. In every 
picture, this central field cannot but be absent, and replaced by a hole -a 
reflection, in short, of the pupil behind which is situated the gaze. 
Consequently, and in as much as the picture enters into a relation to desire, the 
place of a central screen is always marked, which is precisely that by which, in 
front of the picture, I am elided as the subject of the geometral plane'. (Lacan 
1994 [1973]: 108) 
Lacan elides the notions of `hole' and `mirror' here in a way that seems to belie his 
Phallogocentrism. This central field or blind spot, which is a hole (so that the gaze falls into it) 
and also simultaneously a reflection (so that the spectator sees him or herself reflected), performs 
an eradicating act on the subject. The blank central monochrome of Hilliard dwarfs us with its 
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size, but it also eliminates us with its blankness. The big, inscrutable tain of the picture, which 
Foucault would describe this as, `The other side of a psyche' (1970: 6), is the first sign of double 
invisibility. This works equally well for the Veläsquez and the Hilliard. However, Veläsquez 
supplies an important clue about the possible content of the front of his canvas, whereas Hilliard 
does not. In amongst the panels of oil paintings in the dark gallery, one panel in particular 
(featuring two figures in silhouette) glows improbably with a bright light. The source of this light 
is inexplicable, it appears as if the panel is glowing from within, or of its own accord. As it turns 
out, this isn't a picture but a mirror. Foucault writes that, `Of all the representations represented in 
the picture this is the only one visible; but no one is looking at it' (1970: 7). The mirror represents 
the content of the mysterious front of the canvas, a portrait of the King and Queen. In all this 
confusion of unstable looking, nobody is actually looking at either the representation of the Royal 
couple on the canvas, or at their reflection in the mirror, the reflected representation of their 
representation. Taken figuratively, Lacan's `reflection [... ] of the pupil behind which is situated 
the gaze' could refer to the mirror that Veläsquez has placed, or hidden, in amongst the panels of 
paintings in the dark gallery. Of course, what Veläsquez's mirror reflects is the King and Queen, 
whose position in the picture is roughly equivalent to that of the spectator and therefore erases 
the spectator the minute s/he realises her/his place is filled by powerful symbols of royalty. 
Lacan also writes, however, that he is `elided as a subject of the geometral plane' by the marking 
out of the central screen. This reflective hole, this area where `the nothing' resides, according to 
Lacan performs an act of erasure on the subject's subjectivity. It reflects the seer back into the 
Imaginary, before the initial subject-forming confrontation with the mirror, before the inception 
of the subject's subjectivity and passage into the Symbolic. This is what the White Phallic eye of 
photography would attempt to do with the subject of Mixed Race; to place her in the position 
where hole and mirror are elided, a position that oscillates between Imaginary and Symbolic. The 
White eye would then be able, at will, to reflect the Mixed Race subject back into the Imaginary, 
where she cannot reach subjectivity and therefore cannot pose a real threat. In her second 
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Doctoral Thesis, Luce Irigaray challenged the Phallogocentric economies of knowledge and 
representation that could be symbolised by the Lacanian mirror, and proposed the speculum as 
Woman's alternative. This visionary text, Speculum: Of the Other IVoman, offered an embodied 
writing specifically by and for women. Predictably the Phallogocentric system that she criticized 
for silencing women did its best to silence Irigaray: she was dismissed from her post at the 
University of Vincennes. I wonder if another kind of `speculum' could be suggested, this time for 
the Mixed Race subject, a `speculum' which does not privilege the Phallic specularity of Lacan's 
mirror, and which does not erase the specularity of the Other? (I will come back to this in section 
2: 6, below) 
Hilliard does not appear to present an equivalent mirror in his composition, whilst his gallery 
walls are hung with figurative pictures, the presences they depict are carnivalesque (eg, the child 
with its face painted like a dog who is analogous with the Infanta in Las Meninas), or iconic. 
These are, of course, all representations of representations, as is the cunning mirror hidden in the 
Veläsquez, but none of them appears to reflect. Has Hilliard, in making what appears to be a 
contemporary version of LasMeninas, left out one of Veläsquez's most ingenious compositional 
devices? This question answers itself if we re-look at Lacan. It is the inevitable blind spot in a 
picture that acts as a reflection of the blind spot at the centre of all vision, the sightless pupil. 
Where Veläsquez has ensured the double representation of this blind spot by his inclusion of the 
back of the painting and a mirror reflecting the thing that we cannot see; Hilliard relies on the 
relentless centrality of his grey monochrome (also the back of a picture? ), to `reflect' back to the 
spectator the blindness at the centre of their vision. In Debate (18% Reflectance), the monochrome 
becomes a mirror reflecting the blind spot. Foucault goes on to write that what the mirror in Las 
Meninas actually reflects is the invisible, the thing that cannot be seen within the picture space, 
`The mirror provides a metathesis of visibility that affects both the space 
represented in the picture and its nature as representation; it allows us to see, in 
the centre of the canvas, what in the painting is of necessity doubly invisible' 
(1970: 8) 
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We therefore have two blind spots in Las Meninas, the blind back of the canvas, and the mirror on 
the far wall. The double-blind spot is a familiar position for the Mixed Race subject in White 
society, who is historically invisible as a Black subject, but whose `Mixture' is also invisible, a 
horrific sight denied by the eye of White society's ego. 
The concept of the gaze in Lacan and Foucault is fugitive. Apparently the only way we can 
apprehend such a gaze is in its reflection; paradoxically though, the reflection is always of this 
unavoidable blind spot. Hilliard has conceptualised this blind spot as a monochrome, which 
receives and hides all our gazes, something that is, quite literally, at the centre of all vision. Into 
the composition of Debate (18% Reflectance) Hilliard has figured a treatment of the monochrome 
which privileges it in the quite crude terms of its overpowering size and central positioning. 
However, if we are to read this as a strategy that also writes monochrome as the blind spot at the 
centre of all vision, it surely follows that this blind spot is, paradoxically, also accorded much 
privilege. But is a blind spot empty or full? Is it even possible to consider a blind spot in terms 
of innate volume? Foucault's analysis of the mirror as blind spot in Veläsquez's picture presents 
this blind spot as replete, even layered. 
`In the realm of the anecdote, this centre is symbolically sovereign, since it is 
occupied by King Philip IV and his wife. But it is so above all because of the 
triple function it fulfils in relation to the picture. For in it there occurs an exact 
superimposition of the model's gaze as it is being painted, of the spectator's as 
he contemplates the painting, and of the painter's as he is composing his 
picture (not the one represented, but the one in front of us which we are 
discussing). These three `observing' functions come together in a point 
exterior to the picture: that is, an ideal point in relation to what is represented, 
but a perfectly real one too, since it is also the starting-point that makes the 
representation possible. Within that reality itself, it cannot not be invisible' 
(1970: 14-15) 
Full of gazes and reflections of gazes, this monochrome blind spot is the central organising point 
of the composition. The blind spot acts here like a benevolent monarch, `A reflection that shows 
us quite simply, and in shadow, what all those in the foreground are looking at. It restores, as if 
by magic, what is lacking in every gaze '(1970: 15). The spectator can thus fill the painter's 
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disturbingly empty gaze with the models, the king's gaze is filled with his own portrait, and so on. 
This action of desperately attempting to fill blank spaces is a typical activity of the Phallic gaze. 
But Foucault, tantalisingly, also allows for the possibility that this apparent reparative function of 
the mirror/blind spot could be a trick: 
`But perhaps this generosity on the part of the mirror is feigned; perhaps it is 
hiding as much as and even more than it reveals [... ] For the function of that 
reflection is to draw into the interior of the picture what is intimately foreign to 
it: the gaze which has organised it and the gaze for which it is displayed. But 
because they are present within the picture, to the right and to the left, the 
artist and the visitor cannot be given a place in the mirror: just as the king 
appears in the depths of the looking-glass precisely because he does not belong 
in the picture. ' (1970: 15). 
In Hilliard, however, all the things that don't belong in the picture - the spectators represented by 
his gallery-goers, the artist represented by the tools on the floor and the mystique of the invisible 
canvas - are actually represented in the picture. This in itself could be read as Hilliard's trick, 
taking the form of the double-bluff. The mirror doesn't reflect any of the things that Veläsquez's 
mirror reflects, because Hilliard's mirror functions as both mirror and hole, or blind spot. So the 
multiple gazes of the spectators are hiding behind the mysterious grey monochrome, whilst being 
represented by proxy by the figures of the gallery goers. We see what they see, but they can't see 
what we can't see - or rather, they don't appear interested. None of them are looking at the front 
of the painting, which is invisible to us, but then none of them are looking at the back of the 
painting either. So this means that Hillliard's mirror/hole/blind spot might pretend to give back 
that which is missing in the picture (the artist's gaze, the spectator's gazes), but in actual fact it 
only gives us back the reminder that we can't see what we want to see. 
Foucault does go on to say that both the painter and the spectator `compose' the picture whilst 
they look at it (1970: 16), thus assigning authorial activities beyond the realm of the traditional 
author. Eventually it is the condition of invisibility, too, that becomes something that the painter 
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and the spectator share, and all artifice on the part of the painter counts for nothing in the face of 
the inevitable invisible; 
`[... ] the profound invisibility of what one sees is inseparable from the 
invisibility of the person seeing - despite all mirrors, reflections, imitations and 
portraits. ' (1970: 16). 
The blind spot at the centre of Hi liard's Off Screen is conceptualised slightly differently; its power 
to separate (figure from ground, seen from unseen) is just as great, but its size is smaller and the 
surrounding figures perform different actions. The main activity in Of Screen is to look avidly 
towards a central point, the `off screen' side of the bright white monochrome which we cannot 
see. We can trace in the spatial and epistemological structure of the composition an orientation 
based on a play of light, similar to that found in the surface of Las Meninas. The main difference 
in each case is the source of the lighting. In Las Meninas, the light's sources appear mysterious 
because they are illogical. However, logic isn't important here, what really counts is the light's 
ability to act as a clue to the oscillation of looks that the surface both contains and projects. In 
this interchange of looks, the object of vision (like Poe's letter), becomes unstable, mobile and 
shifting. It cannot be contained, and endlessly moves off from where any gaze might attempt to 
fix it. In this case, the clue to the gaze is the light, a mimetic representation of the process that 
constructed the picture itself. In relation to the monochrome, the oscillations of light and gaze 
we see here can be used as metaphors to describe its slippery significatory indeterminacy. In 
relation to the subject of Mixed Race, the same is true, but with the added metaphor of an `origin' 
that defies Phallic logic. 
The well known second section of Lacan's Four Fundamental Concepts of Pucho Analysis is devoted to 
an analysis of the eye, the gaze and the problem of defining a picture. Entitled Of the Gate as Objet 
Petit a, the section implicitly conceptualises the gaze itself as the symbol of the fundamental 
condition of lack that Lacanian psychoanalysis relegates all living humans to, a lack that engenders 
an eternal cycle of desire. As the fugitive illusion of satisfaction fades, it ultimately exposes the 
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original emptiness - and again, more lack. Lack is a motivating force, as is desire (which is always 
unconscious), but it is never possible for the subject to arrive at a position where these forces can 
be controlled. The gaze originates from the subject's body but is simultaneously exterior to it: 
'he objet a is something from which the subject, in order to constitute itself, 
has separated itself off as organ. This serves as a symbol of the lack, that is to 
say, of the phallus, not as such but in so far as it is lacking. It must, therefore, 
be an object that is, firstly, separable and, secondly, that has some relation to 
the lack [... ]' (Lacan 1994[1977]: 104)' 
Like the weaned child, the gaze is never, satisfied; its desire to see and know, to re-look and re- 
consider even supposedly familiar sights is voracious throughout human life. The gaze itself 
provides a visual image of the relentless cycle of lack, desire, attempts at filling, more lack, more 
desire, and so on ad infinitu i?. The gaze as objet a represents the Phallus-that-is-not-there, or that 
is imagined not to be there, or that is jealously guarded in case it should one day disappear. So: 
following the trail from the originary lack to its symbolisation as objet a, to the objet ds 
symbolisation as gaze and, finally, to the unreadable monochrome in the photographs discussed 
above as symbol of the gaze oscillating optically between projection and reflection, and 
psychically between Imaginary and Symbolic; what we are left with is the possibility of 
monochrome as fetish -a symbol of the Phallic eye's potential visual castration. 
Lacan does not explicitly mention the notion of visual castration in Of The Gaffe as Objet Petit-a. 
However, his notion of the gaze carries with it the scent of deception and trickery. The subject 
needs the gaze in order to have subjectivity, `In the scopic relation, the object on which depends 
the phantasy from which the subject is suspended in an essential vacillation is the gaze' (Lacan 
1994[1977]: 83) So perhaps it is possible to conceptualise the gaze as something that has its own 
type of subjectivity; that is able to conceal or play a trick. If this is the case, it follows that a 
reading of the `evil eye' could expose it as a `castrating eye', an eye that disempowers. The `evil 
eye' causes milk to curdle and bad luck to rain down on anyone who falls foul of its gaze. In 
animals, Lacan states that the `evil eye' causes the drying up of their milk (1994[1977]: 115-119). 
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The animal becomes, quite literally, full up with `the nothing'. In terms of its previous ability to 
nourish its young and to be of use to humans, the animal can be said to be `castrated' - although 
in Lacan, castration in the female (and the `Mulatto') has already occurred, so perhaps this should 
be described as a double castration. The `evil eye' has, symbolically, performed the function of 
the Name of the Father, separating the young from the mother's milk and preventing the bodily 
re-attachments to the mother that take place in breastfeeding. Visual castration could provide a 
useful way of reading the monochrome in terms of that other of the Phallic function, the eternally 
lost object or objet a. The power that comes from owning the legend that cracks the code must 
necessarily be a Phallic power, since in Lacanian psycho-analysis the Symbolic Order is structured 
in relation to the Phallus. So the gaze is the missing Phallus, and the monochrome represents the 
space, hole or gap where the Phallus `ought' to be. But at first sight this appears to be too 
straightfoward, it also doesn't allow for the possibility of trickery or concealment. Is 
monochrome the absence of the Phallus, veiled? 
Perhaps we should go back to the Purloined Letter for help in solving this puzzle. Assuming, as 
Poe's detective Dupin does, that the best place to hide something is in full view, monochrome 
can be said to be involved in a tricky double-bluff. In the examples from Hilliard and Sugimoto, 
each author places their monochrome at the centre of a scene or action. In other words, like the 
purloined letter, monochrome is stationed right where everyone can see it. Like the mother 
holding up the infant to the mirror, the compositions `hold up' or present the central figure of the 
monochrome to our spectating gaze. Hilliard and Sugimoto even go so far as to draw attention to 
it, placing it within fancy settings in a sort of mice-en-abime, which echoes the glance-saturated 
worlds in which the photographs are set. Sugimoto's pictures, for example, are composed as 
cinematic shots; Hilliard's pay attention to traditional, scholarly values of photographic 
composition. According to Susan Hayward, this kind of `dressing up' is similar to that of the 
transvestite, who; 
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`[... ] articulates his desire for the phallus in that he identifies with the phallus- 
as-hidden under the mother's dress. In other words, he identifies with a 
woman who has a hidden phallus. Fetishism is, as we know, a strategy of 
disavowal faced by the fear of castration: the fetishist `completes' the female 
body and in doing so denies difference, denies the lack. ' (Hayward 1996: 283) 
So, in this alternative reading of the `staged' or mediated monochrome, the absent Phallus in the 
guise of the monochrome is really the absent Phallus twice-veiled. The first disguise is in the fact 
that the absence is so clearly presented. The second veiling is a little more complex; the 
monochrome disguises the fact that it is presenting an absence, by pretending to present that very 
absence. An elaborate hiding-by-showing is going on in these monochrome surfaces, a 
conceptual game of dressing-up which makes a fetish out of fetishisation itself. The analogy of 
the transvestite should, then, ideally be replaced by the analogy of a woman dressed as a 
transvestite. That which is castrated veils itself with that which is obsessed with the castrated 
thing which possesses the Phallus, but which hides it. In the end, as Lacan would have us believe, 
it's all about the gaze deceiving the eye. The legend of Zeuxis and Parrhasios which Lacan refers 
to (1994 [1977]: 103) shows that whilst it is commendable to be able to paint so convincingly as to 
deceive birds, the real skill lies in managing to deceive a human. And what better way to deceive a 
human than to arouse curiosity, to paint a veil which is so realistic that the desire to know, to 
possess the Phallic knowledge associated with power, takes over. This is what Sugimoto and 
Hilliard have done in these monochromes, they have veiled both knowledge, and the Phallus 
itself. Like Parrhasios' picture, all the spectator wants to do is to rip the mask off the 
monochrome, to draw back its veil; to find out what it is managing to get away with. The 
photographs of Hilliard and Sugimoto exist in a space between two definite categories. This un- 
nameable space is what the inflexible binary categories leave over; it is their trace, their surplus, 
the symbol of their desire, another incarnation in the surface of the objet petit-a. Like the aural as 
discussed in the following section, and like the subject of Mixed Race within Whiteness, it is an 
interstitial thing. 
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2: 4 The Interstitial Auditory 
This section will consider what the ear in cinematic photography presents in relation to the 
previously discussed White eye. The audience for film is involved in a socially-inscribed ritual of 
silent sitting and rapt absorption; I want to begin to look here at the ways that silence (and sound) 
relate to the discussion. Cinema has been understood to function simultaneously for the 
Imaginary and the Symbolic Orders of existence, with the viewing subject in a continual flux 
between the twou. The cinematic apparatus has always already positioned the spectator as 
voyeuristically identified with the look, and effectively constructs the spectator as subject whilst, 
in Dyer's reading, it castrates the Black subject. If the projector is read as the omnipotent all- 
seeing eye, then the spectator's visual pleasure is tied in with issues of `lawless seeing' (Hayward). 
The viewer watches, but from the position of power since s/he is not watched. Every time the 
subject goes to the cinema, then, a desire to repeat the experience of visual pleasure is enacted. 
However, the accompanying narcissistic Imaginary identification with the image also implies the 
subject's desire to repeat the orgasmic experience of jouisranc? b. This form of pleasure pays no 
regard to the Phallus, it is pre-linguistic and cannot be articulated in words (unlike Phallic 
pleasure, which takes place in the linguistic realm of the Symbolic)". 
The cinema provides an ideal repository for psychic desire, especially since it has always carried 
associations of dreams, escapism and fantasy. The cinema screen becomes the screen on to 
which the subject's unconscious fantasties and desires are projected and read: cinema positions 
the spectator as desiring subject (and, presumably, positions the Black spectator as existing in a 
condition of pathological desire and lack). As Kaja Silverman writes, 
'We have seen that the object is definitively lost (and the subject definitively 
found) at the moment of linguistic access. Cinema replays that drama of 
phenomenal loss and cultural recovery. ' (Silverman 1988: 10)`" 
With its clear emphasis on vision, it is sometimes easy to forget that the experience of cinema can 
also be extra-ocular. The phenomenon of the monochrome or blank film really foregrounds this 
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issue, as we can see from the initial reception of Guy-Ernest (later Guy) Debord's situationist 
film, Hurlements en Faveur de Sade. On June 30`h, 1952, Debord brought great perplexity to the 
Paris Musee de l'Homme when he presented this imageless film. Screening had to be stopped 
after just twenty minutes; actual physical violence broke out in response to this confusing film 
which oscillated between an entirely black and an entirely white screen, first accompanied by 
silence, then by `a melange of in-group dialogue, political proclamation, citation of philosophers 
and American western movies. ' (Marcus 1989: 331-339) The visual portion of Debord's film is 
credited as the inspiration behind some of the Minimal films that arose a decade later". 
The confusion of Debord's audience arises from the disturbing fact that both the audio and the 
visual elements of the film appeared meaningless. Finding themselves thwarted in their search for 
meaning on screen, the audience were forced to concentrate on the sound - in which they found 
no `meaning' either. Bouncing between sound and image and back again, the spectator is forced 
into the centre of an oscillation which places them neither here, nor there -a place that Phallic 
thinking would probably call, `nowhere'. In this case, the eye and ear are 'tricked'- Debord's 
monochrome cinema screen playfully dresses up for a moment as a representative of cinema's 
Phallic economy, appropriating the Phallic functions of exclusion and confusion, and playing 
them out in its own way with the assistance of sound. What is interesting here is that the sound- 
aspect of Debord's film is doubly indeterminate. Firstly, the nature of the voice in cinema is an 
interstitial thing, a go-between. It is a border condition, existing between the body and language 
(see Rosolato 1974). As such a border condition, it can be understood to have parity with the 
blank surface. Secondly (and specifically to Debord's film), the voice presents itself for the first 
few moments as something that can be understood. It sets up the expectation in the audience 
that it will provide the explanation for the film's blank visual aspect. When it becomes clear to 
the audience that the `soundtrack' is nothing but a random collection of fragments, that 
expectation is dashed. 
140 
Kaja Silverman's seminal 1988 work, The Acoustic Mirmr: The Female Voice in Pycl)oanalysis and 
Cinema, deals specifically with the problem of sound and the voice within classical narrative 
cinema, particularly of the voice of Woman. Silverman's thesis is that classic cinema generates 
castration anxiety at the site of male subjectivity. She goes on to write that the central lack that 
haunts all film theory is, in reality, a preoccupation with male subjectivity (1988: 1). The reality of 
male lack is projected on to female characters in classic cinema, who embody the walking 
wounded or the lack lived, and so in a manner following Freudian fetishism, `classic cinema [... ] 
projects male lack on to female characters in the guise of anatomical deficiency and discursive 
inadequacy. ' (1988: 1). Interestingly, Silverman also democratises castration anxiety. She suggests 
that there is an initial castration that takes place before the founding Freudian split of the infant's 
discovery of sexual difference. This castration affects both male and female subjects, and it 
concerns the splitting from the world of objects and entry into the world of language, ie the 
Lacanian Symbolic Order (1988: 1,15). Whilst this enables a more realistic understanding of the 
male and/or female subject's horror at the idea of the loss of or threat to its perceived bodily 
integrity, it does also create conceptual problems. If stripped of its originary genital significance, 
the horror of castration then surely becomes a dread of subjectivity, of individuation, a dread of 
losing the direct connection to the mother. It is a dread of being set adrift, ' of having no anchor 
in a mother tongue or mother country. Perhaps the classifying White Phallus relies on this dread 
in order to wield its `power'; when the Phallic eye views the subject who is not easily locatable in 
any one mother country or single mother tongue, what it sees is a mobile, potentially transgressive 
and potentially destabilising subject. To contain this perceived threat, the Phallic eye must 
convince that subject that she is really rootless, destabilised, wrong. Perhaps it would also be fair 
to say that the dread is less of subjectivity and more of the threat of deprivation of the joni lance, 
which as we have seen cannot take place in the realm of language. 
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Silverman quotes Freud's 1923 Analysis o fa Phobia in a Five-Year-Old 1ioy to indicate Freud's 
insistence that the term `castration' should only be used in relation to the absence of the penis. 
Her purpose in this is to suggest that Freud's strategy serves to place the maximum distance 
possible between the male subject and the notion of lack. 
`To admit that the loss of the object is also a castration would be to 
acknowledge that the male subject is already structured by absence prior to the 
moment at which he registers woman's anatomical difference - to concede that 
he, like the female subject, has already been deprived of being, and already 
been marked by the language and desires of the Other. ' (1988: 15). 
She compounds this by going on to quote Freud's description of the revelation of female lack as 
being experienced by the male as `uncanny and traumatic' - here, of course, Freud performs what 
appears to be a spectacular parapraxis. Freud's definition of the `uncanny' or unheimlich is that it 
must be familiar, but with an eerie and frighening twist. For something to be uncanny, it must be 
recognisable and known `of old' - so in order to experience female castration as `uncanny', the 
male subject must necessarily have already undergone it himself. 
`In other words, the recurrence of the word uncanny in the essay on fetishism 
reminds us that even before the so-called castration crisis, the male subject has 
an intimate knowledge of loss - that he undergoes numerous divisions and 
splittings prior to the moment at which he is made to fear the loss of his sexual 
organ. Thus, what seems to confront him from without, in the guise of the 
`mutilated' female body, actually threatens him from within, in the form of his 
own history' (1988: 17) 
This is a key point, if, as Silverman suggests, all traumatic splittings off of things which were 
formerly assumed to be part of the subject's body are experienced as a `castration', then the male 
and female subject are, in reality, equally castrated. What Silverman exposes is the founding `trick' 
in cinema, that which dupes the woman into believing that her subject position is that of 
incomplete other. She also goes on to say, however, that the identification of woman with lack 
can only come about as a result of the identification of man with specularity3". So therefore, 
`[... J through an extraordinary sleight of hand, woman has been made the 
repository not only of lack but of specularity. She has also come to be 
identified with two other qualitites, narcissism and exhibitionism, which would 
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seem more compatible with male subjectivity - qualities which are almost 
synonymous with organ display' (1988: 26). 
In the final analysis, Silverman writes, `it is the male viewer's own exclusion from the site of filmic 
production rather than the spectacle of woman's anatomical `lack' which arouses such anxiety and 
fear in him' (1988: 30). In film, as well as in the subject, there exists an originary and fundamental 
splitting which corresponds with the splitting of the subject from the world of objects to enter 
into the world of language as outlined by Silverman. Film, she writes, `is defined by the distance 
that separates it from the phenomenal order - by the absence of the object or referent' (1988: 3) 
So the clear split between the thing represented and the referent, is one of the founding realities 
of the cinematic experience, Silverman goes on to trace the arguments of film critics such as 
Andre Bazin, who, despite his insistence on the inseparability of the object and the photographic 
image, `occasionally concedes that lack is somehow intrinsic to the cinematic operation' (1988: 3); 
and Lacanian Christian Metz; who takes great pains to elaborate on the absence at the heart of 
cinema. She concludes that, `Despite their divergent theoretical positions, Munsterberg, Bazin 
and Metz all conceptualise the transition from referent to cinematic sign as a surgical incision' 
(1988: 3) Cinematic experience then, or the `film work', directly parallels the journey into 
subjectivity and acquisition of language. In each case there is a founding traumatic split which is 
fundamental to the organisation of the subject's subjectivity; and in both cases, `all links with the 
object are severed' (1988: 4). Most tellingly, Metz actually uses the term `castration' when 
describing the lack he perceives as inherent in cinema; the use of this language personalising the 
sense of the individual's own stake in the loss of the object/world of objects. 
Kaja Silverman (1988) tells us that fetishhation (that which protects the subject from the tragic 
horror of castration anxiety) often takes the form of technical virtuosity, or formal brilliance. In other 
words, it is the `goodness' or effectiveness of the apparatus that protects the individual from the 
shock of castration, and keeps her/him whole. This is a trick: in terms of classic narrative cinema, 
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it is the creative use of the repertoire of `tricks' available in directing, shooting and editing which 
safeguard the film's `goodness' or success. A little like a proud male child showing off the 
`wonder' of his genital, the film-maker can make whole the castration prior to the discovery of 
sexual difference by simply being the best. It is interesting to read Oudry's White Duck (Chapter 
One), and other paintings of that genre in this light; all the `tricks' of trorrrpe 1'oeil painting are 
mobilised, and suddenly the stakes are raised in the notion of Art History as competition between 
men". Importantly, though, the trick relies on the audience's willingness to believe in the 
goodness and brilliance of the technology. If, as Silverman writes, `film communicates its 
illusions through other illusions; it is doubly simulated, the representation of a representation' 
(1988: 3), then monochrome film is far more illusory, more involved in trickery. It is the 
representation of a representation of a representation. 
2: 5 Derek Jarman's Blue : Fantasy of the Maternal Voice? 
Figure 24: 1)( 1( 1. Imnn. n ii slic Iii i nur i li/ue, 1993. Photograph by Liam Longman. 
courtesy of Basilisk Communications. 
`[... ] we must realize that the cinema presents us with an incomplete world, 
shown only on one side; and it is just as well that the world should be set in its 
unfinished state because if, by some miracle, the objects thus photographed, 
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thus stratified on the screen, could move, we dare not think of the void, of the 
hole in appearances which they would create. ' (Artaud 1972: 77) 
When Derek Jarman conceived the script and idea for his film Blue, he was already almost blind. 
Jarman had by this time developed full-blown AIDS, and his blindness was a direct result of the 
AIDS-related infection toxoplasmosis. Finding that his vision had become a uniform blue, he 
described the exact nature of the blue and requested it be replicated on screen. The loss of vision 
was, however, not his only physical worry. Jarman also experienced agonising pains, 
hallucinations, intermittent paralyses and other horrors. The film Blue was intended as a sort of 
final document of his life, and a homage to the cardinal of blue, Yves Klein, with whom Jarman 
had been obsessed for a long time32. Injarman's Wittgensteinian book of musings on colour, 
Chroma, he describes Klein as, `the great master of blue. 'Qarman in Wollen 1996: 161). 
Premiered in 1993 at the Venice Film Festival, Blue consists of a narrative, read by Jarman himself 
and other actors. The voices describe the horror of gradual loss of sight, and also document the 
tragic, also gradual loss of friends to HIV and AIDS. There are moments of intensely eerie vocal 
arrangements of specially commissioned original music, and frequently it is Jarman's words, 
recently spoken, which are repeated, repeated and harmonised. Michael O'Pray writes that in 
Blue, Jarman, 
`[... ] manages to bring together the collagist impulse - juxtaposing different 
kinds of voice from the personal to the philosophical with music, noises and 
sounds and the ominous abstraction of the saturated blue screen. It is as if a 
cacophony of sounds has supplanted the pandemonium of images' (O'Pray in 
Wollen fed] 1996: 73) 
It is certainly true that Jarman is famed for the lush, visual repleteness of films such as Caravagio 
(1986), or Sebastiane (1976), films that replicate the Victorian aesthetic of horror vacui. In this 
context, Blue certainly reads as a surprise. One of the things that Jarman is trying to share with his 
viewer is the experience of being an intensely visually active being deprived of sight, and the 
sometimes unexpectedly lush `visual' qualities in language, music and sound. The relentlessly blue 
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monochrome screen sings the eyes to sleep, soundlessly, so the actual perceived sounds become 
the ultimate focus. It is a film about sound, a film which envelops the audience in sound, which 
delivers the huge, thundering effects of visual cinema entirely in terms of sound, and which uses 
sound to lull, fascinate and frighten. 
We remember that Kaja Silverman has written about the initial castration that applies to all 
subjects, that coinciding with, `the separation from the world of objects, and the entry into 
language' (1988: 1). We also remember that she goes on to write, 
`[... ] the entry into language is the juncture at which the object is definitively 
and irretrievably lost and the subject as definitively and irretrievably found'. 
(1988: 8) 
So language effectively ruins that sense of prelinguistic fascination enjoyed by the subjectless 
subject in the Real. In Jarman's case, his visual loss actually separates him from the `world of 
objects' as he has known it since learning to see. The classical Freudian and Lacanian notion of 
the founding of subjectivity being entirely visual is dearly a problem here. Any implications that 
psychoanalysis might have for the founding of subjectivity of someone who is physically unable 
to see genital difference, or whose image in the surface of a mirror means nothing, are difficult (if 
not impossible) to find. Freud's writings on the castration crisis also state that an unwanted part 
of the self is moved to the outer register, where it can be mastered through vision. The projected 
image returns to trouble the masculine subject. However, in Jarman's case a double castration has 
occurred. Any `mastery' by vision is denied him, and any projections must be done from the 
scene of blindness. His disempowerment, both as an artist and as a man, is doubly distressing 
and almost complete. We must not forget the Freudian conflation of the power of the eyes with 
the power of the testicles, likewise their forced removal. In Freudian as well as physical terms, 
Jarman is castrated. Silverman's liberating take on the founding of subjectivity offers some 
consolation; she proposes that it is not the look but the voice of the mother that surrounds the 
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intra- and extra-uterine infant, in a way not dissimilar to the ways in which the voices surround 
the cinema-bound subject in Jarman's Blue. 
One way of conceptualisingJarman's Blue is in terms of the reality of his own visual castration (or 
at least a trauma which prefigures the horror of castration anxiety). Jarman's monochrome is a 
fetish, much like the monochrome passages inserted into the work of Sugimoto and Hilliard, 
whose purpose is to disavow the absent Real of the perceptible world. Monochrome, as a non- 
representative representation much like the signifier which takes the place of the Real in 
Silverman's account (1988: 8), is another fetish. Jarman's lost object is his vision; the defence 
against this is first to deny it by appearing to admit to it - another cunning double-bluff 
performed by the film's monochrome surface - but secondly and more importantly, his finest 
defence is to surround himself with the fantasised enveloping warmth of the imagined maternal 
voice. 
Silverman writes that the voice is in itself a division, and `one of the most radical subject divisions' 
(1988: 42), because it stands between meaning and materiality. The voice also demonstrates 
qualities of subversion, because classical subjectivity is predicated on notions of bodily limits, and 
the voice violates and transgresses these. 
`[... ] the sounds the voice makes always exceed signification to some degree 
[... ] Because we hear before we see, the voice is also closely identified with the 
infantile scene. On the other hand [... ] because it is through the voice that the 
subject normally accedes to language, and thereby sacrifices its life, it is 
associated as well with phenomenal loss, the birth of desire, and the aspiration 
toward discursive mastery. ' (1988: 42) 
Beginning in the body and exceeding the body, the voice, unlike vision, has the ability to envelop 
the subject in its `sonorous blanket'. The specifically maternal voice, however, can contain echoes 
of a blissful previous plenitude, or can seem like a soft cell. Silverman distinguishes between the 
fantasy of the maternal voice as `sonorous envelope' as viewed from the position of the 
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unconscious, where it corresponds to the cornucopian fantasy of safety and richness, and the very 
different view from the preconscious/conscious system. The latter sees the warm quilt of the 
maternal voice as an emblem of entrapment and impotence, triggering deep panic and an anxiety. 
As a moving space that appears static, Jarman's Blue could be said to symbolise both the utopian 
and the dystopian versions of this maternal voice fantasy. The former relates to the 
aforementioned position of the spectating subject in the cinema, trapped (albeit wilfully, and with 
the perfect possibility of escape) within a warm, sonorous darkness. The images the darkness 
shows you, though, and the sounds the subject hears within it, can fix the spectator in a state of 
abject terror. At once the female space of the `mother's voice', pre-linguistic and situated in the 
Lacanian Real, can also be a male space; the space of the male subject's dreaded lack. So, one 
could say that whilst Lacan's visual mirror creates subjectivity; the acoustic mirror (the reflection 
of the maternal voice) destabilises it. The cherished maternal voice of blissful fantasy can be 
understood as a lost object, (Lacan also included the voice of the mother in his definition of the 
objet a), whilst the monstrous mothervoice of the latter example functions as an incipient 
superego, speaking and listening, and feeding the paranoid fantasy of entrapment" 
The Barthesian notion ofjouissance is distinguished from the understandable and symbolisable 
`pleasure' in his 1973 text, Pleasure of the Text. Like jouissance, Barthes' notion of Third or Obtuse 
meaning, can be smoothly fitted over the monchrome surface. Martin Jay uses the metaphor of 
the film still to illustrate what Barthes meant by 'Third Meaning'. Jay describes `Third or Obtuse 
Meaning' as, 
`Resisting metalinguistic translation, outside of the circuit of semantic 
exchange, not a copy of anything in the real world, obtuse meaning was visual 
counter-narrative [... ] it remains a fragment of a whole, which can never be 
reunited through the setting in motion of the cinematic apparatus' (Jay 
1995: 444) 
If, like jouiscance, Third/Obtuse meaning can also be said to reside in the Real (or at least in the 
area of the pre-linguistic) does this then mean that both are feminine conditions? Does it, 
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perhaps, mean that the monochrome itself is a feminine, because pre-linguistic, space? When 
Lacan writes that women derive this jouisrance, this unspeakable jubilation, from heterosexual 
intercourse, he sounds suspiciously like the Freud who wrote of women as the `dark continent', 
attesting to their notions of the unfathomability of female sexuality, and its subsequent relegation 
to the unspeakable or a-linguistic. Along with mastery and control, language also enables the 
achievement of Phallic enjoyment and the ability to symbolise. That which cannot be symbolised 
is, of course, expelled to the wilderness of the Real, where jouissance, death and female sexuality 
rub shoulders. What is forbidden to the speaking subject tends to be the surplus of desire, a 
leftover not unlike the objet petit-a. 
In Pleasure of the Text, Barthes describes how any narrative mode that offers no closure gives the 
reader jouissance rather than pleasure. Because pleasure can be enunciated, it exists in the Symbolic 
Order. Jouissance however, which cannot be approached through language, belongs in the Real, or 
the Imaginary (the term `Imaginary' actually refers to the moment when jonissance is first 
experienced as that moment of imaginary unity with the self as seen reflected in the mirror). 
Now, since the pre-linguistic jouissance cannot be spoken, upon the subject's entry into the 
Symbolic Order, jouissance joins the Real Order of subjectivity and becomes associated with other 
great unspeakables (ie death and desire). Jouissance stands then for the Imaginary moment when 
the narcissistic subject identifies with the ego ideal. Jouissance also, however, stands for another 
fusion, the desired fusion with the perpetually lost object, objet petit-a or (m)other. This fits the 
idea that the cinematic monochrome is a space that cannot be articulated or experienced through 
language. It is somehow beyond or before language, and its inaccessibility to `reading' is perhaps 
the most concrete example of the monochrome's a-linguistic status. IIowever, it also suggests 
that the space the monochrome inhabits is gendered feminine. The impossibility of coming to a 
conclusion about a monochrome surface should, if we follow Barthes, result in a wonderful 
experience of jouissance. However, this depends on who is doing the spectating. A Phallic 
149 
spectator would find, jouissance and its location in the Real unacceptable. Such a reader will force 
conclusions on to monochrome, disavowing its positioning in a non or pre-linguistic space. 
2: 6 Conclusion: Mixed Mediation 
Figure 25: (arment Cooper, from Deep 1997.28.5 x 23.5cm. Duotune photograph. 
If the light-based media of photography and film can be read convincingly as embodying an 
innate privileging of sight, and of Whiteness, Dyer reminds us that, `Such a stress on sight poses a 
problem, however, in relation to that which cannot be seen. ' (1997: 104). Blank photographs or 
films (or, photographs or films that contain blankness) are, by their nature as photographs or 
films, part of a system which privileges Whiteness. However, in containing areas that radically 
refuse to signify, they confound the expectations of each even as they occupy them - they `cannot 
be seen'. I think that the important point here is the situation of blankness within the Phallic 
system. The blank space that is made of light but shows nothing, is an area of resistance, of 
rebellion. Blank photography or film causes unease to the apparently whole and complete system 
that rejects or cannot read it. It acts as a sort of mirror, holding up to the system the realities of 
that system's arbitrary and nonsensical `rules'. It introduces instability and chaos into a system 
that considers itself stable and ordered. Using this notion of a tricky or fragmented 
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(fragmenting? ) mirror as against a unified, totalising Phallic mirror, might it be possible to arrive 
at something like a `speculum' of the Mixed Race Subject? 
In the mid 1990s, photographer Clement Cooper spent time in the British cities of Manchester, 
Liverpool, Bristol and Cardiff, where the Mixed Race presence has a long history. Of Mixed Race 
himself, Cooper was interested in the history of these communities, and the fact that in such 
cities, Mixed Race people have been a part of British life for over two hundred years. This 
contrasts starkly with the better-known fact that until the last five to ten years, Mixed Race people 
have been overlooked, or silenced, or spoken about in embarrassed, hushed tones, or had their 
identities decided for them. In Deep [Figure 251 the subjects gaze out from the pictures with a 
variety of human looks and attitudes that show the deciding White Phallus that the single, simple 
categorisation `Black' is not always enough. Cooper's work culminated in the show'Deep of 1997, 
which comprised photographic portraits of Mixed Race people of all ages, shapes, sizes, mixtures 
and, importantly, optical appearances. Equally importantly the show also included a sound 
element; Cooper provided a much-needed vehicle for some of his photographic subjects to tell 
their stories. This work is very important because Cooper gives pictorial representation and voice 
to a historically under-represented community. But what he also does is to present his subjects as 
a community, something that does not always happen, since Mixed Race people can often live in 
isolation within family units and are rarely represented as, or have experiences as, a group. As 
David Parker and Miri Song write, `Few social groups have evoked such dichotomous reactions, 
while simultaneously lacking a clearly articulated and self-defined social identity. ' (Parker & Song 
2001: 3) 
Mixed Race people, (particularly in port cities), have in fact played a part in British society for two 
hundred years, existing silently as a sort of guilty secret. As part of his tour of England in 1936, 
J. B Priestley stayed for longer than originally planned in Liverpool 1. He was fascinated and 
encouraged by the entire classrooms he saw full of Mixed Race children, and the concentration of 
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brown, yellow or other faces that weren't White. Priestley saw this as positive, and even 
suggested that the lives of these children would make an intriguing film. When Enoch Powell 
gave his famous Rivers of Blood speech in 1968, he showed a remarkable disavowal of the 
knowledge of this brown British presence. These port cities are unique, as existing Mixed Race 
`communities' tend to occur as the result of pioneering individual or group efforts. We can find 
many virtual communities on the internet, for example (see www. mixedfolks. com, or internet zinc 
The MulticulturalActivisl); or in Universities or Colleges (such as the well-known Hapa Issues Forum, 
Berkeley). Despite the best efforts of the White phallic ego to silence them, or to conceal them 
under Blackness', the Mixed Race subject keeps pushing up through the censorship into the 
Symbolic. I see Clement Cooper's work as playing a key role in this becoming-subjectivity, and 
could be deployed in finding the elusive `speculum'. 
One of the most interesting features of Deep is how the work compromises the White eye of the 
lens, how the lens that mediates is itself mediated. First of all, the subject who has been denied 
the right to determine her own identity is presented as a confident and self-possessed subject of 
portraiture. Cooper makes a very clear, simple statement about long-overdue acknowledgement 
of presence and subjectivity. However, not all audience members read the gesture this way, as the 
following two extracts from the visitors' book for the 1998 show of Deep at the Drum Arts 
Centre, Birmingham, demonstrate: 
Me children themselves will and do wonder where they belong [... ] look deep 
into the eyes and expressions, you can almost feel their confusion. ' 
`People with attitude towards us had better get used to us being around; the 
way the world is integrating, mixed race people will run the world. \Ve are 
beautiful people with beautiful features and believe it or not beautiful 
experiences and a lot to offer Britain. ' (Deep visitors' statements, in Parker & 
Song 2001: 3) 
Despite the actual feelings of the `children' in the photographs, Mixed Race people are historically 
and socially coded as `confused', which means that readers with an investment in maintaining the 
Phallic dichotomy `Black/White' will read the surface determinedly until they find what looks like 
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`confusion'. This action of forced reading reminds us of the Phallic spectator in front of 
monochrome, reading determinedly until he finds whatever it is that he wished to find before he 
began to look. 
With Deep, the act of positioning of the Mixed Race subject as compositional focus is completed 
with the presence of another Mixed Race subject as photographer. The White eye of the lens is 
bracketed on both sides by the kind of subject it would seek to render blank - except that in this 
case, it is trapped, and rendered powerless to perform this action. Whiteness is effectively forced 
into an enclosed hall of mirrors, where it sees its own reflection and recognises the existence of 
Whiteness `warped'. The (in)visible Whiteness of the Mixed Race subject is, for the White 
Phallus, uncanny in the truly Freudian sense. It is familiar, but with an affect of foreboding or 
discomfort. Here, the discomfort is worse because the Whiteness is about as familiar as anything 
can be - the Phallus recognises this brown Whiteness as it own, immediately realising the 
existence of a kind of Whiteness that it may not be able to control. Also, the Mixed Race subject 
will present as a `fragment' to the Phallic eye, and as we remember from Barthes' discussion in 
Camera Lucida (see section 2: 1), the fragment has an inherent trauma about it. 
So, in the midst of all this Phallic trauma, what of the search for the speculum? I want to suggest 
that the notional `speculum' for the Mixed Race subject would take the form of a three hundred 
and sixty degree mirror -a continuous reflective surface which entraps the Phallic eye in its 
centre. This is a trick whereby the Phallus would `relax' with what at first looks like its centrality 
in a system. However, the mirror or speculum would then begin to show images of the endless 
varieties of Mixed Race subjectivity, the varied identities that are possible - and the confused 
Phallic eye would cause the Phallic ego to begin to panic, as it realises it is being forced to 
acknowledge that its authority is nothing but an illusion done with mirrors. 
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1 Dyer also shows how photography's inherent privileging of light and Whiteness has been used to 'race' White 
working-class subjects, or problematic White people that posed a threat of some kind to White 'normality' and 
'goodness' (see Dyer 1997: 48-70, esp. 58) 
2 The 'mastery' referred to here relates to the individual spectating subject's own relationship to the gazed-at object. 
Other issues of 'mastery', such as the master status of individual writers within their intellectual fields - for example, 
Jacques Lacan as a master within psychoanalysis - or the Hegelian master/slave dialectic, will not be explored at this 
time. 
3 Martin Jay traces the history of this western tendency towards ocularcentrism (Jay 1995: 21-83), locating the 'golden 
age' of the human eye's absolute agency as beginning with Plato and reigning unchallenged until well after Descartes, 
with his faith in the monocular gaze. Jay believes that the modern era (as distinct from the pre- and post-modern), is 
characterised by the domination of the sense of sight, with the only real challenges to vision's predominance 
happening in French thought of the Twentieth Century. Western ocularcentrism began with the late mediaeval 
fascination with the spiritual and metaphysical possibilities of light (Divine lux as opposed to perceived lumen). 
Subsequent obsessions with linear perspective, with its harmonious regularities that corresponded to the perfect will 
of God also privileged the eye, and this was compounded, as in Marshall McLuhan's well-known argument, by the 
invention of the printing press. It is interesting to note that during the Middle Ages hearing was privileged as the first 
sense in the order of five. (Barthes 1967: 55). 
4 Whilst mentioning the Cartesian scopic regime, it is also important to remember that Descartes actually challenged 
the notion that eyesight is the sole means by which the individual comes to know the world. In the Second Meditation, 
Descartes writes that, 'perception, or the action by which we perceive, is not a vision [... ] but is solely an inspection 
by the mind', going on to say that the subject understands the world, 'uniquely by perception of the mind' (Descartes 
(Trans. 1984) Volume 2: 21). See Rene Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (1984) 2 vols. (Trans. 
Cottingham, Stoothoff & Murdoch) Cambridge University Press. 
S In this year, the techniques of permanently capturing an image which were simultaneously worked out during the 
1830s by Fox Talbot, Daguerre and Nicephore-Niepce, were formally presented at a meeting of the French Academy 
of Sciences. Shortly afterwards the Gazette de France newspaper sensationalised the new medium as newspapers will, 
providing worrying future predictions about drawing. This discovery partakes of the prodigious. It upsets all 
scientific theories on light and optics, and it will revolutionise the art of drawing'. (Newhall 1980: 17) No less 
sensational was the painter Paul Delaroche's famous jeremiad that, 'From now on, painting is dead'. (Cromer 
1930: 114) Almost immediately, and as a direct result of photography, the issue of optical truth and illusion presented 
itself for urgent debate, along with the accompanying question of whether photography merited the status of an art 
form. Daguerre's camera was popularly known as the 'mirror of the world', Fox Talbot's the 'pencil of nature', and 
indeed the camera's inability to he, or assumed fidelity to an actual experience of the world was its most lauded 
quality. On the history of photography, see Freund, G. 1980 Photography and Society, Newhall, B 1964, The History of 
Photography: From 1839 to the Present Day, Nori, C 1979, French Photography: From Its Origins To The Present. 
6 Such a feeling of awe and wonderment in the face of a photograph was quite usual. Some reports state that early 
observers of the photographic miracle expressed great concern that the little faces in the pictures were so real, surely 
they must be able to look back at the spectator. Superstitious fears surrounding this new phenomenon also seemed 
common; Balzac's strange dread of the power of the photograph to destroy the outer'aura' of the body, was reported 
by the early pioneer of both aerial photography and portraiture, Nadar, in My life as a Photographer, October 5 (Summer, 
1978: 9). 
7 Nicholas Mirzoeff sees the fact that Louis Daguerre, inventor of photography's first practical method, the 
daguemtype, was also the proprietor of the diorama, as 'no coincidence' (Mirzoeff 1998: 185). 
8 To imagine the unconscious, an unseen motivating force, as an apparatus designed forseeinggives an interesting 
understanding of the potency of the unconscious. It is an unsettling thought that we are oblivious, even blind to the 
thing that nudges us into action, and even more unsettling to think that this hidden force has a full potential view of 
us from inside. Perhaps Freud means us to understand the unconscious as a visual apparatus with an absent seeing 
eye, a bit like a camera without a lens or a sightless human eye. Freud's usually clear writing here, with repeated 
looking, reveals futher meaningful possibilities. The unconscious sees and presents like a mechanical eye, and sees 
like an incomplete human eye. His suggestion is, however, of an emergent image rather than a fully formed one. We 
might see this as pertaining also to the enigma of the monochrome surface, whose 'image' presents itself to us as 
illegible or invisible. Derrida praised Freud's use of ocular or visual rather than textual metaphor in his essay, 'Freud 
and the Scene of Writing' in lVriting and Difference, Trans. Alan Bass, Chicago (1978). 
9 Lacan's use of the term 'Imaginary' is, as his readership might expect, idiosyncratic. What is most useful to us here 
in terms of the monochrome surface, though, is his understanding of all Imaginary behaviour and relationships as 
essentially deceptive. Lacan proposed that the image of the counterpart, or . rpecular ego 
in the Mirror Stage is essential in 
the formation of the ego of the subject. Resemblance is of great importance in the Imaginary register of existence. It 
should be noted that Lacan insists on the oppositionality of the Imaginary with the Symbolic. 
10 Remembering, Repeating and Working-ThrouTh. Farther Recommendations on the Technique of Prycho Ana f sis II originally 
appeared in 1914. It was not to be translated into English until 1924. This paper is notable for containing the first 
reference to Freud's Compulsion to Repeat (SE xii: 150), yet it is usually the later (and longer) Beyond the Pleasure 
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Principle of 1920 (SE xviii) that is quoted in English language texts as the source of this compulsion. Perhaps this is 
partly due to the fact that the Beyond the Pleasure Principle was the first to be translated into English, in 1922. The 
Compulsion to Repeat also appears in Freud's 1919 paper, The Uncanny (SE xvii: 238). In Remembering Repeating and 
Working Through, Freud writes that what is forgotten and repressed is acted out rather than remembered. The memory 
is reproduced continually as an action, 'For instance, the patient does not say that he remembers that he used to be 
defiant and critical towards his parents' authority; instead, he behaves in that way to the doctor. ' (Freud, SE xii: 150) 
The account in Byond the Pleasure Principle is more detailed, and follows on from his theory in The Uncanny that the 
Compulsion to Repeat is strong enough to disregard the pleasure principle, that regulator of mental events. Notably, 
Freud takes pains to point out the lack of 'precociousness' in the child's intellectual developments, but that he was 
unusually well behaved. The game with the cotton-reel was quite an obsession for him, but he would actually throw 
and retrieve almost any small object he could find on a daily basis. Freud's footnote on his 'further observation' that 
the child would crouch in front of a mirror to make himself disappear, saying Baby -ooooool' (SE xviii: 15) is the 
forerunner of Jacques Lacan's paper, The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I (Lacan, 1949: 449-53). 
11 As a theory, the Death Drive is part of Freud's second topography of mind. In the first topography, Freud states 
that the instinctual impulses aim at pleasure, but sometimes the censorship intervenes and represses them, keeping 
them unconscious. The ego is therefore in constant conflict with the repressed. In his second theory, the instincts 
aim on the one hand at pleasure (Eros) and on the other at unpleasure (Thanatos). Wishes arising from the 
unconscious are now dualistic, having different aims and manifestations, but often using the same channels. Either 
way, there is some kind of internal battle going on. 
In Byond the Pleasure Principle, Freud describes the Death Drive as mental energy whose aim is to regress to the earlier 
state of things, ie death, a return to the inorganic. The organism must be destroyed from within. This drive 
governed by Freud's Nirvana principle (which is not to be confused with the Buddhist principle of Nirvana, which is 
the negation of self and absorption into the supreme spirit). Freud's Nirvana principle is the reduction of all tensions 
to zero. In the Compulsion to Repeat, Freud sees an attempt to restore the earlier state of things. If the repeated 
material is entirely unpleasurable, it's another manifestation of the Death Drive, the masochistic trends of the ego. 
(NB, the instinct may also combine with the sadistic trends of the super-ego for a double dose of punishment. ) The 
wish to cause pain and unpleasure by punishment can find its way into a dream - this is the Freudian punishment 
dream. Freud did not directly claim a connection between his early theory of punishment dreams and his later theory 
of the death instinct, but it does seem logical to connect the two, it certainly provides a clear explanation. 
Punishment dreams happen in traumatic neuroses, to repeat the traumatic event. Freud says that these dreams arise, 
again, out of the Compulsion to Repeat, and fall outside of his general wish theory. (cf. Interpretation of Dreams PFL 
v. 4,520. At the beginning of his work, Freud described symptoms as mnemic symbols, 'a thing which has not been 
understood inevitably reappears; like an unlaid ghost it cannot rest until the mystery has been solved and the spell 
broken'. (Anafysir o fa Phobia in a Syear-old Boy, 1909, SE x, 122). 
11 From an interview with Monty DiPietro, in 'Hiroshi Sugimoto at the Gallery Koyangi'. Found at 
,, vww. assemblylaneuage. com/reviews /`Sugimoto. html. 
12 Jay goes on to say that this link was noted by Ralph Waldo Emerson as early as 1841, so this is not a new way of 
thinking about photography. 
13 Laura Mulvey (1975) notes that a similar process takes place within cinema. She writes that the illusion of reality 
that dominant cinema uses to compensate for the absent real, and therefore to cancel out its own status as discourse, 
relies upon continued re-stagings of the drama of loss. This is yet another example of the death drive working in the 
guise of the compulsion to repeat, or the return of the repressed. 
14 This term is often used with regard to the Psychoanalyst in the analytic situation, with the key word being 
'presumed'. Regardless of how much the analyst really does or does not know, one of the requisites of a successful 
analysis is that the analysand truly believes in, or'presumes' the powerful knowledge of the analyst. It is necessaryfor 
the analyst to occupy this position in terms of the transference. 
IS Sugimoto is also interested in original Nineteenth Century photographic techniques, often placing a 16 times 
neutral density filter on his camera, which reduces the film's sensitivity to below one ASA. Iie says, 'that's like the 
speed of 19th Century film, when photography was invcnted'(mmu. asscml)lyltngu,, tgc. com/reviews/sugimoto. htm l) 
This apparent loyalty to photography's beginnings also serves to make tiny ripples of disquiet in the presumably clear 
boundaries that separate painting from photography. The other effect that he likes in his work, describing it as 
'painterly', is the effect of blurred edges. It is an elusive effect, something Sugimoto describes as an ideal 'only the 
camera can see'. All of his images are black-and-white, which is an immediate signifier for 'photography', but which 
also carries traits of the kind of 'pure monochrome' painting that can be only black or white, as described by Lucy 
Lippard in her 1967 essay The SilentArt. 
16 As Shoshana Felman notes (1987: 27-28), Jacques Lacan chose to open the 1966 Icrits, his first collection of 
published essays, with his Seminar on The Purloined Litter' (Le Siminaire our La Leitre Volee ). This was a reworking of 
his 1955 seminar, The Ego in Freudian Theory and Pychoana ytic Technique. Lacan was also to devote an entire year's 
course to the exploration of this tale of Poe's. Felman's interpretation of these two significant placings of The 
Purloined Letter within Lacan's explanations of Psycho-Analysis is that the tale itself functions as an allegory of the 
psychoanalytic process, and also of the process of reading poetic writing (1987: 48). Lacan also compares the 
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intervention of the detective Dupin to the intervention of the analyst. Dupin restores the letter to the Queen, the 
analyst restores the patient to a comfortable, symptom-free existence. 
17 Benvenuto & Kennedy (1986) point out the significance of the setting of the 'royal boudoir' for the Queen's 
receipt of the letter, linking the boudoir to the place of the Primal Scene. 
13 This is interesting in terms of the observable fact of the epistemological impulse. People do, overwhelmingly, tend 
to want to be'in on' things, especially knowledge. In the case of Sugimoto's pictures, a commonly asked question is 
about what film was being shown. Sugimoto sometimes tells, and sometimes does not. This brings to mind 
Rauschenberg's Erased de Kooning Drawing, a burning question for many students when they first learn about this work 
is, 'What's underneath? What drawing did Rauschenberg erase? ' (The erased drawing was actually part of De 
Kooning's famous Women series). See Chapter Four for a discussion of this. 
19 Hilliard's own essay for the Kunsthalle Exhibition, 1997, is tellingly entitled, The Pleas. vrrs of Erasure. 
20 David Green reads this space not as a gallery opening but as a 'crowded auction room', which, given the presence 
of the hammer, also seems valid. I think that the ambiguity of scene-setting is a deliberate authorial choice by 
Hilliard. 
21 We are able to read, '... owgirls Get The Blue... ', which could be from the Tom Robbins novel Even Cmvgirlc Get 
The Blues, but somehow it seems more likely to be 'Showgirls Get The Blues'. 
22 The objet a is sometimes also symbolised by the breast, as the discarded object, 'the nothing', that the weaned child 
no longer needs but nevertheless remains fixed in a state of desire towards. 'At the oral level, it is the nothing, in so 
far as that from which the subject was weaned is no longer anything for him. In anorexia nervosa, what the child eats 
is the nothing. This will enable you to grasp obliquely how the object of weaning may come to function at the level 
of castration, as privation'. (Lacan 1994[1977]: 103-104). It's also, as Kaja Silverman writes, the object with 'only a 
little otherness'; since it's familiarity to the infant is so great that until the mirror stage, the infant knows the breast, 
favourite blanket, or whatever, as a real part of its corporeal body (Silverman 1988: 7). 
23 Lacan makes much of the notion of repetition in his chapter, The Unconsions and Repetition, in The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Prychoanafysir (1997 [1973]: 17-64). Mentioning Kierkegaard's essay on Repetition along with Freud's work on 
the same subject, Lacan insists that neither Kierkegaard nor Freud were dealing with the return of need, which is 
rather situated'in the service of the appetite'(61). Lacan suggests that in the 'fort-da' game, the actual return of the 
boy's mother is of secondary importance. This is another trick, and one designed to foreground Lacan's 'mastery'. 
The activity as a whole symbolises repetition itself, rather than any action on the mother's part, and what the 
repetition actually repeats is the mother's departure as cause of the splitting in the subject. 'It is aimed at what, 
essentially, is not there'(63). So the boy is actually repeating repetition, but within this he is repeating the splitting of 
his own subjectivity. 
24 The little 'a' stands for autre, or'other'. The 'other' - in this case the (m)other who holds up the infant to the 
mirror - is necessary to the formation of the subject and the acquisition of language. Identification is only possible in 
relation to an other, in the same way as the playful signifiers in the unconscious only make sense in relation to other 
signifiers. 
2$ Whilst psychoanalysis and cinema appeared in western culture in approximately the same time-frame, it took until 
the middle of the Twentieth Century before psychoanalysis impacted on cinema studies in any serious way. It is easy 
to see how the cinema screen offers a near-perfect working analogy of the mirror stage. In fact French semiotician 
Christian Metz put forward the theory that each time the spectator watches the film, it marks an actual experience of 
re-entry into the mirror stage. Each screening represents a psychic re-enactment of the passage from the Imaginary 
into the Symbolic order, and the acquisition of language, subjectivity and sexual difference. See Metz, C (1975) The 
Imaginary Signifier, Screen, Vol. 16, No. 3. See also Baudry, J-L (1970) Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematic 
Apparatus, in: Rosen P. (ed. ) (1986) Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology, New York, Columbia University Press, and Mast, G., 
Cohen, M., and Baudry, J-L (eds. ) (1992) Film Theory and Critidsm, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
also Bellour, R. (1975) Le Blocage Symbolique, Communications, No. 23. Also, Susan I layward points out that the 
repetition of the mirror stage is equivalent to the repetition of the Freudian Oedipal stages (Iiayward 1996: 289). 
26 Roland Barthes elaborates on the difference between pleasure and joxissance in his 1973 work, The Pleasure of the Text. 
Pleasure, he suggests, is the kind of satisfaction enjoyed by the closure offered by classical realist narrative texts. 
Conversely joulssance is experienced from narrative modes that offer no closure. It is experienced in the body, rather 
than through language. Barthes coined the term corps dejouirsance, or 'enjoying body', to name the erotic, corporeal 
p7leasure he encounters. 
Feminist film theorists were to pick up on this Phallocratic interpretation of seeing and pleasure, investigating the 
ways in which the patriarchal signifying system represents. Firstly and most famously Laura Mulvey in 1975 wrote, 
Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema, first appearing in Screen. In a similar way to the way Dyer and others have pointed 
out that the presumed cinematic spectator is always White, Mulvey pointed out the implied 'understanding' that the 
spectator was always male, effectively allowing for the spectator to oscillate between the masculine and the feminine. 
She questioned the implication that the spectator-screen relationship was one-way and identified the problem that 
filmic texts are organised to present a preferred reading. The debate surrounding the problems engendered by 
156 
Phallocentric cinema continued to enlarge throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and psychoanalytic theories - particularly 
those concerned with subjectivity and spectator positioning - gained much ground in the analysis of film as a result. 28 Pollock (1995) identifies the look with the specifically male spectator. However, Kaja Silverman writing in 1988 in 
The Acoustic Mirror. The Female Voice in Prychoanalyris and Cinema, makes the important historical point of 
`revisualisation'. She writes that the `insistent equation of women with spectacle and man with vision marks a shift in 
the general terms of cultural reference which occurred between 1750 and the present. This shift manifests itself in a 
variety of nineteenth-century discourses, from painting and the novel to psychoanalysis and photography. However, 
JC Flugel suggests that if we want to understand the stakes involved in that transformation, we might well look even 
earlier, at late-eighteenth-century fashion, which inaugurated a major change in clothing customs. That change, 
described by Flugel as `the Great Masculine Renunciation', turned upon the despecularisation of the male subject, 
and, `consequently [... ] upon the hyperspecularisation of the female subject [... ] Male clothing underwent a process 
of democratisation, becoming both simpler and more uniform; it [... ] began to signify the solidarity between one 
male subject and all others [... ] the whole relatively `fixed' system of his clothing is, in fact, an outward sign of the 
strictness of his adherence to the social code. ' (Silverman1988: 25). One could say that a 're-speculariation' of the 
male subject was brought about via the figure of the Dandy in the 1890s. 
29 `Not long after Kelly's return to Paris (in 1951-52), Guy-Ernest Debord premiered (or tried to) the first imageless 
film in the same city, and within two months and four thousand miles John Cage's silent sonata was debuted. The 
period from April 1951 through August 1952 may be the watershed in early Minimalism, on both sides of the 
Atlantic, the year not only of less is more but of nothing is most of all. ' (Strickland 1993: 25) 
30 Silverman notes that even Laura Mulvey identifies with the masculine spectatorial position. She writes that Metz, 
Cornolli, Oudart and Dayan do not necessarily occupy this authorial position, identifying with the male spectator 
(1988: 29). 
31 The trick here is simply to display such dazzling virtuosity that a lack is the very last thing on one's mind, and thus 
on the mind of the audience. I have witnessed a similar thing, at a gallery lecture by the Belgian painter Luc Tuymans 
in Dublin in 1998. Tuymans took his audience around the show picture by picture, demonstrating his self-acclaimed 
virtuosity. At one point he became particularly excited, repeatedly rubbing a passage on the surface of one of his 
paintings faster and faster as his voice rose in excitement at describing his own genius. The afterimage of this has 
remained burned on my retina. Tuymans seemed entirely unaware of the onanistic auto-idolatry of his actions, and of 
the fact that for him, his paintings, as the embodiment of his exceptional talents, were the Phallus. 
32 Jarman's interest in Yves Klein is well documented, and it is widely suggested that the monochrome nature of the 
film Blue is also a tribute to the French painter. Jarman actually trained as a painter at the Slade School of Art, 
London, but ended up spending most of his time in the Department of Theatre Design where he experienced a 
relaxed attitude towards homosexuality. Many of his paintings, especially those from the 1980s, resemble the 
assemblages of Joseph Cornell or Jasper Johns. Jarman also made some paintings about his blindness such as Toxn, 
mostly in violent blood-reds and blacks. 
33 As Silverman notes (1988: 98) Freud and Isakower point out that the superego is determined primarily by the act of 
listening. Isakower writes, We know that the child is not capable by itself of constructing new words, to say nothing 
of a language, but that he has to build up his speech from linguistic material which is presented to him ready made. 
But this very fact sets in motion the process of developing an observing and criticizing institution. 
The following formula then suggests itself: just as the nucleus of the ego is the body-ego, so the human auditory 
sphere, as modified in the direction of language, is to be regarded as the nucleus of the super-ego'. Otto Isakower, 
On the Exceptional Position of the Auditory Sphere, International Journal of Psycho-analysis 20, nos 3-4 (1939): 345 
157 
Chapter Three: 
(IN)VISIBLE WHITENESSES: THE PSYCHIC SPACE OF 
THE MIXED RACE SUBJECT 
3: 0 Introduction 159 
3: 1 One: Two: Many 163 
3: 2 When is a Signifier Not a Signifier? (When It's a Monkey) 174 
3: 3 Diluted Nigger or Dirty Nigger? The `Choice' is Never Yours 180 
3: 4 Neither Fish Nor Fowl: Indeterminacy & (Ill)legibility 186 
3: 5 `The New Colored People' 
3: 6 Conclusion 
191 
195 
158 
3: 0 Introduction 
`Jem, ' I asked, `what's a mixed child? ' 
`Half white, half coloured. You've seen `em, Scout. You know the red-kinky- 
headed one that delivers for the drugstore. He's half white. They're real sad. ' 
`Sad, how come? ' 
They don't belong anywhere. Coloured folks won't have `em because they're 
half white; white folks won't have `em `cause they're coloured, so they're just 
inbetweens, don't belong anywhere. ' (Lee 1997 [1960]: 177-178). 
The children in Harper Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird famously had more insight into the human 
condition as regards the mixing of `races' than most of the adults in their town of Maycomb. 
Although set in the American Deep South of the 1930s, the condition of the person of Mixed 
Race, as regards `fitting' or `belonging' within a system that prescribes your identity, seems to have 
changed little. Importantly, there is not really such a thing as Mixed Race `culture', and only 
recently have Mixed Race people actively begun forming `communities'. This gives gravitas to the 
stories that each individual of Mixed Race has to tell, particularly when one considers that such 
stories have not been allowed to be told until very recently in this country. As a child in 1980s 
Britain, I remember almost verbatim a `Problem Page' letter I read in a girls' magazine popular at 
the time. I remember it so well because I understood much of the girl's predicament, and because 
it was the first time I had heard another `half caste' have the confidence to speak about her 
experiences. I think the author of the letter was writing from Manchester (I was reading in 
Birmingham). She asked, 
`Dear Cathy and Claire, 
What do you do if you're half black and half white and you can't mix with the 
black kids and you can't mix with the white kids? None of the white lads at my 
school will ask me out because I am coloured, and I don't like the black lads. I 
hate my Dad for making me black. My skin is a sort of dark tan colour, but I 
am white'. 
The teenage scribe clearly identified herself as `White', (whatever that means), but her brown skin 
guaranteed that however White she felt she actually was, nobody outside of her situation who had 
eyes and could see would ever accept her as such. She wasn't even a `tainted' \Vhite, she simply 
wasn't one at all. This girl had had a Black identity decided for her, her Whiteness - which was 
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perfectly clear to her - was rendered invisible. As an indeterminate in a dyadic system, this girl 
(and others like her) threatens the maintenance of that system's illusion of power. To manage the 
threat, the system simply performs a Phallic act of decisive naming, or categorisation. At the 
same time it also performs a drastic foreclosure, pretending that it has not seen the Whiteness in 
the brown body of this Mixed Race subject. If White people in a White system have a huge 
investment in keeping Whiteness White, then a brown White person certainly cannot be allowed 
admission. She must wait on the borders, just outside (but ever so slightly inside, too). 
This chapter looks at the psychic dimension of indeterminacy as lived human experience, and 
leads into the next chapter which will concentrate on indeterminacy in the monochrome surface. 
In this chapter I want to take the evidence of the preceding chapter a step further; to propose that 
the Lacanian Phallus be `raced', and to read it as White. To my knowledge this has not been 
attempted, and I find this strange as it seems highly plausible to me that if the Phallus can be 
gendered then it can also be `raced', and if it is gendered masculine because it represents the 
dominant social order, it should be `raced' White for the same reason. Phallic and White activity 
share uncanny similarities; both, for example, wield their power best when the source of that 
power is invisible. Lacan tells us that the Phallus can only function when `veiled', just as Richard 
Dyer writes that, `The invisibility of whiteness as a racial position in white (which is to say 
dominant) discourse is of a piece with its ubiquity. ' (Dyer 1997: 3). In other words, in %White 
western culture, Whiteness is silently equated with `normality' in the same way that the Phallic 
order of patriarchy passes as normality - because nobody on the inside can actually see that the 
workings of each system are highly specific. I will look at some of the ways that the White 
Phallus creates and maintains the status of Other in people who might destabilise it, how it 
silences them and renders them invisible. I hope that by suggesting a `racing' of the Phallus as 
White, some of its separating, naming and deciding power will be exposed and thus destabilised. 
In this I follow the example of Richard Dyer (1997), who exposes the specific, raced `Whiteness' 
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of White people which, in their interests of maintaining the illusion of White dominance, they 
refuse to see. 
I wish to look at the ways in which some of those whom the Naming Phallus has designated 
`Other' have responded, and some of the strategies used against that which would silence the 
`noise' of cultural and `racial' multiplicity. These silences call for `mixed mediations' or acts of 
`critical indeterminacy' like those of Clement Cooper as discussed in the previous chapter. I will 
look at some examples of slippery or directly oppositional interventions around or against the 
classificatory system of Phallic Whiteness. The agency of the Mixed Race subject is unique, as her 
(in)visible Whiteness is a Whiteness of transgressive potential. Brown Whiteness shows how 
`authentic' or `racially pure' Whiteness is in fact a he. The power of this hidden Whiteness is again 
predicated on its invisibility; only in this case the power is paradoxical. This becomes clearer if we 
ask the following important question: in each case, exactly who, what or whose system is doing 
the hiding? In the case of the Phallus or Logos, Whiteness and its corollary, power, are hidden by 
the Phallus or Logos. In the case of the Mixed Race subject, her Whiteness is, again, hidden by the 
Phallus or Logos - and for the exact same reasons, to keep its own power and system intact. This 
puts the indeterminate subject in a highly provocative position, always full of potential to 
destabilise the dyadic power of the Phallus; indeed her existence shows the emasculated and 
dependent nature of that `power'. The downside to the transgressive potential, however, is that 
the Mixed Race subject is also always potentially available to the White Phallus to play a part in its 
phantasy of power. The `racially' indeterminate subject who has been successfully subjugated may 
never have the opportunity to consider that her voice might be valid, or to question her marginal 
position. 
As with the monochrome surface, the Mixed Race subject's body is horrific (but also quite 
fascinating) for White eyes to behold because it embodies a conceptual impossibility; the union of 
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binary opposites. On a psychoanalytic level this body also shows, optically, the split nature of the 
subject. This is horrific for the ego to behold, and the ego denies it furiously. In the case of the 
monochrome surface, this is problematised slightly by the illusory notion of one-ness, wholeness, 
completeness and unity that inheres in the very name of `monochrome'. This unityis in fact 
conceptual sleight-of-hand. The `mono' in monochrome, the singleness of the surface colour, 
disguises a buzzing kinetic hive of significatory activity which is pre-Phallic and thus pre-linguistic 
in nature, and therefore will neverfit smoothly into any category of canonical western `Art History', 
with its ruling binary Phallogocentrism. The indeterminacy of the Mixed Race subject's body is 
(usually) visible optically, but denied psychically. In monochrome the opposite is the case, the 
indeterminacy is invisible optically (the surface appears unified), but operates psychically, so it is 
really still invisible (outside of vision). It cannot be contained by the binary opposition which 
seeks to contain it (and which is, in fact, invoked by the very term `mixed'. ) Monochrome plays a 
trick by being indeterminate, but looking unified. The Mixed Race subject's body is involved in 
trickery of a slightly different nature, the Phallus is playing a trick by convincing the Mixed Race 
subject that her Whiteness does not exist, but at the same time she tricks the Phallus by defiantly 
wearing some of its coveted Whiteness. It seems on the ssrrface - and it is the surface that is 
important here - that both the Mixed Race subject and the monochrome are `rogue' categories in 
their respective neat, western systems. Each has enormous potential to introduce chaos into the 
tight warp and weft of each system. 
To attempt to show this, my approach must be one of radical superficiality; my purpose is 
`epidermalist'. As Elizabeth Grosz proposes in Volatile Bodies (1994), the book she describes as, 
`an experiment in inversion'; the outside of the body can and should displace the supremacy of 
the psyche or interior in accounts of subjectivity. I am suggesting that the Phallogocentric, 
White, western system of canonical art history requires a knowledge of the Phallus and the Logos 
before it can be deciphered. Monochrome exists in a condition, or a Lacanian `order' of existence 
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prior to the entry of the Phallus, and of language - this is the order of the Lacanian `Real', where 
boundaries of signification have yet to be set; and signifiers are fully mobile, slippery and shifting 
in endless plays of potential signification. There is therefore no definite, full and final signified 
for the signifiers to aim towards; they simply dance about in endless jouissance. The concept of 
`aim' is redundant, in fact, the signifiers simply `are', since the Phallic shadow of the Law of the 
Father and of specific `meaning' has yet to darken their playground of endless and indeterminate 
signification. However, as we will see, monochrome's relationship to the Lacanian Real is not 
quite as clear and distinct as I might like. As an interrupter of a system, monochrome 
paradoxically still relies on the existence of that system, so that it has something to interrupt. This 
suggests the possibility of complicity at some level; that there is something invisibly (and again, 
paradoxically) Phallic about monochrome. Here the analogy of the Mixed Race body is helpful in 
reading monochrome. This subject's Whiteness does not necessarily make her complicit with the 
system of Whiteness and its power. Quite the opposite is the case - her (in)visible Whiteness, as 
part of her indeterminacy, threatens the system. Perhaps, if monochrome has hidden Phallic 
power, this is just as threatening to the system as monochrome's indeterminacy? And perhaps the 
Phallic attributes of monochrome are radically different to the Phallic attributes of the Lacanian 
Phallus, in the same way that Henry Louis Gates Jr proposes a Black version of Signification 
whose meaning is radically different, if not opposed, to Saussurean Signification? This sharing of 
a name is inherent to the ability to cause confusion, and it challenges the naming-power of the 
Phallus or the Father's Law. 
3: 1 One: Two: Many 
`We are not ourselves; actually there is nothing we can call a `self anymore; we 
are manifold, we have as many selves as there are groups to which we belong 
[... ] The neurotic has overtly a disease from which everybody is suffering. ' 
J. H. Van Den Berg. 
`My aim is to bring about a psychic state in which my patient begins to 
experiment with his own nature -a state of fluidity, change and growth, in 
163 
which there is no longer anything eternally fixed and hopelessly petrified. ' Carl 
Jung. 
`Anybody can be anybody. ' The Dice Man. (Van Den Berg and Jung in 
Rhinehart 1971: 9) 
Luke Rhinehart, or the infamous `Dice Man' of the 1971 novel, was a maverick (and apparently 
insane) psychiatrist who advocated the total destruction of what conventional psychiatry 
conceived of as `the personality', a unified, unbreakable whole that signified mental well being. 
The fundamental mistake that psychiatrists made, he felt, was the assumption that there was only 
one personality. Rhinehart understood this notion as damaging to human beings, keeping 
thousands unnecessarily incarcerated in mental institutions. He devised `Diceliving', where any 
decision is made by giving a pair of dice six options, each one numbered, then seeing where they 
land. You might for example give the dice options on how to react to your boss when you are `let 
go', what direction to walk, how to respond to a marriage proposal. The options were endless, 
and Rhinehart felt most liberated and `well' when embodying a fresh personality, dice-chosen, 
every ten minutes. This is obviously extreme fiction, but there is something to be said for 
Rhinehart's suspicion of the overarching power of the unifying `One'. 
One of the functions of the ego, a little like that of the Phallus, is to unify and therefore make 
understandable and controllable the confusing multiplicity of things that exist in the world, and to 
foreclose the inherent knowledge of the fundamental split nature of the subject. As discussed in 
Chapter One, western philosophical traditions have always had trouble reconciling the problem of 
`One' to the problem of `Many': `One' is Sublime, infinite, ultimately separate from and superior 
to the separated and disunified world below, in which the accursed human being is condemned to 
act. It seems paradoxical that despite western philosophy's traditional conferring of `esoteric' 
status on the `One/Many' problem, the system of binary pairs that Derrida identified as 
constitutive of western metaphysics is itself utterly dependent on the concept of `One'. This 
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works in two ways: firstly the `One' identifies the Logos itself, the Word or omnipotent end of all 
signification, and secondly, within the pairs themselves, one notion is usually dominant. It is 
possible to spot the favoured term in any society or time-pocket by its dominant position in the 
pair, most usually written or spoken first (for example on/off, masculine/feminine, high 
culture/low culture, etc. ) All these binary pairs are authenticated by the `One', the Logos which 
excludes anything that isn't clearly one thing or the other. Oppositionality keeps both the Logos 
and the Phallus intact. In the Mixed Race subject or indeterminate thing, the two (or more, for it 
is significant that there can be more) components are jointly embodied and both are altered as a 
result. The condition of the racially indeterminate subject means that is no longer possible for the 
two `oppositional' components to reinforce the Logos, because the two are changed on becoming 
jointly embodied. What is more, the components continually shift - one may be more visible 
than another, but nevertheless, both (or all) exist. The Mixed Race subject literally fucks up the 
distinction, blurs it, sometimes laughing in the face of the Logos and defying definition - and 
since definition is the primary activity of both the Logos and the Phallus, the indeterminate 
(despite endless Phallic resistance to her innate uncategorisability) can also challenge the Phallus' 
power. 
In her `Bill of Rights for Racially Mixed People' (1996), Maria Root sets out a series of basic 
human rights that Phallic thinking frequently denies to Mixed Race people. These are 
fundamental existential rights, and I suspect that many of those who have never considered 
Mixed Race subjectivity would be shocked to find that Mixed Race people do not automatically 
enjoy these rights. Root writes, 
`I Have The Right: 
Not to justify my existence to the world. 
Not to keep the races separate within me. 
Not to be responsible for people's discomfort with my physical ambiguity. 
Not to justify my ethnic legitimacy. 
I Have The Right. 
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To identify myself differently than strangers expect me to identify. 
To identify myself differently than how my parents identify me. 
To identify myself differently than my brothers and sisters. 
To identify myself differently in different situations. 
I Have The Right: 
To create a vocabulary to communicate about being multiracial. 
To change my identity over my lifetime - and more than once. 
To have loyalties and identify with more than one group of people. 
To freely choose whom I befriend and love. ' (Root in Root [cd] 1996: 7) 
To have to continually face intrusive questions from complete strangers such as, `What are you, 
exactly? ', or `Where are you from? ' and to be considered ill-mannered if you either choose not to 
tell them, or respond perfectly truthfully (whilst refusing to play their game) with something like, 
`I'm a Sagittarius', or `I'm from Lancashire', is quite tiring. As Root writes, it is a basic right to 
define oneself as one wishes, when one wishes, and not to have to justify the fact that one exists. 
It is our right not to feel that we must comply with a system which does not recognise ambiguity 
as a valid option for human existence. Despite this, Root does recognise that the influence of 
systems is powerful and that, `the system is also maintained by the oppressed's internalization of 
the mechanics; for example, an insistence on singular ethnic or racial loyalties, colorism, and 
discrimination against multiracial people across all racial and ethnic groups [... ) Paradoxically, 
this internalization of the mechanics of oppression is a version of the hostage syndrome observed 
in prisoners of war. ' (Root in Rood [ed] 1996: 5) Unity as an ideal is highly prized in 
Phallogocentric and racist thinking. It is sometimes difficult not to collude with this, especially if 
one attempts to do so from a position of isolation. 
Unity also has a key role to play in psychoanalytic thinking. The notion of unity would seem to 
be essential for the survival of the organism living in a Phallogocentric society, helping the 
organism to understand its world by synthesising what it perceives there, or at least relating it to a 
unifying and understandable `One'. As Elizabeth Grosz writes in Vo/ai le Bodies 
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For Freud, the ego is what brings unity to the vast and overwhelming diversity 
of perceptions which, to begin with, overwhelm the child. The ego is a 
consequence of a perceptual surface; it is produced and grows only relative to 
this surface. In his initial formulations, Freud argues that the ego [... ] is the 
result of a psychosocial intervention into the child's hitherto natural 
development. "We are bound to suppose that a unity comparable to the ego 
has to be developed [... ] there must be something added to auto-eroticism -a 
new psychical action - in order to bring about narcissism". (Freud 1914: 77) 
This new action engenders primary narcissism (or what Lacan calls the mirror 
stage) at around six months of age. It consists in the relative stabilization of 
the circulation of libido in the child's body, so that the division between subject 
and object (even the subject's capacity to take itself as an object) becomes 
possible for the first time. (Grosz 1994: 32) 
The mirror, then, initiates a division: subject becomes separated from object, the split itself 
generating the binary pair of subject/object. Grosz develops an intriguing theory of the ego out 
of Lacanian and Freudian conceptions, which suggests that the ego as singular unified `One' is not 
only formed out of a non-binary `many', a plenitude of social interactions, but also suggests that 
the ego can be conceptualised as an external coating a little like the skin. For both the Mixed 
Race subject and the psychical indeterminate (and the woman, whom Lacan has said does not 
exist), who elude the rigidly fixed variations possible within the Phallogocentric frameworks, this 
notion of the `skin ego' is full of fantastic possibilities for exercising the basic right to say you 
exist. Grosz's radical reconception of the ego, also explored by Guy Rosolato and Didier Anzieu 
(The Skin-Ego [1989], Prychic Envelopes, [1980]), aims to resituate the surface, site of social (or 
artistic) inscription, as the most important site for both interpretation and interaction. 
Importantly, Grosz's developments of `classical' psychoanalysis offer a world of existential 
possibilities to the subject of Mixed Race, whose optical surface plays a disproportionately key 
role in their life-experience. 
In Volatile Bodies, the superficial really does become absolutely radical. The lived, physical body is 
moved from the margins of psychoanalytic reading, previously seen as somehow less central than 
the interior, the psyche, the `mind' - to the centre of analysis, to be understood as the very 
"`stuff" of subjectivity' (1994: ix). She twists the prior primacy of the `inner' right around in order 
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to expose the `outer', that which is always available to be seen, but has been rarely `visible' in 
terms of its validation by scientific or philosophical enquiry. It can be seen, but remains unread, 
illegible. Psychical interiority is entirely dependent on corporeal exteriority, but not in a simple 
vehicular way. The body is a mobile, mutable surface, something that lives and can be read and 
inscribed, something which exerts its influences on the infra-psychic life. It is inscribed from 
without, it inscribes within. The body and its surface or boundary, the skin, help to make 
redundant the dualistic pairs outer/inner, psychic/corporeal, and more importantly, one/many. 
By fudging the clear distinguishing lines between each pair, the body offers an observable picture 
of one-ness and multiplicity, but of something that is both, and that is different from each. 
What is perhaps most striking in Grosz's account is the way the ego and the skin become almost 
interchangeable as potent figures for the dissolving, confusing or sidestepping of boundaries. In 
The Ego and the Id, Freud describes the ego as though it were a corporeal projection, positing that 
the subject only acquires a sense of wholeness or unity only after a series of multiple processes 
have taken place, constructing the ego as they go. The neonate's experience consists of a baffling, 
constant whirring of noises and colours, shapes and movements, and in the preobject stage (prior 
to primary narcissism or the mirror stage), the child has no control over these confusing 
experiences, because it does not understand them. Here we see the beginnings of the human 
organism's attempts to deal with its confusion by attempting to control whatever causes the 
confusion. For Freud, the ego is the, `consequence of a perceptual surface; it is produced and 
grows only relative to this surface. ' (1994: 32). To illustrate his point Freud calls upon the figure 
of the cortical homunculus, a popular idea in Nineteenth Century medicine and neurology; 
`The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego: it is not merely a surface entity, but 
is itself the projection of a surface. If we wish to find an anatomical analogy for 
it we can best identify it with the "cortical homunculus" of the anatomists, 
which stands on its head in the cortex, sticks up its heels, faces backwards and 
as we know, has its speech-area on the left hand side. ' (Freud 1923: 26) 
168 
The ego thus does not map the perceivable, real body, but instead the areas of libidinal cathexis. 
The body is always meaningful because the subject is always libidinally attached to it in different 
ways, and the body-parts of the homunculus correlate in size with the importance accorded to 
each body part by its inhabiting subject'. A cortical homunculus for the subject of Mixed Race 
might be expected to have a disproportionate area of skin, or hair, or facial features. The 
Lacanian account of the mirror stage also supports this understanding, except that in this case the 
ego is a projection of the body as read by other.. In the examples of the monochrome and of the 
Mixed Race body, this reading-by-others, or definition-from-the-outside, is characteristic of their 
conditions of indeterminacy within a fixed and Phallic system. 
Here we can see how the ego always wishes to seem whole and complete, a `One' composed out 
of the disunity, fragmentariness and `many' of human experience (therefore falsifying evidence 
suggesting the reality of the body in pieces). We also see how the ego is the projection of the 
corporeal body, its topography corresponding with the most intensely cathected areas on the 
body itself. It is positive and potentially liberating to acknowledge the ego in or as the skin, as 
this validates readings of the skin as meaningful, such as Grosz' or Anzieu's. Skin is only 
`superficial' in that it is literally external; it is only `shallow' in as much as it is a matter of 
millimeters thick. In terms of significance, it is huge and deep. Thirdly and most importantly of 
all here, the Freudian ego as developed by Lacan is clearly a result of the power of the gaze of the 
Other. Whoever decides the subjectivity of the subject, it is certainly not the subject, but the 
reading gaze of the one who looks. This deciding outside subject acts in the same way as the 
Phallus; like the Phallus, the outside subject makes a reading and decides on what the thing under 
its gaze will mean. Like the Phallus, the outside subject who makes these decisions about 
`meaning' is the place where the play of signification stops. Like the Phallus, for non-White 
people in White society, the outside subject is White. As we will see, Grosz's feminist reading of 
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the Phallus offers the indeterminate and `castrated' subject of Mixed Race a positive opportunity 
for self-identification. 
Lacan would have us believe that everybody wants the Phallus, but that nobody can get it. The 
question of who has the Phallus is set in Lacan's writing against the question of who is the Phallus; 
the Phallus itself is involved in the classifying of male or female identity by the distinction of 
being or having. Put very simply, the male `has' the Phallus, so therefore the female (who is 
always already castrated because she does not `have' the Phallus) spends her life in various 
attempts to `be' the Phallus. As Parveen Adams writes, 
`I have argued earlier [... j that the phallus is a crucial category for 
psychoanalytic thought. Its scope covers both male and female psychic life. 
But that is not because the difference between male and female coincides with 
the distinction possession/non-possession. Rather, the phallus is the central 
reference-point because no one possesses the phallus. ' (Adams 1996: 124) 
Lacan describes `feminine' tendencies towards body-adornment, narcissism, and masquerade as 
some of these attempts to be the Phallus. For the mother, it is slightly different; the object of her 
desire is the Phallus, which is always beyond the infant. This is something that the infant can never 
quite understand or accept; therefore the child (or, for Freud, the neurotic) is also involved in an 
attempt to be the Phallus, this time for the mother. The form of Phallus that the infant will 
attempt to `be' varies between individuals. So the question of what the Phallus might want 
becomes secondary in importance to the question of who wants the Phallus. The object of desire 
is always absent, and this absence, or inability to ever achieve satisfaction is what keeps the desire 
itself in place: `desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the 
difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second, the very phenomenon of 
their splitting (. rpaltungf (Lacan 1977: 287). 
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So desire itself is a difference, a surplus. The question of who or what the Phallus is in Lacanian 
discourse - for it is Lacan who takes this concept (mentioned less frequently by Freud though 
with a similar level of apotheosis), and runs with it - becomes particularly vexed when we 
consider the notorious impenetrability of the writings of Jacques Lacan, and the possibility that 
his writings were never meant to be `understood' in the first place3. The most salient paradox 
attending the Phallus is that despite its clear reference to the male reproductive organ, Lacanian 
fundamentalists will insist that it is written as a kind of attribute-free `neutral'. Unsurprisingly, this 
has forced a split, radical and ongoing, in feminist psychoanalytic debate. As a symbol of power; 
the Lacanian Phallus should not be confused or even connected with the human male penis. The 
phallus is not the same thing as the penis: it is the penis plus the idea of lack' (Leader 1995: 89). 
Malcolm Bowie, however, suggests that, `Lacan's use of the term phallus depends upon a conceit' 
(1991: 128). In embryology, the term `phallus' is used to describe the foetal sex organ in its early 
stages, before male or female gender has developed. Having established this initial neutrality, 
though, Bowie goes on to write, 
`The phallus is [... ] a primitive structure, but by now it has been elevated from 
anatomy to a universal semantics. Sexless it once was, and now, after passing 
for a time though the human body and creating sexual difference on the way, 
sexless it has again become. But this tale of a voyage beyond male and female 
is disingenuously told and often contradicted. For Freud and Lacan both seek 
the patronage of Priapus and write with unashamed enthusiasm of his magical 
powers'. (Bowie 1991: 128) 
My own position rests on an understanding of the Phallus as neither neutral nor attribute-free. I 
align myself with Elizabeth Grosz when she observes that, 
`[... ] the phallic signifier is not a neutral `third' term against which both sexes 
are analogously or symmetrically positioned. The relation between the penis 
and the phallus is not arbitrary, but socially and politically motivated [... ] It is 
motivated by the already existing structure of patriarchal power, and its effects 
guarantee the reproduction of this particular form of social organization and 
no other' (Grosz 1990: 124). 
If we take Grosz' observations that the Phallic equation with the human penis are based on the 
existing power-structure of patriarchy, it becomes easier to deduce that the 'veil' that covers the 
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Phallus and assures its power, also disguises its Whiteness. My equation of Whiteness with the 
Lacanian Phallus here is not arbitrary either, but is based on the social and political realities that 
the western structure of power is White. In the binary `Phallic/castrated', those subjects who 
problematise Phallic authority are `castrated'. In terms of gender, this subject is Woman4. In 
terms of `race', the White Phallus castrates the Black subject. For the subject of Mixed Race, in 
whom the Phallus recognises an uncanny, deviant version of its own Whiteness, the White 
Phallus makes special efforts to classify, categorise, contain and castrate. In The Signification of the 
Phallus, Lacan posits the Phallus as the contender for this role of boss signifierr. 
`The phallus reveals its function here. In Freudian doctrine, the phallus is not a 
phantasy, if by that we mean an imaginary effect. Nor is it as such an object 
(part-, internal, good, bad etc. ) in the sense that this term tends to accentuate 
the reality pertaining in a relation. It is even less the organ, penis or clitoris, 
that it symbolises. And it is not without reason that Freud used the reference 
to the simulacrum that it represented for the Ancients. For the phallus is a 
signifier, a signifier whose function, in the intra-subjective economy of the 
analysis, lifts the veil perhaps from the function it performed in the mysteries. 
For it is the signifier intended to designate as a whole the effects of the 
signified, in that the signifier conditions them by its presence as a signifier'. 
(Lacan 1977 [1958]: 285) 
We may deduce then that the Phallus functions as the primary signifier, chosen for its (limited) 
shape-shifting powers to act as the most powerful signifier of them all. The Phallus is the 
signifier whose significance is almost as conclusive as a signified; its presence effectively stops the 
motion of signification by assigning a definite meaning. The silent and invisiblejouissance of the 
signifiers in the freedom of perpetual motion is split or interrupted by the puissance of the looming 
Phallic shadow overhead. Definition by the Phallus is never self-definition; and the 
conceptualisation of the defining Phallus as White allows us to see how the self-definition that is 
denied to Mixed Race subjects colludes with Phallic activity. 
The perpetual motion of the Phallus also colludes with White activity towards the `racially' 
indeterminate subject. The mother, although she is perceived to already have the Phallus (see 
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Melanie Klein, where the mother's body is perceived as filled with penises, babies and faeces -a 
veritable cornucopia of having (1988[1975], and 1988a[1975]), desires the Phallus because it is 
forever out of her reach, since she is castrated. The infant desires the mother and, in its games of 
seduction, continually attempts to `be' the Phallus for the mother. The mother desires the Phallus 
of the father, who is perpetually terrified that it might be severed. The mother, already `castrated', 
exists in mourning for her own lost Phallus. It is a little like a game of `chase'; the Phallus 
perpetually moving, establishing itself, performing important tasks of signification, then running 
away. The most vexed and problematic element in Lacanian theory, that of his stance towards 
women, begins here. The alleged `neutrality' of the Phallic signifier seems disingenuous in the 
light of the patriarchal nature of the society within which psychoanalysis had its genesis; but more 
gravely, such statements of Lacan as `Woman does not exist' and such cases as Freud's treatment 
of `Dora' - where he failed to recognize that Dora in fact desired a woman, Frau K- all suggest 
that the apotheosis of the Phallus should be aligned with an apotheosis of masculinity, or the 
male. Lacan refuses to ascribe signifying powers to the woman. Elizabeth Grosz (1990), explains 
that, 
`The processes by which the phallus, a signifier, becomes associated with the 
penis, an organ, involves the procedures by which women are systematically 
excluded from positive self-definition and a potential autonomy. The relations 
each sex has to the phallus gsra signifier map the position(s) each occupies as a 
feminine or masculine subject in the patriarchal symbolic order [... ] Because 
the penis and the phallus are (albeit illusorily) identified, women are regarded as 
castrated. By its presence or absence, the penis becomes the defining 
characteristic of both sexes. ' (Grosz 1990: 116) 
Similarly, Whiteness as ultimate Signifier, ultimate decider of `what' somebody is, or what their 
skins and features mean, is perpetually on the move; its perceived `presence or absence' deciding 
someone's `racial' fate, but always to its own advantage. Maria Root's observations on the 
classificatory systems of White authority echo Grosz' observations on the Lacanian deciding 
Phallus and who it excludes: 
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`The purpose of the classification system, which insists on clean lines between 
groups, always remains the same: to establish and maintain a social hierarchy in 
which the creators and enforcers of the system occupy a superior berth. 
Consequently, members of the group are always `deserving' of inferior status, 
until they are arbitrarily elevated to a higher status or a change in status 
provides economic advantages to those in power. ' (Root in Root [ed] 1996: 5) 
This similarity between White and Phallic activity can even be seen in terms of what Grosz 
describes as the Phallic determination of the structure `of romantic relationships' - in 1967 in the 
famous and wonderfully named case of Loving vs. Virginia, Mildred Jetters and Perry Loving 
managed to overturn all remaining U. S state laws against interracial marriage. The Supreme Court 
invoked an interpretation of the 14`h Amendment to repeal these laws, as they infringed the basic 
civil liberty of the pursuit of happiness. Of course, such Phallic deciding activity about 
relationships is not confined to Whiteness - the final right in Roots' Bill of Rrglvs states the right to 
`freely choose whom I befriend and love' (1996: 7). This means that the Mixed Race subject may 
choose her partner based on their compatibility and happiness together, and that in this she may 
be free from all accusations of being a race traitor, a `coconut', a try-hard, an Uncle Tom, a 
wannabe-Black, or anything else. 
3: 2 When is a Signifier Not a Signifier? (When It's a Monkey) 
`Free of the white person's gaze, black people created their own unique 
vernacular structures and relished in the double play that these forms bore to 
white forms. ' (Gates Jr. 1989: xxiv). 
`Jean Paul Sartre (trans. 1976) suggests that people define self in terms of the 
subjective experience of the other. In this case, multiracial people are the 
inkblot test for the other's prejudices and fears. ' (Root in Root [ed] 1996: 9) 
In H. L Gates Jr' account of the African-American notion of `signification', meaning is anything 
but `meaning', and creative appropriation by an oppressed group of some of the oppressor's 
language opens up the possibilities for that group's negotiation of their existence. Developing out 
of slavery, African-American `signification' is simply the act of confusing someone, especially a 
White someone, by talking in complex, eloquent-sounding, interweaving circles. It is a difficult 
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skill to learn, a conspiratorial joke against the White plantocracy that required much practice to 
perfect. Gates Jr tells of an African-American proverb that attests to the prevalence of this form 
of communication; `Signification is the nigger's occupation'. In my account of monochrome, 
would we see it as the `nigger' of western art history? Or more specifically within that category of 
`nigger' (as decided by the White Phallus), the problematic `half-caste'; the indeterminate, 
undecidable Mixed Race subject, too horrible for the ego (which abhors a split), to behold? 
`Lacan's human subject is not a "divided self' (R. D Laing) that in a different 
society could be made whole, but a self which is only actually and necessarily 
created within a split -a being that can only conceptualise itself when it is 
mirrored back to itself from the position of another's desire. ' (Mitchell in 
Mitchell & Rose (eds) 1982: 5) 
There are other ways to signify than those of the western traditions of semiotics'. Derrida, for 
example, in some of his earlier work rejected the Saussurean understanding of signs as fixed, 
closed and (most importantly) binary systems. Crucially, Derrida's critique does not adopt a fixed 
position, neither does he use traditional terminology or systems of questioning. His problematic 
legibility is a deliberate and subversive strategy, causing questioning of the systems that `pass' as 
`normal'. What is interesting for me in terms of the doubleness I propose both for the psychic 
space of monochrome and the epidermal or optical space of the Mixed Race subject, is that 
Derrida factors doubleness deliberately into his work. The word Deconstruction, for example, has at 
least two meanings in French - to take apart (usually machinery), or to re-arrange the words or 
grammar in a sentence. Derrida also questions how meanings can be lost or undervalued if the 
systems reading those meanings do not understand themb. 
However, the African-American figure of the Signifyin(g) Monkey, through whom final meaning 
is not only deferred but actively avoided in favour of witty suggestion and mischievous word play, 
confuses the signifying systems of the White west in more subversive ways7. This `Black' mode 
of Signifyin(g) as favoured by the tricky Monkey has more in common with Derridean 
Deconstruction than it does with Saussurean signification. African-American Signifyin(g) does 
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not have ultimate meaning as its goal, or primordial meaning as its first referent. In this respect it 
shares common traits with `code' speech formations that deliberately close off access to 
oppressive authority. To seek `meaning' in the Signifyin(g) speech of the Monkey or the 
Signifyin(g) Nigger (sic) in the traditional way in which meaning is sought in the western text pre- 
Deconstruction, is to miss the point. More than this, however, the African-American speakerly 
mode of Signifyin(g) actually disrupts the dominant White systemic notions of meaning, whilst 
remaining hidden. In this way it `means' in common with the Mixed Race subject's body, or any 
kind of cultural indeterminate. As Henry Louis Gates Jr. tells it, 
`Some black genius or a community of witty and sensitive speakers emptied the 
signifier "Signification" of its received concepts and filled this empty signifier 
with their own concepts. By doing so, by supplanting the received, standard 
English concept associated by (white) convention with this particular signifier, 
they (un)wittingly disrupted the nature of the sign = signifier/signified equation 
itself [... ] I wish to believe, that this guerrilla action occurred intentionally on 
this term, because of the very concept with which it is associated in standard 
English (Gates Jr. 1989: 46) 
Signifyin(g) is, as Wittgenstein said of poetry, a rhetorical practice that does not involve itself in 
information-giving. Indeed, Signifyin(g), as opposed to Signifying, involves deliberately saying 
exactly the thing one does not mean, in order to confuse a possible White listener, and to indulge 
in witty wordplay with one's fellow Black conversation partner. This is not a `master' trope. It 
deliberately ignores or bypasses the transcendent signified, the Logos or the Phallus, writing itself 
in the margins of spoken discourse; 
`The ironic reversal of a received racist image of the black as simianlike, the 
Signifying Monkey [... ] dwells at the margins of discourse, ever punning, ever 
troping, ever embodying the ambiguities of language, is our trope for repetition 
and revision, indeed our trope of chiasmus, repeating and reversing 
simultaneously as he does in one deft discursive act. If Vico and Burke, or 
Nietzsche, de Man, and Bloom, are correct in identifying four and six `master 
tropes, ' then we might think of these as the `master's tropes', and of 
Signifyin(g) as the slave's trope, the trope of tropes [... ]' (Gates Jr. 1989: 52). 
The African-American trope of Signifyin(g) at first sight has no part in the dyadic decision- 
making of the Phallogocentric system, Not only does it confuse its homonym, it also makes 
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redundant any kind of attempt to `understand' in the Phallic, Logocentric way. Signifyin(g) is the 
Slave's trope, as Gates Jr. suggests, and its deliberate confusion of White concepts allows for the 
exclusion of the White, Phallic plantocracy (or White racist whoever), and frees Black speakers to 
enjoy the meaning-games this secret method of communication involves. In classical Derridean 
terms, Signifyin(g) defers meaning, 
`In opposition to the apparent transparency of speech, this poetry calls 
attention to itself as an extended linguistic sign, one composed of various 
forms of the signifiers peculiar to the black vernacular. Meaning, in these 
poems, is not proffered; it is deferred, and it is deferred because the 
relationship between intent and meaning, between the speech act and its 
comprehension, is skewed by the figures of rhetoric or signification of which 
these poems consist. This set of skewed relationships creates a measure of 
undecidability within the discourse, such that it must be interpreted or decoded 
by careful attention to its play of differences. ' (Gates Jr. 1989: 53) 
Beneath the surface however, there is more to Signifyin(g) than meets the ear, as with the 
monochrome, as with the `decided' body of the Mixed Race subject. Whilst its immediate 
signifiers suggest that it `ought to' make sense as a picture, if we see the monochrome 
painting/installation/film/whatever as a psychic object rather than simply a visual or tangible 
one, we will be able to penetrate that surface. Beneath or beyond the surface, I suspect we will 
also find that in monochrome as in `Black' Signifyin(g), the process of meaning-production that is 
actually taking place is radically different from the one we immediately assume is taking place 
from our reading of the name. 
Tales of the Signifying Monkey's exploits are common in African-American communities. These 
tales, thought to have been brought over with the dreaded `Middle Passage' from Africa's west 
coast to the shores of the New World, involve three principle characters: the Lion, the Monkey 
and the Elephant. Due to his immense size the latter is true king of the jungle, although the Lion 
believes himself to be the rightful occupant of this office. In the stories, the Monkey usually plays 
a trick on the lion or Elephant, rousing one to extreme anger brought about by an `insult' from 
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the other, which in reality came from the tricky Monkey. The Monkey figure is thought to share 
much in common with Esu-Elegbara, trickster figure found in the Yoruba cultures of Nigeria, 
Benin, Brazil, Cuba, and Haiti. Other names for Esu-Elegbara include Legba, also called the 
`divine linguist' by the Fon of Dahomey (Benin), and Papa La Bas (Haiti). There are many 
versions of Esu, but in each version he is sole messenger of the gods to the humans, the go- 
between. In Yoruba mythology Esu-Elegbara's indeterminacy is worn on his body; he is said to 
walk with a limp because he is perpetually caught between two worlds. Esu's discourse is double- 
voiced, like that of the Monkey he would later become, and his tricks always involve a doubling or 
confusing of any expected notion of `meaning' as an absolute, definite, decided end-point. Gates 
Jr. describes Esu as, `the Yoruba figure of indeterminacy itself, aseye, ayewi, or ailemo, literally, `that 
which we cannot know" '. (Gates Jr. 1989: 11). 
The Yoruba story of `The Two Friends' demonstrates the trickster-god Esu-Elegbara's 
determined aim to confuse, but more importantly it demonstrates the (Ph)allacy of striving for a 
single definitive meaning. Esu-Elegbara makes himself a tricky cap, one side of which is jet black, 
the other dazzling white. He rides directly between two men who have angered him by making a 
friendship pact without his blessing, making sure he greets each man. Later on, a violent fist-fight 
ensues between these sworn friends, who are unable to agree on the colour of the `pleasant 
stranger's headgear. Eventually Esu intervenes in the fight to tell them that they are both right, 
but they are also both wrong in their reading of his hat. The folly here is the insistence on one 
determinate meaning, (itself dependent on one's personal vantage point, and one's mode of 
seeing), which is particularly foolish when the observed thing is in fact indeterminate, double or 
multiple. Esu's rightful place is between the two, his anger stemmed from the fact that the two did 
not initially factor him as a third term into their two-way friendship. Esu thus suffered two 
insults; firstly he was not acknowledged as a god ought to be, but secondly and more importantly 
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he was not given his proper place as slider-in-between, as interruptor of restricting systems. 
Gates goes on to tell us, 
`As anthropologists demonstrate, the Signifying Monkey is often called the 
Signifier, he who wreaks havoc upon the Signified. One is signified upon by 
the signifier. He is indeed the "signifier as such", in Kristeva's phrase, "a 
presence that precedes the signification of object or emotion" '. (Gates 
1989: 52-53) 
The Signifyin(g) Monkey offers a glimmer of hope for an alternative to the established system, 
but it is clear throughout Gates Jr. 's work that he wishes to claim Signifyin(g) as an exclusively 
Black trope. Whilst Gates Jr. does not expressly state this, his writing implicitly elides `Black' with 
African-American. This is a specific way of being Black that cannot necessarily include the 
African, the Caribbean or the Black British person - it is certainly a way of being Black that the 
Mixed Race person, especially a British one, cannot fit easily into. In this insistence on 
particularizing the Monkey's or Esu-Elegbara's indeterminate activity, Gates Jr. is taking part in 
something oppositional yet akin to Phallic activity; it is almost as though he perpetuates the same 
power-structure in reverse. His alternative invocation of the Signifyin(g) Monkey should be 
understood as a partially useful, partial alternative to the Phallogocentric. `Partial' here is not 
meant entirely negatively, for it seems to me that any attempts at creating a straightforward 
counter-system to the great systems of White Phallogocentricity should be applauded. At the 
same time, however, such attempts might be always already doomed to failure as this would be a 
frontal attack and the system would literally `see' you coming. 
A more subtle and cunning way of disempowering the Phallogocentric, I think, is to attempt a 
synthesis of more than two (for two is the number of the sacred oppositional pair) distinct ways 
of thinking and to think this synthesis into the system. To find a way to be perpetually present in 
the system, and yet not quite of it; to slither and slip in and out of it, sometimes rhyming with it 
and sometimes creating dissonance. This kind of activity - an example of which is in the notions 
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of strata and the planes of immanence and organization in Deleuze - will be more effective than 
replacement, since it will present the Phallus with the absurd folly of its fixed categories. It seems 
that invoking the figure of Esu-Elegbara, with his structural indeterminacy (and particularly with 
the striking figure of his Black/White tricking cap), would be a more useful strategy for the 
subject of Mixed Race than would Gates Jr. 's more `decided' Signifyin(g) Monkey. Like the 
Mixed Race subject, Esu-Elegbara is a figure that rehearses and performs the task of confusing 
`fixed' categories, showing the system the historically-formed strata that it has mistaken for truth. 
3: 3 Diluted Nigger or Dirty Nigger? The `Choice' is Never Yours 
`In Greece, the family insignia, which served to differentiate one class from 
another through the exclusion of slaves from access to the family name, 
functioned as the phallus' (Grosz 1990: 121). 
The authority of the Phallus is not open to question; it simply has to be accepted and lived under. 
The act of naming is a Phallic act that presupposes a structural dyad of power and subjugation. 
The family insignias that Grosz refers to above served to separate the noble family from the 
ignoble slaves in ancient Greece, thus the family name became a potent symbol of that family's 
authority. The acts of naming that the family performed were automatic symbols of their power, 
the choice of slave-names was never a choice made by the slaves themselves. More recently in 
the history of African slavery in the west, the European surnames of many Black diaspora people 
usually come from the surnames of the slave-owners who owned their ancestors, enabling any 
lost slaves to be traced and returned. It was a system of tagging. The knowledge of this real and 
symbolic persistence of this fundamental theft of identity, history and culture is what made 
Malcolm little change his name to Malcolm X, setting up a tradition still adhered to by many 
devotees of the Nation of Islam. The giver of the name is also the decider, symbolically, of the 
identity. These people have reclaimed both the act of naming and the name itself, and have 
successfully outsmarted the Phallus - in this case is the White west. The Lacanian Name of the 
Father, which is also a prohibition, a `No', both inscribes the child with the father's name and 
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provides the child with permission to speak. This is very important, for it suggests that anything 
non-Phallic or pre-Phallic has neither identity, place, nor voice. It also suggests that the subject 
who is named, classified or decided, is also dependent on the decider for the right to speak8. 
The art of Gordon Bennett (see Chapter Two) is predicated on an examination of the speaking 
position of the subject. As Lingard & Rizvi write, 
`In the dominant colonial discourse, Aboriginal people are not provided a 
subject position; there is no space from which they can speak. In his work, 
Bennett is constantly putting forward and problematising his own speaking 
position. It is a position that is neither fixed nor unitary. ' (Lingard & Rizvi 
1994: 83) 
As with all subjects of Mixed Race, Bennett's own speaking position is complex and 
contradictory. By foregrounding this in his work, he challenges Phallic preconceptions about 
`Aboriginality', about what White Australian authorities decide it means to be Aboriginal, and 
about the decisions about one's Aboriginal `authenticity', which are again made by White Phallic 
authority. He refuses to be spoken for, or spoken about, any longer. Bennett's strategy is to 
confidently claim his own speaking position amongst all the apparent contradictions that create 
his identity. One of the strategies of his work is to implicitly suggest that subjects like him are not 
inherently fragmented, but are designated as fragmented by the Phallic system that constructs 
them as Other. His work returns the Phallic gaze back to the Phallic eye of Power in a move that 
Bhabha (1985) describes as `hybridisation''. `Hybridisation' articulates indigenous and colonial 
knowledges, enabling `a strategic reversal of the process of domination'. In Bennett's case, he not 
only shows the White Phallic eye some of its own Whiteness in `deviant', Aboriginal form, but he 
also exposes the Phallic neo-colonialism of the art market that `decides' when Aboriginal art 
should be considered fashionable and interesting, and what value should be placed upon it (Fry & 
Willis 1989). 
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It should be noted that the tendency to binarism usually referred to as Cartesian, Platonic, is not 
specifically western. Many cultures abhor a split, or anything that appears to threaten the clear- 
cut boundaries of a binarism; some even legislate against such aberrations. However, the west (or 
more specifically the Vienna/Paris axis) was the birthplace of the Phallus, and the context of the 
west is possibly the most appropriate one in which the Phallus can be said to be operational. 
Malcolm Bowie points out that the concept of `Europe' was irrelevant to Freud at the time he was 
conceptualising his version of the unconscious (a notion that is traceable in European thinking 
back to antiquity, and was quite fashionable during Freud's lifetime). The Freudian unconscious 
was to be understood as a grand universal, unaffected by cultural specificity: 
`[... ] if the general principles of mental functioning were at issue, Europe was 
too small to be worth studying; if, on the other hand, a suffering individual 
presented himself or herself, Europe was an unfocusable vastness. ' (Bowie 
1993: 117-118) 
Now, however, few would attempt to deny the high specificity of Freud's unconscious. Not only 
is it European, it is distinctly referential to the Viennese, Nineteenth Century, educated Judaeo- 
Christian-Atheist, and referential to a particular family structure and to the male and female 
subjects' becoming within patriarchy'o. Bowie further describes the specifically gendered, socially 
`removed' nature of this particular unconscious, further giving the lie to any idea of universality, 
`Time and again during this `advanced' age of sexual self-awareness, the 
unconscious became Woman, just as it had during the heyday of Romantic 
agony. But whichever woman it now became - the deranged heroine of 
Erwartung, Breuer's Anno 0., Freud's Emmy von N., the Salome of Richard 
Strauss, the Lulu of Berg and Pabst, Klimt's Judith, or any one of the lesser 
hysterics, houris and earth sprits who crowd the annals of European culture at 
this time - she was wondrously removed from the complicating life of the 
social group'. (Bowie 1993: 132) 
Amina Mama in Beyond the Marks: Race, Gender and Subjectivity (1995) asks key questions about the 
possibility of racism, or at least western-centrism, within psychology. Such questions are crucial 
because they beg further questions about whether a psychology of Black subjectivity is ever 
possible, given the Whiteness' of psychology and psychoanalysis. I would go further and add 
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that this Whiteness is inextricably tied in with the Phallic function of both psychoanalysis and the 
individual analyst in the analytic relationship. The Black psychoanalytic subject in the west is 
always first and foremost a subject factored into White western society by the White west; only 
situated there because of previous acts of White, Phallic authority such as the forced mass- 
movements of slavery. Mama writes, 
`It is worth pointing out that enslavement and colonisation did not only 
materially exploit and politically subordinate African resources and ways of life 
but at the same time transformed and subjected Africans to the imaginings and 
caprices of imperial culture and psychology [... ] and cast them in the position 
of subjected Others, while it advanced the interests of European nations. ' 
(Mama 1995: 17) 
White western colonisation was obviously not a mere matter of geographical intervention. The 
effects run far deeper, scars of enforced difference run deep in colonised people and societies. 
What Mama is particularly bringing to our attention here, however, is the propagation of White 
ideologies as universally correct. A Black subject is always a `wrong', or failed White subject; but a 
Black psychoanalytic subject will pose more problems than ever because of enforced double 
consciousness. The identity of the Black subject warped by White colonialist intervention became 
in psychology and psychoanalysis - White western disciplines - something that Mama writes as 
the, `generalised and pathologised `Negro personality' (1995: 47), an understanding that reaffirms 
Black inferiority. Mama goes on to detail various social psychological projects which, through an 
attempt at scientific objectivity, manage to further subjugate the Black subject. One such 
example is the 1950 UNESCO Statement on Race, which despite an apparent commitment to 
anti-racism, nevertheless managed to come up with a `damaged Negro' conclusion thanks to 
questionable research methods. Most of the Black subjects interviewed were already in mental 
institutions, for example (just like Charcot's female hysterics); other participants living in extreme 
poverty were tempted by offers of payment for answering the questionnaires. A Black 
psychoanalytic subject is also, however, always a subject studied and theorised about from a 
White perspective, as Mama explains; 
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`Until the 1920s, psychological research had been the exclusive preserve of 
white academics, with black people as their objects of study. In that year 
Francis Sumner became the first black person to obtain a Ph. D in psychology. 
Subsequently, he supported Kenneth and Mamie Clark's research on `Negro 
identity' during the 1930s and 1940s. By the 1950s there were still only fifty 
black Americans with doctorates in psychology, and although there has been a 
steady increase since the 1960s, black people are still grossly underrepresented 
in the discipline. ' (1995: 44) 
I would add that the Mixed Race psychoanalytic subject whom the White west has decided is 
Black, is at least once removed again from any kind of agency. She has been classified, named 
and decided twice over by the White Phallus. The mechanics of patriarchal oppression disguises 
embodied individuals, subsuming them into a huge, imaginary `rightness' and power, `men [... ] 
hide themselves and their specificities under the banner of some universal humanity' (Grosz 
1994: xi). The obviously masculine Phallus does the same, concealing its sexed nature under 
Lacan's opaque veil of neutrality. Anything that does not fit into the male Phallus' definition of 
`universal human being', for example a female human being, is automatically positioned as 
subaltern. Whiteness does exactly the same thing: it disguises its racial specificity by propagating 
the myth of its universality, it names, decides and subjugates anything that is different from itself 
or threatens its power. Whiteness silently equates itself with the notion of what it is to be human. 
As John Tercier writes, 
`In Western culture, the fact that whiteness is the norm cloaks it with 
invisibility. It allows the white man to attain the Enlightenment intellectual 
ideal, the observing subject without properties [... ]' (Tercier 2000: 20) 
In the world of lived-in human bodies, Whiteness performs this subjugation mostly through 
vision. Donna Haraway cites vision as a system that should be useful for subaltern discourses, in 
her case, specifically feminism: 
`Vision can be good for avoiding binary oppositions. I would like to insist on 
the embodied nature of all vision, and so reclaim the sensory system that has 
been used to signify a leap out of the marked body and into a conquering gaze 
from nowhere. This is the gaze that mythically inscribes all the marked bodies, 
that makes the unmarked category claim the power to see and not be seen, to 
represent while escaping representation. This gaze signifies the unmarked 
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positions of Man and \White, one of the many nasty tones of the word ob, jectivity 
to feminist ears in scientific and technological, late industrial, militarised, racist 
and male dominant societies [... ]' (Haraway in Mirzoeff 1998: 191) 
Writing most specifically about a feminist reclamation of scientific study, Haraway proposes a 
variety of binary-busting alternatives to some of the fixed, Phallic `universals' that we are conned 
into believing are transcendent truths (though she does admit that her `dichotomous chart' is 
problematic as it makes reference to the system she is questioning). For instance, `universal 
rationality' would ideally be replaced with `ethnophilosophies', or `world system' with `local 
knowledges'. Concepts such as resonance and tension are suggested, not because they are 
opposed to dichotomous pairs, but because they slither out from under them, they sidestep 
around them, they exceed them. There is movement, play and possibility in such mobile 
concepts, they elude Phallic systems and their dualisms. So whilst the White Phallus would 
designate the psychic space of the Mixed Race subject as damaged, deviant or a mistake, that 
subject can choose not to recognise the authority that makes this decision, and can engage in a 
positive process of self-identification that can change and fluctuate as many times as she likes. 
If Phallic Whiteness is equated with humanity, anything that problematises that XXUtencss is 
automatically dehumanised. This accounts for some of the pseudo-scientific theories which 
attempted to `prove' the likeness of African and simian brains, etc. The Black subject poses no 
real threat to Phallic Whiteness, she is simply designated as outside of it. The subject of Mixed 
Race is so frequently and determinedly classified as `Black' by the White Phallus because of the 
very fact that she contains some of that Whiteness, though (sometimes) imperceptibly. That 
invisible Whiteness, a little like the invisible spoken `a' in Derrida's d jerance, makes all the 
difference. Such problematic Whiteness shows that the system is not as impermeable as it wishes, 
and shows up the inside/outside boundary that the system supports as unstable and ultimately 
transgressible. Such Whiteness shows that the Mixed Race subject cannot properly and 
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unproblematically be said to be outside of Whiteness. The binary categories that the White Phallus 
sets up are inhabited, woven through and continually destabilised by the fluid and the boundless, 
and thus the White Phallus must work hard to maintain its oppositional pairs. The non-White, 
problematically White or non-Phallic subject need not necessarily be condemned to a life of 
`passing' and tragedy, however. The position of marginality, where boundaries are continually 
open to trasgression, can, paradoxically, be a position of the kind of power only available to the 
subaltern. As Haraway goes on to say, this position of having been 'located' can be a position of 
potential transgressive power, as `location is about vulnerability; location resists the politics of 
closure, finality' (Haraway in Mirzoeff 1998: 197) 
3: 4 Neither Fish Not Fowl: Indeterminacy & (Ill)legibility 
Elizabeth Grosz begins her journey towards new philosophical terrain by examining a few so- 
called `anomalous philosophers', Vico, Nietzsche and most importantly the highly influential 
Spinoza, all of whom self-consciously question Cartesian dualism and its offshoots. Suggesting 
that Spinoza not only displaces Cartesian dualisms but also frees the body from the `dominant 
mechanistic models with which the Cartesian tradition surrounded it' (1994: 10), Grosz offers 
alternative figures, such as the flame, whose endless state of becoming and newness prevents it 
from ever being `defined' into one or another category. 
`As in a burning candle, the permanence of the flame is a permanence, not of 
substance but of process in which at each moment the "body" with its 
"structure" of inner and outer layers is reconstituted of materials different from 
the previous and following ones so the living organism exists as a constant 
exchange of its own constituents and has its permanence and identity in the 
continuity of this process. ' (Jonas in Grosz 1994: 11)" 
There is too much inscribed on the brown skin of the Mixed Race subject that the ruling White 
Phallus does not want to see; the union of cultures, colours and `races', and importantly, the 
evidence of the deviant sexual crime of interracial intercourse. By simply being alive, the Mixed 
Race subject bears testimony to the fact that an improper sexual union, one not sanctioned by 
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White society, has taken place. The mixing of `races' has been the subject of precise legislation in 
certain areas because of this taboo. New Orleans and the surrounding areas, for example, had 
highly specific terminologies for the different degrees of mixing that occurred, and the State Laws 
set out clearly what entitlements each `type' or colour of person had, depending on the degree of 
Black `blood' that could be traced in their ancestry via their appearance combined with official 
records12. In Canada however, First Nation people with one White parent are referred to as 
`Metis', and given the same rights as someone with two First Nation parents. Robert Young 
(1995) suggests that this manic and obsessive insistence on taxonomising the various `types' of 
Mixed Race subject was really a futile attempt to disguise the Whites' prurient interest in what 
they considered the ultimate sexual perversion. 
Monochrome occupies a similar place in Phallogocentric western Art History. Any attempts to 
make monochrome `be' any one particular thing will always be doomed to failure, since 
monochrome is fundamentally indeterminate. Floating independent of definite signification, the 
Mixed Race subject and the monochrome can, like the Diceman, almost be anything. What is 
important to remember, however, is that this position of deviant agency is not always apparent at 
first, thanks to the pervasive power of the Phallic Logos that always presents itself in the guise of 
`universal truth'. In order to explore these ideas as they relate to indeterminacy as a lived, human 
condition, I have made a body of visual art work surrounding the fictional character of `Carlton 
Johnson' [Figs 26- 28]. The stories in the work are set in 1978 in Pelsall, West Midlands, a 
mostly White area that was mostly occupied by people who believed Enoch Powell was a 
`visionary'. The action takes place ten years after Powell gave his famous `Rivers of Blood' 
speech, igniting what was already a hotbed of racism in Britain. The installation includes cartoon 
drawings about Carlton's life, a short Super-8 Film, and a short video piece. The work also 
explores issues of cultural appropriation and appropriateness, class and family, the authorial voice, 
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and attempts to bring the importance of the individual human story to bear on the theoretical 
question of liminality. 
n 
Figure 26: Angeline Morrison, Carlton Johnson: my 'Nfe' 2002. 
Ink drawing on paper. 12 x 8cm. Collection of the author. 
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Figure 27: Angeline Morrison, Carlton Johnson: my Yife , The Bleach Bath' 
(detail) 2000. Pencil drawing on paper. 20 x 27cm. Collection of the author. 
Figure 28: Angeline Morrison, Carlton Johnson: my kJ , The Band' (detail) 2001. 
Ink drawing on paper. 15 x 10cm. Collection of the author. 
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Carlton's position as a Mixed Race subject is one of extreme isolation. He has no contact 
whatsoever with so-called `Black culture', his White mother being a down to earth, working class 
Midlander who isn't bothered by such notions, and having no contact with his (Black, Jamaican) 
father or his father's family. He experiences racist abuse daily, but has no referents for it other 
than his face (which he curses), and his signature cloud of afro hair, of which he is `perversely' 
proud. Carlton's solid friendship with Vikram, the only other brown face at the local 
comprehensive, makes Carlton feel jealous. Vikram's parents are Indian, so Vikram has a culture, 
he speaks a special language and can have secret conversations that nobody but `his' people 
understand. Vikram knows who he is and where he comes from. When Vikram gets called a 
`Paid', he is able to align this racist misnomer to the fact that the Indian culture from which he 
comes marks him out as different from the White kids. Conversely, when Carlton is called 
`Nigger', `Wog', `Darkie', `Sambo', or whatever, he has no notion of what this means outside of 
himself. Knowing no other Black or Mixed Race people, he is quite adrift in the all-pervasive 
`normality' of Whiteness. Carlton has no idea `what' he is supposed to be and longs to wake up 
White. White people never need to ask themselves who they are or how to be White, they are 
simply `normal'. Carlton does not understand how to `be' a nigger. 
What is significant in the drawings is that Carlton changes colour [Figure 28]. When he is with 
his White mother, or with Vikram, his skin is indistinguishable in shading from theirs, since he 
feels indistinct from them. However, Carlton's skin becomes darker and darker depending on the 
level of racism he encounters in each story. One of the stories, The Bleach Bath, [Figures 27] 
illustrates a young Carlton's internalisation of the dominant idea of Whiteness as `normality'. We 
see his mother reading a newspaper report of the tragic death of a little girl somewhere else in 
England who, like Carlton, bathed in bleach in an attempt to achieve the coveted Whiteness. 
Both the dead girl and Carlton longed to enter into the magical world where nobody called you 
names or thought you were dirty or hated you on sight. To a White individual in a White culture, 
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Whiteness would, of course, be invisible as Dyer points out. However, to a person living in a 
White culture who is not White - or worse, who is somewhat White, or 
deviantly White - 
Whiteness would not only be clearly visible, but could become intensely desirable. To someone 
like Carlton, his own Whiteness is `invisible' to him in Dyer's sense - that is, something that is 
passively equated with the condition of being human. However, his Whiteness is also invisible 
in 
the optical sense to almost everyone else around him. His appearance is different (brown), his 
features don't make sense (African-ish), he might be half White, but that doesn't really count. 
Carlton cannot be `read' by his society; this makes him miserable and his society ever more 
determined to `name' him. 
The video piece takes the form of an imaginary television programme, also set in 1978, called 
`Folk Club'. The presenter, an `Oirish' cliche of what a folk enthusiast is `expected' to look and 
sound like, introduces `the MacDonald Sisters from Stornoway' (played by my sister and myself), 
singing a traditional Scottish Rebel Song `of their ancestors'. We are clearly of Mixed Race, and 
our Scottish `blood' (and the locataion of our immediate White family in Stornoway, Isle of 
Lewis), is `invisible' to the naked eye. Carlton's mother remarks casually, `what are them two half- 
caste girls doing singing that song? ' The message of the song, however, could refer to almost any 
colonised people; the last two lines in particular could almost be referring to slavery: `\Ve are 
bought and sold for English gold/ Such a parcel of rogues in a nationl"' 
In Black Art and the Burden of Representation, Kobena Mercer writes in reference to Paul Gilroy's 
work, that Gilroy importantly shows how, `the simplistic dichotomies of margin and centre, left 
and right, or black and white, are no longer adequate (and probably never were) as a means of 
making `good sense' of the bad times we find ourselves in' (Mercer 1994d: 236-237). Mercer also 
explains Gilroy's term `ethnic absolutism' as, 'an essentialising position which regards cultures as a 
fixed and final property of different `racial' subjects or ethnicities. ' (Mercer 1994d: 237) It is 
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precisely this `ethnic absolutism' that, ludicrously, denies the reality of the mobile nature of 
popular culture which, like Grosz' flame, is perpetually re-molding itself. Nobody owns a song, 
but more importantly, nobody has the right to decide what someone may or may not say, do or 
sing. 
3: 5 `The New Colored People' 
When I was younger, I'd see talk shows on TV about someone who didn't like 
the fact that their white daughter was dating a black man. Invariably there was 
always someone who would stand up in the audience and say [to the couple], 
`Don't you realize what you are doing? You're going to have kids and they're 
going to be ruined! ', and stuff like that. And I would always wish that they had 
someone on those shows who's biracial who would say, `Hey, that's not always 
true. ' 
Then I went on Judge for Yourself [... ] when the host asked me what race I called 
myself, she said, `He knows what race he is - he's black. ' 
I said, `Well, no, I consider myself biracial. ' 
And she said, `And so you're black. ' 
[... ] I've had people tell me that before - you know, `Regardless of what you 
think you are, you're black. ' But it's not going to affect me because it's my 
personal choice what I want to call myself. So they can hate it, they can go to 
sleep crying about it, but it's not going to affect my choice. I mean, I know 
what I am. ' (Brian Harris in Gaskins [ed] 1999: 60-62) 
The above extract is the voice of sixteen-year-old American Brian Harris. Other voices in Pearl 
Fuyo Gaskins' anthology, W>hatAre Your? Voices of Mixed-Race Young People (1999) describe various 
incidents of having their identities decided on their behalf; in each case the `identity' always 
benefits the person who does the deciding. In each case there is a refusal to take into account the 
wishes of the Mixed Race subject. 
Given the pervasiveness of Phallic investment in preserving a false notion of `racial unity', it is not 
surprising that there has been a strong backlash against the recent explorations of self-identity by 
Mixed Race people. Some critics, in the USA in particular, are hostile to claims of a unique 
`Mixed Race experience'. One such critic is the philosopher Lewis Gordon, who charges those 
who dare to describe themselves as Mixed Race with a wish to escape the `taint' of Blackness, and 
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gain the `privileges' of Whiteness. He writes that, `offsprings who are biracial mixtures with 
blacks are pretty much excluded from most racial categories except for black. ' (Gordon 1997: 56) 
Gordon neglects to consult any of these actual `offsprings', grudgingly nodding towards the 
existence of Mixed Race people whilst simultaneously denying their right to name themselves. 
Welcome contrast is provided in Jayne O. Ifekwunigwe's brilliant 1999 book Scattered Belongings, in 
which she conducts interviews over a period of two years with various subjects of Mixed Race in 
Britain. Her subjects all have different mixtures from different countries and cultures, all having 
some Black and some White. Ifekwunigwe allows for highly nuanced, highly complex analyses of 
these subjects' various experiences and naming-choices, her analysis giving implicit acceptance of 
the validity of each choice. One of Ifekwunigwe's interviewees is Akousa, a Mixed Race Rasta 
woman from Liverpool who chooses to be Black whilst also acknowledging her White parent. 
Ifekwunigwe writes, 
`I reappropriate Adrienne Rich's theorizing on the political institution of 
`compulsory heterosexuality' to describe what I call compulsory Blackness. 
Compulsory Blackness is a political institution wherein it is presumed that 
identification with Blackness is the implicit or explicit exclusive personal 
preference of most `mixed race' women and men with one Black continental 
African or Black African Caribbean parent and one White British or White 
continental European parent [... ] I define Akousa's reconciliation of these 
biracialised public forces and private influences as Additive Blackness. 
Additive Blackness is a cumulative process of `racial' reconciliation, wherein a 
`mixed race' individual starts with her or his familiar social foundation and 
builds forward without having to sever tics with her or his often White English 
or in this case Irish roots. This particular psychosocial process of becoming 
Black as an individual and collective response to racialised oppression does not 
compromise the specific allegiances and attachments `mixed race' individuals 
may have to White identities, cultures and family. ' (Ifekwunigwe in Parker & 
Song [ed] 2001: 57-58) 
The concept of Additive Blackness is a welcome strategic one, as it allows the Mixed Race subject 
to choose a Black identity without having to feel ashamed of part of herself, without feeling like 
she has to deny some of her family members, and without feeling oppressed by false notions of 
`authenticity'. It also allows the Mixed Race subject to choose Blackness precisely because it is 
her choice, and not because someone outside of herself decides that she must do so. 
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Paul Spickard (2001) has observed that America cannot seem to get enough of `Biracial 
Biography'. He remarks on fetishistic interest in Mixed Race celebrities such as Tiger Woods, 
Mariah Carey or Lenny Kravitz - but he notes that the interest is predicated on the Mixed 
individual's containing some Whiteness. Contesting that the notion of the `tragic mulatto' is alive 
and well in contemporary culture, Spickard takes Henry Louis Gates Jr. to task for a piece he 
wrote for the New Yorker in 1996 on Anatole Broyard. Broyard, who was a prominent literary 
critic in New York from the 1950s to the 1980s, was a very light-skinned man of Mixed Race 
from a Black-identified family in New Orleans. Gates Jr. writes, `Anatole Broyard wanted to be a 
writer, not a black writer. So he chose to live a lie rather than be trapped by the truth. ' (Gates Jr. 
1996: 66). Spickard responds, logically, 
`[... ] why should Broyard's choice be construed as passing for something he 
was not? His appearance was White, his ancestry was mostly White, he 
functioned smoothly as a White man in the world without raising serious 
questions, his adult family and friends were White - in what meaningful sense 
was he not White? Why should some essentialist, one-drop notion of race, on 
Gates' part or ours, compel Broyard to identify himself as black? (Spickard in 
Parker & Song [eds] 2001: 80) 
It might be useful to re-appropriate Ifekwunigwe's strategic elusion of the Phallic, and describe 
Broyard's experience and choice as one of Additive Whiteness. Perhaps it would be better, 
though, to accept Broyard's identity as simply White', and Akousa's as simply `Black', and not ask 
any further questions. The area is tricky, and perhaps the most helpful thing that can be said is 
that one must always respect the wishes of the person doing the self-naming, no matter what their 
optical surface (or ancestry) appears to be telling us. 
The New Colored People is the title of Jon Michael Spencer's 1997 `diatribe against the multiracial 
movement' (Spickard in Miri & Song [eds] 2001: 82). Spickard moves on from his discussion of 
Gates Jr. 's appropriation of Broyard for his own ends to describe the insidious nature of this 
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publication. It seems that Spencer's problems with the multiracial movement are based on a 
double misunderstanding; first of all he seems to assume that if any Mixed Race person had the 
choice, they would choose to be White. For this reason he opposes the `Multiracial' census 
category that some American multiracial activists have been petitioning for - Spencer somehow 
reads `multiracial' as being `closer' to White, and patronisingly assumes that this is why Mixed 
Race people, (whom he also patronisingly assumes are desperate to escape Blackness), would 
want it. He does not acknowledge the multiracial activists such as Maria Root and others, who 
are rightly supportive of the needs and concerns of America's monoracial communities of colour, 
and who are rightly proud to acknowledge their own descent from and involvement with these 
communities. In fact, such activists have been lobbying for the option to tick as many boxes as 
need apply. This strategy would avoid the creation of another `category', and thus would not 
comply with the kind of Phallic thinking that seeks to categorise, cirumscribe and confine. 
Secondly, Spencer's, 
`[... ] argument depends on unthinking adherence to a misplaced analogy 
between the American multiracial movement and racial politics in South Africa 
[... ] Whenever Spencer encounters a rough spot in his argument against the 
multiracial category, he hits the default button and starts talking about South 
Africa. Yet he never demonstrates that the formal intermediate position of the 
Coloured population in apartheid-era South Africa is in fact like the fluid, 
multi-faceted situation of multiracial people in the USA. ' (Spickard in Parker & 
Song [eds] 2001: 85) 
It seems to me that Spencer's fundamental dread is a Phallic one of indeterminacy, liminality, in- 
between-ness. I suspect that along with those who fear or revile the notion of `Mixed Race', what 
Spencer really dreads is the potential for a group of people to create their own identities and name 
themselves as they wish, as many times as they wish. Such a liminal would continually slip out 
from under any kind of fixed definition that Spencer might wish to place on them, thus 
questioning Spencer's Phallic power to name and decide. As aforementioned, that which the ego 
cannot control becomes confusing and potentially frightening. 
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3: 6 Conclusion 
`In the white world the man of colour encounters difficulties in the 
development of his bodily schema. Consciousness of the body is solely a 
negating activity. It is a third-person consciousness. The body is surrounded 
by an atmosphere of certain uncertainty. ' (Fanon 1952: 111) 
`Many biracial and multiracial people identify themselves differently in different 
situations, depending on what aspects of identity are salient. This `situational 
ethnicity' is often misinterpreted. In the novel, The Crown of Columbus, by 
Louise Erdrich and Michael Dorris (1991), one of the main characters, Vivian, 
a mixed-blood Native American woman, describes this process as watering 
whatever set of her ethnic roots needs it most. This changing of foreground 
and background does not usually represent confusion, but if may confuse 
someone who insists that race is an imperturbable fact and synonymous with 
ethnicity. The essence of who one is as a person remains the same. ' (Root in 
Root [ed] 1996: 11). 
In Tales of Dark Skinned Women: Race, Gender and Global Culture (1998) Gargi Bhattarcharyya tells 
the modern-day fable of `the Skin-Woman'. The tragic figure of the Skin-Woman is renowned in 
her village for her beautiful skin, and comes to be understood and related to solely in terms of her 
lovely fleshly envelope. Bhattacharyya makes it abundantly clear in her story how skin comes 
first. The subject's skin is always subjected to a process of reading, it is therefore crucial to 
acknowledge the centrality of skin and its colour. Up until recently, White society (and 
sometimes Black society) has tended to situate the indeterminate, \Vhite-ish, Black-ish body of the 
Mixed Race subject firmly within Blackness. This definition-from-without is psychically 
uncomfortable for the subject who will never fully satisfy the `requirements' of either Blackness or 
Whiteness, always failing within each because she contains and is made up of part of the other, 
traditionally having horrendous times at the fruitless, useless task of trying to `fit in'. The Critical 
Indeterminacy of the Mixed Race subject's body creates perpetual social abrasions. 
The fixing of the Mixed Race person within Blackness is, of course, the performative privilege of 
the ruling decider, the outside Phallic subject writ large; the differences between Black and White 
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naming only slight. When Black society claims the Mixed Race subject as Black, this act is 
strategic, political and sometimes Phallic. When White society designates the Mixed Race subject 
as Black, this act is always Phallic. Whilst the British media has - bizarrely only in the last four 
years or so - consciously recognised Mixed Race people and named them as such, 
before this the 
not-so-subtlety of their difference remained invisible. The often brutal realities of this difference 
were left for the Mixed Race subject to endure by herself, completely internally. The chaotic body 
of the Mixed Race subject has the potential for insurrection inscribed on its very skin. 
Simultaneously a Brown Blackwoman and a Brown Whitewoman, the Whiteness of the Mixed 
subject's body must be made invisible by White society to ensure its survival as first in the binary 
pair - this Whiteness must be disavowed. Disavowal 
in psychoanalysis is a traumatic, 
simultaneous acknowledgement and refusal to acknowledge the perceived `absence' of genitals on 
the female. The imagined `castration' is clearly seen, but the seeing subject is so horrified by it 
that he pretends he has not seen this sight, or disavows the vision. This may develop into fetishism 
in later life. Disavowal is predicated on the experience of really seeing something that is horrific 
for the ego to behold, and therefore dedicating one's psychic life to pretending it never happened. 
So: Mixed Race people cannot be allowed to be White, even though they are. They are always 
and only ever Black. They may be Black in a problematic and unfixed way, but since the 
problems are never encountered by White egos they have no cause to worry about them"a 
On a wider level, the British person of Mixed Race is a type of indigenous `British Black', living 
out her life as an immediately identifiable undecidable; `from here' yet apparently `foreign', neither 
fully Black nor fully White, both Black and Mite, the person of Mixed Race is subject to the 
wearying, inevitable and continually shifting process of definition fior the outside. Sometimes there 
will be racist taunts or attacks; at other times admiration from White people because you look 
unthreateningly `exotic', sometimes admiration or jealousy from Black people who wish they had 
lighter skin, or who consider light skin a sexual prize. Here we have the paradox of the Skin- 
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Woman, whose light skin was considered a good thing because it was both light and dark. At yet 
other times, both Black and White alike will openly criticise the person of Mixed Race for looking 
`too White', or `too Black/rootsy', or for being a failed Black person, or `not Black enough'. You 
will be considered beautiful because you are `exotic', you will be considered ugly because your 
features don't make sense. Sometimes another, less easily identifiable kind of racism will take 
place. This is the racism of shame, where the colour of someone's skin is perfectly obvious, yet 
people will go out of their way not to mention it, to pretend that you are `normal', that you are 
like them. Lorna Sage remembers a Mixed Race child in her class at the remote English village 
school she attended in the late 1940s, 
`[... J a girl I watched narrowly because she was dangerously clever and would 
have done better at maths than me except that I slaved over my homework. 
She was called Jean Evans, her dad had been away in the army during the war, 
but afterwards went back to work for the railways [... ] Jean was an only child. 
So far so unsurprising. But jean was black. Well, dark yellow with a bloom of 
sooty down and hair that was frizzy where it wasn't painfully pulled flat. Her 
father must have been one of the GI's briefly stationed near Ellesmere. 
However, no one in Whitchurch, and certainly not at school, ever noticed or 
mentioned this interesting fact. Jean was her parents' child and attended the 
high school, and that was that. There were no black people living in 
Whitchurch then, of course, which in a way may have helped to make her 
difference invisible. ' (Sage 2000: 202) 
It does seem that the person of apparent Mixed Race is seen as a legitimate target for the kind of 
`deciding' of identity which is, at its most generous, patronising. Whilst she may well be a 
member of the African diaspora, may have the heritage of slavery deep within her and share 
formative experiences of racism with Black people in White societies, the diaspora subject is 
displaced yet again in the subject of Mixed Race, for she also has Whiteness in her, In terms of 
both culture and skin she will never be Black `enough'; however long she sits in the sun, however 
political she makes herself, however much ackee and saltfish and fried plantain she nyam, she is 
always %YUhite as well as Black. 
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Now, the unconditional fixing of Mixed Race people within the binary category 'Black' is 
sometimes down to the agency of the Mixed Race subjects themselves, and this should not be 
forgotten. Many Mixed Race people have made invaluable contributions through their strong and 
conscious Black-identification; many have found personal peace within it. However, it should 
also be remembered that the dominant White society's interest in keeping that binary in place has 
meant that White society has never allowed for the possibility of an identity that is both Black and 
White. Until very, very recently it was rare to hear anyone in Britain speaking of themselves as 
Mixed Race, or in any terms that upset the dualism, simply because White, Phallogocentric 
discourse has seen to it that the only descriptive names for such a person are insulting. Half- 
caste. Half-breed. Diltued Nigger. Mulatto. White Nigger. The choice was never an option, as 
the White Phallus carefully guarded his authority both to rule and to name. To situate the Mixed 
Race subject forcibly and automatically within Blackness means that subject will, like the castrated 
Lacanian subject, always run the risk of being seen as lacking, failed and incomplete. Since Mixed 
Race identity is a no less problematic or troubled way of being `Black' than it is of being `White'; it 
should be considered as both, and as something different and new. The Mixed Race subject must 
first, however, be situated in 'White'. It is neither possible nor desirable to simply bypass this 
nonsensical injustice, as to do so would be to comply with the Phallogocentric order. Christine 
Battersby (1999) among others, has pointed out that Barthes' Author should not be allowed to die 
in peace until the traditionally masculine, heroic figure of the Author has been reclaimed for 
women, should they wish to occupy such a role. Similarly the Mixed Race subject needs to be 
allowed to be perceived as 'White', as a liminal or brown White person instead of a failed or 
messed up or ugly or wrong one, in just as equal a way as she is only now allowed to be perceived 
as a Black person (though sometimes she will be considered a failed or a messed up or an ugly or 
a wrong or a brown one). The area of White Studies could play a crucial part in this by 
considering the particular issues that the Mixed Race subject poses for Whiteness, how she 
interrupts and makes the psychic structure of \Vhiteness change shape. The Critically 
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Indeterminate body of the Mixed Race subject is both dual and multiple - the White and the 
Black origins within the subject are never `pure', as there is no such thing as `racial' purity - and I 
suspect that the failure in White society to acknowledge this has entirely to do with the desire to 
keep the ruling White Phallus in place. I wonder whether the fact that White Studies has yet to 
consider the possibility of brown White people (or yellow, or any other non-White colour) could 
also have this reason somewhere in its unconscious? 
Elizabeth Grosz supports notions of bodily indeterminacy as, importantly, she never 
conceptualises the body as simply an abstract transcendental. These bodies are real, more 
importantly they are individual and specific. Their experiences make them, and they are made 
afresh as a result of their experiences. Throughout Grosz's text are echoes of Donna Haraway's 
1991 notion of `situated knowledges', where Haraway insists on the perspectivally specific, 
embodied nature of all vision, and the power that the science of optics exerts in terms of 
positioning subjects and deciding what they are allowed to see. Grosz's bodies, however are 
active and exert agency; these are bodies that can change things: 
The bodies in which I am interested are culturally, sexually, racially specific 
bodies [... ] If bodies are objects or things, they are like no others, for they are 
the centers of perspective, insight, reflection, desire, agency [... ] It is this ability 
of bodies to always extend the frameworks which attempt to contain them, to 
seep beyond their domains of control, which fascinates me [... ]' (Grosz 
1994: x-xi). 
The lived body, then, is something whose very nature is to confound both the `One' and the 
dualisms that the `One' supports and nourishes. How much more agency and potential to 
confound must the Mixed Race body then have, perpetually seeping beyond the boundaries that 
would attempt to control or define it. Place it in the category of `Black' and it will slide out, 
always lacking and incomplete, always liminally White, yet also superabundant and overspilling. 
Place it in the category of White' and the same thing will take place. The point is that the Mixed 
Race body is never situated in the category of '\Vhite', despite actually occupying and overspilling 
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this category, and such a situation is long overdue. I want to state that whilst Black and White 
societies alike may acknowledge that there are many possible ways to be Black, or to be White, 
experience tends to show that it is usual for the Mixed Race subject to be categorized as Black. 
This is no longer enough. The condition of liminal Whiteness, White-ish-ness, or (in)visible 
Whiteness that, like a deep stratum, cannot be perceived by the naked eye, needs to be examined 
in any study of Whiteness as one amongst all the forms that lived conditions of Whiteness, or 
Whitenesses, take. 
I Grosz gives a fascinating reading of anorexia, which she describes as, 'arguably the most stark and striking 
sexualisation of biological instincts: the anorexic may risk her very life in the attainment of a body image 
approximating her ideal'. She notes that 'ideal' should not be confused, as it is so regularly today, with the preferred 
physique du jour of the superwaif. Rather anorexia should be understood in the same way as the phenomenon of the 
phantom limb, as a protracted act of mourning for the pre-castrated or pre-Oedipal body, and connection with the 
body of the mother 'that women in patriarchy are required to abandon' (Grosz 1994: 40). 
2 Grosz cites Caillois' famous paper, Mimest and Legendary PUchetthaenia, where it is mentioned that the young female 
pigeon needs to see an adult female before the maturation of her gonads can take place. Lacan's ideas about the 
unitary image of the body being dictated by the readings and imaginings of others clearly goes to extremes in the 
animal kingdom. Crucially however, this shows that a man is not necessarily as central to the sexual to female sexual 
awakening as all the variations on the 'Sleeping Beauty' story would suggest. 
3 Re-reading this section subsequent to writing, I couldn't help but notice that I had described Lacan's writings as 
'impenetrable'. I concluded that this would make the writings themselves Phallic, as the Lacanian Phallus is pretty 
much the one thing that it's impossible to penetrate. That which performs the act of penetration is, presumably, safe 
from the experience of penetration. In his 1973 seminar Lacan complains - immediately after he has stated that 'la' 
must be written crossed through (barn) - that each of his students has produced 'gibberish regarding the phallus' 
(Lacan in Gallop 1985: 139). This insistence on Lacan's behalf that the Phallus can be read, understood and 
'correctly' written about does more than suggest, it states quite clearly there is a single, right and proper way of 
reading and writing the phallus. A little later on though, Gallop conjectures that, 'it is nonetheless interesting to 
imagine how the problematic nature of his project might link up with the tenuousness of sexual identity, in short, to 
wonder how the difficulty of Lacan's enterprise, its (near) impossibility, might itself be an effect of the castration 
complex. ' (Gallop 1985: 143). 
° Grosz goes on to explain that, since the Lacanian Real is the realm of completeness where no lack can indwell, and 
in the Real the vulva has the same ontological status as the male genitals, if woman is to be constituted as necessarily 
incomplete the Real must be displaced and recoded (Grosz 1990: 117). The detachable penis (imagined as once 
belonging to the mother) becomes an imaginary object, a sort of hyphen or 'copula', a signifier standing for the 
'bridge' between the two sexes, which should really mean that the Phallus itself is indeterminate and has no gender. 
As a signifier, it cannot be possessed. As far as the alleged and much disputed 'neutrality' of the Phallus-as-signifier 
goes, feminists are divided, sometimes bitterly. Ellie Ragland-Sullivan is well known as a supporter of Lacan and his 
Phallic signifier; she argues that the Phallus is 'meaningless in its own right' (Ragland-Sullivan 1982: 10), and that all 
Lacan is doing is making a description of an existingly patriarchal Symbolic order. This argument is similar to that 
espoused by Juliet Mitchell in her 1974 work, Pychoanasris and Feminism. A Radical Reassessment of Froxdian 
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Prychoanafysir. Jane Gallop gives a brief, if partial, overview of the Phallic argument in Reading Lacan, 1985. She writes 
that Ellie Ragland-Sullivan 'takes Irigaray to task for misreading the meaning of the phallus in Lacan' (Gallop 
1985: 134), emotive language redolent of that psychoanalytic sword of victory, the Symptom. One might be forgiven 
for thinking that any deviation from, or refusal to accept, classical psychoanalytic fare is, in fact, a 'symptom' or 
'refusal' to read or engage; 'misreading', or worse, 'failure'. Whilst Ragland-Sullivan is busily exposing the 'failure' or 
'misreading' of Lacan that Irigaray does, she also manages to mis-spell the name of Fredric Jameson (she adds a 'k' to 
his first name), whom she invokes in support of her argument. Gallop, ever the vigilant psychoanalyst, has her eyes 
trained to spot such parapraxes. She appears to be happy to show her own 'failures' or'misreadings'; she points out 
that she herself mis-spelled Ragland-Sullivan's first name as 'Elie'. (Elie, as mentioned in Memoirs of the Blind, is 
Jacques Derrida's middle name. I wonder if Gallop knew this? ) Either way, it is not difficult to imagine the Jacques 
Lacan as Phallic King of the Freudian Primal Horde feeling filled with a warm glowing sense of smug glee at the 
thought of all these women fighting over his Phallus. 
s The words 'semiotics' and'semiology', meaning simply'the science of signs', come from the Greek sema, meaning 
sign. Usually the terms are associated with the early to mid-Twentieth Century bodies of theory spearheaded by 
Barthes and Sausure (1857-1913) in Europe, ('semiology' refers, strictly speaking, to the Francophone tradition) and 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1834-1914) in the States (again, 'semiotics' should strictly only refer to the Anglophone 
American tradition, but the terms tend to be used interchangeably). Proto-semiotic theories can be found in the 
writings of Husserl and of the Stoics. According to Bal and Bryson (1991) semiotics has at its very core, 'the 
definition of the factors involved in this permanent process of signmaking and interpreting and the development of 
conceptual tools that help us to grasp that process as it goes on in various arenas of cultural activity' (Bal and Bryson 
1991: 107-208). The Twentieth Century western tradition of semiotics is part of the Structuralist movement, which 
emerged after 1950 in France as a response to intellectuals' growing disillusionment with Marxism and existentialism. 
Structuralism can be defined as an attempt to see, 'universal mental structures as these manifest themselves in kinship 
and larger social structures [... ] and in the unconscious psychological patterns that motivate human behaviour' 
(Kurzweil, 1980: 1). This search for universals meant the importance of the idea of an'author' in conferring meaning 
on text or image became destabilised - thus laying the groundwork for Derrida and Barthes to metaphorically 
'murder' the author. 
6 An example of this is Plato's Pharmacy (in La Dissemination, 1972). Derrida takes Plato's Phaedrus as a starting point, 
a text which has been considered as flawed, or disjointed. Derrida's argument is that instead of being flawed, Plato's 
text actually follows the graphic of di, /Jeranc-e, where meaning is eternally deferred. Following such a graphic shows 
Plato's suspicion of writing as a kind of mimesis. Note that Derrida substitutes the word 'graphic' where one would 
expect him to use 'logic', a word that would place Derrida in collusion with the western Logocentric discourse that he 
was critiquing. 'Graphic' as a word also privileges drawing over writing, both of which Derrida believes arise from a 
central blind-spot. Derrida reads Plato as, 'bent on presenting writing as an occult, and therefore suspect, power. 
Just like painting, to which he will later compare it, and like optical illusions and the techniques of mimesis in general. ' 
(Derrida [1972] in Kamuf 1991: 126) Plato could only partially control the level of textual play in his text, since 
writing should be defined (if it is to be defined at all) as fundamentally in motion, indeterminate, as a play of 
possibilities or continual movements in and out of and between the opposites that attempt to structure meaning. 
D jerance, another Derridean neologism, as a word directly relates to the problem of opposing pairs in western 
philosophy. Meaning an eternal deferral of signification, Derrida's new word is deceptive; whilst it sounds like the 
French word for 'difference', the petit-a which he switches for the 'e' ensures that the difference of df'rance is 
inaudible in spoken French. Di, ffirance as a word becomes invisible unless written, thus problematising the division 
between speech and writing. A true indeterminate, differance is neither noun nor verb, and also both. As such an 
indeterminate, and as something arising out of a critique of western philosophy, this would seem like an ideal way to 
approach the indeterminates that I propose monochrome and the Mixed Race subject are. 
7 Henry Louis Gates (1989) brackets the 'g' in Signifyin(g) Monkey for two reasons. Firstly he intends to distinguish 
the 'black' vernacular notion of 'Signifying' from the European academic and theoretical notion of the same name. 
Secondly he is placing the stamp of what he calls 'blackness' - which is in fact African or African-American-ness - by 
echoing the pronunciation of 'Signifyin', which would usually not include the hard 'g' at the end. lie writes that his 
choice of spelling and presentation of the word 'Signifyin(g)' is equivalent to Derrida's spelling of the word 'd jiraneir' s The notion of the Name of the Father is, according to Jonathan Scott Lee, Lacan's 'most structuralist move', since it 
synthesizes the structural anthropology of Claude Levi-Strauss with classical Freudian psychoanalysis (Scott Lee 
1990: 62). Lacan has situated the human being in relation to a system of language, identifying this language with the 
'background language' (1990: 62) of structural anthropology. Levi-Strauss' understanding of the human system of 
kinship was that the incest taboo was intended for regulating the exchange of Woman as Gift in society. The 
prohibition of incest is the'supreme rule of the Gift'. This is where the reconception of the Oedipus complex comes 
in; what Freud wrote as the struggle between the demands of instinct and the restricting demands of civilization, 
Lacan writes as an entry into the unconscious participation in the 'background language', making civilised and 
intelligible behaviour possible. The child learns the language and laws of familial relations by passing through the 
Oedipus complex, and is able to adopt a position within the culture of its family by taking on a name. So whilst Levi- 
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Strauss first showed society's indebtedness to the structures of kinship, Lacan united these with the Oedipus complex 
by situating the complex at around two-and-a-half years, the period when the capacity for language-learning is at its 
most receptive. According to Jonathan Scott Lee, 'For Lacan, successful negotiation of oedipal conflicts is quite 
literally a matter of learning to speak properly. ' (1990: 64). 
9 Within current discourses on Mixed Race, the relation between 'race', hybridity and Mixed Race has yet to be clearly 
explored. Sometimes `hybridity' is used in Bhabha's sense to refer to cultural practices of combining, intermingling 
and syncretism. At other times, `hybridity' is used to refer to the intermingling of separate 'races' and the people this 
produces. Understandably the latter definition, with all the references to animal breeding and experiments that it 
implies, is considered very offensive by many people of Mixed Race. 
10 Whilst Freud did not write specifically on the unconscious and 'race' and colour, his former disciple Jung did. As 
well as travelling to Central `Black' Africa to make studies, in 1912, Jung analysed fifteen African-American patients at 
St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, DC. Jung was reliant on his contact with these Black patients in order to 
prove that a 'racial' theory of the unconscious was not valid. Instead, Jung posited the unconscious as universal to 
humankind, culturally non-specific and un-raced. Interestingly, Jung identified a dream of one of these `pure-blooded 
Negroes' (Jung CW 18: 37), that of a man being crucified on a wheel, as representing a figure of Ixion. fie concluded 
that this was evidence not of a specific `Christian' unconscious, but of a universal, `Greek' one: 'In the dream of the 
Negro, the man on the wheel is a repetition of the Greek mythological motif of Ixion, who, on account of his offence 
against men and gods, was fastened by Zeus upon an incessantly turning wheel. I give you this example of a 
mythological motif in a dream merely in order to convey to you the idea of the collective unconscious. One single 
example is of course no conclusive proof. But one cannot very well assume that this Negro had studied Greek 
mythology, and it is improbable that he had seen any representation of Greek mythological figures. Furthermore, 
figures of Ixion are pretty rare. ' (Jung CW 18: 40) Two things are worth mentioning here: first of all, the `Negro' may 
well have either seen a picture or heard talk of Ixion on the wheel. Either way, Jung could have just asked him. 
Secondly, a 'Greek' unconscious is, of course, just as specific a notion as a Christian unconscious. 
11 The main reason why Spinoza seems most appropriate is that his work offers the possibility of posing the same 
questions, only in very different theoretical terms, enabling anything outside of the Cartesian dyad to be allowed 
examination. Spinoza assumes the existence of an infinite and indivisible substance (superficially like the Sublime) of 
which there is only one. Although this seems (superficially again, but then we should not scorn the superficial) like 
the Logos, such things as are finite are 'modifications or affections of the one substance' (1994: 10), the substance 
being so powerful and all-enveloping that an infinite number of things can express its nature. 
12 In Haiti a sort of reverse version of the `One Drop Rule' applied, where a person could lay claim to a 'White' 
identity if they had a single White ancestor, no matter how far back. The cultural feeling-tone of this inversion of the 
One-Drop Rule is that of a faith in the cleansing power of White blood. 
13 From Hogg's `Jacobite Reliques', Arr. Hart/Johnson/Kemp/Knight/Prior. The tune used here can be traced to 
1752, the words are by Robbie Burns, based on traditional Jacobite rebel themes. The rule of the Stuart dynasty, who 
ascended to the English throne in 1603, came to and end in 1714. James II had been forced to flee to France in 
1688, and his daughters Mary II (1688-1694) and Anne (1702-1714) succeeded him. The Jacobite rebels made two 
attempts to reinstate their 'Kings across the water'. The first, in 1715, was never a real threat to George I who was 
then occupying the English throne. The second culminated in a horrific defeat on Culloden Moor in 1746. Rebel 
clans always believed that they had been betrayed by their own countrymen; first in Parliament, then on the 
battlefield. In 1962 Ewan MacCoi wrote that this song represented the 'anti-Union feeling of Scotland during the 
18th Century. The charge of corruption which is made here against the majority of the Scottish Parliament who 
'treasonably sold us for English gold', is repeated again and again in the Jacobite songs. ' AfacColl (1962) The Jacobite 
Rebellions' (sleeve notes). 
14 This kind of thinking explains some of the more ludicrous decisions made by adoption authorities, where nixed 
race babies and children are only placed with Black families so that they can have access to 'their' culture. In many 
cases, the exact geographical origins of the children's Black parent are unknown -African tradition' is a nonsense, as 
there are so many diverse countries, regions and traditions within the continent, and the same goes for notions of 
'Caribbean tradition' - moreover, where is the mixed race child in the Black family going to get her 'White culture', 
whatever that is, from? 
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4: 0 Introduction 
`The great obsession of the nineteenth century was, as we know, history; with 
its themes of development and of suspension, of crisis and cycle, themes of the 
ever-accumulating past, with its great preponderance of dead men and the 
menacing glaciation of the world [... ] The present epoch will perhaps be above 
all the epoch of space. We are in the epoch of simultaneity: we are in the 
epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of 
the dispersed. We are at a moment, I believe, when our experience of the 
world is less that of a long life developing through time than that of a network 
that connects points and intersects with its own skein. ' (Foucault in Alirzoeff 
1998: 237)' 
Foucault attributes some quite specific and radical, potentially transgressive qualities to the notion 
of space. He sets it against the western notion of time as linear and teleological, creating a tacit 
understanding of `space' as something not necessarily subject to the same organising principles as 
time. In a way that is analogous to the way I propose we look at monochromes, Foucault's spaces 
seem capable of appearing at whim, they seem mobile and unconstrained; `space' becomes an 
alternative and less rigid lens through which we can examine the world. But is there really any 
truth in this apparent claim for space as firstly a more fluid category than time, and secondly as a 
defining notion for the epoch of the Twentieth Century? At the time of writing this thesis, 
(2002), the notion of space seems more contested than ever before, with `new' spaces such as 
digital space (see Cubitt 1998) or non-western conceptions of space rubbing their edges against 
each other, often uncomfortably. Space might be more various than ever before, or more 
available, but it is also more potentially confusing. In terms of defining an epoch, then, Foucault 
may well be right. 
This chapter suggests that the psychic space of monochrome is primarily an abject and deathlike 
one, and that the more humorous, light-hearted aspects of monochrome function as the flipside 
or the tarn of narcissistically morbid affect. Some different kinds of space will be examined, as 
will the possible consequences of an understanding of monochrome as a space of mourning. The 
kind of sorrowful affect that accompanies monochrome would, it seems, have something to do 
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with the fear -a fear that seems to run like a deep vein through western culture - of ultimate 
meaninglessness, which is also a fear of death. 
We really need to ask, along with Jeremy Gilbert-Rolfe, Were do Pictures Come Fmm? (Gilbert- 
Rolfe 1995: 193-202). Firstly, however, it would be useful to examine Gilbert-Rolfe's 
conceptualization of Blankness as a Signifier (1997: 159-175), and to the response of Penny Florence 
(1998), who develops the gender implications inherent in a discussion of the history of blankness. 
In a move that refuses to collude with Phallic attempts to evade the blankness of monochrome, 
Gilbert-Rolfe writes from the position that blankness is something that can always be read. The 
appearance or condition of blankness is never simply `nothing' or `absence', but instead, 
`Blankness is a space of projection, where anything can happen or even be 
made to happen. In the contemporary context blankness is eloquent rather 
than the absence of a message, the condition of a subject whose fashionably 
blank expression, formerly known as a lack of expression, is neither 
communicative nor incommunicative but rather brings the two as close 
together as they can get. ' (Gilbert-Rolfe 1997: 166) 
The point is that the condition of blankness is historically dependent, and readings of blankness 
therefore changeable. Penny Florence writes, `Blankness, then, according to Gilbert-Rolfe, looks 
different now from the way it looked a hundred years ago' (Florence 1998: 1). In terms of having 
what could be called a `history', blankness, `first appeared as the ground for a signification that it 
facilitated but that antedated it [... ] Blankness, then, was a response to the pictographic rather than 
a precondition for it. ' (Gilbert-Rolfe 1997: 159, my italics) He gives the example of the 
Palaeolithic cave-painters, who `did without, or felt no need for an uninterrupted field, but one 
later became necessary - the ground acquired the properties of a clear sky - in order that the 
image could operate unimpeded by any other presence'(159), making reference to Meyer 
Schapiro's observation that the uninterrupted white ground associated with much pictorialism was 
`quite a late development' (159)2. The kind of blankness under discussion here is paradoxical. 
The signification that it is a response to predates it, yet also blankness as a concept must predate 
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signification. Herein lies the first indeterminacy of the blank monochrome space, an 
indeterminacy that can take the form of a question. Which came first, the blankness or the blank 
space that gave rise to the blankness? This is impossible to answer other than to say that 
blankness exists in a condition of perpetual doubleness, and is therefore resistant to 
categorisation. Blankness is at once both generative and responsive, only it has been read and 
understood in different ways throughout its history; ways that have striven to solve, or `decide' 
the problematic indeterminacy of blankness by situating it firmly on one side or the other of the 
`generative/responsive' divide. So, long before it has even begun to be a blank proper, blankness 
is already involved in signifying the space of signification. 
`[... ] blankness signifies from the start the place of signification [... ] similarly, 
the blank rectangle is already figural before it is filled with figures or otherwise 
composed - during which process blankness disappears altogether [... ] As the 
surface on which rows of pictograms are arranged, it is first encountered as 
analogous to silence (the background to stories)' (Gilbert-Rolfe 1997: 160) 
The `silence' that Gilbert-Rolfe writes of, the kind that only exists as a support to the `real' work 
of the story, is the same kind of silence that Lucy Lippard conferred on monochrome in her 1967 
essay The SilentArt. Interestingly, Lippard uses the word monotone to describe monochrome 
paintings, invoking connections with notions of invisibility as comparable to the inaudibility of 
the silent musical compositions of John Cage or Yves Klein. 
Silence, like its visual counterpart, invisibility, appears as a transgressive act when foregrounded as 
the main event, rather than as background to an image or punctuation within a symphony. This is 
because in both cases each signifies a space of sign jcation; the viewer or listener has been 
conditioned for centuries that silence means a story is on its way. Blankness and silence mock 
these expectations of signification; a picture is missing. Alongside this, however, Lippard also 
introduces an interesting variant on the notion of painting's death or end. She observes a 
tendency towards an emptying out of form from the canvas, an inversion of the notion that a 
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picture (or story) is on its way. In this version, a picture once inhabited the screen but is now 
long gone. Lippard identifies this tendency as suicidal rather than merely deathlike. The notion of 
suicide implies choice and agency, which is a very different way of conceptualising painting than 
to assume that certain ideas run their course and become exhausted, having a time-limit 
programmed in so that they can make way for the next artistic development'. 
`The art for art's sake, or formalist strain, of non-objective painting has an 
apparently suicidal tendency to narrow itself down, to zero in on specific 
problems to the exclusion of all others. Each time this happens, and it has 
happened periodically since 1912, it looks as though the much heralded End of 
Art has finally arrived. ' (Lippard 1967: 58, my italics) 
Like the letter in Poe and Lacan, the `End of Art', seems to have arrived, it always looks as though it 
has arrived, but art goes on. This begs the question, what is it, if anything, that has actually 
arrived? Is it even appropriate to consider this in terms of an arrival? Has something arrived, or is 
this part of the trickery of monochrome? Here, what Lippard describes as `non-objective 
painting', in its various investigations and guises, all share the surface blankness that is so easily 
interpreted as `empty'. The quality of blank emptiness equates with a deathlike affect, so that, 
` "Empty" art is more wounding to the mass ego than "sloppy" art because the 
latter, no matter how drastic, is part of the esthetic that attempts to reconcile 
art and life, and thus can always be understood in terms of life. There is 
nothing lifelike about monotonal paintings. ' (Lippard 1967: 58) 
Lippard's implied notion of monochrome-as-absence is, again, historically and culturally specific. 
It aligns itself with Minimalism's detractors in the 1960s and 1970s like Greenberg and Fried, and 
it is an understanding of blankness as something incomplete, something containing a lack. 
Lippard's understanding is that since there is nothing there to read, the surface cannot be read. 
Gilbert-Rolfe and Florence's understandings of blankness as something that is not only 
historically and culturally dependent but also legible, might encourage us to interpret Lippard's 
essay as exemplifying what blankness looked like in the mid-nineteen-sixties. In her 
understanding, monochrome wears the robes that mark it out as emptiness, as death, as finality, 
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lack, or absence. Barnett Newman's contemporaneous Fourteenth Station [ Figure 17] from his 
Stations of the Cross series of 1966 is an all-over white-on-white acrylic painting, `pure' in the sense 
often applied to monochrome's optical surface, meaning it is unmodulated and uniformly painted. 
Fourteenth Station's position as the final Station in the series has meant that it has unavoidably been 
interpreted as the Ascension of Christ, its unsullied whiteness signifying the purity of holiness; its 
position at the end of the series signifying finality; its blankness signifying the absence of Christ 
on earth. The context of this painting, and Newman's fondness for titles that invited any kind of 
symbolic interpretation makes it easy to see how this surface can be associated with absence and 
finality. Out of the three dominant strains or styles of monotone painting that Lippard identifies, 
`the evocative, romantic or mystical; the formally rejective and wholly non-associative; and the 
gesture of defiance, absolution or comment' (1967: 58), Newman's Fourteenth Station is of the lyrical 
and `romantic' strain. Here again is another class of blankness, that which is far from empty but 
has echoes of the Sublime and the Beautiful. 
`Blankness may be associated with the flawless, the completely adequate and 
complete, as well as with the unformed. Either association posits a close 
relationship with inscrutability, a condition often associated with both the 
beautiful and the sublime [... ]' (Gilbert-Rolfe 1997: 162-163) 
This manner of blank space gives the impression of a silence that has a gestatoryquality and that 
is very different from the resistant refusal to signify of Rauschenberg or Cage. In the latter case 
the transgressiveness of the surface is a conscious authorial choice; in the former, the authorial 
choice was in favour of a blank, silent space that was spiritually eloquent. We can surmise from 
what we know of Newman's artistic intentions that a reading of his white monochrome as 
transgressive was incidental to his aims for the piece. Some alternative historically specific 
monochrome spaces are those made by Ellsworth Kelly. Kelly is a classic example of someone 
who used monochrome as a way of avoiding the trace of his own hand in the work. Kelly was 
fascinated by detail, his shaped canvases often represented a minute detail from a scene, 
magnified so much as to render it unrecognizable. Paradoxically, the eschewing of authorial 
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marks became most recognisable as Kelly's authorial mark, and the particular kind of invisibility 
that he sought in his monochromes turned out to be elusive°. 
This chapter considers the hints of death as ultimate illegible and ultimate blank that inhere in 
monochrome, especially where monochrome is understood as the ultimate in nonrepresentation. 
Questions will also be asked about the ways in which a morbid or reductive affect is always 
present in the monochrome surface or environment. I want to consider monochromes here as 
spaces that inhabit and project death-drive activity, particularly narcissistic mourning as discussed 
in Kristeva's The Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia (1989), and to posit this death-drive activity 
and the indeterminacy that is structured into it as a possible way in which monochrome continues 
to avoid the Logos. I want to ask how it is possible that the sorrow and mournfulness of 
monochrome might cohabit with the absurdist humour that monochrome also connotes. Finally, 
I also want to ask whether the abject feeling-tone of monochrome could be understood to be, in 
some way, gendered as well as raced. 
4: 1 Silence: Castrated and Castrating 
`There is nothing lifelike about monotonal paintings. They cannot be 
dismissed as anecdote or joke; their detachment and presence raise questions 
about what there is to be seen in an `empty' surface. ' (Lippard 1967: 58) 
Lippard's comments attempt to close down the endless significatory possibilities of the blank 
surface. Such readings of blankness confirm rather than challenge the suspicion that when one 
can see nothing, one can say nothing. Despite all the words of art theory and criticism that have 
been lavished on monochrome, its secretive blank surfaces do all too often leave the spectator in 
confounded silence. We expect the blank space of a picture plane to be there to present the action, 
the narrative, all of the great recognisables. Visibility is in the nuance, or in differentiation; so 
that between monochromes, differences in levels of visibility or legibility can be said to exist. 
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Figure 29: Ralph Humphrey, Camden 1965. Oil on canvas. 168 x 168cm (not to scale). Collection of the artist. 
Figure 30: Robert Ryman, Untitled 1965. Enamel on linen. 29 x 29cm (not to scale). Collection of the artist. 
Changes in rhythms of brushwork over a surface can at least be remarked upon or analysed, 
whereas a smooth, uniformly coloured surface presents untold problems. Compare, for example, 
Ralph Humphrey's tactile and modulated Camden, 1965 [Figure 291, with Robert Ryman's 
smoothly white Untitled of 1965 [Figure 30]. 
When a surface presented as a `picture' is devoid of nuance or differentiation, not only does it 
appear `silent' in communicative terms, but it can also silence the spectator. This is where WET 
Mitchell's (1996: 74,76) suggestion that images are less powerful than we might imagine can be 
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complicated slightly - if the power of the image is limited, perhaps the picture that contains no 
image - the monochrome, for example - could be said to have a different, or paradoxical power? 
In his earlier Iconology, Mitchell posits two alternative positions for a picture. It can either be, `the 
mute, castrated aesthetic object, or the phallic, loquacious idol' (Mitchell 1987: 10). If we 
approach monochrome in I ippard's terms as `monotonal' and silent - and when we consider that 
since she was writing about monochromes that appeared directly after the machismo noise and 
gestural frenzy of Abstract Expressionist painting, their silence would have seemed 
unquestionable, deafening - we must also acknowledge that despite Mitchell's understanding of 
these silent paintings as `castrated', they also have the power to silence. In the case of 
monochrome, it is worth considering that the power of silence might be equivalent to (or at least 
concomitant with) the power to silence, the latter being, like naming, both a function of the 
Lacanian Phallus and a political act. Here monochrome displays an apparently contradictory 
containment and mutation of yet another Phallic attribute, which would seem to ascribe to 
monochrome the transgressive, paradoxical power of the subaltern: denied speech and 
condemned to a condition of silence, but able to silence, to resist being read. 
To go back to WJT Mitchell's fascinating turning of the power-tables in IV/hat do Pict rr s Really 
Wants (1996), he asks questions about the loaded notion of desire by locating desire itself within 
the viewed, rather than the viewing subject - in this case, the picture. Ile writes, 
`[... ] the picture is treated as an expression of the artist's desire, or as a 
mechanism for eliciting the desires of the beholder [... ] I'd like to shift the 
location of desire to the images themselves and ask what pictures want. ' 
(Mitchell 1996: 71) 
The radical repositioning of desire that Mitchell proposes, along with his title, already go some 
way to suggest the potentially subaltern nature of images. The titular question echoes both Frantz 
Fanon's `What does the black man want? ' (1967: 8), which was in turn inspired by Freud's (and 
Chaucer's Wife of Bath's) questing as to `What does woman want? ' (Freud in Gay [ed] 1989: 670). 
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Like the Black man, the woman, and the Mixed Race subject within racialised society, the 
Lacanian subject is always castrated, always disempowered, always looking for the Phallus; and 
therefore always full of desire. Mitchell rhetorically situates the picture in an analogous position, 
making interesting socio-cultural observations about the anthropomorphisation of pictures. He 
points out that the western premodern tendency towards animism has, like blankness as pointed 
out by Gilbert-Rolfe (1997) and Florence (1998), its own history. Nineteenth-century European 
novels (cg those of Poe, Balzac, James) abounded with images of magic pictures or animated 
objects, as they did in Gothic novels before, and Mitchell muses that, `It's as if the encounter with 
and destruction of traditional or premodern `fetishistic' societies produced a post-Enlightenment 
resurgence of subjectivised objects in Victorian domestic spaces' (1997: 73)6. This suggests a 
fundamental desire to worship things (or at least to imbue them with some kind of life and 
personality) at work in the human psyche. In terms of the history within art history of 
anthropomorphising pictures, Mitchell is more specific: 
`[... ] the progressive and teleological narratives of Western art are not (as is so 
often suggested) focused primarily on the conquest of appearance and visual 
realism, but on the question of how, in. Vasari's terms, `liveliness' and 
`animation' are to be infused into the object. Winckelmann (describes) the 
Apollo Belvedere as an object so full of divine animation that it turns the 
spectator into a sort of Pygmalion figure, a statue brought to life [... ]' 
(Mitchell 1996: 73) 
In terms of this idolatrous power-relation, then, it seems that in order to be a success the picture 
is required to mimic the viewer in some fundamental way, to exhibit or project `human' or `lively' 
qualities. This `success' relies on the picture's being seen and understood, made visible, worked 
out - which suggests that the power in this relation rests in the hands of the viewer. Pictures 
such as monochrome, that refuse to mimic human traits in any way, disrupt this established 
relation of power. An undifferentiated monochrome surface is able to silence, confound and 
exclude the Phallic viewer whose desire is to interpret, unmask, or decode. The Phallic viewer is 
assured success in such a position when it comes to illusionistic painting, or even some abstract 
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painting where there is something to recognise. Monochrome, as the ultimate unreadable, does 
not allow such ease of decoding. Its power is partly comic and partly castratory; it pulls the rug 
out from under the Phallic viewer. 
What is interesting here is that Mitchell does not oppose the condition of power to 
disempowerment, but to desire, which he describes as the perpetual condition of the subaltern. In 
asking what pictures want, Mitchell not only anthropomorphises pictures, but also positions them 
as subaltern. This paves the way for one of the many paradoxes that I propose constitute the 
condition of monochrome as idea: monochromes are subaltern, but they also exert - even if as 
part of their desire -a kind of tricky `mastery' over the Phallic viewer. 
But above all they would want a kind of mastery over the beholder. Michael 
Fried summarises painting's `primordial convention' in precisely these terms: 
`[... ] a painting had to call to someone, bring him to a halt in front of itself and 
hold him there as if spellbound and unable to move. ' The painting's desire, in 
short, is to change places with the beholder, to transfix or paralyse the 
beholder, turning him into an image for the gaze of the picture in what might 
be called `The Medusa Effect'. This effect is perhaps the dearest 
demonstration we have that the power of pictures and of women are modeled 
on one another and that this is a model of both pictures and women that is 
abject, mutilated, castrated. The power they want is manifested as lack, not as 
possession. ' (Mitchell 1996: 76)' 
I think that the notion of a `mastery' over the viewer would be most markedly the case with a 
surface of extreme monochromy, the kind that introduces silence and bewilderment into the 
relation between the viewer and itself. Mitchell's point is valuable as it pertains to the abject 
qualities inherent in monochrome. Mitchell's suggestion is that the abjection has to do with 
castration, with lack, with the desire that is the perpetual condition of such a lack. In the case of 
the extreme monochrome surface, however, things are not so simple. Monochrome's ability to 
silence is another power, so what we are presented with is a castrating gaze (that of the Phallic 
spectator) that, whilst it gazes, is itself castrated. Weirdly, then, the lack of the castrated subaltern 
exerts itself as a kind of paradoxical power, 
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`The picture as subaltern makes an appeal or issues a command whose precise 
effect and power emerge in an intersubjective encounter compounded of signs 
of positive desire and traces of lack or impotence. ' (Mitchell 1996: 79) 
This notion of the paradoxically empowered subaltern is part of the paradoxical condition of 
monochrome. This paradoxical power depends on the paradox discussed above: that the 
possibility of reading requires the picture to mimic the viewer in some way. The paradox here is 
that monochrome does mimic the Phallic viewer, but it does this psychically, partially, invisibly and 
ironically. Herein lies the power of its perpetuity: monochrome's ironic containment of certain 
Phallic attributes (the power to silence, hiding by showing), ensures the continued seduction of 
the Phallic viewer who, though unable to read the surface `successfully', nevertheless recognises 
enough of himself to want to continue to try. The perpetual desire to decode is part of the 
creative power of monochrome, as is the impossibility of its satisfaction. It is interesting that 
Mitchell uses the figure of the Medusa, the terrifying Phallic woman with castratory powers, to 
describe the power of the picture. He writes with some certainty that all pictures are `marked', 
whilst the `default position' of pictures is feminine; 
`If pictures are persons, then, they are colored or marked persons, and the 
scandal of the purely white or purely black canvas, the blank, unmarked 
surface, presents quite a different face. As for the gender of pictures, it's clear 
that the `default' position of images is feminine, `constructing spectatorship', in 
Norman Bryson's words, `around an opposition between woman as image and 
man as the bearer of the look. ' (1996: 75) 
If pictures are coloured or marked, then, they can be marked out as `different' in the same way as 
the Black or Mixed Race person in \Vhite society or the woman in patriarchal society 
automatically is; or they can be marked as Cain was marked, that all might know of his 
transgression from the Law. Of course, for the subject in Black skin the difference between styles 
of branding is hardly worth mentioning; that subject's difference from `Whiteness is already 
constructed as a transgression. As for the visibly `racially' indeterminate subject, the 
`transgressions' are further complicated and multiplied. Anti-miscegenation legislation has meant 
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that someone's existence as an identifiable person of Mixed Race can reduce that person to a 
mere signifier of `crime'. The wages of sin is yellow skin'. 
Taking this analogy back to the picture surface and developing Mitchell's argument, it could be 
said that within the realm of images - already transgressive and subaltern - the image that 
contains no image is, like the subject of Mixed Race, at least doubly transgressive within an 
existing category of transgression. Continuing on with the analogy of racist thinking, Mitchell 
points out that the vision-centred nature of racism is fundamentally split at its heart. `The ocular 
violence of racism splits its object in two, rending and rendering it simultaneously hypervisible 
and invisible, an object of, in Fanon's words, `abomination' and `adoration. ' (1996: 75) In the case 
of the victim of racism, the complex relation between master and slave, violent racist and victim, 
is such that the perpetrator paradoxically needs the victim in order to confirm his own power and 
beliefs'. The desires of the idol and the subaltern under racism are not readily acknowledged, 
because of the apparently `clear' nature of the power relation. 
The power of the monochrome as image-without-an-image is dike the power of the oppressed; it 
exists but in unusual and potentially disruptive forms. The essential paradox pertaining to 
monochrome here is that of the castrated object that also has the power to castrate the person 
who wishes to examine or explain it. The silence of monochrome is paradoxical too, but even 
more so when Mitchell's notions are brought to it. It ceases to be the pure silence whose visual 
equivalent is invisibility. Instead it becomes the enforced silence of someone or something who 
is perfectly capable of speaking, but whose speech is not acknowledged by the `system' that 
surrounds it, reading it as silence. If monochromes appear time and again as silent or invisible 
passages in the narrative of the development of western visual culture, it is not necessarily because 
they are meaningless. Perhaps they are read as silent because they reject the rules of the system 
and are therefore illegible to it. And, as discussed in the previous chapter, anything that is 
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threatening to the system's order is marked like Cain as transgressive, and is outlawed. All this 
anthropomorphisation of the surface reconnects with the question of skin as analogy, something 
that can connect the picture surface, the Mixed Race subject's body, and the woman's body1Q. 
4: 2 Other Kinds of Silence 
`Our science has always desired to monitor, measure, abstract, and castrate 
meaning, forgetting that life is full of noise and that death alone is silent: work 
noise, noise of man, and noise of beast. Noise bought, sold, or prohibited. 
Nothing essential happens in the absence of noise. ' (Attali 1985: 3) 
The kind of silence that Attali is referring to is rather like Lippard's visual `silence'. It is a 
particular kind of blank space, and a bereft one; it is the gap that is left when something one is 
used to or expects, disappears. This is only one kind of silence. Just as there are different kinds 
of blank space, and blank spaces can mean different things, so it is with silence. The silence of 
the musical compositions of John Cage, `the champion of indeterminacy' Qones 1993: 629), most 
notably his famous 1952 work, 4'33is a silence that is ambiguous. First of all it makes clear 
reference to (and use of) the presence of actual musicians, instruments, musical notation, audience 
- the piece mimics the socially-agreed structure of the classical recital. However, it refuses to give 
up the understandable, audible and above all, expected treasure of performed music. Everything 
is silent. This is analogous to the effects of the monochrome painting situated on the gallery wall; 
all its references are to a long historical tradition of representational (or legible abstract) painting, 
but more importantly the presence in the gallery makes references to the equally long historical 
tradition of societal sanctioning of the image in its proper place. In the case of 4'33'; everything 
was at first glance in its proper place. This explicit reference to `order' works to foreground the 
refusal of the piece to conform to expected notions of order within systems. The little incidental 
noises of the audience - the shuffling of feet, the clearing of throats - become, as a result, the 
uncomfortable focus of the composition. During a regular recital, these sounds would be 
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rendered silent or invisible simply because they are not coded within the `system' of musical 
performance. 
Caroline A. Jones, in Finishing School: John Cage and the Abstract Expressionist Ego, suggests that 
Cage's silences might be read, `at the deeper level of a resistant gay/lesbian aesthetic' (Jones 
1993: 630). This is important in terms of the notion of an overarching system which rejects 
anything that does not fit by silencing it or rendering it invisible. Cage's refusal to provide the 
`expected' music means firstly that the silence contains the ghosts of the music that might have 
been; thus there is bereavement in the silence. More importantly however, the silence is this time 
one of rebellion and empowered refusal to comply. There was no real place for a gay man in 
`[... ] what would come to appear hegemonic in American modernism of the 
1950s: the cultural construction of the artist as a masculine solitary, his artwork 
as a pure statement of individual genius and autonomous will [... ] whose 
staunchly heterosexual libido drove his brush. ' (Jones 1993: 630,639) 
Cage's silence in 433 "performs a classic comedic feature: a situation is set up that assumes 
specific expectations from the audience. At the final moment, the audience's expectation is not 
fulfilled - either the expected thing does not appear, or otherwise something completely 
incongruous is provided in its place. When read in terms of Cage's `resistant gay [... ] aesthetic', 
the silence acts as a trick, a joke at the expense of the Phallogocentric society whose Laws work to 
exclude Cage. Again, the Phallic viewer becomes the subject of the joke. 
The blank space in the example of Cage's 433 "exists between two signals - the complex signal 
of the start of the recital, and the related signal of its end - and thus, like any other signifier, this 
blank space finds its meaning in a relationship to the spaces around it. Cage's earlier Lecture on 
Nothing (1949), where he famously remarked, `I have nothing to say/ and I am saying it'" sees 
Cage actively creating silences and inserting them conspicuously into sentences where they appear 
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not to belong, `silence was actively, even maddeningly, inserted between words and phrases [... ) a 
light snowfall of phonemes falling in empty space. ' (Jones 1993: 644) 
Tacita Dean's Berlin Project also uses the silences between signals, but this time they are found 
silences. In 2002, Dean made a fifty-minute audio-collage of the silences of public spaces in 
Berlin (eg hospital lifts, alleys, or public toilets). When collected together, these silences form 
their own subtly nuanced and apparently meaningful language', a sort of blank vernacular. 
British sound artist Matt Rogalsky also collects silence. Using software commonly used by 
American commercial radio stations to edit out the spaces between spoken words, Rogalsky's 
method is to edit out the words that interrupt the silences12. Rogalsky describes his results not as 
true silence, but, `the ghostly tail-ends and beginnings of words [... ] some people hear an urgency 
suggesting something dark and sinister [... ] several people have found this material erotic'13. The 
main difference between the work of Cage on the one hand and Rogalsky and Dean on the other, 
is that Cage has created a blank space by emptying something out of an existing space, and 
presented it. Dean and Rogalsky have, instead, isolated pre-existing blank spaces for presentation. 
The latter kind of space already exists in spoken communication and daily life, with its 
significance resting on its invisibility. Messages need blank spaces in order to secure their 
meaningfulness, just as blank spaces need messages to secure their blankness. Where these little 
invisibilities are isolated from that system and strung together, they acquire the invisibility of the 
transgressor of systems, whose silence is far from that of death or absence. It is instead a silence 
of agency, of a refusal to signify or be classified. As Foucault writes in Volume One of the History 
of Sexuality, silence is (like the monochrome), a multiple thing, necessary for communication; 
`Silence itself - the things one declines to say, or is forbidden to name, the 
discretion that is required between different speakers - is less the absolute limit 
of discourse [... ] than an element that functions alongside the things said, with 
them and in relation to them within over-all strategies' (Foucault 1978: 27) 
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The silence in the musical compositions of John Cage is easy to compare with the silence of the 
monochrome canvases of Robert Rauschenberg, largely because of their association together at 
the legendary Black Mountain College, North Carolina. Their influences on one another are 
acknowledged, and Cage wrote a piece called On Robert Rauschenber& Artist, and his Work, published 
in his 1969 anthology of writing, Silence. Cage issues the instruction, 
`If you hear that Rauschenberg has painted a new painting, the wisest thing to 
do is to drop everything and manage one way or another to see it. That's how 
to learn the way to use your eyes [... ]' (Cage in Harrison and Wood (eds) 
1992: 720) 
Cage's essay makes no mention of the tendency towards monochrome that, by 1949, 
Rauschenberg was already showing in his palette. Many interpreted the White Paintings as `empty 
stages open to chance events and all comers' (Lippard 1967: 61), though Rauschenberg reportedly 
said he only wanted to make a painting'". These all-white paintings were closely followed by all- 
black ones of 1951-1952, where he used newsprint as a `ground'. In the summer of 1952, 
Rauschenberg showed a series of apparently identical white canvases [Figure 31]. Cage saw 
these, and as a result was encouraged to proceed with his idea for 493"'. Rauschenberg 
understood these blank white rectangles as sentient organic skins". He was fascinated by the 
endless possibilities for meaning-play that the mutable light on his white surfaces might provide. 
What is interesting here is that the image of a sensitive skin implies the hidden existence of a 
complex set of organs which, working together, enable sensate function. Unless of course 
Rauschenberg meant his skins to be ghost-membranes, disembodied, in which case the idea of his 
blankness changes from one of erasure to one of bereavement. Some of the White Paintings are 
made in panels; giving a sense of the surface as a whole made of many parts. It could be 
interesting to read this as a visual echo of a hidden aesthetic, that of the psychic trickery of the 
single-colour surface as it meticulously covers over its own multiplicity'. 
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Figure 31: Robert Rauschenberg, Untitled [small White Lead Painting) 1953. Oil on canvas. 25 x 20cm. Sonnabend 
Collection, New York. 
Rauschenberg accorded status to his paintings by insisting that they were reactive, or interactive; 
they functioned in part as oblique mirrors. Jones does not explicitly make the point that the 
silences in Rauschenberg's blank paintings might function as part of a resistant gay aesthetic 
comparable to the silences in Cage. However, she does point out that, 
`As against Ginsberg's contemporaneous I Jowl (1956), with its exuberant 
homoeroticism and its savage outcry at the repression of Otherness in 
America, Rauschenberg and Johns allude only tangentially to their lives as gay 
artists in New York. ' (Jones 1993: 652). 
It would seem to me that a study of the silences in Rauschenberg, when compared with those in 
Cage, could yield some interesting observations about the use of blankness as the Other's refusal 
to signify in the terms of the master discourse. Jones, however, here analyses only the works of 
Rauschenberg that include identifiable subject matter (such as the 1955 combine-painting, Bed). 
She writes that, `[... ] homosexuality is not some essentialist discourse based on bodily sex acts; it 
is discursively produced by `gay' and `straight' alike as a negativity within a dominant heterosexist 
culture. ' (Jones 1993: 652-653). Whilst I am wary of the simplistic exercise of making 
comparisons between one Other and another, I would add that there is a parallel that can be 
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drawn between a gay aesthetic, a Black aesthetic and a feminist aesthetic when considered in the 
context of the Abstract Expressionist `ego'. The ideal `American' that Abstract Expressionism 
created and maintained was not only that of the lone genius, but also, more importantly because it 
was not explicitly spoken, an American who was invariably male, invariably heterosexual and 
invariably White. Photographic documentation of the Abstract Expressionists occasionally shows 
the face of Norman Lewis, an African-American painter who is seldom mentioned in the official 
histories of the movement, and who met with continual resistance from galleries who refused to 
show his work. 
Figure 32: Robert Rauschenberg, Erased de Kooning Drawing 1953. Traces of ink and crayon on paper with mat and 
hand-lettered ink label in gold leaf frame. 63 x 53.5cm. Collection of the artist, New York. 
The particular blankness of Rauschenberg's famous Erased de Kooning Drawing of 1953 [Figure 321 
seems to invite a reading of rebellion or deliberate transgression into the surface. Apparently, 
Rauschenberg requested a drawing from de Kooning that he could rub out, asking specifically 
that de Kooning `make it a good one"". The piece of work that resulted is, as one would imagine, 
a piece of paper that is almost blank, but whose title eloquently clarifies not only that there was 
once something there, but that it was a thing of value. The obvious psychoanalytic reading would 
be that of wilful disobedience to the Law of the Father in the guise of the senior artist. The 
father's function is, after all, to establish the signifier, which this rebellious `son' has quite literally 
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blanked. When we consider that what this `son' also blanked was a drawing from de Kooning's 
Women series, the question of the erasure of an Other also comes into play, problematising the 
`blank space as subaltern' suggested earlier, and raising the possibility of another level of 
(paradoxical) Phallic activity within the psychic surface. The blank space may perform its own 
erasure, and may symbolise Phallic choices about who gets rubbed out. What is interesting about 
Rauschenbergs monochrome is that he actively exhibits the fact that he has rubbed something 
out. Rauschenbergs Erased de Kooning Drawing is the zenith of the kind of exhibitionist erasure 
that he showed in a more restrained way in his Black Paintings (with their grounds of painted-out 
newsprint [Figure 33]), White Paintings and Untitled (Gold Painting) (with its collection of glue, 
fabric, wood and paper visible in the places where the gold leaf has flaked away [Figure 34]). 
David Batchelor observes on this covering-up that, 
`[... ] in each case the monochrome is such a laboured achievement of erasure or 
covering-over. In both instances there is a sense of their being something 
either physically beneath or temporally prior to the finished work [... ] here the 
monochrome is a comrgtion of some other work. A palimpsest. Not a tabula 
rasa. ' (Batchelor in Osborne [ed] 2000: 158) 
To consider first of all the idea of corruption: what I think is remarkable about the Erased de 
Kooning Drawing is the way Rauschenberg holds his hands up, claiming authorship of this strange 
blankness that is like a reverse grafitti. There is no shame or secrecy in the act of his rubbing-out; 
he wishes his spectators to be aware of how the blank space came about, and what was there 
before. When we realise that some critics have read blankness as the subject of de Kooning's 
work, the blankness of the Erased de Kooning Drawing is further problematised. It would be 
interesting to read Rauschenbergs erasure as the erasure of something which signified a void, ie 
Woman. The blank space represented by Woman is simultaneously erased and overwritten by 
another blank space, one whose purpose is to collude with the process of masculine competition. 
Rauschenberg also wishes to show his spectators that before this monochrome was made, in its 
place stood a visual artefact of great quality and desirability. His blank space is thus accorded the 
kind of genealogy, pedigree or patrilineage that, for example, the uniform blue of an Yves Klein 
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surface does not have. Before there was even a de Kooning drawing to erase, there was a blank 
sheet of paper; now the blank sheet of paper returns. Batchelor intriguingly describes the genesis 
of this picture as a mobile continuum of monochromes, `the monochrome appears in a temporary 
and unstable state, a state which is in a constant process of being lost and recovered and lost 
again. Or painting here is a temporary state between monochromes. ' (Batchelor in Osborne [ed] 
2000: 158-159) 
Figure 33: Robert Rauschenberg, Untitled [small Black Painting) 1953. Oil on newspaper on canvas. 60 x 75cm (not to 
scale). (>ffentliche Kunstsammlung, Basel. 
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Figure 34: Robert Rauschenberg, Untitled [Gold Painting] c. 1953. Gold leaf on fabric and glue on masonite in wood 
and glass frame. 30.25 x 30.5cm (not to scale). Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New York, bequest of Eve 
Clendenin, 1974. 
Penny Florence describes a similar continual kinesis for writing, but implies that it is neither 
straightforward nor safe; `[w]riting is the perilous passage between blanks. ' (Florence 1998: 2) For 
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Rauschenberg, there was something there, but now a space has been cleared, and a particular kind 
of blankness created. This is comparable to the literary example of William Golding's 1956 novel, 
Pincher Martin: The Two Deaths of ChristopherMartin, where in the last chapter the drowned body of 
the protagonist is found, wearing the seaboots he had struggled to remove after a shipwreck in 
the first chapter. Nothing can prepare this reader for final, dramatic act of erasure. Golding 
cancels out the entire novel, as we realise that the story was nothing but the vivid hallucination of 
a drowning man in the last few seconds of his life. In this case Golding erases his own work, 
though traces remain available to the eye. This kind of erasure creates an invisibility that is 
anamorphotic; at the point of shift in the reader's understanding of what has taken place, an 
entire novel disappears and leaves in its wake a vast, blank space". 
This kind of dramatic rubbing-out, designed to be seen, has parallels with that most classic of 
palimpsests, Freud's Mystic Writing Pad. In 1925 Freud wrote a short paper about a child's toy, the 
Wunderblock or Mystic WY7riting Pad, a block of wax covered by a thin sheet of celluloid. Marks could 
be made on the celluloid with any instrument sharp enough to leave an impression in the wax, 
and renewed at will. A simple tug would release the celluloid from its contact with the wax, 
making it once more `blank' and ready to receive inscriptions. The old inscriptions remained in 
the wax, but soon became illegible with the build-up of new inscriptions. Freud proposed this toy 
as a metaphor for the psychic apparatus he outlined in his Pro, jest for a Scientific Pycbology. The way 
the Mystic Writing Pad worked was analogous to the manner in which the psychic economy 
remains unmarked by sensory impressions from the outside world. These impressions instead 
pass straight through to a deeper layer, where they are recorded and stored as unconscious 
`memory'. Freud added that, `The appearance and disappearance of writing, ' is similar to, `the 
flickering-up and passing-away of consciousness in the process of perception. ' (Freud SE xix: 230). 
Derrida concluded in Freud and the Scene of Writing (1978) that Freud's reliance on writing-related 
metaphors to describe the psychological processes suggested that these were not in fact mere 
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metaphors - perception really is a kind of writing-machine. The `marks' made on the system of 
perception are not visible; their visibility is acquired by contact with the wax on the reverse side of 
the plastic sheet. The same, says Derrida, is true with perception. We do not apprehend the 
world directly. Previous memories, traces and inscriptions create our sense of what is around us. 
In the sense that our own identities can be understood as constructed retrospectively, only 
`legible' deep in the unconscious, Rauschenberg's Erased de Kooning Drawing can be read as a 
diagram of the reverse of the celluloid; an anti-inscription that describes the psychic process of 
inscription itself, its role in constructing identity and experience20. The spaces between, around, 
and left behind by things are far from empty; they are filled with the resonances of the things 
themselves. The erased or covered-up blanknesses of Rauschenberg have little in common with 
the blank page of Mallarme; these are calculated acts of the kind of destruction that, like grafitti, 
create at the same time as they damage. Whilst Briony Fer writes that, `[c]ancelling out is always a 
violent manoeuvre' (Fer 1997: 80), in the Erased de Kooning Drawing we have a kind of cancelling- 
out whose subversive qualities seem to rely on laughter or competition rather than violence. 
Rauschenberg, in an act of defiance, castrates the Phallic viewer and has the last laugh. His 
exhibitionistic erasure reveals the tain of the image, and in a gesture that recalls some of the 
comedic or satirical aspects of blankness, Rauschenberg literally shows the Phallic viewer his back 
side. 
4: 3 Generative Blankness and Deathly Silence 
The purpose of this section is, primarily, to ask questions about monochrome space and gender, 
in a similar way to the way in which Chapter Three asked questions about space and `race'. I 
would like to use the Kristevan semiotic chora to help understand the gendered and paradoxically 
generative nature of blankness, to complicate the notion of castration within blankness, and to 
help provide an alternative structure to the Phallic. With the confounding and tricky 
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monochrome as object of desire, can the spectator ever expect to win the same kind of success as 
that expected by the Phallic spectator in front of a narrative or realistic image? 
In Where Do Pictures Come From? (Gilbert-Rolfe 1995: 193-202), Jeremy Gilbert-Rolfe chooses two 
pictures by American artist Sarah Charlesworth to discuss notions of Oedipality and blank space. 
These are her Snakegirl triptych of 1985 [Figure 35] and her Bowl, Column diptych of 1986 [Figure 
36]. 
Figure 35: Sarah Charlesworth, Objects of Desire Part II: Snakegirl, 1985. Framed, laminated Cibachrorne print, 
lacquered frame, 100 x 210cm. Photo by Douglas M. Parker, L. A. Courtesy of jay Gorney, Modern Art, New York. 
Figure 36: Sarah Charlesworth, Ob/eds n/'Desire Part 11 . Bow/, (. olu, u, 1986. Framed, laminated Cibachrome print, 
lacquered frame, 100 x 210cm. Photo by Douglas M. Parker, L. A. Courtesy of Jay Gorney, Modern Art, New York. 
Much of Charlesworth's work discusses notions of photography as cultural arbiter; the ways 
photographs affect the cultural consciousness. She has said that she prefers to; 
`[... ] look at the photographs as something real and of my world, a strange and 
powerful thing [... ] part of a language, a system of communications, an 
economy of signs. ' (Charlesworth in Linkler 1998: 1) 
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This exemplifies the Barthesian influences evident in much of her work, including her writing 21 - 
These two works are part of a series called Objects of Desire, and are classic Charlesworth in their 
use of radically truncated or excised images from mass media sources. Charlesworth first 
appropriates images such as Snakegirl from media where an appropriation has already been 
performed; so that the `theft' is problematised and, at least, doubled. Her strategy is a little like 
that of Ellsworth Kelly, only in reverse. Where Kelly's detail becomes an entire monochrome, 
Charlesworth relies on the monochrome as a self-sufficient `ground' with (NB, not `on') which to 
display her detail. What is special about the monochrome grounds of Charlesworth is that they 
seem to give the impression that they could fly out at any moment and take control of the picture 
plane. They continually vie for foreground-status with the images; so that the question of figure 
and ground, so problematic in monochrome anyway, is doubly problematised. Without the 
figures (which also seem complete and sufficient unto themselves) you get the impression that the 
`grounds' would be replete and eloquent. These are not simply backgrounds, but empowered, 
(Phallic? ) monochromes that flicker in a perpetual combat with the figures; monochromes 
cunningly disguised to look like backgrounds; and as Yve-Alain Bois has written, `the 
figure/ground opposition[... ] is the perceptual limitation at the base of our imprisoned vision, 
and of the whole enterprise of painting. ' (Bois 1990: 240)22 
These works are obviously not `monochromes', but they do deploy monochrome in a comparable 
way to Sugimoto and Hilliard (see Chapter Two). Through the application of multiple shiny 
laminations, Charlesworth creates a background which, excessively glossy and flawlessly 
unmodulated, can be read as supreme blankness. This particular blankness - the extraordinarily 
shiny one of a Cibachrome print which is laminated several times then placed in a lacquered 
frame - has something Phallic about it, though it is hard to pin down exactly what'. Perhaps it is 
the excessive surface sheen, reminiscent of the way the males of certain species, such as the 
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peacock, will preen and strut their surface beauty during mating season. Their language is 
radically superficial; the apparent urgent call to admire their beauty is really a far more urgent call 
to assure them of their virility. Perhaps this excessive glossiness is that of the Phallus in abject 
thrall to castration-anxiety; to such an extent that all its energies are consumed in showing off its 
alluring, shiny surface. Each monochrome, this time masquerading as a `ground', gives such an 
air of repleteness that the images appear as `cuts', or interruptions in the surface. 
The series Objects of Desire series is organised into four parts. Part One concentrates on gender- 
coded messages, and includes such images as a disembodied shock of `blonde bombshell' hair, 
again placed floating upon an articulate and replete monochrome surface. Part Two (which 
includes Snakegin) explores notions of the natural, or nature as myth. Part Three is concerned 
with gods, icons, and figureheads. The dominant aesthetic here is iconic, much gold is used. 
Charlesworth continually keeps open the gap between the irresolution of meaning, and the desire 
of the Phallic viewer to achieve meaningful closure. Part Four (which includes Bowl, Column) 
explores the limits of this Phallic viewer. In a self-consciously appropriationist style, she chooses 
ethnographic images from the National Geographic in Bowl, Column -a kneeling girl from a Pacific 
culture plays a reed-recorder in the central panel, whilst cobras crouch in the side panels. This 
image of `Otherness' is obviously neither Indian nor Arabic, yet calls to mind stories from India 
or `The Mystic East' of snake-charmers in market bazaars. The power of the snake-catcher in 
India is uncontested. Such highly-skilled people travel from village to village earning a good living 
by ridding houses of dangerous creatures. However, the snake-charmer in the market-place is 
more of a showman. He will frequently use toothless, old or sick snakes in his show; and when 
you know this, his power is compromised. The analogy I wish to make here is that of the illusory 
sheen of Phallic power - like a gloss or finish, the power of the Phallus is not absolute, but relies 
on the presence of the subaltern (the castrated, or those who fear castration). Charlesworth's 
Snake 
, girl remains unspecifically exotic. 
This is necessary for the point Charlesworth makes about 
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the mediation of images in western culture, and it reads as exotic shorthand. All the cultural 
stereotypes that go with the notion of unspecific exoticness fall neatly into the person of the girl, 
and thus her `realness', her personality, is rendered invisible. Unspecifically racialised and highly 
specifically sexualized, she is almost naked (apart from a loincloth and some jewellery), has power 
over the animals and, `a reference to fellatio seems incontrovertible [... ] in this image of a girl 
playing a phallus and in that simultaneously controlling animate phalli, snakes, at either side' 
(Gilbert-Rolfe 1995: 197,198). The girl is not unproblematically `feminine'; if anything, she 
exemplifies the psychoanalytic dilemma of the pregnant woman; simultaneously Phallic (because 
she contains the baby), and castrated (because she is Woman). Like her fellow `unspecifically 
exotic' Mixed Race subject, Snakegirl is an indeterminate figure. 
Bowl, Column contains similar complications of the picture plane. This time each panel is a glossy 
vivid blue depth with an image of a bowl floating at the bottom of one, and an Ionic column 
standing straight in the middle of the other. Again Charlesworth seems to be playing with the 
notion of western culture post-Freud's essentialist reading of such images as `masculine' and 
`feminine'; vessels for girls and towers for boys. However, this superficial code is deliberately 
deceptive; the Ionic capital in Vetruvian terms is a signifier of the feminine, `so that the column is 
in effect an androgynised sign whose masculine function becomes a matter of emphasis imposed 
by Charlesworth. ' (Gilbert-Rolfe) 1995: 197), and the bowl, situated at the bottom of the picture 
plane, symbolises envelopment within another envelopment, so that the principle of envelopment 
becomes dominant. 
So, in a system - that of the history of pictorial space in the west - that has been constructed 
mainly by and for men, Charlesworth's custom-made Oedipal space is already inherently 
transgressive because it is made by a woman. She then goes on to make this space resonate with 
further transgressions by stuffing it full of all kinds of apparent inconsistencies and tensions. 
Charlesworth reactivates the figure/ground problem by, 
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`[... ] causing a new jamming of pictorialism's essentially androgynous - the 
space is both male and female, although as an alterity primarily invented by 
males it is in some degree more explicitly female than male: the space precedes 
the figure - codes. ' (1995: 195) 
This image of activism - jamming the codes of pictorialism - is an apt description for a work that 
transgresses the set boundaries of pictorial space, but does so by containing a transgressive thing 
(a monochrome `passing' as a background) within the surface organisation. In this way another 
pair of binary opposites, figure and ground, are further complicated. The glossy and beautifully- 
coloured monochromes sit in equal authority to the photographic images, so that figure and 
ground become so impossible to disentagle from each other that both are rendered meaningless, 
Charlesworth deploys her monochromes to subversive ends - they are neither `ruined' nor perfect 
monochromes, just as the photographic images, floating anchorless, have no visible `context' 
other than the assumed one of western mass-media-consciousness. The images are neither wholly 
masculine nor wholly feminine, although they consciously invite the Phallic viewer to assign a 
gender to them. It is easy to see only the photographic images, but there again it is almost as easy 
(for myself, at least) to see only the potential monochrome, so that the edges of the photographic 
images seem to acquire profound importance as limits to signification. Charlesworth tricks the 
Phallic viewer by using images which that viewer immediately thinks he understands. Space is 
layered and confounded optically (layer upon layer of transparency) and psychically (layers of 
surface and ground, ever-mobile, layers of feminine and masculine space, also mobile and 
unfixable). Instead of the all-knowing I/eye, the Phallic viewer in front of Charlesworth's Objects 
of Desire is turned into, '[a) viewer necessarily maintained, like the sign, in a persistent condition of 
sexual indecision and disquiet. ' (Gilbert-Rolfe 1995: 201) The viewer that Charlesworth therefore 
affirms or creates a space for is the subaltern one, silenced by the Phallic order. 
At the same time as these surfaces hold something fundamentally Phallic within them, they 
paradoxically also hold something originary. This is more than the more fact that the images can 
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be seen to come out of the articulate blank `ground'. It has explicitly to do with the glossiness of 
the object. 
`Charlesworth's use of lamination leads to the notion that the field of meaning 
is not meaninglessness as blankness, the field which awaits the figure, but 
invisibility as depth, a precondition for the figure which will imply an origin for 
it. ' (1995: 210) 
These works, like the monochromes they contain and rely on, seem to exist in a condition that is 
perpetually pre-something; in a state of becoming but one that is generative. Blankness here is 
profound and filled, it contains the potential to create and to fill as it is itself filled. The silences 
analogous to this blankness would be the `pregnant' ones of John Cage, paradoxically deathlike in 
their generative potential; 
`The/ acceptance/ of/ death/ is the source/ of/ all/ life. /... Not one sound/ 
fears/ the silence/ that ex-tinguishes it. / And/ no silence/ exists/ that is not/ 
pregnant/ with/ sound. ' (Cage 1967 [1952]: 98) 
Notions of generative potential connect with the Platonic Chora and Julia Kristeva's version of 
this, the Semiotic chora; a strange receptacle that is generative but has qualities of indeterminacy. 
It also has qualities of pre-ness; for Kristeva the Semiotic precedes the Semantic (the order of 
language), and thus the Kristevan chora is the realm of the prelinguistic, the pre-Phallic, of 
formlessness. The chora first appeared in Plato's Timms, the first Greek written account of 
created nature. Timaues narrates this account of the heavenly ideals and their flawed, earthly 
copies. The chora is simultaneously space and non-space, a receptacle gendered feminine and 
made (paradoxically, for a non-space) of gold, where these flawed copies are created. It is a 
passing-through space, nothing gets to stay in the chora. In terms of the flawed nature of the clhoric 
creations, we see evidence of the notion of feminine as specifically lacking or damaged. Penny 
Florence points out that, 
`The feminine was until recently the active blankness par excellence. Cultural 
commentators who take account of gender have made much of this idea that 
the feminine functions in various ways as blank. But that blank also looks 
different now. ' (Florence 1998: 1) 
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The cbora is described in terms that specifically pertain to the feminine functions of maternity, 
birth and succour. But Kristeva tells us that, `Plato emphasises that the receptacle, which is also 
called space [... ] is not divine since it is unstable, uncertain, ever-changing and becoming; it is 
unnameable, improbable, bastard [... ]' (Kristeva 1984: 239 n. 12). The `bastard' of course is 
traditionally socially problematic because it is il-legitimate, outside of the Law. The space/non- 
space of the cbora, moving, ever-changing, is outside of Phallic Law because, as Kristeva posits, it 
is pre-linguistic (which would make it pre-Phallic). She asks, 
`There is a fundamental ambiguity: on the one hand, the receptacle is mobile 
and even contradictory, without unity, separable and divisible: pre-syllable, pre- 
word. Yet, on the other hand, because this separability and divisibility antecede 
numbers and forms, the space or receptacle is called amorphous. ' (Kristeva 
1984: 239 n. 13, n. 14) 
So: the space that is a non-space, that is named cfiora but is yet unnameable exists, like 
monochrome, witborlt unity. The chora seems like a most perfect analogy to monochrome space; 
amorphous and kinetic, shifting and ambiguous, frequently named but ultimately unnameable. It 
is unsignifiable because it exists in a condition prior to language. It also provides what is, quite 
possibly, the perfect description of blank space as something that does not necessarily lack a 
figure: 
The chora is a modality of signifiance in which the linguistic sign is not yet 
articulated as the absence of an object and as the distinction between real and 
symbolic. ' gristeva 1984: 26) 
Yet whilst monochrome all the time presents a superficial front of unity and wholeness; the chora 
is not involved in any such trickery. It simply is, regardless of whether we can adequately say just 
what it is. The chora is a replete and generative mother, always outside of the organising 
principles of Phallic Law. Paradoxically however, the ebora also lacks in some way since it 
produces flawed creations. Of the mother, Kristeva writes, 
`As the addressee of every demand, the mother occupies the place of alterity. 
Her replete body, the receptacle and guarantor of demands, takes the place of 
all narcissistic, hence imaginary, effects and gratifications; she is, in other 
words, the phallus. The discovery of castration, however, detaches the subject 
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from his dependence on the mother, and the perception of this lack [manque] 
makes the phallic function a symbolic function' (Kristeva 1984: 47). 
Mother, then, is already Other. Mother is also already feminine, and femininity is also already 
Other. In relation to a blank Other, Penny Florence has, 
`[... ] argued before that the eruption of that which was designated feminine, 
blankness here, into high culture reactivated the problem with perspective that 
has remained since its emergence in the Renaissance. In this restricted sense, 
those commentators who noted the `effeminacy' of Impressionism were right. ' 
(Florence 1998: 4)24 
The specific kind of gendered blankness that Florence describes erupts into culture in a manner 
analogous to the way the hysterical symptom erupts from the unconscious to the `surface' of the 
(woman's) psyche. This kind of blankness is the blankness that is `designated' feminine, the 
specific type of `feminine' that is constructed in flawed and problematic opposition to the replete, 
and necessarily Phallic, `masculine'. Florence refers to this as the `old feminine', writing that, 
`[t]he last generation of feminist writings often worked with the notion of `the feminine' as 
unspoken, as absence. The most interesting of the current explorations move towards what 
Gilbert-Rolfe calls the excess of contemporary blankness' (Florence 1998: 2) 
The feminine space of the chora is designated `blank' because its pre-Phallic, pre-linguistic and 
indeterminate nature render it unintelligible to the Logos. The Logos will fail to understand 
anything that is non-mimetic (good mimesis requires submission to the Logos), and will therefore 
read it as absent or lacking. What Charlesworth's surfaces can be said to activate is ultimate 
confusion for the Logos: she deliberately includes passages of the most perfectly mimetic medium 
we know, photography. She then subverts this `submission' to the Logos by her inclusion of 
adequate, complete and equivalent monochrome spaces. Her surfaces are almost perfect chora in 
their generative, subaltern indeterminacy. The series of gaps she creates and then jams open, 
means that meaning can never be a finished thing. Like Eco's Open Fork, the choric space 
transgresses Phallic significatory Laws. In terms of the `gendering' of space, then, the chow and 
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the monochrome space cannot properly be said to be one gender, but confoundingly contain 
elements of both. This double or multiple containing guarantees the deviancy of the blank space, 
and guarantees its subversive nature. And since we are still thinking about monochromes as 
`persons', 
`The question of what pictures want certainly does not eliminate the 
interpretation of signs. All it accomplishes is a subtle dislocation of the target 
of interpretation, a slight modification in the picture we have of pictures (and 
perhaps signs) themselves. The keys to this modification/dislocation are (1) 
assent to the constitutive fiction of pictures as `animated' beings, quasi agents, 
mock persons; (2) the construal of these persons, not as sovereign subjects or disembodied 
spirits, but as subalterns whose bodies are marked with the stigmata of difference and who 
function both as go-betweens' and scapegoats in the social field of human visuality. ' 
(Mitchell 1996: 81, my italics). 
Mitchell is not talking about monochromes here but about all painting. However, if you apply 
this model to all painting, it seems as though it would be even more strongly the case for 
monochrome, simply because monochrome doesn't fully belong in the category `pictures', yet also 
it does. The blank space of monochrome is, at least, duplicitous. At the same time as it bears a 
resemblance to deadness, the blank space can also be read as generative, a little like the blank and 
silent darkness in the Book of Genesis that existed before the Creation of the world (Gen. 1: 1-2). 
This apparent opposition, death-within-regeneration, introduces characteristics of Foucault's 
heterotopia of deviancy into monochrome's existing dynamic of undecidability. Monochrome, 
like the heterotopia of deviancy, does not fit neatly or completely into any of the categories that 
Art History provides for it, containing elements of disruption in its multiplicity, its straddling of 
divides and its union of apparent oppositions. In a system that privileges meaning and relies on 
legibility, monochrome presents as deviant. Rosalind Krauss uses Fredric Jameson's notion of 
`cultural revolution' to desribe aspects of this kind of perpetually erupting, transgressive activity. 
She writes that Cultural Revolution, 
`[... ] is a way of understanding how upheavals in modes of production will 
demand the opening up of freshly wrought, imaginary spaces into which 
prospective subjects of the new cultural and social order might narratively 
(phantasmatically) project themselves. ' (Krauss 1996: 84) 
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So in returning to the question of the choric monochrome and its possible relation to deathliness; 
we should take into account the fact that illegibility is often read or seen as destructive, disturbing. 
Kristeva traces this back to Freud, situating the mother's body as central, 
'The mother's body is therefore what mediates the symbolic law organizing 
social relations and becomes the ordering principle of the semiotic chora, which 
is on the path of destruction, aggressivity, and death [... ] the semiotic chora is 
no more than the place where the subject is both generated and negated, the 
place where his unity succumbs before the process of charges and stases that 
produce him. ' (1984: 27-28) 
In terms of the notion of a generative space, or a space that will always be pre-something, 
monochrome shares another of the most important impulses of the Freudian Death Drive, or 
Thanatos", in that the Death Drive forces the psychic economy into a dynamic motion backwards, 
to a state of being that is always pre-. The drive aims to return the organism to the inorganic state 
before life began, thus reducing all tensions to zero. The eternal conflict between Eros, the life- 
instinct, and the death-instincts, is yet another example of the splitness that inheres in the human 
subject. This time the split is dynamic and in constant motion, and, 
`It is as though the life of the organism moved with a vacillating rhythm. One 
group of instincts rushes forward so as to reach the final aim of life as swiftly 
as possible; but when a particular stage in the advance has been reached, the 
other group jerks back to a certain point to make a fresh start and so prolong 
the journey. ' (Freud in Gay [ed] 1995 [1920]: 615) 
You could say that the monochrome surface performs this reduction to zero perfectly, but only 
on the surface - since the promise of life to come inheres in the deathlike (rather than dead) 
blankness that is understood to precede something. The powerfully generative maternal body is 
also abject, a go-between, and an essential part of the mysterious and ambiguous erotic space. 
Furthermore, these spaces keep on erupting in society Like symptoms, and each time they can be 
read as a fresh crisis. 
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4: 4 Kristeva's Black Sun: Monochrome as Narcissistic Mirror 
The sorrowful affect which comes from the kind of regressive psychic motion discussed above 
can also be read as relative to a kind of cannibalistic narcissism - the blank surface perpetually 
`eats its heart out' with grieving self-love, and shares commonalities with the kind of narcissistic 
depression that Kristeva discusses in The Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia. Motifs to which 
Kristeva returns in this text are: a fundamental, archaic void (paradoxically also nutritive), and the 
cannibalistic motif of the introjection of what she calls the death-bearing mother26. Not only do 
these motifs make implicit and explicit references to the feminine and to death, but, as we shall 
see, they also suggest reflectivity. In Mourning and Melancholia (1917) Freud wrote that the 
condition of melancholia followed the pattern of mourning27. Such mourning, the result of the 
introjection of the simultaneously loved and hated maternal lost object, was impossible and 
doomed. As the Lacanian lost object, the Objet petit-a has no specular image, it does not seem 
unreasonable to associate this with the blank surface of a picture that does not depict. 
Kristeva describes the depressed person (in the first person) like a blank surface, `Absent from 
other people's meaning [... ] On the frontiers of life and death' (1984: 4), thus establishing at once 
a sense of illegibility and indeterminacy. Writing of melancholia as the `Somber (sic) Lining of 
Amatory Passion' (1984: 5), Kristeva goes on to give a sense that this profound sadness is the fain 
or unseen but necessary side of jouissance, thus assuming a dual existence. More interesting is the 
description she goes on to give of Bellerophon, 
`[... ] the first Greek melancholy hero [... ] who is thus portrayed in the Iliad 
[VI, 200-3]: `Bellerophon gave offense to the gods and became a lonely 
wanderer on the Aleian plain, eating out his heart and shunning the paths of 
men. ' Self-devouring because forsaken by the gods, exiled by divine decree, 
this desperate man was condemned not to mania but to banishment, absence, 
void' (1984: 7)28 
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As well as having fundamentally to do with the backwards motion of the death drive (depressed 
longing is for something in the past), the sorrowful self-devouring, the `melancholy cannibalism' 
(12), is fundamentally unrepresentable because it has no referent. There is no place for words or 
even meaning in this self-sufficient counter jouissance of sorrowfully consuming one's own heart. 
If monochrome pictures are persons, then they are depressed or wounded persons - persons 
perhaps who bear the weight of sorrow that comes with a life devoted to `passing'. The blank 
surface might also be read as a narcissistic mirror, showing blankness to itself and thus allowing it 
to mourn forever in a sorrowful circle of self-absorption. The mirror is a tricky one though, or 
smashed; for it does not show the future fantasy of wholeness or bodily integrity -a fantasy of 
the self `as' something - like Lacan's mirror, but rather a past fantasy that cannot be drawn or 
written, but creates an awareness of an empty space. The blank picture is a mirror that 
perpetually eats itself up with an internal psychic economy of mournful self-love'. 
A very literal blank-surface-with-wound-that-is-also-a-mirror would be Rob Pruitt's 1997 Cocaine 
Biet. Pruitt's reputation as an artist went downhill in the early 1990s, after a mistimed and, he 
claims, misinterpreted show about the commodification by White American capitalism of 
African-American culture and heroes, which many found racist and offensive. Cocaine Bnll°et was 
Pruitt's passage back into art-stardom. First shown at Gavin Brown's Enterprise Gallery, Chelsea, 
the piece consisted of a sixteen-foot long mirror placed on the floor, with a line of white powder 
running exactly down the middle. Organisationally, the ground bisected by a single stripe is 
reminiscent of Newman's Onement L Cocaine Beet is also reminiscent of minimalist floor- 
sculpture as a whole, but more specifically of some of the shiny, manufactured works of Donald 
Judd (eg Untitled, 1970) that give the feeling of reflective incisions in space. To cut space is to 
achieve an apparent impossibility, and to embody a union of oppositions that is perfectly 
indeterrninate3°. Untitled does not, however, share quite the same properties of abjection that 
Pruitt's Cocaine Bqf tinduces in the viewer". At Pruitt's opening, his Bret quickly descended 
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into a hellish riot of gluttony once those present realised that the title was in fact quite literal. 
The reflective surface `cut' by the stripe of cocaine (itself created by careful `cutting' by Pruitt, 
using razor blades on the mirrored glass), which in turn cut into the space of the floor, now 
became a narcissistic mirror which showed people their own acts of devouring. In this case the 
devouring was of something outside the self; but if cocaine induces feelings of elated self- 
absorption in its users, it could be said that the mirror revealed an act of narcissistic devouring. 
Pruitt describes the scene with obvious mirth and relish, enjoying seeing respected art world 
figures grubbing for drugs on the floor, musing that, `It was kind of satisfying to see all those 
people who had treated me badly down on their knees. ' (www. evansgallery. com)32. This mirror is 
literally showing `the system', as personified by the critics, curators and so forth who devoured the 
buffet - its own reflection. However this mirror is, like Narcissus' pool, a trick mirror; for it 
shows the system its own face as something wounded or distorted, but the system chooses only 
to see its own fabulousness. Pruitt combines exposure of cuts or wounds, devouring, abjection 
and reflection with a dark, doomed jouirsance in this work, whose abject edges just touch the 
sublime. 
As David Batchelor points out, it is possible to map out a tradition of monochrome-as-mirror; 
'Mn the mid-1960s, at the age of about forty-five, the monochrome entered its 
mirror phase [... ] the mirror has a double-value. First it is a manufactured 
surface: clean-sharp-polished-bright; and it is a ready-made: it can be ordered 
up by phone from bed. Second, the mirror is pure contingency: it does 
nothing but reflect its setting and the passing traffic; its content is all context; 
what's in it is all outside it. The mirror-monochrome pushes this particular 
relationship in painting to its limits: the relationship between painting and 
interiority' (Batchelor 2000: 169). 
Whilst I would disagree with the ludic diagnosis of a late mirror phase for monochrome 
(monochrome did not begin as something fragmented and then image itself as illusorily whole at 
this period, for example; the mirrors in question are not for monochrome to regard itself in, and 
finally if we use Mitchell's pictures-as-persons analogy, monochrome's `subjecthood' is, like all 
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other pictures, already a given); Batchelor nevertheless raises the crucial point that the mirror is a 
perfect go-between and in-between. Its inherent indeterminacy (neither/both deep nor/and 
shallow, neither/both empty nor/and full) makes it a common motif for liminal states or 
passings-through in literature - Lewis Carroll's Alice Through the Looking Glass, for example. 
However, it is possible for a matt, non-reflective monochrome surface to act as a notional or 
psychical mirror. Some of Lucio Fontana's work can be directly compared to Cocaine Buffet in this 
way, presenting the horrible reality of a self-devouring void, and holding a double indeterminacy 
intact in their surfaces. 
Best known for piercing or slashing the canvas, Fontana, a trained ceramicist, sculptor and master 
builder, refrained from using the term `painting' to describe his canvases, preferring to use the 
term `spatial concept'. His fascination with voids and nothingness is well documented, and he 
freely admitted, `I am seeking to represent the void. Humanity, accepting the ideas of Infinity, has 
already accepted the idea of Nothingness. ' (Fontana in Whitfield/Hayward Gallery 2000: 148). 
Fontana insisted, 
`[... ] for me painting is a matter of ideas. The canvas served and still serves for 
the documentation of an idea. The things I am doing at the moment are just 
variations of my two fundamental ideas: the hole and the cut. ' (Fontana in 
Whitfield/Hayward Gallery 2000: 136) 
It was important for Fontana that his holes were not merely read as destructive gestures; they 
were paths that could lead beyond the restrictive space of the canvas and into alternative, 
surrounding spaces. Fontana layered space. flis pierced, gouged or slashed canvases might be 
left bare, or they might be covered in an unmodulated monochrome layer of paint of a particular 
colour. Earlier in his career, he sometimes layered near-transparent white paint over the canvas, 
or added glitter. The repeated gesture of piercing the canvas [Figure 37] created a series of actual 
lacunae in his surfaces, some of which resemble finely drawn stripes, others mouths, others 
vaginal openings. 
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Figure 37: Lucio Fontana photographed by Ugo Mulas, 1964. Private collection. 
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Figure 38: Lucio Fontana, Concetto Spa, -Tale 1963. Oil on canvas. 146 x 114cm. Private collection, Venice. Water- 
based paint on canvas. 100 x 81 cm. Private collection, Turin. 
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Figure 39: Lucio Fontana, Concerto Spatiak/La Fine di Dio (Spatial Concept/The End of God) 1963. Detail, showing 
bucchi. Oil on canvas. 178 x 123cm. Private collection, Milan. 
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It is impossible to ignore the explicitly sexual (rather than erotic) nature of the appearance of 
some of these holes, which Fontana referred to as I3uchi (mouths) [Figure 39], and also some of 
the later slashes or cuts (ten years separate the appearance of his Buchi from that of his cuts). A 
series of well-known photographs by Ugo Mulas document Fontana's actual making of the holes 
in the canvas. Sarah Whitfield describes how, 
`[... ] a small puncture made with the point of an awl or a similar instrument, 
has now been enlarged, opened up by the artist's hands. The edges of the 
canvas surrounding the gouged-out orifices are gently pulled apart making the 
imagery as blatant a celebration of female sexuality as Courbet's L'Origine dir 
Monde [... ] Some are painted in a colour fashionable at that period called 
`shocking pink' [... ] others are painted white [... ] But even in white the 
associations with the vulva are no less flagrant. ' (Whitfield/Hayward Gallery 
2000: 19) 
Of course, Whitfield's assumption that all vulvae are pink is a lazy and inaccurate one based on 
the prior assumption that all flesh is White. It is also highly problematic to describe Fontana's 
holes as a `celebration of female sexuality', since the violence of some of his methods is 
uncontested and, more importantly, visible in the canvas". There is also violence in the 
`revolutionary aesthetic' reading of the cuts (Alloway 1961, van der Marck 1974), where Fontana 
attacks what he considers an overstuffed aesthetic. In the photographs, which Mulas freely 
admits were posed (Fontana could not make the cuts unless he was alone), we see the artist posed 
with a knife, but we see neither the first nor the last stages of the hole-making. Prior to 
considering the cut, Fontana would soak the canvas in emulsion paint. Waiting until the paint 
had coagulated slightly but was still essentially wet, he would then make the cut, gouge or hole. 
Once the paint had dried, he would open the cut using his fingers, and finally, a strip of gauze is 
attached to the back of the canvas to secure the cut. Although a friend of Fontana's allegedly 
described this process as a `caress', it reads rather more like an account of early surgery. 3i The 
violent connotations are, I think, quite clear - in the title of his 1988 review of the Fontana show 
at the Whitechapel Gallery, Andrew Graham-Dixon referred to the artist as `Lucio the Ripper'''. 
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An image that is particularly explicitly vulval and woundlike is Fontana's 1963 Concello Sparrale 
[Figure 38]. The literary and religious tradition of the generative potential of wounds is well 
established; the mediaeval Church believed the wound in Christ's side to be the symbolic womb 
that generated the Church. James Elkins has written of the total assimilation of Christ's body as 
`Holy Wound' in mediaeval illuminated manuscripts, in which one might find, `an entire page [... ] 
occupied by a vulva-shaped scarlet ellipse. ' (Elkins 1998: 241) Violent rupture can sometimes also 
contain originary power. In the Old Testament, it is a break that originates the World. In 
Derrida, it is a break that originates Language. In Lacan, it is a break that originates the Subject. 
Fontana presents a mauve-pink monochrome space, which is scored so that it becomes a space 
within a space, doubling spatial confusion and opening up or problematising designated spaces 
(which was Fontana's intention). However, this slashed void appears to be devouring itself up 
from its very centre. At its heart is the sorrowful (though generative) void Kristeva writes about, 
and the conceptual and actual space of the 1963 Concetto SpaZiale begins to look tantalisingly like 
an act of narcissistic self-devouring. This surface `completes' the existing melancholy of 
monochrome; the death drive activity inherent in the blank surface pointing back to a 
presymbolic state is taken further backwards by the self-devouring of the surface. 
If monochrome is an illusion done with mirrors, those mirrors are not always straightforwardly 
reflective. Monochrome can present `trick' mirrors; mirrors that are notional, symbolic or 
psychical. The elision of hole and wound in Fontana's surface is reminiscent of Lacan's elision of 
hole and mirror in his consideration of the complex spectating relationship. Like the blind spot, 
Lacan's hole is also a mirror that reflects the spectator's absence and wears away that spectator's 
subjectivity. The disappearance down this hole is attended by sorrow, abjection and mourning as 
the picture negates its viewer. Rosalind Krauss seems to be referring to a similar process when 
she describes, 
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`[... ] the idea that they are `cutouts', lacunae, `holes', ways of inscribing the 
viewing subject within the painting as coinciding with his or her own scopic 
object of desire, which is to say his or her own absence. ' (Krauss 1996: 95) 
This desire, of course, is one of extremely mournful affect because at its heart are one's own 
absence and death. The surface that colludes with such a desire is, as Krauss writes, also 
indeterminate and undecideable: 
`Jackson Pollock's painting is said to reach its most sublime achievement when 
it is no longer just a matter of the dripped line's having transcended the `cut' - 
Clement Greenberg's expression for traditional drawing's isolation of figures 
from their backgrounds [... ] Fried locates Pollock's accomplishment in the 
`cutout', which is to say a figurative shape that has been literally excised from 
the linear skein [... ] to create a hole or absence in the pictorial surface. ' (Krauss 
1996: 94) 
In Snakegir/ and Bowl, Column, Sarah Charlesworth has performed a Greenbergian `cut' in reverse - 
she has isolated figures from an unrelated and separate background, voiding the original 
background and placing her newly-voided `cut' on to a surface already void. Fontana's 
achievement reads like a near perfect example of Fried's `cutout', where a real hole or absence is 
created, negating received spectatorial notions of the continuity of the canvas surface. All this 
`cutting' does not necessarily presuppose solidity, though, as a cut can take the place of a solid 
addition. It is possible to `cut' space, like Pruitt, rather than to create a space by cutting a solid; 
and indeed, one of the binary pairs that monochrome continually disrupts is that of space/solid. 
Apish Kapoor's Adam of 1989 [Figure 40] is a classic example of this kind of worrying of 
boundaries. 
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Figure 40: Anish Kapoor, Adam 1988-1989. Sandstone and pigment. 119 x 102 x 236cm. Tate Gallery, London. 
In front of this work, the spectator who is not allowed to touch can never be absolutely sure 
whether they are looking at a sculptural block with a monochrome panel, or gazing into a void; `. 
The mirror that this work holds up to the spectator is a tricky one of abjection, it reveals the 
spectator's own incompleteness". Presented with such a deathly mirror, what happens to the 
spectator when mimesis disappears from the surface and there is nothing to grasp? What 
happens to the `I' during the narcissistic drama of the relation with the blank surface? For 
Michael Fried, notions of the literal and the theatrical were levelled as accusations to works that, 
he believed, impoverished art; `Art degenerates as it approaches the condition of theatre. ' (Fried 
1998 [1967]: 164) Here, however, I understand the notion of theatre as a necessary and complex 
interaction between the spectator and the work. The interaction is complex because, 
`My body, whether I like it or not, does not function in a single and particular 
type of space. It does its work in Euclidean space, but that is all it does within 
it. It sees in projective space, it touches, caresses and manipulates in a 
topological spatial type, suffers in another, hears and communicates in yet a 
different one [... I ' (Sexres in Daval 1989: 30-31) 
The drama of the blank or monochrome work, then, is a multi-levelled one of seduction; you the 
spectator lose yourself in narcissistic contemplation of it, which then annihilates you - like death 
orjouissance. This is the (feminine) power of the siren or the medusa, except that the gaze is 
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coming back at you - your abjection is the result of seeing your reflection and realising your 
woundedness. This is not the same as the sense of smallness and physical enervation 
experienced in front of, say, one of Judd's Specific Objects as discussed in Chapter One, which 
has to do with the Sublime38. So when the surface devoid of mimetic representation accosts the 
viewer, that viewer is always in some way negated. If, as Elizabeth Grosz writes, `the 
representation of space is thus a correlate of one's ability to locate oneself as the point of 
reference of space' (Grosz 1994: 47), then when nothing is represented or presented but space, 
with no anchor or signpost, a viewer could easily become lost. Grosz is making reference to 
Roger Caillois's 1984 essay Mimicry and Legendary P. rychaesthenia', and interestingly Rosalind Krauss 
elsewhere uses it to make a related point, that once the distinction between figure and ground is 
blurred, depersonalisation occurs, caused by assimilation into space. 
`Animal mimicry is a kind of strange, shadow case of modernism's own drive 
to create an analytical pictorial language by suppressing the distinction between 
figure and ground, thus making all boundary conditions irremediably 
ambiguous. ' (Krauss 1996: 94-95)x" 
Psychaeshtenia is the term coined originally by Pierre Janet for the particular type of psychosis in 
which the patient loses all sense of location in space, or with relation to space. In her reading of 
Caillois' essay, Grosz explains that, 
`Some psychotics arc unable to locate themselves where they should be. They 
may look at themselves from outside, as another might; they may hear the 
voices of others in their heads. The subject is captivated and replaced by 
space, blurred with the positions of others. ' (Grosz 1994: 47) 
It is hard for the psychotic because of the different kinds, layers and levels of represented space, 
which science acts to confuse: 
`[I]t is remarkable that represented spaces are just what is multiplied by 
contemporary science: Finsler's spaces, Fermat's spaces, Riemann-Christoffel's 
hyperspace, abstract, generalized, open and closed spaces, spaces dense in 
themselves, thinned out and so on. The feeling of personality, considered as 
the organism's feeling of distinctness from its surroundings, of the connection 
between consciousness and a particular point in space, cannot fail under these 
conditions to be seriously undermined [... ]' (Caillois 1984: 28) 
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The sense of absorption has echoes of Freud's oceanicfeeling, but perhaps more with the Buddhist 
notion of Nirvana with its negation of self. The monochrome surface, presenting a 
representation of undifferentiated space, has some of this destructive and disorienting potential. 
However, how much more disorienting or dissolving to the subject would an entirely 
monochrome environment be? At least a canvas or a form is a recognisable thing with limits, it is 
outside of the subject, under the subject's vision and therefore its threat can be disregarded. The 
subject existing momentarily inside the monochrome environment has no such luxury, for that 
subject has their edges blurred as they become, even if only for a time, indistinguishable from 
their surroundings. 
"The delineation of a limit concerns that which is outside as much as that which 
is within, particularly in any act of signification, for the dynamic of meaning - 
visual, linguistic - is always ex-centric or implosive, and implosion alters the in- 
outside as much as externally-directed motion. This integrality does indeed 
imply that blankness and the pictographic, meaninglessness and meaning, are 
inseparable. But what is interesting about this is what follows, because they are 
neither equal nor qualitatively alike. They are not oppositions. ' (Florence 
1998: 2) 
As well as gouging holes in his monochrome canvases, Lucio Fontana also made monochrome 
environments that work on the principle of envelopment, In 1949 in the Galleria del Naviglio, 
Milan, Fontana exhibited his first monochrome environment, Ambiente Spa{iale a Luce Nera (Spatial 
Environment in Black Light) for a few days only. The spectator entered a small black room, and 
gradually, found that s/he could no longer judge distance or spatial relationships. Up above 
Fontana had hung some abstract forms that he had painted with a fluorescent paint, which gave 
some kind of sense of orientation (and disrupted the monochromy). A white monochrome 
environment was reconstructed for the 2000 Fontana retrospective at the Hayward Gallery, which 
I was fortunate enough to see at a time when there was nobody else about. After leaving my 
shoes with the attendant, (a compulsory act which was no doubt designed to preserve the 
surface's whiteness, but which also had connotations of sanctity), I entered what was a very long, 
very white labyrinth. There is no way to adequately describe the sense of utter envelopment by 
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`white' that this Ambiente SpaZiale induced; it was as though as spectating subject, led from room to 
corridor to room, all white, I succumbed entirely to the sense of whiteness outside my body. The 
final small, white room, contained a white monochrome, slashed, that looked a little like an altar; 
the sensation was not quite one of being buried alive but was certainly almost one of 
zombification, or a living death, a death-within-life. 
Envelopment is a principle which Gilbert-Rolfe describes as dominant in Charlesworth's work, 
and which allows for the creation of a brand new kind of space. After proposing a Lacanian 
conceptualisation of pictorial space, `so that the history of pictorialism becomes a metonymic 
space somewhat like Mother, a space or cavity created, historically, primarily by boys, and created 
in part at least to play with' (1995: 193) he goes on to ask, 
`[... ] whether Charlesworth, in privileging envelopment, may be said to have 
constructed a newly irresponsible pictorial practice, in which the Oedipality of 
the sign is permitted to run rampant by an author who feels no complicity in its 
production [... ] An irresponsibility which is nonetheless responsive and 
responsible when it comes to rectifying that other irresponsibility which it 
conceives as dominant. A feminine irresponsibility, then, which plays with the 
terms to whose origin it is irresponsible in such a way as to render them newly 
ungovernable [... ]' (1995: 202) 
I think the environments of Fontana share with Charlesworth's surfaces the formal quality of a 
cut that oscillates continually with a monochrome for attention as `figure'. Fontana's 
environments share with the other surfaces discussed in this section a paradoxical, indeterminate 
quality of death-within-life. 
Kristeva writes of the speech of the melancholy person as a `dead language', 
`[t]hey have lost the meaning - the value - of their mother tongue for want of 
losing the mother. The dead language they speak, which foreshadows their 
suicide, conceals a Thing buried alive. The latter, however, will not be 
translated in order that it not be betrayed; it shall remain walled up within the 
crypt of the inexpressible affect, anally harnessed, with no way out. ' (1984: 53) 
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My proposal for monochrome as an apparent `one' with disguised, shifting qualities of `many' can 
also apply to the monochrome as apparent `dead' thing concealing or suffocating `life'; sorrowful 
receptacle of the thing-buried-alive. The living monochromes of German artist Wolfgang Laib 
are an almost literal illustrations of this. Laib is a former medical student who, since the late 
1970s, has been exploring the role of artist as shaman and creating pieces that, formally, appear to 
be `about' nature. Laib is best known for his monochromes of pollen. Living in a remote 
location in Germany's Black Forest, he spends each pollen season collecting the pollen of 
dandelion, pine, moss and hazelnut (mostly). Sometimes he will sift this through muslin directly 
on to the gallery floor, creating a dazzling yellow-orange monochrome area. [Figure 41]. More 
interesting here is his equally famous series of Milchstein (Milkstone) sculptures of white marble and 
milk [Figure 42] . 
Laib obtains rectangles of white marble - already shaped to `resemble' a 
monochrome canvas - and places these on the floor of the gallery. He sands an 
Figure 41: Wolfgang Laib, sifting pollen on detail of Pollen firm Pine 1998.230 x 260cm. Photograph courtesy of 
Installation Gallery Kenji Taki, Nagoya. 
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almost imperceptible depression into the surface of the marble, which he then fills with milk. The 
end result is an apparently complete block of white marble. The block is involved in a complex 
act of layered concealment: first the depression or void, then the white liquid, then the teeming 
microscopic bacterial life within the milk. The disguises continue on and on, the result is an 
apparent unity that conceals a continually shifting diversity. In the case of the Milchstein though, it 
is possible to trace the `thing buried alive' that Kristeva mentions; each day Laib refills the 
depression with fresh milk, thus engaging in a ritualistic act that has a sense of the Death Drive. 
At the same time as he refreshes, he also `kills' the old quantity of milk, bringing a fresh quantity 
to its inevitable death and thus in some way acting as the `death-bearing-mother'. The fear of 
being buried alive is a strong and archaic one, and much of the `horror' genre of film or literature 
is predicated on this fear. Edgar Allan Poe's story The Premature Burial is a classic example of this, 
in which we are told, 
'To be buried while alive is, beyond question, the most terrific of these 
extremes which has ever fallen to the lot of mere mortality I... ] the boundaries 
which divide Life from Death are at best shadowy and vague. ' (Poe in Whitley 
[ed] 1993: 177) 
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4: 5 Returns of the Repressed 
`But is the end ever to be gained? Duchamp (the imaginary), Rodchenko (the 
real), and Mondrian (the symbolic), among others, all believed in the end - they 
all had the final truth, all spoke apocalyptically. Yet has the end come? To say 
no (painting is still alive, just look at the galleries) is undoubtedly an act of 
denial [... ] To say yes, however, that the end has come, is to give in to a 
historicist conception of history as both linear and total (ie, one cannot paint 
after Duchamp, Rodchenko, Mondrian; their work has rendered paintings 
unnecessary, or: one cannot paint anymore in the era of the mass media, 
computer games, and the simulacrum. ' (Bois 1990: 241) 
It is not unusual to find monochrome at any of the `End of Painting's eternal returns. Briony Fer 
writes that, `[fjor Tarabukin, Rodchenko's monochrome was the `last painting' yet, despite 
repeated assertions that the monochrome marks the death of painting, it has remained one of 
abstract painting's most resilient and most repeated strategies'. (Fer 1997: 153) Yve-Alain Bois in 
his essay Painting: The Task of Mourning posits the analogy of the `game' as a possible salve for the 
wound of inevitable and final decision-making that the ever-returning notions of the `end of 
painting' seem to present: that is, an absolute denial or an absolute affirmation of its truth. 
Suggesting that a `game' cannot be properly understood as having an end, Bois uses the `anti- 
historicist' (241) notion of gaming used by Hubert Damisch that separates the actual, individual 
performance from the generic game itself. This leaves the question of a `death of painting' open- 
ended and, therefore, eternally indeterminate - and whilst it is eternally indeterminate and 
`undecided', I think it is safe to say that one will always expect it to reappear. It also provides an 
intriguing conceptual image of the artist as someone playing in a cemetery, or reopening old 
wounds (cf Fontana). If the exploration of painting's end or death is, as Bois goes on to 
propose, intrinsic to the pursuit of painting; then it should be possible to see explorations of 
seriality within painting as emblematic of the same Death Drive activity that causes artists to 
explore their work's death. Jacques Attali reminds us that, `death, more generally, is present in the 
very structure of the repetitive economy. ' (Attali 1985: 126). We are left with another visual image, 
an Escher-like mise-en-abime of deadness with repetition at its heart. The death of painting is 
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always, however, simultaneously a beginning and an end, a death-bearing mother, something 
whose undecideability is inherently deathlike. 
Figure 43: Marcia Hafif, Green Lake Deep 2000. Oil on linen. 90 x 65cm. Collection of the artist. 
If all repetition is inherently deathlike, then Marcia Hafif's monochromes, which she has been 
repeating and refining for at least thirty years, can be understood as having something Thanatic 
about them (Figure 431.1 lafif is perhaps best known for her involvement with a group of 
monochrome painters including Ryman, who began meeting in late 1978 and had many group 
shows together41. Hafif uses the terms `pure painting' or `aniconic painting' to describe 
monochrome - aniconic is fairly self-explanatory and seems to fit well with my proposed 
definitions of monochrome; but `pure painting' for her is painting which is, `not at the service of 
other needs. ' (Hafif 1981: 133). Her focus is an essentialist one (in that she understands painting 
to have an essence, a purity or zero degree): the author of the work and the marks made by that 
author are all-important. She writes that, 
`In a realist or in an abstract painting the strokes function (and have always 
functioned) at an underlying level, but in a one-color painting the strokes carry 
a major load of significance. Rather than serving another intention, they are 
that intention, a part of the subject matter of the painting as a whole. ' (I lafif 
1981: 132) 
Despite her attention to intention, the way she writes about her monochrome practice seems to 
invite parallels with kinds of unconscious activity, or even placement in a painterly unconscious. 
For Hafif painting becomes, `a kind of thought which is closer to a state of mind' (1981: 134). 
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Hafifls devotion to intentionality then is a curiously egalitarian one, as it also allows for the 
aleatory and the unconscious. What interests me here is her comparison of monochrome 
painting-as-thought to non-verbal thought, the sorts of thoughts that are more like powerful 
feelings that haveyet to be verbalised. There is an inherent suggestion of process and, within this, the 
suggestion that non-verbal thought is so because it is pre-verbal. Hafif thus (unwittingly) gives her 
permission for me to situate her monochromes in the Kristevan semiotic chora, along with other 
monochrome surfaces. And though she is actually making a point about the surface of 
monochrome in terms of an Art Historical developmental chain, she can also be interpreted as 
describing some of the qualities of monochrome that make it analogous to the surface of the 
mirror when she writes, `[o]ne looks at the surface of this type of painting and not into it. This 
way of looking has been a goal in painting since Cubism. ' (Hafif 1981: 138). 
The so-called End of Painting and its rebirth is also something Hafif has written about (1981, 
1989), so it is safe to assume her concern is as an active participant in this ongoing process. The 
notion of artist as death-bearing-mother appears in her work in the continued repetition of a void. 
Monochrome acts simultaneously as vehicle for and access-provider to the void, `Like the grid, 
monochrome presents a frontal, non-hierarchical compositional device - the grid locating form in 
space (if ambiguously), the one-colour field opening itself to the void. ' (Fiafif 1989: 129) Void 
space that is filled with sorrowful affect is strongly reminiscent of the `artistic' space as posited by 
Melanie Klein, who attached great importance to the death drive, via the melancholy Swedish 
painter Ruth Kjar (cited in Lacan as Ruth Weber)". In Kjar's case, the depressive void that ate 
her up was successfully filled with her intuitive figurative paintings, which apparently sprang, 
untutored, from `nowhere'. Darian Leader reminds us to, `Note that this empty space wasn't 
there before the paintings: it is not something original, primary, but is produced by the change to 
the arrangement of objects. If it is a void, it is a manufactured void. ' (Leader 2002: 65) Miat is 
important here is that objects, like signs, can only produce meaning if their arrangement 
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corresponds to prior, socially-agreed arrangements. If re-arrangement disrupts the 
Phallogocentric signifying chain, it produces something which can only be read as a `void'. In her 
manic filling of this void, Kjar could be said to be performing a Phallic act - she refused the 
sorrowful blank space all signifying possibilities, even before it even had a chance to signify as 
`void'. 
If we also remember that imagery of powerful women - including her own mother - 
predominated in Kjar's work, in terms of the artist-daughter's actual melancholy suffering (the 
tears at breakfast, inexplicable in language, the overwhelming sense of emptiness inside), the 
depicted mother can truly be said to have been `death-bearing'. However, the Kleinian 
interpretation of melancholia would be the internalization of the imago of the bad object. Such 
internalization relies on the notion of splitting that Klein introduced in 1946, (a notion that relies 
on pairs of opposites; good breast/bad breast, for example); and, as Kristeva points out, it also 
includes a notion of backward motion. 
`On the one hand it moves backward from the depressive position toward a 
more archaic, paranoid, schizoid position. On the other, it distinguishes a 
binary splitting (the distinction between "good" and "bad" object insuring the 
unity of the self) and a parcellary splitting - the latter affecting not only the 
object but, in return, the very self, which literally "falls into pieces". ' (Kristeva 
1989: 18) 
Kristeva's interpretation of Kleiman splitting then itself harbours an inherent split; that between 
the originary infantile binary splitting and the latter `parcellary' kind. The notion of unity, though, 
is still very much an illusion that the ego must maintain for its own comfort and safety. Klein's 
account of Kjar's activity reads very much like quite straightforward art therapy, and we see that 
in Kjar's case, what she painted very much stood for her own self. 
The notion of a perpetual creation of voids, or the illustration or presentation of them, rather 
than an attempt to fill, disguise or `correct' them with figuration, is very interesting. In both lIafif 
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and Kjar the void is inescapable; whether represented or disguised, it remains the pictorial subject. 
I would be hesitant to read the perpetual creation of voids as in some way indicative of 
melancholia in the artist. What I do propose is a reading of monochrome as a symbolic space of 
mourning within the context of western visual culture, harbouring hints of death because it is 
indeterminate and eternally repeated. The repeated revelation of voids is not necessarily so 
different to the filling of voids with obsessive figuration, since in both cases, void pictorial space 
is foregrounded in perpetuity. 
Figure 44: Gerhard Richter, Grau 1976. Oil on canvas. 200 x 170cm. Collection of the artist. 
The grey monochromes of Gerhard Richter, such as Grau of 1976 Figure 441 have been 
described in explicitly abject ways by the artist, ways that make repetition clear as the source of 
the deadness and sorrow. He explains in 1975 that his greys came out of a blank cloud of 
unknowing, 
`At first (about eight years ago) when I painted a few canvases grey I did so 
because I did not know what I should paint or what there might be to paint, 
and it was clear to me when I did this that such a wretched starting point could 
only lead to nonsensical results. But in time I noticed differences in quality 
between the grey surfaces and also that these did not reveal anything of the 
destructive motivation I... I misery became a constructive statement, became 
relative perfection and beauty, in other words became painting. ' (Richter in 
Tate Gallery Ex. Cat. 1991: 112) 
254 
Richter's abject starting point is similar to Newman's famous, `search for something to paint. ' 
(Newman in Hess 1971: 39) Except in Richter's case, the search is a profoundly sorrowful one, 
one which does not really expect to find an answer. Some of Richter's later monochromes did 
not start off as monochromes but as photographic depticions. The logic of the 1Y7rrnderblock is 
active in such work, as superficial memory is erased (with the unspoken promise that it will be 
erased over and over), only to leave the impression of a memory so deep that it cannot be read. 
This kind of blankness is of a similar genre to Hiroshi Sugimoto's blanked out cinema screens 
(see Chapter Two); although in Richter's case the image and the fact of its former existence are 
not necessarily obvious from looking at the surface. In both the case of Richter's earlier grey 
monochromes and his later dissolved photographs, `parcelled' into illegibility, he is involved in a 
deathlike activity embedded in another deathlike activity - repetition within repetition. At the very 
centre of this Russian doll of mourning lies the littlest doll of them all: blank space. 
In conversation with Benjamin Buchloh, Richter has made reference to the presence of the 
unknown in his process. Elsewhere in his own notes, Richter writes about the necessity of 
destruction in his process: 
`Any consideration that I make about the `construction' of a picture is false and 
if the execution is successful then it is only because I partially destroy it or 
because it works anyway, because it is not disturbing and looks as though it is 
not planned. ' (Richter in Harrison & Wood (eds) 1992: 1047) 
This really suggests that any Thanatic activity in his work is not entirely unconscious, but partly 
felt and understood by the artist. In particular, the idea of continually having to repeat something 
is quite conscious and quite readily associated with what Richter calls `our normal misery' 
(1992: 1043). Making eternal repetitions of grey monochromes becomes almost as mundane and 
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Figure 45: Alan Charlton, Paintings aid) a Central Vertical Division 1975. Oil on canvas. Photograph courtesy of 
Conrad Fischer Gallery, Dusseldorf. 
destructive to the spirit as, say, working the same night-security shift for twenty years. There is 
misery and sorrow in repetition. Alan Charlton is another artist who repeats the grey 
monochrome; but Charlton is more explicit about the associations with work and jobs [Figure 
451. He has worked for over thirty years in a set pattern: 9am to 5pm, five days a week, 
committed to an aesthetic of deliberate muteness. Andrew Wilson informs us that, like Cage, 
`Charlton had once used Samuel Beckett's aphorism, `I have nothing to say and I say so', in the 
context of his own work. ' (Wilson 1997: 35). Charlton is always at work on at least one grey 
surface, a pattern which reads like a forced continuation of beginnings, and a paradoxical 
foregrounding of ends. The grey monochromes of Alan Charlton do not bear the greatest `family 
resemblance' to the ideal monochrome described at the beginning of this study, because they 
contain channels or slots that follow the edge of the canvas; nevertheless they are useful to 
consider as part of what Lawrence Alloway called `abstract classicism' and what David Batchelor 
has described as an attempt to make monochrome - which elsewhere he has described as `absurd' 
and funny because it can seem so 'dumb'- more serious-looking". In his 1966 essay for the 
Systemic Painting show, Alloway wrote that the term Abstract Classicism was, `to refer to the new 
development that combined economy of form and neatness of surface with fullness of colour, 
without continually raising memories of earlier geometric art. ' (Alloway in Battcock [ed] 1969: 45). 
The `classicism' of black and white monochromes - and grey ones too, for that matter - can be 
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read as another disguise on the part of monochrome, this time an attempt for the tricky multiple 
to `pass' as serious-looking. 
The Wild Card is `passing' again; this time disguising its joking trickery. The question to ask 
though, when considering a joke, is whether or not it is actually funny. Is monochrome seriously 
comic, or comically serious? As we know from Freud's work on jokes and the comic function, 
the joke-work and the dream-work have similar economic responsibilities in the organism, and in 
both cases the internal censorship seeks to avoid unpleasure. In the case of the masquerading 
monochrome though, its associations with the void, mourning and death-drive activity mean that 
its joking is profoundly abject. As an undecideable, the leaf of monochrome's jouissanee can be 
turned over to reveal mourning, and vice versa, the two sides constituting one undecideable. 
Sometimes pop music can surprise with the wisdom of its lyrics; in the case of Smokey Robinson 
and the Miracles' Tears of a Clown, the reference to the inevitable conjoining of abjection and 
jonissance takes the form of a very poignant visual image where you can almost see the stage make- 
up running in a single sorrowful stripe; `[n]ow there's some sad things known to man, but there 
ain't too much sadder than the tears of a clown. ' (Robinson/Wonder/Cosby: 1967 [copyright 
Motown Records]) 
The `white' paintings of Robert Ryman [Figure 46] are also endlessly repeated, though they are 
not necessarily repetitions of the same thing: 
`Le blanc revient [... ] as the poet wrote in Quant au Lim in 1896, the blank-white 
returns, but not always in the same way. This is a blankness that is like and 
unlike `le neant', the nothingness that haunts so much late nineteenth century 
literature. ' (Florence 1998: 2) 
Ryman's `white' paintings are masquerades or tricks in some ways, as the layer of white conceals 
many colours. The difference between a Ryman `white' and, say, MTalevich's Black Square, is that 
Ryman is quite open about the fact that he also uses colour. Ryman's `white' paintings have been 
repeated seemingly endlessly, though with different variations which make the workings-out of 
various problematics more apparent. Dan Cameron makes reference to Ryman's paintings in the 
context of that great necessary of all vision: light, 
`Ryman's ideal white paintings serve as the ideal conductor of light, stripping 
the spectrum down to a pure, blinding essence which is at the same time utterly 
transparent [... ] Considered on the level of sheer ingenuity, one cannot help 
but be amazed at the number of ways Ryman has discovered to present the 
white painting to us, literally (re)inventing his definition of this same 
plastic/conceptual problem so many times that, rather than tire of the problem 
ourselves, we become further drawn into the complex vocabulary of changing 
supports, brushstrokes, paint densities, shades of white, and other 
presentational devices. ' (Cameron 1991: 91-92) 
At the level of the surface, the `invisible' in Ryman's painting is the colour, in an analogous way to 
the `invisible' Whiteness in the Mixed Race subject; and probably both could function in 
comparably transgressive or destabilising ways. Ryman's white surfaces also change and mutate in 
a comparable way to the tricky White Phallus, mutating at will in order to fool those it wishes to 
subjugate. 
Giving the example of Ryman's 1984 white monochrome Resource (which, with its structure of 
layered voids, fits nicely into the repetitive economy of a mire-en-abirre of dcathlikeness), Gilbert- 
Rolfe writes that, 
`[... ] one is involved in the surface as a zone of nonproduction. Nothing 
happens there and everything happens there. It has nothing to do with 
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negligence, but, like negligence, it makes meaning by not doing rather than 
doing; it is not responsible to the cult of production. It is, instead, a deferral. ' 
(1995: 60) 
Ryman's involvement in the eternal deferral of meaning is clear, his `white' paintings and other 
white monochromes do what they do by refusing to act. The endless deferral of signifiers that 
precludes arrival at a fixed interpretation is continually being worked out in each new 
monochrome that Ryman produces. Their individual differences are thus, because of this generic 
and highly subversive family activity of deferral of meaning, sometimes overlooked, as is their 
(paradoxical) subaltern status. When something has subaltern status within a greater overarching 
system, its individualities and subtle nuances can often be overlooked, in rather the same way as 
the Mixed Race subject in White society is often automatically categorised as `Black'. Penny 
Florence gives a parallel with another subaltern status, the feminine: 
"Recall' can notoriously make things look different in a homogenising way - in 
other words, it can overlay difference with similarity, the recently unfamiliar 
masquerading as difference. The history of the feminine suggests another, 
parallel trajectory of recall, symptomatic of the disjunctions of the 
contemporary, and of its history since the accelerated movement of peoples at 
the dawn of colonialism in the Renaissance. ' (Florence 1998: 4) 
There are of course schools of thought (such as racist thinking) that do not value these 
differences. David Batchelor writes that, `Buchloh has argued that it is at best meaningless and at 
worst `bordering on the grotesque' to make conventional discriminations of value and meaning 
between the monochrome works of Klein or Rauschenberg or others. ' (Batchelor 2000: 155) 
Perhaps, as a result of all the painterly repetitions, Yve-Alain Bois would include Ryman as an 
example of the artist as `manic' mourner. In his essay Painting: The Task of Mourn ing, Bois writes 
that, `mourning has been the activity of painting throughout this century' (Bois 1990: 243), and 
interestingly describes what he calls `appropriation art'- and we could conceivably include 
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Charlesworth's examples discussed above in this - as `the `orgy of cannibalism' proper to manic 
mourning' (1990: 243). Bois seems to wish to rid painting of the odour of death, 
`Painting might not be dead. Its vitality will only be tested once we are cured 
of our mania and our melancholy, and we believe again in our ability to act in 
history: accepting our project of working through the end again, rather than 
evading it through increasingly elaborate mechanisms of defense (this is what 
mania and melancholy are about) and settling our historical task: the difficult 
task of mourning. ' (1990: 243) 
I wonder about exactly who Bois means when he says `our historical task', and would question 
whether different individuals or groups can be understood to mourn in the same way. I would 
also prefer to take the approach of Kristeva in The Black Sun who, rather than opting for a `cure' 
like Bois, prefers to attend carefully to the language of mourning, and ask what it has to say. 
4: 6 Conclusion: Mourning the Lost Object of Art History? 
`All productions of the human mind are already marked with their death's head: 
fading, failing, falling short, falling apart, lapsing and expiring are their native 
domain. A wish can be fulfilled; desire cannot: it is insatiable, and its objects 
are perpetually in flight. ' (Bowie 1991: 10) 
The concept of repetition is seen by some as reductive, by others as straightforward pathology, 
and by others still as renewal. David Batchelor gives a witty summary of some of these 
interpretations; 
`In the red corner, Peter Burger's Theory of the Avant-Garde, which makes the 
argument for repetition as decadence. For Burger, the repetition in the post- 
war period of earlier avant-gardist devices (of which the monochrome would 
be one example), merely `insitutionalises the avant-garde as art and thus negates 
genuinely avant-gardist intentions' [... ] And in the blue corner, October 
magazine's Buchloh-Krauss-Foster, who, between them, over a period of more 
than ten years, have set out to counter this `evolutionary' version of avant- 
garde events [... ] Here, repetition can be understood in terms of a recoding of 
an earlier, repressed, trauma; and, critically, it is onfy through the process of its 
repetition that the trauma may be fully analysed and understood. ' (Batchelor 
2000: 154) 
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Monochrome's disruptive function within western art history can be likened to that of a tricky 
and deathlike mirror. In the relation between artist, surface, spectator, and writings or 
interpretations of the work, monochrome acts as a reflective surface. Meanings are deferred, or 
bounced backwards and forwards off one another, never being allowed to rest long enough to 
stick in any one place. This is the `trick' of monochrome, a trick that it could not play if it were 
not indeterminate. This is one of the reasons why monochrome has never been successfully 
`assimilated' as any one particular thing, and perpetually returns. This is less like a sentence, less 
like being `doomed' to perpetual return, and more like creative play. Here is transgression with an 
eternal freedom from punitive action - since the system refuses to acknowledge that its 
boundaries are being transgressed, it cannot punish the `crime'. Monochrome can be anything, 
and anything that can be anything is inherently a challenge. 
`Pictures want equal rights [... ] They want neither to be levelled into a `history 
of images' nor elevated into a `history of art' but to be seen as complex 
individuals occupying multiple subject positions and identities. ' (Mitchell 
1996: 82) 
In this sense, monochrome's `wishes' echo those of the `racially' indeterminate subject, whose 
ideal would be to be approached as a `complex individual occupying multiple subject positions 
and identities', rather than someone who needs to continually explain their `fractions', or else 
must submit to being explained. Monochrome may also have some of the qualities of the Return 
of the Repressed, but it is not simply and only this. It also may have qualities of the lost object 
that is forever mourned and lacked, and in some cases might be understood as a representation of 
that mourning and lack. But it is not simply and only this, either. Monochrome certainly seems 
to have something about it that concerns the fear of death or of, as Mallarme put it, `la neutralite 
identique du gouffre' (the undifferentiated nature of the abyss)'. (Florence 1998: 2) 
According to Jacques Attali, `The absence of meaning [... ] is nonsense; but it is also the 
possibility of any and all meanings. ' (Attali 1985: 122) Nonsense by definition works with a very 
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peculiar kind of empty space - the space between things that cannot be filled with anything that 
makes sense in the world we perceive. Nonsense, like monochrome, creates a space between 
things that is impossible to contemplate and thus baffles us. Like monochrome, nonsense is 
impossible to fix, and, like monochrome, nonsense persists in different guises. Parveen Adams 
writes that any pursuit of this object cannot ever possibly end in satisfaction due to the nature of 
the object, 'he object of desire is not a possible object of satisfaction, of pleasure [... ] Desire 
for it is founded upon its loss; it cannot fulfil desire. ' (Adams 1996: 51) It is a matter of shifting 
focus: the pursuit itself will have to become its own reward. Monochrome as tricky, deathlike 
mirror performs an act of uncovering that is kin to that of deconstruction, which `demonstrates 
that any assertion of truth and any appeal to nature or first principles is a sham. ' (Heartney 
2001: 18) 
Notions of space, like most other categories, often conform to systemic patterns; admitting those 
that seem to fit the patterns, rejecting those that do not. Within the greater organisational system 
of a type of `space', it is usual to find problematic, chaotic spaces; spaces whose quirldness the 
system will normally try to force into invisibility. In Of Other Spacer, Foucault describes 
heterotopias as the sites that have, 
`[... ] the curious property of being in relation with all the other sites, but in 
such a way as to suspect, neutralise or invert the set of relations that they 
happen to designate, mirror or reflect'. (Foucault in Nfirzoeff (cd) 1998: 239)' 
This is exactly how monochromes throw chaos into art history; they exist in relation to other 
paintings, defined by and defining, and so on. However, in the inevitable mirroring that takes 
place, monochrome casts suspicion on all other painting. Malevich's Black Square, for example, 
casts suspicion on icons because it both is and is not an icon; yet is also a mirror, the dark 
counteractive mirror of representation. According to Jeremy Gilbert-Rolfe (1995), spaces only 
ever exist as versions of themselves -- perspectival space, for example, or deep space. Space should 
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not, however, be seen as an empty backdrop, but instead as a dynamic entity that varies from era 
to era, from place to place. Spaces, including apparently blank ones, have identifying 
characteristics and histories. Foucault describes how the space of the City has its own spatial 
subsets. `Utopias' are spaces that have no concrete site, but a general relation `of direct or 
inverted analogy' (Foucault in Mirzoeff 1998: 239) to the actual space of society where people 
live. They either present society in an idealised form or `turned upside down' (239). Conversely, 
between the utopias there are `heterotopias': concrete, actual sites, which Foucault describes as 
`counter-sites'. These heterotopias, though real, are psychically dynamic. Within their spaces, all 
the other real sites that exist within the culture in question are simultaneously, `represented, 
contested and inverted' (239). The category of the heterotopia includes the so-called `crisis 
heterotopia', a space with totemic significance and oppressive psychical affect, places of sanctity 
or places with forbidden connotations. Such places are designed for those members of society 
who, when considered in relation to their society, are in a state of `crisis', eg `adolescents, 
menstruating women, pregnant women, the elderly, etc' (240), and he confines these spaces to 
so-called `primitive' societies. These kinds of `heterotopias of crisis', Foucault writes, are being 
replaced by `heterotopias of deviation'. He includes prisons, hospitals, senior citizens' homes, 
mental institutions and cemeteries as examples of these, explaining that whilst the situations 
which would put an individual into any of these spaces might be actual crises, in a society where 
leisure and order rule, they are also considered deviant. 
What I find interesting about the heterotopia in terms of attempting to think about issues of 
space in the monochrome, is that it, `is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, 
several sites that are in themselves incompatible' (1998: 241), in other words, Foucault's 
heterotopia is a classically uncategorisable undecidable. However, Foucault's notion of a 
heterotopia does something extra for my argument about monochrome by shifting it into the 
realm of the Death Drive. In embodying a clustering of `antisocial' spaces that just don't fit, 
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Foucault's heterotopia of deviance is not a single unit but a multiple thing, and also has something 
deathlike about it. This is not to say that it is possible to identify Freud's Death Drive at work 
here, but it is to say that they might sit quite comfortably together. MMy aim here is to investigate 
monochrome as another space of plenty; but consider it as a psychic, as well as a physical reality 
whose mobile signifiers assure its dynamism as a surface. It is, however, also a space within a 
system of interconnected and related spaces, each of which is expected to form itself to its 
allotted niche of meaning. What is enervating about monochrome is the insistent surface 
blankness, a mocking, silent blankness that defies interpretation and is reminiscent of death. 
Rosalind Krauss (via Lacan) identifies this resistance to signification with the formlessness of that 
which is presymbolic, fitting with the Kristevan ideas discussed above (Krauss 1996: 92-93)45 
If western art history is a `city', then, the unrepresentable, formless and presymbolic space of 
monochrome within it acts as a Foucaultian heterotopia of deviance, a self-sufficient `necropolis' 
inside the city walls. A city that houses the dead is a city in backwards motion, going back to the 
originary lack that is the object of mourning. And if this city exists within a wider city or 
structure whose logic is linear and progressive - like that of the `kinship' system of western Art 
History - then clearly it will stand out markedly as `wrong', or as a problem. Its characteristics 
are those of the `black sheep' who usually turns up somewhere in every family tree, accompanied 
by secrecy, shame and sorrowful affect. But monochrome also continues to do something 
confounding, each time it re-appears, to the Phallic viewer intent on fixity of meaning. Using the 
metaphor of the library as symbol of the colonisation of knowledge, Sean Cubitt presents what 
could be read as an analogy for the way in which monochrome jams the door of meaning open; 
`The very architecture of the great libraries breathes with this ambition: to 
colonise knowledge, through order, in the image of imperial rule [... J The public 
reader is caught up in what Lacan, borrowing linguistic terms from Jakobson, 
took to be the syntagmatic dialectic in which the subject is condemned to 
pursue the object-world down endless shelves of signification in pursuit of that 
impossible object of desire, total knowledge, total control. ' (Cubitt 1998: 9) 
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The desire of the Phallic reader is impossible - total control, total knowledge, and total access to 
meaning are all impossibilities. In presenting the Phallic reader with the impossibility of ever 
satisfying his desire, monochrome is involved in an act of visual castration, so horrifying that it 
cannot be symbolised by the ego, and whose affect is of sorrow, grieving and loss. Perhaps it is 
this sense of loss and longing that appeals to monochrome's admirers, who might then be 
considered narcissistic mourners. Perhaps, though, those who love monochrome also somehow 
sense the endless play of possible signification. In this way monochromes perpetually re-enact 
the Malevichian scene of opening the possibilities for meaning... 
Of Other Spaces, or Des EspacesAutirs published in French journal Anhitectun Alouveenent-Continuitl in 1984, was 
originally the basis of a lecture Foucault gave in 1967. Foucault himself did not review this text for publication, so it 
is not generally considered part of the official body of his work (although it did appear in the public domain shortly 
before his death, when it was used to accompany an art exhibition in Berlin). 
2 See Meyer Schapiro, 'On Some Problems in the Semiotics of Visual Art: Field and Vehicle in Image-Signs' Theory 
and Philosophy oJArt Style, Artüt, and Society, vo1.4 of Selected Paper (New York, 1994: 1-7) 
3 Lippard's choice of the word `suicidal' is also suggestive of an investment in expressionism; she can be seen as 
reading monochrome or blank works as a response to New York School painting. 
4 This also connects with the undercurrent of comedy that runs through this attempt to think through the 
monochrome. This time, the notion of a microscopic image of something very small, enlarged so that it is too big to 
make out, is another comedic device that is sometimes used in conjunction with a joke monochrome 'painting'. This 
is a characteristic of the specific kind of comedy that is identifiable as 'Nonsense'. Nonsense has parallels with 
monochromy in terms of its transgressive function and the complex relationship it has with 'sense'. Nonsense can 
only function in an oppositional relationship to the societally-sanctioned, generally understood way of perceiving the 
thing in question. If nonsense were to fall in line with traditional ways of perceiving or understanding something, it 
would lose its transgressive function and become unrecognisable as nonsense. Monochromes also work as 
transgressive spaces because of their oppositional relationship to the way in which spectators expect to make 'sense' 
of visual imagery. 
5 The purpose of Mitchell's essay can be summed up in the following paragraph; 'Aly own position is that the 
subjectivised object in some form or other is an incurable symptom, and that Marx and Freud are better treated as 
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6 For a further discussion of this intriguing topic, Mitchell points us to Theodore Ziolkowski's Diren hanted Luaser: A 
Llterarylconology (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977). 
7 Some of Mitchell's remarks on women here are highly problematic. I lowever, to maintain focus, I have chosen not 
to engage with a discussion of these problems at this time. 
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(1974) The Children of Calihan: Miscegenation (London, Seeker & Warburg), I iyam, Ronald (1990) Unpin and Seaiiality: 
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volumes, also prefixed Six and Race, Gist, N. P & Dworkin, A. G (eds) (1972) The Blending of Races: Marginality and 
Identity in World Perspective (NY, John Wiley & Sons). 
9 On this subject, also see Homi Bhabha, (1994) 'The Other Question: Stereotype, Discrimination and the Discourse 
of Colonialism' in The Location of Culture (New York, Routledge). 
lo For a discussion of the analogy between the painted surface and the skin of Woman, see Rosemary Betterton's 
1996 book, An Intimate Distance: Women, Artists and the Body_(London: Routledge). Also see Christine Battersby's 1989 
book, Gender and Genius: Towards a FeministAesthetics (I. ondon: Women's Press) 
11 The slash should be understood as a caesura, a beat, a period of silence. This is Caroline A. Jones' notation, she 
uses the slash for ease and speed, rather than reprinting the complex columns that Cage used in his text to denote the 
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12 In the satirical novel by Heinrich Boell, Dr. Murke'' Collected Silence, something analogous takes place. The 
protagonist has a job at a radio station, and, fed up of listening to human chatter all day, begins to collect all the silent 
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relief. 
13 From an interview with Stephen Poole in the Guardian newspaper, Saturday November 17th 2001. 
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'hypersensitive membranes' ensured that the paintings were not seen as mere backdrops, but that they reflected and 
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18 I would like to thank Jeremy Gilbert-Rolfe for relating this story to me. 
19 The imagery of shipwrecks also appears in Mallarme's poem, Un Coup de Dis Jamait n'abolira le Ilasard, which is an 
important work in terms of a different kind of blankness. I wonder if Golding, when considering the specific erased 
blankness in his novel, was thinking about this connection. 
20 It is generally acknowledged that Freud's Mystic ll%'riting Pad is a good analogy for short-term memory, but a poor 
one for long-term memory. For further discussions of this in terms of the theories of I Iypertext - which seem to 
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Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press. 
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Art and Language/New York, Charlesworth founded and edited The Fox, a radical magazine of art theory. 
Unfortunately it only lasted for three issues, but it was the place that Charlesworth's well-known article, A Declaration 
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22 Art historian and critic Yve-Alain Bois studied under Barthes and Hubert Damisch at the Ecole des I lautes Etudes 
en Sciences Sociales, and now is Professor of the I listory of Art at Johns I Iopkins University. Perhaps best known 
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backgrounds of Charlesworth's in Lacanian terms, referencing the Mirror Stage, Linkler decides that this is an 
incorrect reading, as Charlesworth herself claims only a scant knowledge of Lacanian theory. I lowever, my thinking 
is that overt attention to the intentions or desires of the artist can lead to an impoverished reading. Such attention 
would, for instance, invalidate Gilbert-Rolfe's article Where Do Pictures Come From?, in which he writes, 'I believe it 
may be usefully provocative to think of these works in terms of, first, the Lacanian possibility that the Oedipal is a 
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gradual dissolution of previously indissoluble sign. Fragmentation or disintegration of the object in painting is 
evidence of death drive activity, of splitting, just as much as a void would be. In fact, if Impressionism is seen as the 
beginning of the disintegration of the object, then perhaps it can also be read as the start of a backwards motion, a 
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25 Freud did not actually use the word 'Thanatos' in his writings, although according to Ernest Jones, he would 
occasionally use it in his conversation (see Volume III of Jones' Sigmund . 
Fand, p. 295). Use of the term 'Thanatos', as 
analogous to Freud's references to the life-instinct as 'Eros', could be seen as an example of anthropomorphising 
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26 Interestingly in terms of the Kristevan notion of a choric space, she tells that the god Pluto was an, 'alchemist, 
who died celibate, whose deformity caused the goddesses to flee (hence he is bereft), and who figured the earth at the 
bottom of a cauldron where all alchemical processes have their source. ' (1984: 146-147) The word chora is not used 
here, but the association of a vessel in which the earth is fashioned by a god cannot, I think, go unnoticed. Pluto's 
celibacy, bereft-ness, melancholy, deformity and creative potential could also suggest that he has some qualities of the 
'death-bearing mother'. (Again, Kristeva does not write about this). Kristeva also distinguishes between 
'melancholia', which is a generic term, and 'depression', which is more specific and symptomatic (1984: 9-10) 
27 Moarneng and Melanchola, though published in 1917, was written in 1915 along with the other metapsychological 
papers. At this time Freud is using the term 'ego-ideal' to refer to the self punitive internal agent, which would later 
be named the 'super-ego'. 
28 Making clear the separation of Bellerophon from the gods, Kristeva reminds us that, 'there is nothing more dismal 
than a dead god. ' (8). 
29 Freud documents examples of the dreams of depressives, concluding that 'melancholy cannibalism' is a common 
feature in such dreams. The motif of melancholy cannibalism acts for the depressed subject as a repudiation of the 
reality of loss, and of death. See Mourning and Melancholia (1917 SE xiv: 237-258), On Transience (1917, SE xiv: 305-7), 
and more generally, On Narcissism (1914, SE xiv) 
30 Carl Andre proved that it is possible to 'cut' space. David Bourdon writes, Later, he (Carl Andre) realised he was 
doing the Endless Column in negative with a cutout beam. 'Up to a certain time I was cutting into things. Then I 
realised that the thing I was cutting was the cut. Rather than cut into the material, I now use the material as the cut in 
space. ' To expedite the cut in space, he began to stack readymade materials - aluminium channel, glass prisms, and 
honing stones - to form simple geometric shapes like cubes and pyramids [... ] Each pyramid was self-sufficient, 
but 
like the Endless Column, all could have been stacked base-to-base to infinity. ' (Bourdon in Battcock (cd) 1969: 104) 
Interestingly, in this same essay can be found Andre's explicitly Phallic (or genital) remarks about his work, which are 
often quoted elsewhere :' "All I'm doing, " says Andre, "is putting Brancusi's Endless Column on the ground instead of 
in the sky. Most sculpture is priapic with the male organ in the air. In my work, Priapus is down on the floor". 
Rhetoric aside, he denies emphatically that his work has even implicit sexual connotations, coursing through the 
doorway like a 34-and-a-half-foot erection. ' (Bourdon in Battcock [ed] 1968: 104) 
31 Any abjection in Judd's work has more to do with his reading of the death-throes of painting and sculpture, and 
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fifteen minutes afterward, people thought it was the best art they had ever seen in their lives'. 
(www. evanswallgallery. com/galarjun24ed. html) 
33 Fontana's activity of cutting and enlarging an aperture, and the residual aural connection to 'slasher' murders such 
as Jack the Ripper, who famously targeted prostitutes as his victims, is reminiscent of a violently misogynistic 
character in the Anais Nin's story Mathilde. The last paragraph describes, 'the man who had so often slashed at the 
sexual openings of whores, and who for this reason had never touched his mistress there. i It had been safe only 
when he lived with her, when the provocativeness of her breasts kept his attention diverted from the sex, the morbid 
attraction to what he called'woman's little wound', which he was so violently tempted to enlarge'. (Nin, A. 1978 
Della of Venus London, Penguin Books). 
34 Sarah Whitfield tantalisingly points out that the 'friend' of Fontana's who gave her this description wishes to 
remain anonymous. (51n. 65) 
35 In the Independent newspaper, 19, h July 1988. 
36 Jeremy Gilbert-Rolfe does not believe in the notion of a blank form: "there are no such things as blank forms, 
while there clearly is such a thing as a blank surface. A smooth surface can be blank, but a smooth form is still a 
shape, with a figural relationship to an at least implicit field and all that that implies. Blankness itself eludes the 
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tactile; Descartes' blind subject is always touching something or failing to find anything to touch. ' (Gilbert-Rolfe 
1997: 167) I don't agree with the above: it all depends if you hold preconceptions about 'pictures', and whether you 
are of the position that a painting - especially a monochrome - is an 'object'. Greenberg famously believed that as 
long as it was 'stretched or tacked up', a blank canvas already existed as a painting. The Support-Surface group put 
'blank' untouched canvases on gallery floors. I think you can have blank forms, though it seems tome that Gilbert- 
Rolfe is thinking about the fact that forms are not usually inscribed, whereas we expect the painted surface to be. 
" Jones describes this very process taking place when Cage holds up his work as a mirror to the body-part-obsessed 
Abstract Expressionists: 'Cage, invited by Motherwell in 1949 to speak to the prestigious Artists Club, meeting in the 
space of the former Subjects of the Artists school, chose to give a 'Lecture on Nothing. Among the listeners were 
aging dadaists such as Richard Huelsenbeck, who would not have blinked at Cage's nihilistic agenda, but the 
dominant abstract expressionists in the group may have recognised themselves as the bull's-eye in Cage's target. To 
that audience, obsessed with subjects, Cage offered subjectlessness; to men captivated like Narcissus with their own 
bodies' parts, a bodiless philosophy; to the protectively arrogant leaders of the New York school, an exercise in Zen 
discipline and discipleship. ' (Jones 1993: 643) 
38 As Briony Fer writes, 'exhaustion is already heavily implicated in those objects, not as an inherent property of their 
geometric form, but as the spectator's experience of the object, and the kind of subjectivity it presupposes. ' (Fer 
1997: 133) 
39 Caillois uses as his analogy the manifestations of mimicry in nature. Ile considers mimicry an 'excess' in nature, as 
it does not have immediate survival value. 
40 In Hen I Stand. Perspective from Another Point of View, (1994) Norris Kelly Smith makes the point that for the 
Renaissance painter, perspective was a political tool which positioned both himself and the spectators of his work in a 
quite specific relationship to the authority of the Church, State or Patron. 
41 The 'often-changing' group included the following artists: Olivier Mosset, Stephen Rosenthal, Jerry Zeniuk, Marcia 
Hafif, Doug Sanderson, Joe Marion, Phil Sims, Frederic Thursz, Raimund Girke, Carmen Gloria Morales, Robert 
Ryman, Susanna Tangen, Anders Knutsson, Dale Henry, Merrill Wagner, Howard Smith. Some of their shows - for 
example the June 1979 show at Julian Pretto's Franklin Street space - were private, and for the purpose of group 
discussion. 
42 Klein's work on Kjar is found in her 1929 paper, InfantifeAwdety Situations in a Work ofArt and in the Creative Impulse, 
where she suggests that these remembered anxiety-situations from childhood are actually rehearsed in the creation of 
a work of art. Klein's information is from a rather idealised and sensationalist newspaper account of the 'miraculous' 
genesis out of 'nothing' of Kjar's paintings, written by Kjar's journalist friend, Karen Michaelis. Neither Klein nor 
Lacan had seen Kjar's paintings, but Kjar's relatives confirm that the 'naked negress' that Kjar apparently painted 
from her imagination was, in fact, a representation of Josephine Baker. If the account of Kjar's sudden brilliance and 
cure seems suspect, it is because some of the details of the story were changed, presumably for the purposes of 
journalistic license. Kjar was, in fact, a tutored painter, having received lessons from her brother-in-law. She also did 
not paint directly on to the wall as the account suggests, but on to a prepared canvas. 
43 In a personal e-mail from David Batchelor dated 26th February 2002, he wrote, 'In some respects I regard it 
(monochrome) as a comic genre. Comic in the Bakhtinian or Baudelairian sense. There it is, the crowning glory of 
high abstraction, and at the same time it is as dumb as you can get. ' 
44 In thinking about space, Foucault (like Klein) was inspired by Gaston Bachelard, who in his Poetics of Space wrote of 
the profound importance of space as our 'element', the thing that humans live within. Bachelard also added that 
space is the one thing that cannot ever be seen. Space is the one great, omnipresent, all-pervasive, profoundly 
invisible thing in the world; yet space also has a limited power on its own. 
45 (NB: internal quotes from: Zizek 1991: 38) 
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Chapter Five: 
CONCLUSION? 
`[... ] the map [... ] is ultimately devoted to an internal logic of impossible 
completion. ' (Cubitt 1998: 55) 
Figure 47: Lewis Carroll, Ocean Chart from The Hunting of the Snark. 1872. Illustration by I lenry 
Holiday. 
If we think about Cubitt's quote (above) with relation to the blank space of Lewis Carroll's 
famous map of the sea [Figure 47] it is possible to draw some interesting conclusions about the 
blank space of monochrome in visual culture. As the legitimised or sanctioned vehicle for blank 
visual space, monochrome seems to have more in common with the notion of the map (especially 
a map like Carroll's that mimics the structure suggested by Cubitt) than with the notion of the 
picture surface. A picture surface has, factored into it, the expectation of prior completion. 
Cubitt points out that the map does not, since both cartographer and map-user know that they 
must expect changes in landscape and topography which will render those maps useful only for a 
time. Structured into the map is a time-limit on any single `fixed' meaning or Phallic 
interpretation. Structured into this same map is also, importantly, an absence of limit on new and 
different interpretations. The map, like the monochrome, holds meaning open. Lewis Carroll's 
map of the sea in the illustration works as a monochrome in some ways; initially these 
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commonalities might appear superficial. First, an area of blank space is demarcated and 
presented. 
Figure 48: Eva Hesse, Untitled 1969. Gouache, watercolour and pencil on paper. 55.5 x 43.8cm. Collection of 
Sondra and Charles Gilman Jr. 
This is the structure of monochrome canvases such as Eva Hesse's untitled drawing of 1969 
[Figure 481. Hesse is involved in the presentation of at least two kinds of blank space. The page 
or canvas was blank already, but rather than simply frame or hang the canvas in its raw state, she 
creates another layer of blank space on top of, or coexistent with the existing blank. liesse makes 
a blank space on her virgin sheet of paper, whereas an artist like Klein covers with a considered and 
created blankness a canvas which was, again, originally blank. Carroll does the same with his map - 
the original, clear sheet of white paper, as simultaneously horrifying and full of potential as 
Mallarme's vide, gathers complexity as a fresh blank rectangle is made within the existing blank 
page. 
The addition of text in the map could be read as alluding to specific, ludic function of text in 
Allais' fictive satirical monochromes (Chapter One). The long and convoluted titles of his 
paintings, such as Harvest of Tomatoes on the Shores of the Red Sea by Apopleptic Cardinals: Effect of the 
Aurora Borealis (1884), first of all make an unnecessary reaffirmation of the joke monochrome's 
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colour. Secondly, within the context of an already-established game, the titles play dirty by 
warping the accepted `rules' of the game and making a fool of the Phallic spectator. He is enticed 
into peering into the surface, just to ensure that those ripe tomatoes and florid cardinals aren't 
really, somehow, there. In a similar way, the text on Carroll's ocean chart points his reader to 
something that is only there in the reader's imagination; the spectator makes the work in the same 
way as Christian Metz's cinema-going subject makes the film, and Barthes' reader makes the text; 
`[... ) a text is made of multiple writings, drawn from many cultures and 
entering into mutual relations of dialogue, parody, contestation; but there is 
one place where this multiplicity is focused and that place is the reader. ' 
(Barthes 1977: 148) 
I think, however, that this is where the similarity ends. Rather than performing the joke or trick 
function of defeating the Phallic viewer by appealing to his vanity, the text in Carroll's ocean chart 
performs the function of figurative drawing. it makes sense, rather than nonsense, of the blank 
space. The trick of monochrome appears to be, then, a multilayered, mercurial and ultimately 
elusive one, and one which the figure of the Mixed Race body can help unravel. As long as the 
Mixed Race body is read by Phallic racialised society as a blank space that requires `reading', 
deciding or explaining, it will perpetually confound that society, refusing to make `sense'. If 
Phallic society could shift its focus and perceive psychic as well as optical space, it would realise 
that the Mixed Race subject contains a logic of indeterminacy and radical incompleteness, and 
that these can be positive and creative things. Neither monochrome nor the racially 
indeterminate body should have to submit to external definitions that relate only to the spaces 
around them. There are multiple spaces within them that are mobile and potentially threatening 
to a system that wishes to maintain its dominance by insisting on fixity and stasis. 
Darian Leader shows how Freud's theories of the joke Work, and later Lacan's theories about 
jokes, enable commentary on the established codes of language that the joke relies on for its 
transmission, because; 
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`To speak, we have to use codes that are imposed on us by our care-givers and 
their language. In this process, part of what we `mean' to say is always lost, and 
jokes involve a privileging of this dimension of meaning `in between the lines' 
that is actually sanctioned, recognised, by the code itself. The code scrambles 
our messages, but at the same time gives a place to this scrambling in the form 
of jokes. A joke, in this sense, is a message about the code. ' (Leader 2002: 84- 
85) 
Neither the joke nor the blank space of monochrome, then, can be understandable outside of the 
system each inhabits. However, whilst paradoxically relying on the system of Art History for its 
very appearance, monochrome continues to confound and make a fool of that same system and 
its subjects, retaining some power'. The situation for the subject of Mixed Race is slightly 
different; she still finds herself (perpetually, wearyingly) `made sense of in terms of those people 
who surround her. The extreme resistance to Mixed Race self-naming (see Chapter Three) might 
have something to do with an unconscious begrudging of the possible positivity, creativity and 
jouissance that the Mixed subject might find herself in were she to be `allowed' to self-name. 
Perhaps the creativity and mutability of her potential identities is a frightening prospect for a 
Phallic monoracialist thinker who wishes everything to be neat and decided. So monochrome, as 
a blank space within a code of legible pictorial spaces, performs the function of messenger to the 
code, about the code. One of the first tricks that monochrome as messenger plays, is that the 
letter it is charged to deliver always manages to reach the system - monochrome is now accepted, 
read and written about as though its status as `art' were unproblematic - but could it be playing a 
trick? Monochrome is ironically named as a single entity and presents as a unified surface. 
However, deploying the notion of a psychic surface, we may discern that this veneer is a trick - 
monochrome is neither unitary not fixed. Monochrome in its various appearances and guises is 
engaged in perpetually jamming open pictorial codes, eternally deferring meaning, and 
confounding and rendering impotent the Phallic reader. Monochrome does this by being 
indeterminate; it is neither one thing nor another thing but a multitude of things, and therefore 
blasts through the western metaphysical system of binary categories. In this sense, monochrome 
is again analogous to the body of the subject of Mixed Race in White western society. Such a 
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subject presents the White society with a sight whose meaning that society understands, but 
prefers not to `see' - firstly, that of the horror of miscegenation. Secondly, and paradoxically, the 
Mixed Race subject gives the He to the White Phallus' illusion of its own purity and mastery. The 
Phallic act of classifying someone of Mixed Race as `Black' is a way in which White society can 
ignore that subject's [in]visible Whiteness, and therefore literally not see the uncomfortable fact of 
a Black-White sexual union that is staring them in the face. By her existence and continued 
reappearance, the Mixed Race subject performs a political function of challenging prejudicial and 
rigid structures and opinions, leaping across and in between these structures, and showing the 
Phallus that its notions of `race' are illusions done with mirrors. Like the optical surface of 
monochrome, the Mixed Race subject's blankness is in this way, `analogous to silence (the 
background to stories)' (Gilbert Rolfe 1997: 160). As more and more Mixed Race people begin to 
vocalise their own stories, perhaps racialised society will begin to see that Mixed Race subjectivity 
is more than a `background', something that doesn't quite fit that must be explained away. 
Following on from Cubitt's analogy of the map, it might be useful to consider Minelle Malitat-A's 
new spatial metaphor of `mobile paradoxical spaces' (Niahtani in Parker & Song 2001: 173). 
Influenced by feminist geographers such as Gillian Rose who explore the notion that, `all social 
relations are spatial, and take place within particular physical contexts', (Mahtani in Parker & Song 
2001: 174), Mahtani deploys her idea of a `mobile paradoxical space' with reference to several 
multiethnic women (Nahtani chooses not to use the term `Mixed Race) in Toronto, Canada, 
whom she interviewed for her study. The `mobile paradoxical space' idea arises out of Gillian 
Rose's notion of the 'paradoxical space', which Rose uses to question the masculinism that has 
structured much geographic epistemology. Put simply, the `paradoxical space' is Rose's imagining 
of a space beyond the territorial masculinist logic that confines the `spaces' of women2. Mahtani's 
`mobile paradoxical space' is a version of Rose's feminist space which allows for the multiethnic 
woman to shift, change and slip in and out of identities as she pleases, regardless of the Phallic 
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system she may live in which demands that she submit to its arbitrary classifications. In a `mobile 
paradoxical space' it is possible to cut across `traditional social cleavages' (2001: 185) in a continual 
refashioning of identity. If we consider the notion of Psychic Space as mobile also, this allows for 
an investigation that goes beyond the distractions of the optical surface. 
The paradoxical kind of power peculiar to monochrome as the blank space of western Art 
History and the Mixed Race subject as the blank space of the racialised west, is the power to 
remain indecipherable. This may have to do with the psychic surface jouissance which, by its very 
nature, renders any specific reading of the optical surface impossible, `the self-centred solipsism 
ofjouissance denies the communicability of material perceptions. ' (Cubitt 1998: 38) I think, 
however, that the paradoxical power of both the Critically Indeterminate monochrome and the 
Mixed Race subject also comes from the performance of specular trickery that is at least fourfold. 
First of all the failings of the system's codes are reflected back at the system itself, forcing the 
system to examine itself. Both monochrome and the racially indeterminate person achieve this by 
being indeterminate, undecidable, evoking a need in the Phallic viewer to decide that it is one 
thing when really it is so many things (or so few) that a single, `fixed' knowledge of its surface is 
an impossibility. This is what Ad Reinhardt meant when he stated that his black monochrome 
paintings were the last paintings that could not be misunderstood. Reinhardt's philosophy that 
what was not there should be considered far more important than what was, meant that his black 
paintings simultaneously contained nothing that could be misunderstood, or understood. In other 
words, they were never intended for interpretation. 
Interpretation is the function of the spectator who shares or obeys the codes of a system that is 
both Phallic and White, and as Kristeva points out, `Ever since Freud [... ] interpretation 
necessarily represents appropriation, and thus an act of desire and murder. ' (Kristeva in Smith & 
Kerrigan 1987: 33)' When anyone performs an interpretation, they (consciously or otherwise) 
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mark it with the stamp of their authority as a decider of meanings. Monochrome has the last 
laugh; as eternally-deferred insoluble, it tricks the Phallic system (and all its ambassadors) into 
thinking they can solve it, or write it into submission. Here, monochrome's second specular 
function is that of the mirror that tells lies to appease the vanity of the subject who consults its 
surface. It will show the Phallic critic or spectator to himself as the fairest (or most 
knowledgeable) of them all, assuring them that if nobody before them has managed to pin down 
monochrome's meaning, surely they can. For the subject of Mixed Race, the same can be 
observed in silently appearing to `accept' the definition of the Phallic other who wishes to `decide' 
you, whilst inside maintaining your right not to be `read' in ways that only suit those outside of 
yourself. 
The third specular function or trick is that of a notional, highly effective series of strategically- 
positioned mirrors, a little like those used in Velasquez's Las Meninas as discussed in Chapter Two. 
Monochrome surfaces throughout art history here act all together, conceptually, like mirrors that 
reflect the various interpretations of monochrome forwards and back, forwards and back, 
perpetually; ensuring that no single meaning ever stays long enough to stick. In this sense, 
monochrome is an illusion done with mirrors that also performs an illusion, again done with 
mirrors. The Mixed Race subject does the same with all the various components of her `racial', 
cultural and ethnic identities. In a continual dance of reflection, both in the mobile psychic space 
and in the visible optical space (in terms of dress, hair styling, etc); the deciding system can be 
confounded and fall into the trap of exhibiting the folly of its rigid categories. Fourth, but by no 
means finally, monochrome makes a mockery of the Phallic system by containing (in)visible 
Phallic elements, but remaining outside of that system. In this way it can be likened to the Mixed 
Race subject who, remaining outside of Whiteness, nevertheless contains elements of that 
Whiteness. 
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David Batchelor's monochrome aesthetic can be read as mimicking the eternal deferral of 
signification that I propose blankness performs in both monochrome and the Mixed Race body. 
His 1999 series, Found Monochromes of London [Figure 49-501 illustrates the principle that, `[t]he 
world is full of unintended, sometimes accidental, often temporary, and mostly unnoticed 
monochromes. ' (Batchelor 2000: 151). Combining elements of the Situationist notion of the derive, 
Figure 49: David Batchelor, Found Monochromes of London 2000. Photograph courtesy of the Anthony Wilkinson 
Gallery. 
Figure 50: David Batchelor, Found Monochmmes of London 2000. Photograph Courtesy of the Anthony Wilkinson 
Gallery. 
Batchelor wandered around London during 1999 allowing chance to be his inspiration, taking 
photographs of unexpected, unintentional monochromes. These might take the form of a 
billboard temporarily emptied of its poster, or a framed sign, whose lettering had been gradually 
erased by the elements or of a simple blank sheet of white A4 paper sellotaped on to a car 
window. The fact that monochromes are understood to be `everywhere' invokes Malevich's 
original wish that people would graffiti the whole of Russia with black squares in sympathy. 
Perhaps the continued reappearance of unintentional `monochromes' in everyday life has 
something to do with an unconscious wish to hold meaning open, perhaps Batchelor's 
monochromes could be read as symbols of the areas in everyday life where meaning, however 
hard we try, continues to resist. Batchelor's use of photography as the medium for the display of 
these monochromes can be read as a reference to the traditions of thinking about monochrome 
as something that had the look of non-art, or that did not deserve the status of an art object. This 
of course happened in early debates about photography and about everyday found objects in the 
gallery space, and also about monochrome. 
I think that the most important reading of ßatchelor's Foond Monochromes of London, however, is 
the reading that considers the photographs as illustrations of the perpetual instability of meaning 
that monochrome symbolises. Batchelor has no idea where he will find his next monochrome, and 
monochrome is thus implicitly illustrated as something that might pop up at any time, in any 
place; something with agency. Perhaps more symbolic of monochrome's logic of perpetual 
incompletion are Batchelor's Monochromobiles [Figure 51]. These different-sized monochromes on 
wheels are full of impudent promise. Who knows when one might zoom off, in what direction 
and to what ends? Try to force something on wheels into any kind of fixed position, and it will 
simply roll away. These witty monochrome vehicles are truly `mobile paradoxical spaces', and 
seem to provide a perfect embodied analogy to my proposition: if meaning cannot be fixed, then 
why attempt to fix location? 
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Figure 51: David Batchelor, I Love Kings Cross and Kings Cmss Loves Me 2 1999. Found objects, acrylic sheet and 
enamel paint. 650 x 235 x 23cm. Photograph courtesy of the Anthony Wilkinson Gallery. 
So: monochrome's illegible surface represents the Phallic subject's unavoidable castration in 
vision and knowledge, which the ego forecloses because it is both horrific and confounding. 
Anything the ego finds unassimilable can be guaranteed to return. If we understand 
monochrome as the return of the repressed, there is a case for the repressed as the Phallic 
subject's castration in vision. As an undecideable, though, monochrome will be bursting with 
what a Phallic system would understand as contradictions. So, as well as presenting visual 
castration (which would seem to be a definite function), monochrome is also incompatible with 
expected western binarist readings. In this way it introduces chaos and instability into Art and its 
History; critics and theorists cannot easily dominate monochrome. It is a wild card, an active 
unconscious whose function parallels the body of the Mixed Race subject in White western 
society. Monochrome is, in this reading, a subaltern space that cannot be deciphered in the 
contexts of the Phallocentric discourse of Art History. 
Parvicen Adams and Mark Cousins mention the necessity that some kind of understanding must 
take place before communication itself can: 
`The space of communication and argument between different domains is a 
space of representation, the space in which one domain is represented, 
translated, for another. The `freedom' or `tyranny' of a society is in part to be 
measured by the capacity to tolerate or crush the difference between domains. ' 
(Adams & Cousins in Adams 1996: 57) 
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Monochrome presents differentiation (that of the inherent splitness of an undecideable, the split 
in the subject), but it does so in a veiled and tricky manner. Communication has to morph itself 
continually to the mutable demands of that constantly-moving multiple, monochrome; and so the 
undecidability in monochrome is a fundamentally creative act. It could certainly, I think, be said 
that monochrome's creative functions exceed its identity as a problem or inconsistency. 
Monochrome, simply by being what it is, asks questions to the system about its own established 
assumptions, at the same time as the system tries to force it to conform. Monochrome 
laughingly presents us with the fact that attempts to find a `source', or `origin' are pointless tasks; 
pointless because of their impeccable collusion with the Logos. Playing by the Logos' rules 
reduces the possibilities of meaning, whilst monochrome's (ill)logic of trickery and radical 
incompleteness does nothing but increase them. The character of `Miss Mattie' in Jamaican poet 
Louise Bennett's 1966 poem, Back to Africa, fervently wishes for a `source', but in doing so she 
denies her identity as an undecidable, 111ixed Race subject, or `multiple'. Ina total of nine stanzas 
that detail all Mattie's Jamaican heritage from African through French, Jewish, English and so on, 
Mattie's friend attempts to explain the folly of wishing for a single, in this case African source, 
just because one has Black features. (Please note that the italicised verses are my renderings of 
Bennett's poem into colloquial English, for those unfamiliar with Jamaican Patois). 
`Back to Africa, Miss Mattie? 
You no know wha you dah seh? 
You haf fe come from somewhe fas 
Before you go back deh! 
Back to Africa, Miss Mattief 
Doyou realise whatyorr've just said? 
You have to come from somewhere first 
Beforeyou caugo 'back'tl)ere! 
Me know say dat you great great great 
Granma was African, 
But Mattie, doan you great great great 
Granpa was Englishman? 
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I knowyou saidyour Great Great Great 
Grandma was African, 
But Mattie, wasn'tyourgreatgreatgreat 
Grandpa an Engksbman? 
What a debil of a bump-an-bore, 
Rig-jig an palarn-pam 
Ef de whole worl start fe go back 
Whe dem great granpa come from! 
There'd be one bell of a palaver, 
If everyone in the whole world started to go back 
To the place their great grandfather was born! 
(Bennett in Burnett [ed] 1986: 31-2) 
The fear of meaninglessness runs very deep, and is deeply frightening. It is important to 
remember, however, that multiplicity is only coded as meaningless or problematic if it is 
considered from the Phallic standpoint of a `One' which requires the subservience of the Two' or 
the `Multiple' to keep its own `Oneness' intact. As surely as the notion of oppositionality keeps 
binary structures in place, so an alternative slippery structure, coexisting within the binary, will 
destabilise it. This destabilising potential is the true transgressive power for any hidden 
indeterminate space within a specific discourse of authority like that of Phallic Whiteness. Spaces 
of indeterminacy pose new questions about the validity of the structure that has previously done 
all the naming; such spaces will begin to allow a rethinking of all notions of categorisation, their 
existence will question who is doing the categorising, and to what ends. The notion of colours 
having an adversarial or oppositional relationship to one another is a nonsense that only a 
disingenuous White Phallus would try to set up and maintain. As psychoanalyst Michael Vannoy 
Adams writes, 
`Differences simply contrast. White and black are not opposites in any 
ontological sense. It is we who oppose them, we who unimaginatively 
perpetrate the white-black opposition. ' (Vannoy Adams 1996: 27) 
Monochrome, like any other multiple - here, the subject of Mixed Race - suggests that the reader 
change focus. Instead of adhering to a system which gives the reader the choice of either reading 
or misreading, the multiple thing introduces the new possibility of continued, creative readings. 
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Presenting nothing in its surface, one would think that monochrome would make the spectator 
wonder whether they might see something if they simply shifted their focus. Such a shift of focus 
does not always occur, and, I suggest, it is the determination not to shift focus which is 
responsible for much of the `Phallic writing' about monochrome, the writing that always seems so 
sure of its closed and final reading. The same refusal to shift focus is the source of automatic 
`classification' of Mixed Race people without consideration of their own conception of self- 
identity. But possibly monochrome also asks of its spectator that the shift in perspective they 
undergo will make them more like the monochrome itself - in other words, that the spectator 
acknowledge his own indeterminacy. Monochrome and the Mixed Race subject can speak with 
many tongues, existing in a condition of Bakhtinian heteroglossia - and perhaps can lightheartedly 
make spectators acknowledge the complexity of their own subjectivity, questioning any certainty 
about identities or positions. There is a mutual relation between unstable object and unstable 
subject, and perhaps this is something that, through monochrome and the Mixed Race subject, 
can be acknowledged and explored. After all, 
`The possibility of reading is premised on the reciprocal incompleteness and 
instability of the reader. The act of reading is a mutual surrender of text and 
reader to the tentative becoming of the book. ' (Cubitt 1998: 7) 
Perhaps it can also be said that the `racially' indeterminate subject of Mixed Race exhibits, to all 
`races', a disturbing reality which they do not want to see - that of the split nature of every 
subject. Homi Bhabha, talking about possibility of any culture existing without melancholia, 
rethinks Benedict Anderson's influential account of the nation as `imagined community' in ways 
that acknowledge a similar splitness or indeterminacy. Using Derridean and post-Lacanian- 
derived terms, he develops an alternative, performative view of the communality of `the people' as 
an enunciation. This enunciation does not so much produce an imaginary identity as a 
positionality that is always split, and thus uncanny. Drawing on Fanon, Bhabha specifically 
suggests the skin of the colonised, the outside of the body, as a site for rebellion: 
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'Ih(e) inversion of meaning and address in the melancholic discourse, when it 
`incorporates' the loss or lack in its own body - displaying its own weeping 
wounds - is also an act of `disincorporating' the authority of the Master. 
Fanon again says something similar when he suggests that the native wears his 
psychic wounds on the surface of his skin like an open sore - an eyesore to the 
coloniser'. (Bhabha in Donald [ed] 1991: 102) 
The current dread in Britain that by 2020 everyone is going to end up brown, like the 
indeterminate colour that results from mixing up all the paints you can get your hands on, is 
another Phallogocentric myth. It is only actually frightening to someone who has a stake in the 
Phallogocentric world view that indeterminacy equals deviancy. Illegibility can be a simple yet 
potentially powerful refusal of Phallogocentricity. 
1 Many jokes do this. I remember being told of an acquaintance's trip to Ireland, where he and his fellow English 
tourists (who were all very obviously identifiable as English as they were wearing their Morris dancing kit) went into 
an Irish pub. The acquaintance immediately drew attention to himself by asking in a loud voice, `Why are Irish jokes 
so stupid? ' Understandably, the villagers in the pub bristled at this and all pricked up their cars, preparing to take 
some action if these turned out to be English troublemakers. I lowever, the folk humourist continued, 'So the 
English can understand theml' and everyone laughed. I imagine that the laughter was not because they found the 
joke funny (I think this joke could quite reasonably be described as pathetic), but rather because an increase in 
tension had been created, based on the historical codes and structures of Anglo-Irish relations, and then, thankfully, 
dissipated. I think that the laughter was that of relief. Even so, the Englishman telling the joke was able to come out 
on top - he had fooled his audience into thinking he was about to say one thing, then actually said quite another, so 
they were symbolically caught in the bind of Anglo-Irish history to which he referred. I le had made them laugh, and 
thus, as far as he was concerned, he had the last laugh, which is the laugh of power (although I am sure he was 
suitably downgraded in the conversation that followed his departure). 
2 See Rose, Gillian (1993) Feminism and Geograpiy Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. 
3I am interested that Smith and Kerrigan's anthology is entitled, In/erpre/ing Laean, and wonder whether they 
considered that they might be performing an act of 'desire and murder' on the original Lacanian text? 
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